Category Archives: Skagit County Criminal Defense

New Washington Driver’s-License Exam Tackles Pot & Cellphone Risks

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Department of Licensing, Distracted Driving, Drug Offenses, DUI, marijuana, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Reckless Driving, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Studies, Technology, Text Messages, Traffic Infractions, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

A recent news article by reporter E.J. Smith III of the Seattle Times reports that today’s driver’s license exams require not only a more thorough understanding of longstanding traffic laws but also an understanding of the risks associated with smartphones and the legalization of pot.

“We wanted to add more information about impaired driving beyond the information about driving while intoxicated,” said Department of Licensing spokesman Brad Benfield. “With all the growth of cellphone use … we wanted to make sure that type of information was highlighted in the driver’s guide and test.”

E.J. Smith III reports these driving issues are timely and should be addressed. For example, he quotes a recent study by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety concluded that teen drivers spend nearly a quarter of their driving time distracted. Additionally, one in six drivers involved in fatal crashes in Washington in 2014 had recently used marijuana, which is the most recent data available. Finally, according to the NSC preliminary estimates, 567 people died in motor-vehicle crashes in Washington last year, a 21 percent increase over 2014. Nationally, the increase was 8 percent.

“The old test didn’t have any questions on distractions,” said Nur Hassan, who has run MLK Simple Driving School in Seattle for three years. “Driving is very serious business, so people should not try to take it lightly or try to put in other distractions.”

My opinion? Kudos to the Department of Licensing for addressing issues of distracted driving and marijuana use. This is an excellent step in the right direction. Today’s teen driver’s need to know the risks of their driving behavior.

I practice a wide range of criminal defense, everything from low-level misdemeanors to Federal charges. I’m honored to represent them through difficult times. I’ve assisted clients who are minors charged with various forms of DUI (drugs as well as alcohol). Many didn’t know the slightest amount of alcohol or drugs in their system can lead to DUI charges. Others didn’t know the repercussions of their actions.

I’m a firm believer that education is the key to prevention. That said, if you’re interested in more information on these issues then please review my Drug DUI practice area and my Legal Guide titled Drug DUI’s in Washington: The Issues & Recent Case Law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Gift Cards Are “Access Devices”

Access Devices, Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Knapstad Motion, Property Crimes, Retail Theft, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Nelson, the WA Court of Appeals Division II reversed the dismissal of the defendant’s case and decided a gift card is, in fact, an access device.

Defendant Angel Rose Marie Nelson was a Kmart employee. A surveillance video showed that Nelson left her cash register three times to retrieve an empty gift card, then activated each card by adding funds to it without adding cash to the cash register.

She activated an Amazon.com gift card for $100, a MasterCard gift card for roughly $205, and a JoAnn’s Fabric & Craft Store gift card for $25. She later used at least two of these cards.

The State charged Nelson with one count of second degree theft of an access device and one count of second degree possession of a stolen access device. Nelson moved to dismiss the charges under CrR 8.3(c) and Knapstad motion. She argued that the term “access device” could not include gift cards. The superior court granted Nelson’s motion, ruling that, as a matter of law, a gift card is not an access device. The State appealed.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Nelson’s case.

First, the Court reasoned that, under MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, gift cards can access an account because the plain meaning of the word “account” is broad enough to cover a gift card’s balance:

“Under this definition, a gift card can access an account as described above. It is a card that can be used to receive goods or services of a specified value. A gift card thus shows a resulting balance. It is a device that can be used to access a record of a business relationship with outstanding credits, debits, or obligations, and a sum of money—that is, an account.”

In conclusion, the Court held that the definition of “access device” can include gift cards so long as they are a means of account access. The word “account” is not limited to a bank account because the plain language of the statute includes no such limitation. The funds to which a gift card provides access can be an account under this statute.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Jail Phone Conversations Are Admissible At Trial

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, Jail, Privacy, Robbery, Self-Incrimination, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Privacy Act, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Dere, the Court of Appeals Division I held that a telephone conversation between a jail inmate and a person outside the jail is not a private communication when the participants are advised that the call will be recorded and must confirm their understanding that they are being recorded. Also, a recording of such a conversation is admissible evidence against the noninmate as well as against the inmate.

