Category Archives: Constitutional Rights

Is It Against the Law to Destroy Flock Surveillance Cameras?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Fourth Amendment, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Surveillance Creep, Technology, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Across the nation, people are vandalizing Flock surveillance cameras at an alarming pace. A surge in such activity underscores the growing resistance to this police surveillance technology.

WHAT ARE FLOCK CAMERAS?

Flock Safety makes surveillance camera systems that record and analyze everything that passes them. The company sells its services as a crime-fighting tool, and some law enforcement agencies that have contracts with Flock use the cameras’ automated license plate readers to track or reconstruct movements of vehicles in criminal investigations.

According to the company, more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies use its technology. More broadly, there are more than 130,000 AI-powered automated license plate readers on American streets, according to DeFlock, an advocacy group that tracks the cameras.

Because Flock cameras are all connected, it creates a nationwide latticework of recorded activity. Across the majority of states, a police officer in one state can be alerted if a car they’re looking for pops up in another and can inform the local authorities.

WHY ARE PEOPLE VANDALIZING FLOCK CAMERAS?

An online movement called DeFlock is growing in popularity. DeFlock’s messaging claims that Flock cameras are a serious risk to your privacy and civil liberties. These systems continuously record your movements without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. Your driving history is rarely confined to the town or city where the cameras are installed. It’s typically shared with thousands of other agencies nationwide (secretly). DeFlock claims that once the data is out of your community, you have no control over how it’s used or what rules apply, leading to instances of misuse.

People have cut down Flock cameras with an electric saw in upstate New York, thrown paint on them in Oakland, California, and rammed a truck into them in Idaho. One man in Florida sits in a lawn chair holding up a piece of cardboard on a pole to block the camera’s view. City governments have joined in by deactivating the cameras or canceling contracts with Flock in Fort Collins, Colorado; Eugene, Oregon; Madison, Wisconsin; Knoxville, Tennessee; Syracuse, New York; and Walla Walla, Washington.

ARE FLOCK CAMERAS IN WASHINGTON STATE?

Yes. DeFlock’s map currently shows more than 2,100 mapped automated license plate readers in Washington, with Flock Safety accounting for the large majority of mapped cameras. Another independent Washington ALPR inventory lists 2,187 mapped cameras in the state and says 1,912, or 87.4%, are attributed to Flock Safety.

CAN FLOCK CAMERAS BE USED TO TRACK PEOPLE?

404 Media reported that a Flock capability called “FreeForm” allows users to search camera records based on what someone was wearing, their tattoos or even their race. The site also reported that, despite Flock not sharing data with agencies like U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, police officers have been performing searches to aid in immigration sweeps.

IS IT ILLEGAL TO DISARM, BLOCK OR VANDALIZE FLOCK CAMERAS?

In short, yes. Damaging a Flock camera can result in criminal charges. However, the specific charge depends on the circumstances.

Washington’s malicious-mischief laws make certain types of property damage a felony. Second-degree malicious mischief is a class C felony when someone knowingly and maliciously causes more than $750 in physical damage or creates a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of public service by damaging certain public property. First-degree malicious mischief is a class B felony under circumstances including damage exceeding $5,000 or certain interruptions of public service.

DO FLOCK CAMERAS VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH & SEIZURE?

No. Courts, such as in cases like United States v. Martin, have held that license plates and vehicle characteristics displayed on public roads carry no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, because motorists knowingly expose them to public view.

Nevertheless, the debate rages on. Civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argue that networked, mass-surveillance databases aggregate data in a way that mimics continuous tracking—drawing parallels to Supreme Court rulings on cell phone location data (Carpenter v. United States) and GPS trackers (United States v. Jones) that do require search warrants. Because of this aggregation concern, ongoing lawsuits and lower court appeals are actively challenging these deployments

WHAT ARE MY CHANCES AT TRIAL?

