Tag Archives: Mt. Vernon Criminal Defense

Is It Against the Law to Destroy Flock Surveillance Cameras?

Across the nation, people are vandalizing Flock surveillance cameras at an alarming pace. A surge in such activity underscores the growing resistance to this police surveillance technology.

WHAT ARE FLOCK CAMERAS?

Flock Safety makes surveillance camera systems that record and analyze everything that passes them. The company sells its services as a crime-fighting tool, and some law enforcement agencies that have contracts with Flock use the cameras’ automated license plate readers to track or reconstruct movements of vehicles in criminal investigations.

According to the company, more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies use its technology. More broadly, there are more than 130,000 AI-powered automated license plate readers on American streets, according to DeFlock, an advocacy group that tracks the cameras.

Because Flock cameras are all connected, it creates a nationwide latticework of recorded activity. Across the majority of states, a police officer in one state can be alerted if a car they’re looking for pops up in another and can inform the local authorities.

WHY ARE PEOPLE VANDALIZING FLOCK CAMERAS?

An online movement called DeFlock is growing in popularity. DeFlock’s messaging claims that Flock cameras are a serious risk to your privacy and civil liberties. These systems continuously record your movements without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. Your driving history is rarely confined to the town or city where the cameras are installed. It’s typically shared with thousands of other agencies nationwide (secretly). DeFlock claims that once the data is out of your community, you have no control over how it’s used or what rules apply, leading to instances of misuse.

People have cut down Flock cameras with an electric saw in upstate New York, thrown paint on them in Oakland, California, and rammed a truck into them in Idaho. One man in Florida sits in a lawn chair holding up a piece of cardboard on a pole to block the camera’s view. City governments have joined in by deactivating the cameras or canceling contracts with Flock in Fort Collins, Colorado; Eugene, Oregon; Madison, Wisconsin; Knoxville, Tennessee; Syracuse, New York; and Walla Walla, Washington.

ARE FLOCK CAMERAS IN WASHINGTON STATE?

Yes. DeFlock’s map currently shows more than 2,100 mapped automated license plate readers in Washington, with Flock Safety accounting for the large majority of mapped cameras. Another independent Washington ALPR inventory lists 2,187 mapped cameras in the state and says 1,912, or 87.4%, are attributed to Flock Safety.

CAN FLOCK CAMERAS BE USED TO TRACK PEOPLE?

404 Media reported that a Flock capability called “FreeForm” allows users to search camera records based on what someone was wearing, their tattoos or even their race. The site also reported that, despite Flock not sharing data with agencies like U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, police officers have been performing searches to aid in immigration sweeps.

IS IT ILLEGAL TO DISARM, BLOCK OR VANDALIZE FLOCK CAMERAS?

In short, yes. Damaging a Flock camera can result in criminal charges. However, the specific charge depends on the circumstances.

Washington’s malicious-mischief laws make certain types of property damage a felony. Second-degree malicious mischief is a class C felony when someone knowingly and maliciously causes more than $750 in physical damage or creates a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of public service by damaging certain public property. First-degree malicious mischief is a class B felony under circumstances including damage exceeding $5,000 or certain interruptions of public service.

DO FLOCK CAMERAS VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH & SEIZURE?

No. Courts, such as in cases like United States v. Martin, have held that license plates and vehicle characteristics displayed on public roads carry no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, because motorists knowingly expose them to public view.

Nevertheless, the debate rages on. Civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argue that networked, mass-surveillance databases aggregate data in a way that mimics continuous tracking—drawing parallels to Supreme Court rulings on cell phone location data (Carpenter v. United States) and GPS trackers (United States v. Jones) that do require search warrants. Because of this aggregation concern, ongoing lawsuits and lower court appeals are actively challenging these deployments

WHAT ARE MY CHANCES AT TRIAL?

Probably not great, but not impossible, either. In June, a grand jury in Ohio refused to bring felony charges against a Clermont County man accused of destroying a Flock automatic license plate reader (ALPR). The prosecution’s case seemed iron-clad: according to Cincinnati’s Local12, police identified the man using surveillance footage from multiple nearby cameras, combined with info gleamed from a credit card and a customer rewards account. Despite the evidence against him, the jury declined to indict him, resulting in all charges being dropped.