Defendant Zakaria Dere was a co-defendant in a Robbery. Before the trial, Dere posted bail and was released from custody. Dere received several calls from Mohamed Ali, a codefendant who remained in jail. Their conversations were recorded by the jail’s telephone system.

Unfortunately for Dere, the recordings gave evidence that Dere was an accomplice in the robbery. He argued a CrR 3.5 motion to suppress., however, the trial court denied his motion. Ultimately, Dere’s statements were used against him by the State at his trial. He was found guilty of Robbery. He appealed.

WASHINGTON PRIVACY ACT

The Court of Appeals addressed Dere’s argument that the admission of the recordings violated the Washington Privacy Act under RCW 9.73. Under this statute, recordings obtained in violation of the act are inadmissible for any purpose at trial. The act also makes it unlawful to intercept or record private communications transmitted by telephone without first obtaining the consent of all participants in the communication. Dere cited State v. Modica in arguing that a communication is private when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and where that expectation is reasonable.

Despite Dere’s arguments, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Dere’s conversations with Ali were not private communications. Dere and Ali did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephone conversations because they knew their calls were recorded and subject to monitoring. “Because the calls were not private communications, the privacy act does not apply,” reasoned the Court.

WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed Dere’s claims that the recording of his calls violated his constitutionally protected privacy rights. The Court reasoned that although Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution generally protects the privacy of telephone conversations, calls from a jail inmate are not private affairs deserving of protection:

” A jail recording system . . . and its operation typically demonstrates that at least one participant in a conversation has consented to the recording. The inspection of other forms of communication with inmates, such as ingoing and outgoing mail and packages, is not an invasion of a privacy interest protected by the Washington Constitution so long as the inmate is informed of the likelihood of inspection.”

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded there was no violation of Dere’s constitutional privacy interests. The Court upheld Dere’s Robbery conviction.

My opinion? Obviously, this case shows that suppressing jail inmate conversations is difficult to impossible; especially when the automated voice informs the callers that the conversations are being recorded. I always advise my jailed clients to limit their phone conversations with friends and family members.

Speaking from experience, I’ve conducted many trials where Prosecutors use recorded jail inmate against my clients in attempts to incriminate them. Usually, the recorded conversations are suppressible on other grounds as being prejudicial, irrelevant, confusing, misleading etc. under ER 403. Still, trying to suppress incriminating statements is a terrible position to be in; especially when avoidable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Abandoned Cell Phone Searches

Abandonment Doctrine, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, felony, law enforcement, Plain View, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Technology, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Samalia, the WA Supreme Court held that although cell phone information is protected by the Constitution, the defendant abandoned this privacy interest when he voluntarily left the cell phone in a stolen vehicle while fleeing from police.

Defendant Adrian Sutlej Samalia fled on foot from a stolen vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, leaving his cell phone behind in the vehicle. After Samalia successfully escaped, the police searched the cell phone without a warrant and made contact with one of the numbers stored in the cell phone. That contact led to Samalia’s identification as the owner of the phone and driver of the stolen vehicle.

On these facts, the State charged Samalia with Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Samalia moved to suppress the cell phone evidence under CrR 3.6, arguing that the officers violated his constitutional rights when they seized and searched his cell phone with neither a warrant nor a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

The State responded that the warrantless search was valid under the abandonment doctrine. The trial court held that Samalia voluntarily abandoned any privacy interest that he had in the cell phone by leaving it in the stolen vehicle, which he also voluntarily abandoned, while fleeing from Office Yates. After denying Samalia’s suppression motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the trial court found Samalia guilty as charged in a bench trial.  Samalia appealed to Division III of the WA Court of Appeals. They upheld the trial court’s decision under the abandonment doctrine.

Ultimately, the WA Supreme Court decided the search was lawful and upheld Samalia’s conviction. It reasoned that article I, section 7 of Washington’s Constitution states that “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs … without authority of law,” and although the WA Constitution embraces the privacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution – and in some cases, may provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment – the search was nonetheless lawful under the abandonment doctrine.