Probably not great, but not impossible, either. In June, a grand jury in Ohio refused to bring felony charges against a Clermont County man accused of destroying a Flock automatic license plate reader (ALPR). The prosecution’s case seemed iron-clad: according to Cincinnati’s Local12, police identified the man using surveillance footage from multiple nearby cameras, combined with info gleamed from a credit card and a customer rewards account. Despite the evidence against him, the jury declined to indict him, resulting in all charges being dropped.

Clearly, the public lacks the will to prosecute these crimes. Also, observers and commentators on social media suggested the grand jury’s refusal to indict acted similarly to jury nullification – where a panel rejects clear legal guilt because they disagree with the law or the tool being protected.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving the use of Flock Cameras. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pretrial Drug-Monitoring “Sweat” Patches Ruled Unconstitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DUI, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Pretrial Release, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In Bailey-Cobb v.Snohomish County District Court, No. 87738-1-I (Aug. 17, 2026), the WA Court of Appeals held that Pretrial Drug Monitoring Patches (PDMP’s) are a search and must therefore be supported by authority of law to be lawful.

WHAT ARE PRETRIAL DRUG MONITORING PATCHES?

Ingested drugs have been known to appear in sweat. This has created the development of sweat collection devices for use in drug detection, such as the PDMP sweat patches. However, externally applied drugs or drugs deposited on the skin, can cause false positives or contamination from within (CFWI). Different cleaning procedures are used to remove externally applied drugs, however some drugs can remain causing false positives. Also, if an individual lives in a drug-contaminated environment, CFWI could occur also producing misleading results for drug use.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In these consolidated cases, the State charged Mrs. Simone Bailey-Cobb and Mr. Toombs with DUI. As a condition of their pretrial release, the court required them to wear PDMP’s. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs challenged the imposition of the drug patch as a condition of pretrial release. The trial court denied the petitions. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs appealed, alleging the drug-monitoring patch violated the Washington State Constitution.

Additionally, Bailey-Cobb contended the trial court erred in finding she would interfere with the administration of justice, and Toombs claimed the trial court did not make the requisite findings under CrRLJ 3.2 to impose any conditions. We conclude that Bailey-Cobb and Toombs did not suffer diminished privacy interests as pretrial releasees, and the court’s imposition of a drug-monitoring patch violated their rights under article I, section 7. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to remove the drug-monitoring patch condition from Bailey-Cobb’s and Toombs’s pretrial release requirements.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) began by saying both the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. When a party challenges an action, contending it violates constitutional rights, the court conducts a two-part inquiry.

“First, we must determine whether the alleged action “intruded upon a person’s private affairs,” said the COA. “If a privacy interest exists, the next question is whether relevant authority of law justifies the disturbance.”

Next, the COA discussed CrRLJ 3.2. This court rule gives courts the ability to impose conditions on the accused if the court determines there exists a substantial danger that the accused will commit a violent crime or that the accused will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. The conditions include prohibiting the accused from “consuming any intoxicating liquors or drugs not prescribed to the accused” and “any condition other than detention to assure noninterference with the administration of justice[] and reduce danger to others or the community.” To determine which conditions are reasonable, the court shall consider, among others, the accused’s criminal record, the nature of the charge, and the accused’s past interference with the administration of justice.

PDMP’s Are Invasive Technology

The COA reasoned that although Bailey-Cobb and Toombs would not need to submit a urine sample, they would be submitting far more personal information with the patch than urinalysis testing.

“And once affixed to the body, the patch collects and retains evidence of any and all drugs ingested, regardless of whether it is prescribed or otherwise not prohibited, and the individual wearing the patch is required to go into Triton’s office every 10 to14 days to get a new patch. Additionally, the patch does not test for alcohol, which is one of the substances the court order prohibited, so it is conceivable that further testing would be required. The drug patch is also susceptible to outside environmental contamination in limited situations. Because the drug-monitoring patch is invasive and would reveal far more personal information than necessary, it is not narrowly tailored and cannot survive the Olsen balancing test.” ~WA COA

The State Does Not Have a “Special Need”  to Monitor By Imposing PDMP’s.