Clearly, the public lacks the will to prosecute these crimes. Also, observers and commentators on social media suggested the grand jury’s refusal to indict acted similarly to jury nullification – where a panel rejects clear legal guilt because they disagree with the law or the tool being protected.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving the use of Flock Cameras. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pretrial Drug-Monitoring “Sweat” Patches Ruled Unconstitutional

In Bailey-Cobb v.Snohomish County District Court, No. 87738-1-I (Aug. 17, 2026), the WA Court of Appeals held that Pretrial Drug Monitoring Patches (PDMP’s) are a search and must therefore be supported by authority of law to be lawful.

WHAT ARE PRETRIAL DRUG MONITORING PATCHES?

Ingested drugs have been known to appear in sweat. This has created the development of sweat collection devices for use in drug detection, such as the PDMP sweat patches. However, externally applied drugs or drugs deposited on the skin, can cause false positives or contamination from within (CFWI). Different cleaning procedures are used to remove externally applied drugs, however some drugs can remain causing false positives. Also, if an individual lives in a drug-contaminated environment, CFWI could occur also producing misleading results for drug use.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In these consolidated cases, the State charged Mrs. Simone Bailey-Cobb and Mr. Toombs with DUI. As a condition of their pretrial release, the court required them to wear PDMP’s. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs challenged the imposition of the drug patch as a condition of pretrial release. The trial court denied the petitions. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs appealed, alleging the drug-monitoring patch violated the Washington State Constitution.

Additionally, Bailey-Cobb contended the trial court erred in finding she would interfere with the administration of justice, and Toombs claimed the trial court did not make the requisite findings under CrRLJ 3.2 to impose any conditions. We conclude that Bailey-Cobb and Toombs did not suffer diminished privacy interests as pretrial releasees, and the court’s imposition of a drug-monitoring patch violated their rights under article I, section 7. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to remove the drug-monitoring patch condition from Bailey-Cobb’s and Toombs’s pretrial release requirements.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) began by saying both the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. When a party challenges an action, contending it violates constitutional rights, the court conducts a two-part inquiry.

“First, we must determine whether the alleged action “intruded upon a person’s private affairs,” said the COA. “If a privacy interest exists, the next question is whether relevant authority of law justifies the disturbance.”

Next, the COA discussed CrRLJ 3.2. This court rule gives courts the ability to impose conditions on the accused if the court determines there exists a substantial danger that the accused will commit a violent crime or that the accused will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. The conditions include prohibiting the accused from “consuming any intoxicating liquors or drugs not prescribed to the accused” and “any condition other than detention to assure noninterference with the administration of justice[] and reduce danger to others or the community.” To determine which conditions are reasonable, the court shall consider, among others, the accused’s criminal record, the nature of the charge, and the accused’s past interference with the administration of justice.

PDMP’s Are Invasive Technology

The COA reasoned that although Bailey-Cobb and Toombs would not need to submit a urine sample, they would be submitting far more personal information with the patch than urinalysis testing.

“And once affixed to the body, the patch collects and retains evidence of any and all drugs ingested, regardless of whether it is prescribed or otherwise not prohibited, and the individual wearing the patch is required to go into Triton’s office every 10 to14 days to get a new patch. Additionally, the patch does not test for alcohol, which is one of the substances the court order prohibited, so it is conceivable that further testing would be required. The drug patch is also susceptible to outside environmental contamination in limited situations. Because the drug-monitoring patch is invasive and would reveal far more personal information than necessary, it is not narrowly tailored and cannot survive the Olsen balancing test.” ~WA COA

The State Does Not Have a “Special Need”  to Monitor By Imposing PDMP’s.

Next, the COA rejected the argument that the State had a “special need” to monitor the drug use of pretrial releasees via a drug-monitoring patch. “The special needs exception permits an otherwise unlawful search when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impractical,” said the COA.

“Here, the State maintains a special need exists because requiring a warrant or probable cause would jeopardize the State’s need to monitor the defendants for the sake of public safety. But our Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to apply a special needs exception under article I, section 7. See, e.g., Evans, 5 Wn.3d at 215 (declining to adopt the federal special needs exception for administrative searches of pretrial releasees); Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 410 (declining to apply the special needs exception for urinalysis testing of pretrial releasees). Like the balancing test, precedent does not support applying the special needs exception to the imposition of a drug-monitoring patch for pretrial releasees.” ~WA COA

The COA concluded there was no authority of law to impose PDMP’s.  Also, neither the compelling interest test, nor the “special needs” exception to the search warrant requirement applied. “The drug monitoring patch, and the process for obtaining the patch, reveal more personal information than necessary,” said the COA.  “Thus, the patch condition was not narrowly tailored, and not lawful.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

High Court Rules “Geofence Warrants” Constitute a Search Under 4th Amendment

In Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (Jun. 29, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Geofence Warrants constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. They acquire people’s location data from Google by linking to their cell-phone location information.