ABANDONMENT DOCTRINE

The Court reasoned that the “abandonment doctrine,” a person loses normal privacy interests in their property upon abandoning it. The abandonment doctrine is not rooted in any obligation by law enforcement to find the owner of property. Basically, it allows law enforcement officers to retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned property without implicating an individual’s rights. The court reasoned that in this sense, voluntarily abandoned property is different from lost or mislaid property, in which the owner maintains a privacy interest in the property and the finder may have an obligation to seek out the owner to return the property.

Thus, when an individual flees from law enforcement and leaves a cell phone behind in a stolen vehicle, a trial court may find that the cell phone is no less abandoned than any other item that was also left in the stolen vehicle.

Here, the Court declined to find an exception to the abandonment doctrine for cell phones. Consequently, the WA Supreme Court decided the trial court properly found abandonment under these facts.

In conclusion, the WA Supreme Court affirmed Samalia’s conviction on the grounds that the information derived from the search of Samalia’s cell phone was properly admitted as evidence under the abandonment doctrine.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Yu authored the dissenting opinion, which was also signed by Justice Stephens and Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud. In short, these dissenting justices all agreed that common law doctrines like the Abandonment Doctrine cannot be applied mechanically to new technology. Second, the abandonment doctrine applies to personal property generally and not digital technology. Third, digital cell phone data remains a private affair, even if the cell phone itself has been voluntarily abandoned.

“The people of Washington are entitled to hold safe from government intrusion the unprecedented wealth of personal information accessible through a cell phone, even if the phone itself has been voluntarily abandoned. If government officials discover a cell phone and want to search its digital data for evidence of criminal activity, they may seize and secure the cell phone to preserve any evidence it may contain, but they must obtain a warrant before searching its digital data. Because the police did not obtain a warrant here, the search was unlawful and its fruits should have been suppressed. I respectfully dissent.”

My opinion?

Last year, I discussed this case when the Court of Appeals decided it in my blog post titled, State v. Samalia: Search of Abandoned Cell Phone is Lawful. Again, I disagree with the court’s majority decision in this case. The trial court should have suppressed the cell phone search back in the beginning of this case. Under these circumstances, the abandonment doctrine is simply not the proper legal vehicle to permit a cell phone search. Using this doctrine leaps too far in the wrong direction. Kudos to the dissenting judges in this case. Although the decision was not deeply divided (6-3), the dissenters got it right. Officers need to get search warrants. Period.

My general advice to the general public?

Never leave incriminating evidence on your cell phone. No pictures, videos, nothing. A lost phone could now be considered “abandoned” and searchable by authorities.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Backpack Searches When Jailed

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Evidence, felony, Inventory Searches, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Dunham, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a warrantless search of a suspect’s locked backpack pocket was a lawful inventory search where the defendant was booked into jail, a search of his person produced knives, the backpack was to be logged into the jail’s temporary storage area and the officer felt knives on the outside of the backpack.

On January 29, 2014, Sergeant Gwen Carrell of the Chehalis Police Department responded to a reported shoplifting at a local department store. Upon arrival, Sgt. Carrell met with loss prevention officers. They told Sgt. Carrell that defendant Jason Dunham had multiple knives in his backpack and that they had removed the backpack from Dunham’s reach. Sgt. Carrell placed Dunham in handcuffs for officer safety and searched him for weapons. She located two more knives on Dunham’s person, arrested Dunham for theft and booked him into jail.

Sgt. Carrell searched Dunham’s backpack for items to be logged into the jail’s temporary storage. This is called an inventory search. In short, it is every police department’s policy to inventory items to be held in its storage facility for any dangerous items. As part of this policy, knives are to be kept in secure containers, preventing them from puncturing anything.

Sgt. Carrell used Dunham’s keys to unlock the backpack pocket. She opened the pocket and observed a flashlight, a butane torch, and a glass pipe. What Sgt. Carrell thought was a knife was actually the butane torch. The residue in the glass pipe tested positive for methamphetamine. The State charged Dunham with Possession of a Controlled Substance and Theft in the Third Degree.

Dunham filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during Sgt. Carrell’s search of the locked portion of his backpack pursuant to CrR 3.6, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the inventory search was valid. Later, the trial court found him guilty on both counts at a bench trial.

Dunham appealed. He argued that the warrantless search of his backpack’s locked pocket violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. He claims that the search was not a valid inventory search.