Next, the COA rejected the argument that the State had a “special need” to monitor the drug use of pretrial releasees via a drug-monitoring patch. “The special needs exception permits an otherwise unlawful search when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impractical,” said the COA.

“Here, the State maintains a special need exists because requiring a warrant or probable cause would jeopardize the State’s need to monitor the defendants for the sake of public safety. But our Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to apply a special needs exception under article I, section 7. See, e.g., Evans, 5 Wn.3d at 215 (declining to adopt the federal special needs exception for administrative searches of pretrial releasees); Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 410 (declining to apply the special needs exception for urinalysis testing of pretrial releasees). Like the balancing test, precedent does not support applying the special needs exception to the imposition of a drug-monitoring patch for pretrial releasees.” ~WA COA

The COA concluded there was no authority of law to impose PDMP’s.  Also, neither the compelling interest test, nor the “special needs” exception to the search warrant requirement applied. “The drug monitoring patch, and the process for obtaining the patch, reveal more personal information than necessary,” said the COA.  “Thus, the patch condition was not narrowly tailored, and not lawful.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

U.S. Supreme Court Sides With Death Row Inmate in Challenge to Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Selection, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Race & Law, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In Pitchford v. Cain, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Black death row inmate’s criminal conviction and death sentence. By a vote of 5-4, the court agreed with Defendant Terry Pitchford that the judge at his 2006 trial had not properly analyzed whether the prosecutor in Pitchford’s case violated the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination in jury selection.

Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s  Batson v. Kentucky held the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor employed a peremptory challenge based on race.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

in 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed agrocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agree–ment and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty. During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors.

Pitchford’s counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie showing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial court declared the prosecutor’s stated reasons to be race neutral, but the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three). Nor did it make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual.

At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off defense counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and1 black juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitchford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual.

Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court. Applying the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state court had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the trial court had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to argue pretext.” The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was reasonable. The United States Supreme Court granted review.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit’s decision and sent the case back to the lower courts. Justice Kavanaugh’s delivered the majority opinion. His analysis in his opinion for the majority was succinct. “After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike,” he explained, “the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual.” Here, however, Kavanaugh emphasized that the Batson analysis was not correctly or accurately provided:

“Whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson objection.” ~U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh

Kavanaugh conceded that, in cases involving AEDPA, federal courts normally are “deferential to the state court. But deference does not mean abdication,” he stressed. And here, “the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Right To Counsel Does Not Also Include the Right to Coaching A Defendant Mid-Trial

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Homicide & Manslaughter, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In Villarreal v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a trial court, during a brief daytime break in the defendant’s testimony, may entirely prohibit defense counsel from communicating with the defendant.

This protects the truth-seeking function of the trial by preventing mid-testimony coaching.  However, during more extended overnight breaks in the defendant’s testimony, a trial court may only prohibit defense counsel from influencing or managing the defendant’s testimony, not from discussing other topics with the defendant such as the availability of witnesses, trial tactics, or plea bargaining.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

David Villarreal’s murder trial culminated with his own testimony. That testimony was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess, during which the trial judge instructed Villarreal’s attorneys not to “manage his testimony.” The judge clarified, however, that Villarreal was not prohibited from talking to his attorneys. The judge recognized Villarreal’s constitutional right to confer about certain topics, such as possible sentencing issues. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours later and was subsequently convicted of murder. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the order was a permissible exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Villarreal appealed on arguments that his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel was violated by the trial court’s rulings.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson delivered the majority opinon of the Court. In short, she affirmed Villarreal’s murder conviction, holding that a qualified conferral order during an overnight recess — one that prohibits only discussion of the defendant’s testimony “for its own sake” while allowing consultation on other protected topics — does not violate the Sixth Amendment.

The Court framed the issue as a tension between two principles: the defendant’s fundamental right to counsel and the truth-seeking interest in preventing lawyer-influenced midstream alteration of sworn testimony. It treated the case as a middle ground between Geders v. United States, (overnight total ban invalid) and Perry v. Leeke, (brief daytime ban valid), emphasizing that those cases involved unqualified bans on attorney-client communication, whereas this case involved a content-limited restriction.

The majority’s rationale was that the line between Geders and Perry is “substantive, not merely temporal.” In other words, a testifying defendant retains a constitutional right to consult counsel about matters like trial strategy, plea decisions, and other issues beyond the testimony itself, but does not have a constitutional right to discuss ongoing testimony as such while still on the stand:

“The trial judge’s order here prohibited Villarreal’s lawyers from “managing” his “ongoing testimony.” This order permissibly balanced the truth-seeking function of the trial against Villarreal’s right to discuss protected topics with his lawyers—things like trial strategy, whether to consider a guilty plea, and factual information crucial to tactical decisions.”

“A court cannot prohibit a defendant from obtaining his attorney’s advice on whether and why he should consider a guilty plea, even if the “why” includes the impact of ongoing testimony on the trial’s prospects. But it may, like the court here did, prohibit discussion of testimony as such.” ~Justice Ketanji Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court

The Court analogized such orders to witness-sequestration principles adapted to the defendant’s special status. In doing so, the Court reasoned that forbidding only “managing” testimony permissibly balances constitutional rights with the trial’s truth-seeking function.

In its conclusions, the Court also rejected Villarreal’s request for a bright-line rule barring any overnight restriction, reasoning that a narrow no-testimony-discussion order is not the same as an overbroad prohibition on all attorney-client consultation.

With that the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Villareal’s murder conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Homicide or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ianniciello: The Right to Remain Silent

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Fifth Amendment, Homicide & Manslaughter, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Self-Incrimination, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In State v. Ianniciello, No. 86711-3-I (Dec. 15, 2025), the WA Court of Appeals reversed a defendant’s conviction for First Degree Murder. In its holding, the Court found the Ms. Ianniciello did not receive a fair trial because the State violated her Fifth Amendment right to silence by eliciting testimony regarding her pretrial silence in the wake of her husband’s murder and subsequent investigations.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2016, Ianniciello’s husband Tom was killed by a single gunshot to his head as he slept in his bed. Ianniciello called police after discovering Tom’s body in the bed. Police arrived and immediately began investigating. At the time of the murder, Tom and Ianniciello had been married for over sixteen years. The marriage was turbulent, as Tom had an issue with alcohol abuse and would become abusive to Ianniciello.

Police arrived and immediately began investigating. Detective Broggi, the lead detective, asked Ianniciello, “Did you shoot your husband?” Detective Broggi expressed concern with Ianniciello’s silent demeanor, saying “I want you to look at our side kind of this” because “you don’t seem overly concerned, or, you know, just upset about it.” Detective Broggi asked Ianniciello if she would be willing to take a polygraph examination, and Ianniciello agreed to do so. A few weeks later, on April 18, Ianniciello’s attorney contacted Detective Broggi, notified her that Ianniciello would not be taking a polygraph examination, and asked her to have no further contact with Ianniciello.

After nearly three years, the State charged Ianniciello with first-degree murder. Ianniciello’s first trial, in 2022, ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to render a unanimous verdict.

In 2024, the case proceeded to a second trial after which the jury rendered a guilty verdict. On appeal, Ianniciello argued the State violated her right to silence under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution by eliciting testimony from multiple witnesses that she did not “reach out,” “call,” “check in,” or “provide information” to law enforcement.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (Court) discussed Ianniciello’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In short, the State violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights when the State calls to the attention to the accused’s pre-arrest silence to imply guilt.

The Court found that here, the record established that Ianniciello invoked her Fifth Amendment right to silence. She purposefully did not answer Detective Broggi’s questions and declined the offer to take a polygraph. This clear statement that Ianniciello would not provide additional information to the police and should not be contacted by them is sufficient to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.