Unfortunately for Dunham the Court of Appeals disagreed. First it reasoned that  inventory searches are an exception to the requirement that police have a warrant to search people’s personal property. Second, the Court described the purpose of an Inventory Search:

“The purpose of an inventory search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to perform an administrative or caretaking function. The principal purposes of an inventory search are to (1) protect the owner’s property, (2) protect the police against false claims of theft by the owner, and (3) protect the police from potential danger. The scope of an inventory search should be limited to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose.”

Third, the Court reasoned that Officer Carrel’s safety concern about potentially exposed knives in the locked pocket was reasonable based on the facts that (1) several knives were found on Dunham’s person, (2) additional knives were found in the unlocked portion of Dunham’s backpack, (3) one of the knives found in the backpack was unsheathed, and (4) Sgt. Carrell felt what she believed to be another knife in the locked pocket of the backpack. Therefore, a manifest necessity existed for searching the locked portion of the backpack.

Finally, the Court concluded that the inventory search was valid and affirmed Dunham’s conviction:

“Substantial evidence supports the challenged finding of fact. Given the reasonable indication that the locked portion of the backpack contained dangerous items along with Sgt. Carrell’s reasonable fear of being stabbed, we hold that a manifest necessity existed to search No. 46169-2-II 8 inside the locked portion of the backpack. Therefore the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that the inventory search was valid. We affirm Dunham’s conviction.”

My opinion? Search and seizure issues are a HUGE aspect of unlawful possession cases. The legal issues come down to whether the search was lawful, and if not, whether the evidence can be suppressed. Here, the court’s decision appears sound. Under Washington law, officers may search a suspect’s person if they feel “hard and sharp” objects through the outside of a suspect’s clothing. This is done for officer safety. Similarly, Inventory Searches are conducted under the same policy of preserving officer safety. Here, the hard and sharp objects felt through Dunham’s backpack raised a safety concern. Therefore, the search appears lawful.

For more information, please review my Legal Guide titled, “Search & Seizure: Basic Issues Regarding Their Search for Weapons, Drugs, Firearms and Other Contraband.” There, I provide links to my analysis of Washington cases discussing searches of persons, vehicles, cars and homes. Also, please go the search engine of my Blog if you have specific queries about these issues.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ashley: Prior Bad Acts of DV

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In  State v. Ashley, the WA Supreme Court decided a trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. Here, defendant Baron Ashley was charged with Unlawful Imprisonment Domestic Violence (DV) for detaining his girlfriend Makayla Gamble in the bathroom without her consent.

Apparently, Ashley and the victim Makayla Gamble had a long-term DV relationship. Gamble testified that Ashley had physically abused her in the past. She explained that she had been in a relationship with Ashley for several years and that he had abused her multiple times during that relationship. In total, Gamble described four specific instances of abuse, including three instances when Gamble was pregnant. Gamble explained that she suffered bruises, black eyes, and a popped eardrum as a result of these attacks, but that she called the police only once and later retracted her complaint because she loved Ashley. Specifically, Gamble testified that these instances affected her decision to get into the bathroom when instructed.

The jury found Ashley guilty as charged.

On appeal, Ashley argued the trial court wrongfully admitted evidence of his prior misconduct under Evidence Rule (ER) 404(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the WA Supreme Court granted review. ER 404(b) provides in full:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. By its plain language, the rule absolutely prohibits certain types of evidence from being used “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but allows that same evidence to be introduced for any other purpose, depending on its relevance and the balancing of its probative value and danger of unfair prejudice.

The Court  explained that ER 404(b) prohibits certain types of evidence from being
used “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith,” but allows that same evidence to be introduced for any other purpose,
depending on its relevance and the balancing of its probative value and danger of
unfair prejudice. The Court also referred to its four-part test to determine if ER 404(b) evidence is admissible:

“To admit evidence of a person’s prior misconduct, the trial court must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred, (2) identify the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be
introduced, (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect.”

Here, Defendant Ashley argued that the State did not establish that the incidents of prior domestic violence even occurred. He also said that this evidence was irrelevant to Gamble’s credibility and to the elements of the crime, and that the prejudice of the prior bad acts dramatically outweighed any probative value of the evidence.

However, the WA Supreme Court rejected Ashley’s arguments.

The Court decided the Prosecution satisfied the first prong of the test: “The trial court heard undisputed testimony describing a series of instances of domestic violence by Ashley against Gamble and reviewed a 2004 police report. The trial court found Gamble’s testimony credible. Ashley presents no legal or factual argument for disturbing this finding; he simply disagrees with it.”

The Court also found the prosecution satisfied the second and third prong of the test:

“The State’s theory was that Ashley intimidated Gamble, forcing her to remain in the bathroom. The trial court found that the State demonstrated that Ashley’s history of domestic abuse against Gamble was highly probative of whether Ashley restrained Gamble using intimidation and fear based on this history of domestic abuse. Essentially, the trial court found-and the Court of Appeals agreed-that the domestic violence evidence was both material and relevant to Gamble’s lack of consent and to whether Ashley restrained Gamble by intimidation. We agree.”

Finally, the Court held the Prosecution satisfied the fourth prong of the test:

“Here, the trial court properly balanced these interests, concluding that Ashley’s long history of domestic violence toward Gamble was highly probative in assessing whether Ashley intimidated Gamble, such that she was restrained without her consent.”

In conclusion, the Court held that the trial court undertook the proper ER 404(b) analysis, the domestic violence evidence presented was highly probative of the victim’s lack of consent, and the State met its burden of demonstrating the evidence’s overriding probative value to establish a necessary element of the crime. However, the Court also held that the trial court committed harmless error by instructing the jurors that they could consider the evidence for the purpose of bolstering Gamble’s credibility. Ashley’s conviction was affirmed.

For more information on Domestic Violence issues please review my Legal Guide titled “Defending Against Domestic Violence Charges.” There, I provide links to my analysis of Washington cases discussing domestic violence. Also, please go the search engine of my Blog if you have specific queries about these issues.

And please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Good luck!

Utah v. Strieff: High Court Upholds Unlawful Search

Attenuation Doctrine, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Evidence, Exclusionary Rule, felony, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In Utah v. Strieff, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a 5-3 vote that an illegal police stop and resulting drug arrest did not ultimately violate the Fourth Amendment because the officer later discovered the defendant had an outstanding traffic warrant.

The case began when a police officer stopped Edward Strieff on the street and ran his identification. The state of Utah concedes that this was an illegal police stop. However, when the Officer ran Strieff’s identification, it was discovered that Strieff had an outstanding traffic warrant. The officer then arrested him, searched him, and discovered drugs in his pockets. Strieff argued that the drugs should have been inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment because they are the fruits of an illegal search.

In an opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with Mr. Strieff, ruled for the State, and found there was no flagrant police misconduct:

“The evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part of his search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest.”

Furthermore, the Court also noted that although the Exclusionary Rule prohibits the admissibility of evidence which is illegally seized in violation of people’s Constitutional rights, there are several exceptions to the rule. One exception is the Attenuation Doctrine, which admits typically inadmissible evidence when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance.

The Court reasoned that the Attenuation Doctrine therefore applies here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant: “Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to his arrest.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito.

Writing in dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor blasted the majority for excusing police misconduct and undermining the Fourth Amendment:

“The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic war rants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.”

“This case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”

My opinion? I agree with Sotomayor’s dissent. Utah v. Strieff is a terrible blow to every American’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful and intrusive government searches. Period.

That aside, will Utah v. Strieff negatively impact the constitutional rights of citizens in Washington State? Probably not. We already have time-tested precedents like State v. Doughty, State v. Afana and State v. Winterstein. All of these WA Supreme Court cases – and more – are recent opinions that are factually similar to Utah v. Streiff. Fortunately, these cases have already ruled against police officers violating people’s Constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure.

As a colleague of mine said, “The rest of the country may be SOL, but Utah v. Strieff should not survive here in WA State.”

Let’s keep our fingers crossed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Apology Letters & Free Speech

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In State v . K.H.-H., the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant’s First Amendment free speech rights are not violated by a requirement that the offender write an apology letter to the victim of the crime.

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The juvenile court found K.H.-H. guilty. At the disposition hearing, the Prosecutor requested the court order K.H.-H. to write a letter of apology to the victim. Defense Counsel objected, insisting that K.H.-H. maintained the right to control his speech. The Court followed the Prosecutor’s recommendations and ordered K.H.-H. to write an apology letter. The court also imposed three months of community supervision.