Neverthess, at trial, the State elicited at trial direct testimony from two detectives about Ianniciello’s failure to contact them. During its examination of law enforcement officers, the State elicited testimony that Ianniciello did not reach out and did not check in on the status of the investigation. The State also continued this theme of drawing the jury’s attention to Ianniciello’s pre-arrest silence by eliciting testimony that Tom’s other family members would reach out and check in on the investigation, “but not Ms. Ianniciello.”

The Court found the State’s tactics and testimony from its witnesses violated Ianniciello’s Constitutional rights:

“The State’s conduct was an attempt to convince the jury that Ianniciello’s silence, by not communicating with law enforcement, demonstrated her guilt. This is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Next, the Court found that the State’s error was not harmless. Preliminarily, it commented that the State’s case depended largely on circumstantial evidence. More important,  the Court found that testimony from the State’s witnesses about Ianniciello’s pre-arrest silence may have swayed the jury – thus rendering the testimony not harmless – and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt this constitutional error had no impact on the jury’s verdict.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Ianniciello’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Homicide, Manslaughter or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

AI Technology Can Effectively Assist Police. But What’s the Risk?

Artificial Intelligence, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, police, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Technology, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

When a crime happens, police begin compiling a mountain of digital evidence. The evidence can include surveillance videos, phone records, crime scene photos and interviews. The evidence compiled into data sets can be quite substanial, weighty and lengthy. Be as it may, police agencies are hesitant to assign officers to these tasks, especially in light of budget constraints.

King 5 News reports that the Redmond Police Department addressed these challenges by using a new Artificial Intelligence (AI) platform to sift through evidence to solve crimes. In a recent case, an AI platform called Longeyehelped investigators on a cold case by combing through hours of jail phone calls, including a key confession.

HOW DOES LONGEYE WORK?

Longeye’s AI-powered workspace rapidly digests and understands video, photography, and text at speeds up to 100x faster than a human. It makes information searchable and parsable and it ‘reads’ the data contextually to find key intelligence that can break the case open. In theory, this saves thousands of desk hours, closing cases before the trail goes cold, avoiding burnout and getting police investigators back in the field.

Here, Longeye helped the Redmond Police Department process 60 hours of jail phone calls in a matter of minutes. This apparently saved a significant amount of time, and verified the lead investigator’s facts in the case. By using Longeye to search for and locate key information, the investigator was able to work more efficiently.

DOES LONGEYE USE AI FOR ILL PURPOSES?

In short, advocates of Longeye say it gives police more time to serve victims and close cases. Longeye does not create or predict information. It only points detectives to evidence they already have, helping them work smarter and faster. It verifies facts already known to police in a cold cases. It is not used to uncover new information.

WHAT ARE THE CRITICISMS OF LONGEYE?

Accordingt to Google’s AI Overview, key criticisms and concerns of Longeye include the following:
  • Risk of Errors (“Hallucinations”): A primary concern is that, like other large language models, the AI could generate incorrect information or misinterpret evidence (known as “hallucinations”). This could potentially misguide investigations, leading to wasted time or, more seriously, incorrect assumptions about suspects.
  • Wrongful Arrests: Critics point to the history of other technologies like facial recognition leading to wrongful arrests and worry Longeye could be subject to similar issues if not used with extreme caution.
  • Dependence on Human Oversight: The platform’s designers emphasize it is a tool to assist, not replace, human investigators. This means its ultimate reliability depends on the diligence of human officers to double-check the AI’s findings against original evidence, which might not always happen in practice.
  • Potential for Misuse: As with any powerful surveillance or investigation technology, there are general privacy concerns about how law enforcement uses the tool and what data they are looking for.
  • Unreliable in Court: Courts are already seeing problems with attorneys using other AI tools that cite nonexistent case law, raising fears about the admissibility and reliability of AI-generated insights as evidence. 