K.H.-H appealed. Eventually, his case ended up in the WA Supreme Court.

In short, the Court upheld the sentencing requirement that K.H.-H write the apology letter.

First, the Court acknowledged that because a forced apology involves making an offender say something he does not wish to say, it implicates the compelled speech doctrine. The compelled speech doctrine generally dictates that the State cannot force individuals to deliver messages that they do not wish to make.

Nevertheless, the Court also stated that First Amendment rights are not absolute, particularly in the context of prison and probation, where constitutional rights are lessened or not applicable. “Similarly, criminal convictions result in loss or lessening of constitutional rights.”

The Court also reasoned that a victim has an interest in receiving a letter of apology. This not only aims to rehabilitate the juvenile offender but also acknowledges the victim’s interest in receiving the apology:

“A letter of apology demonstrates a recognition and acceptance of responsibility for harmful actions. Such a condition is reasonably necessary for K.H.-H. to recognize what he did was wrong and to acknowledge his behavior. Additionally, an apology letter recognizes the victim’s interest in receiving an apology from the perpetrator. An apology allows the victim to hear an acceptance of responsibility from the very person who inflicted the harm. This is particularly important where both the victim and perpetrator are juveniles, and demonstrates to both the significance of giving and receiving an apology for wrongful acts.

This further advances the rehabilitative goals of the statute. The outward manifestation of accepting and apologizing for the consequences of one’s actions is a rehabilitative step that attempts to improve K.H.-H.’s character and outlook. Such a condition is reasonably related to the purpose of K.H.-H. ‘s rehabilitation and the crime here. One must face the consequences of a conviction, which often include the loss or lessening of constitutional rights.”

Justice McCloud dissented. Among other things, his dissent says the following:

“Compelling a false apology for a crime the defendant denies committing is far from the least restrictive means of achieving rehabilitation. In fact, it is probably the most ineffective way to achieve that result.”

An interesting case, no doubt.

My opinion?

I strive for reductions and dismissals in all of my cases. Sometimes that means taking accountability for what happened. Consequently, that also means apologizing. An apology letter to the judge is a great place to start. They are a great way to demonstrate responsibility and remorse for your actions. While an apology letter to the judge/magistrate is often an excellent way to show your remorse after you have committed an offence, it’s success will largely depend on how serious the crime was. Among other things, judges consider your likelihood at re-offending.

A sincere apology letter may show you have learnt your lesson and may go some way to proving this. Writing a letter to the victim can be one way of repairing the harm caused. Remember, judges have a fair amount of discretion when sentencing. They can consider the fact that you have taken responsibility for your actions as well as paid for any loss or damage caused. Finally, many victims will be happy to receive a sign of your recognition of the harm that you have caused them, especially if your crime wasn’t intentional or didn’t cause a great deal of harm.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Threatening Note = Robbery

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In  State v. Farnsworth, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained threats sufficient enough to support a conviction for robbery.

On October 15,2009, defendants Charles Farnsworth and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to “rob” a bank. The plan was for McFarland to wait outside in the car while Farnsworth entered a bank wearing a wig and sunglasses as a disguise, and retrieve money. Farnsworth would present a note to the teller, which read, “No die packs, no tracking devices, put the money in the bag.”

They executed the plan. The bank teller handed Farnsworth about $300 in small bills, and McFarland left. Farnsworth and McFarland drove away, but they were pulled over and arrested a few blocks from the bank. Both were charged with Robbery in the First Degree pursuant to RCW 9A.56.200(1 )(b) (robbery committed in a financial institution).

Both defendants had long criminal histories. Farnsworth faced the possibility of a life sentence under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 if convicted of this robbery, as he was previously convicted of a 2004 Robbery and a 1984 Vehicular Homicide in California. The POAA requires a life sentence when a repeat offender commits a third felony that is classified as a “most serious offense” (often referred to as a “third strike”).

Farnsworth went to trial and was found guilty. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. Farnsworth appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support robbery because (1) there was no threat of force and (2) he agreed to aid only a theft, not a robbery. The case ended up the WA Supreme Court.

The court upheld Farnsworth’s conviction.  It reasoned that sufficient evidence supports an implied threat of force:

“Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. When a person demands money at a bank, with no explanation or indication of lawful entitlement to money, it can imply a threat of force because without such a threat, the teller would have no incentive to comply. An ordinary bank teller could reasonably infer an implied threat of harm under these circumstances.”

Because of this implicit threat, reasoned the Court, banks have security guards and distinctive policies in place to prevent harm flowing from precisely these types of encounters.

The Court also reasoned that the defendants were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat. “In fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime,” said  the Court.

Finally, the Court reasoned that no errors deprived Farnsworth of a fair trial. With that, the Court affirmed Farnsworth’s conviction for first degree robbery.

My opinion? It’s generally difficult to see how threatening notes create a basis to support a prosecution and conviction for Robbery, which can be a Class or a Class B violent felony “strike” offense. Still, a threatening note passed to a bank teller in a financial institution must be taken seriously. This is, in fact, how most bank robberies happen.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Refusing Field Sobriety Test is Admissible as “Consciousness of Guilt.”

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, Due Process, DUI, Evidence, Jury Trial, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Mecham, the WA Supreme Court decided that Prosecutors in DUI trials may admit evidence that a defendant is declining field sobriety tests as evidence of consciousness of guilt.

FACTS

In 2011, Officer Campbell made a traffic stop of defendant Mark Tracy Mecham. Although Mecham’s driving showed no signs of intoxication, Mecham smelled of intoxicants and had slurred speech. The officer asked Mecham to perform voluntary field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell’s observing Mecham’s eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused.

At trial, Mecham moved to suppress his refusal to perform the FSTs. Typically, trial courts grant this defense motion. In Mecham’s case, however, the trial court denied his motion and ruled that even if FSTs were a search, probable cause supported the search. Mecham’s refusal was admitted to the jury as evidence to support the Prosecutor’s theory that Mecham exhibited “Consciousness of Guilt.” The jury found Mecham guilty of DUI.

Eventually, Mecham’s case was appealed to the WA Supreme Court. He argued that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the trial court admitted evidence of his refusal to undergo FSTs.

THE DECISION

Unfortunately for Mecham, the WA Supreme Court disagreed and upheld his DUI conviction. In a deeply divided decision, the Court held that while a FST is a seizure, it is not a search either under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution or under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State may, therefore, offer evidence of a defendant’s refusal to perform FSTs. Field sobriety tests may only be administered when the initial traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer has reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence.

The lead majority opinion was authored by Justice Wiggins. Justice Fairhurst concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Fairhurst would prohibit the administration of FSTs once the defendant is already under formal arrest for an offense other then DUI. Justice Johnson dissented on the grounds that the defendant had been told by the officer who administered the FSTs that they were voluntary. Finally, Justice Gordon McCloud dissented on the grounds that FSTs are searches.

My opinion?

I agree with Justice McCloud’s dissent. Here’s a portion:

“An FST can reveal information about a person’s body and medical history that are unquestionably private in nature. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in addition to possible inebriation, FSTs can reveal a head injury, neurological disorder, brain tumors or damage, and some inner ear diseases. These conditions are not necessarily observable in the subject’s normal public behavior; they may well be revealed only by the special maneuvers the subject is directed to perform during the FST. Indeed, if an FST did not reveal information beyond what is readily observable by the general public, there would be no need to administer it in the first place. I therefore conclude that FSTs are searches under article I, section 7 of our state constitution.”

FSTs are a search. Period. Clearly, Officers who ask citizens to performs FSTs are seeking evidence of DUI. Because FSTs are a search, Mecham had a constitutional right to refuse to perform them unless (1) the officers had a warrant, or (2) an exception to the warrant requirement applied. Here, the Officer neither possessed or obtained a warrant for a blood test. Nor did the Officer even attempt to get a warrant.

Even more concerning, Prosecutors now have free reign to spin a citizen’s refusal of FSTs as “consciousness of guilt.” That’s unfair. Indeed, there’s a lot of debate in criminal law on whether FSTs accurately and/or scientifically indicate whether someone is DUI. These tests are, quite simply, balancing and memory tests administered under extremely uncomfortable and stressful conditions. These tests – which more of less reflect bad balance, lack of memory and preexisting health issues – simply do not accurately depict intoxication.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.