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Any ill-gotten evidence in a criminal case which was obtained, reviewed, presented and organized by AI tools can possibly be suppressed. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

WA Court Dismisses Criminal Conviction Due To Overbroad Search Warrant

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Technology, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In State v. Hampton, the WA Court of Appeals held a Search Warrant was overbroad because it allows the seizure of evidence related to crimes for which there was no probable cause; in this case, sex crimes.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Law enforcement investigated Mr. Hampton for trafficking in stolen property and controlled substances. During the investigation, officers seized Hampton’s brown briefcase, which contained electronic storage devices. Thereafter, a search warrant authorized law enforcement to search the electronic storage devices and all contents that showed possession of trafficking in stolen property or drugs.

The search requested search and seizure for the following:

“Any data that may be kept on any of the seized digital devices in any format to include but not limited to intact files, deleted files, deleted file fragments or remnants related to the purchase, possession, receipt and distribution of controlled substances and or stolen property.”

When reviewing files from the storage device, law enforcement viewed ten-year-old videos of Hampton engaging in sexual intercourse with his girlfriend, while she was incapacitated. The superior court refused to suppress the videos. A jury convicted Hampton of numerous Sex Offenses. On appeal, Mr. Hampton argued the search warrant was invalid because of its overbreadth.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the Court of Appeals (COA) agreed with Mr. Hampton that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress. First, the warrant authorized an overbroad and unfettered search of electronic storage devices found in the briefcase. Second, law enforcement exceeded the scope of the authorized search when viewing movie files stored on computer drives without regard to their date or connection to the crimes being investigated.

The COA emphasized that the Fourth Amendment demands in part that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Furthermore, the latter part of this clause requires specificity in a search warrant.  Also, Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution states, “No person shall be disturbed in their private affairs or have their home invaded without authority of law.”

The COA also analyzed that the particularity requirement of search warrants provides important protection against governmental invasion of privacy. This is because the demand renders general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. The particularity requirement also ensures judicial oversight of the scope of a law enforcement search such that the executing officer lacks unlimited discretion when executing the warrant. The warrant must be based on probable cause of criminal activity and must limit the scope of the search to the probable cause determination.

“Specificity consists of two components: particularity and breadth,” said the COA. “Particularity demands that the warrant clearly state what is sought. Breadth requires the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.”

The COA reasoned that the search of Mr. Hampton’s electronic storage devices conducted by Detective Travis Frizzell verifies the impermissible breadth of the search warrant. The police’s search warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe Timothy Hampton and Robert Rogers engaged in a criminal conspiracy to purchase and sell narcotics in 2020, not almost a decade earlier.

“By viewing videos from 2013, Detective Frizzell stepped inside a time machine and outside the confines of probable cause. The State’s argument that the warrant sanctioned Frizzell’s view of the 2013 files defeats its defense of the constitutionality of the warrant. If we ruled that the search warrant limited the search to evidence of possessing stolen property or controlled substances and thereby upheld the validity of the warrant, we would need to rule that Detective Frizzell’s search exceeded the scope of the warrant.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The COA concluded that a court must suppress evidence seized due to an overly broad search warrant. It remanded Mr. Hampton’s case to the superior court for vacation of his convictions and for dismissal of the charges.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving search & seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The “Ruse” Tactics of ICE May Violate Constitutional Rights

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Fourth Amendment, Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

During the first 100 days of President Donald J. Trump’s second term, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has arrested and deported thousands of illegal aliens. The undocumented immigrants are broadly labelled as criminals who threaten public safety and national security.

Although some undocuments immigrants are criminals, many of them are not. They are  hardworking individuals simply going about their daily lives — working, commuting, and spending time at home with families.

Unfortunately, ICE has used racial profiling and intimidation tactics that instill fear and confusion in communities and stoke mistrust in the police. ICE deploys “ruse” tactics to gain warrantless entry into people’s homes or lure them out. Ruses are a tactic used frequently by ICE in investigating and arresting non-citizens. Since 2013, hundreds of reported raids include those involving ICE’s use of ruses.

WHAT IS AN “ICE RUSE?”

    • Impersonating local law enforcement: ICE agents frequently pose as local police officers, detectives, or probation officers to gain trust or induce individuals to open their doors or cooperate. They might wear plain clothes, wear uniforms labeled “POLICE,” or even vests that resemble local law enforcement uniforms, while concealing any ICE identification.
    • Fabricating investigations: Agents might claim to be investigating a fake crime or a fake crime suspect to identify and locate the targeted individual. They could show a picture of a “suspect” and use a name that matches someone in the household to trick residents into revealing information or letting them inside.
    • Misrepresenting purpose: Agents may request to “take a quick look around” or “come in to talk,” without explicitly stating they are ICE or seeking to make an arrest. This tactic aims to obtain consent to enter the home without the individual realizing they have the right to refuse entry.
    • Using phone ruses: ICE agents may also employ ruses over the phone to locate targets. These could include pretending to be local police asking questions, asking the person to meet them regarding a fake criminal case, claiming to have found a lost ID and needing to arrange a pickup, or contacting them about a court date or updated contact information. 
WHY DO SOME RUSE TACTICS VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Under the law, police officers, including ICE, can sometimes employ deceptive tactics in investigations, According to the Harvard Law Review, however, these ruses must generally be within legal boundaries and not violate constitutional rights. For instance, without a judicial warrant, ICE agents cannot force entry into a home and rely on trickery or deception to obtain consent, which raises questions about the voluntariness of that consent.
WHAT CAN PEOPLE IN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES DO TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND DEPORTATION?

In the meantime, people in immigrant communities can defend themselves by knowing their rights. Anybody confronted by law enforcement — whether undocumented or not — can and should do their best to verify the officers’ identity and purpose, document the encounter, and report what happened. Community members who know their rights can lawfully prevent ICE from entering their homes and protect themselves and their loved ones from such deceptive practices. More information in English and Spanish can be found here.

Please review my Search & Seizure Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Vehicular Homicide Conviction Prohibits Defendants From Owning or Possessing Firearms

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

In State v. Hamilton, No. 85055-5-I (March 17, 2025), the WA Court of Appeals decided that disarming those convicted of Vehicular Homicide  is consistent with the United States’ historic tradition of firearms regulation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Hamilton was convicted of Vehicular Homicide after a jury trial. Due to his felony conviction, the court notified Hamilton that he could no longer possess firearms. He was ordered to immediately surrender his concealed pistol license and any firearms in his possession. The court also imposed conditions forbidding him from owning, using, or possessing a firearm or ammunition, consistent with the prohibition set out under statute.

On appeal, Hamilton argued that Washington’s statutes restricting his firearms post-conviction violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) discussed numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing Second Amendment. These decision include New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi. In applying stare decisis, the COA ultimately held that the overwhelming majority of courts addressing statutes that ban convicted felons from possessing firearms have rejected the contention that such laws are now unconstitutional. Next, the COA addressed Hamilton challenging the as-applied constitutionality of several Washington statutes that work in conjunction to strip a person’s right to bear arms upon conviction for a felony.

” . . . We conclude that disarming those with felony convictions is demonstrably consistent with America’s historic tradition of firearms regulation. Common law has a long history of disarming individuals, or categories of individuals, who were viewed as a danger to public order . . . The historical justification for felon bans reveals one controlling principal that applies to each historical period: violent or otherwise dangerous persons could be disarmed . . .”

“Groups of people who were categorized as presenting a danger to the public order during that era of our nation’s history included American Indians, Catholics, Quakers, slaves, and freed Black people. Such restrictions are repugnant and would fail modern constitutional scrutiny, but they nevertheless demonstrate historical precedent for restricting the firearms rights of persons perceived to be dangerous.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Finally, the COA addressed Hamilton’s argument that his felony conviction involved a “tragic accident” rather than the actual use of a firearm or political activity. The COA reasoined that Hamilton nevertheless committed a felony offense that resulted in the death of another person. As a result, reasoned the COA, his behavior places him squarely in the category of persons deemed dangerous to the public order for the purpose of historical firearms regulation.

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Hamilton’s criminal conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Allah: Probationer’s Right Against Unlawful Search

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Probation, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In State v. Allah, the WA Court of Appeals held a probationer’s vehicle was unlawfully searched and seized during a traffic stop. His prior criminal history, gang affiliations and geographic boundary  restrictions did not establish a sufficient nexus for a warrantless search.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In October 2020, Mr. Allah was on probation for a 2017 firearm conviction. He was driving his car in the Central District of Seattle, when a police officer pulled him over on suspicion of driving with a suspended license. After learning of Allah’s probationary status, the officer contacted the Department of Corrections (DOC). The Officer requested a Community Corrections Officer (CCO) arrive at the scene to discuss next steps.

While he was on his way to the scene, the CCO reviewed Allah’s prior conditions of community custody. The CCO noted Allah was in violation of a geographic boundary condition, which excluded him from the Central District. The geographic restriction  was in place because Allah was in a gang associated with the Central District.

Upon arriving at the scene, the CCO talked with Allah and then searched the car, specifically for a firearm. The CCO located a firearm on the floorboard underneath the driver’s seat. He collected the firearm as evidence and arrested Allah.

The State charged Allah with a Firearm Offense because his prior convictions barred him from possessing firearms. Allah moved to suppress the firearm evidence from the CCO’s search under a CrR 3.6 Motion. Allah argued there was an insufficient nexus between the search and Allah’s geographic violation. The judge denied Allah’s 3.6 Motion.

In December 2022, a jury convicted Allah as charged.  Allah appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) established that the Washington Constitution provides a robust privacy right; stating that “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” That said, warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable and subject to limited exceptions. The State has the burden of proving a warrantless search falls within an exception.

THE COA further established that parolees and probationers have diminished privacy rights. This is because they are persons whom a court has sentenced to confinement but who are serving their time outside the prison walls. As such, a probationer may be searched on the basis of a wellfounded or reasonable suspicion of a probation violation rather than a warrant supported by probable cause.

Even with probationer’s diminished privacy rights, however, the Washington Constitution permits a warrantless search of the property of an individual on probation only where there is a nexus between the property searched and the alleged probation violation.

“Permitting searches without a nexus would allow fishing expeditions to discover evidence of other crimes, past or present. After all, if a prior conviction, not to mention a prior arrest, should afford grounds for believing that an individual is engaging in criminal activity at any given time thereafter, that person would never be free of harassment, no matter how completely he had reformed.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The COA’s Rationale On “Sufficient Nexus”

The COA further surmised that even when there is a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation, an individual’s reduced privacy interest is safeguarded in two ways. First, a CCO must have reasonable cause to believe’ a probation violation has occurred before conducting a search at the expense of the individual’s privacy. Second, the individual’s privacy interest is diminished only to the extent necessary for the State to monitor compliance with the particular probation condition that gave rise to the search. The individual’s other property, which has no nexus to the suspected violation, remains free from search.

In sum, neither CCO or the State provide a sufficient explanation of why any person would reasonably believe Allah may have had a weapon immediately preceding the search. No matter how the constitutionality of the search is conceptualized—i.e., whether as requiring a nexus between the boundary violation and the vehicle searched, or as simply requiring reasonable suspicion—the logical gap remains.

As to the geographic boundary, CCO admitted it was irrelevant to his decision to search. As to Allah’s prior firearm conviction, our Supreme Court has long explained that a probationer’s past convictions alone are not enough to support a search. Otherwise, a probationer “would never be free of harassment, no matter how completely he had reformed.”

With that, the COA reversed the lower court’s denial of Allah’s CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the firearm evidence. The COA also reversed Allah’s conviction, and remanded the matter to the lower court for future proceedings.

Please review my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.