WHAT ARE “GEOFENCE WARRANTS?”

Geofence warrants are an investigative tool typically employed when law enforcement knows the approximate time and location of a crime but not the identities of suspects. In executing a geofence warrant, law enforcement compels a company to provide certain information indicating which particular smartphones were present within a geographic area during a specified time frame. Law enforcement can then use the information to potentially identify the owner of a smartphone found in the area of interest during the time frame. Because geofence warrants do not begin with an identifiable suspect, they have been said to “‘work in reverse” from traditional search warrants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Virginia. Local police officers learned from witness interviews and surveillance footage that the robber had approached the credit union from a corner of an adjacent church while appearing to talk on a cell phone, but they could not find out anything more, and the robber remained at large. On June 14, the police officers applied to a Virginia magistrate for a Geofence Warrant directed to Google.

Here, the Geofence Warrant would require Google to hand over data about the cell phones located within a 150-meter radius of the credit union—the so-called “geofence”—near the time of the crime.

The federal magistrate judge granted and issued the warrant. Through this process, Google ultimately produced three cell-phone users’ identifying information, including the Defendant Mr. Chatrie. His location data showed that he entered the geofence about ten minutes before the robbery and headed toward a residential area immediately after leaving the bank.

Following further police work, a federal grand jury charged Chatrie with robbery and related firearms offenses. He moved to suppress the information the police obtained from Google. According to Chatrie, the officers had acquired that data through a Fourth Amendment search, and the warrant ostensibly authorizing that search was invalid.

The Fourth Circuit found that the Geofence Warrant “plainly violates the rights enshrined in the Fourth] Amendment. However, it denied the motion based on the good-faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed on different reasoning, holding that no search occurred because Chatrie did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the case solely on the question whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Justice Kagan based his reasoing in Carpenter v. United States, which held that accessing cell-site location information (CSLI) constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. In Carpenter, the Court reasoned that CSLI provides a “detailed” and “encyclopedic” portrait of a person’s whereabouts, and, with that, an intimate window into a person’s life. Because people compulsively carry their cell phones all the time, the Carpenter Court explained, a cell phone tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner, and thus faithfully follows him not only through public thoroughfares but into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. The Carpenter Court further observed that the newfound tracking capacity that CSLI gives the police runs against everyone —not just those under investigation—and travels back in time, making possible a form of surveillance that would have been unknown prior to the digital age.

“Most cell-phone users have no awareness of CSLI records, and would never try to retrieve them; by contrast, Google users regularly employ Location History as a personal journal. In that way, Location History resembles other private materials – e.g., emails, documents, photographs, or calendars – that even if stored on Google’s servers, a user reasonably views as his own and expects to be shielded from the inquisitive eyes of the government.” ~Justice Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court

Against that background, Justice Kagan rejected the Government’s argument that accessing only a short amount of cell-phone location information does not count as a Fourth Amendment search fails. “Even short-term monitoring can provide a wealth of detail about a person’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” said Justice Kagan.

Next, Justice Kagan rejected the Government arguement that the so-called third-party doctrine precludes Chatrie from invoking the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The Government’s idea is that in authorizing Google to collect, retain, and use his location information, Chatrie lost his legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore his right to complain of a search. However, Justice Kagan emphasized that Carpenter refused to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI, and no good reason exists to reach a different result for Location History:

“The exposure of that information to Google is merely what happens when a user avails himself of one of the services on his cell phone. The Government’s argument that generating Location History, unlike producing CSLI, is a voluntary choice is meritless.” ~Justice Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court

With that, Justice Kagan remanded the case back to the Federal Court of Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search process, the Geofence Warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Can Ozempic Decrease Violent Behavior?

The Journal of Criminology published a study suggesting GLP-1 drugs might potentially curb people’s violent tendencies.

Scientists at Rutgers University examined nationally representative survey data that compared former and current GLP-1 users. In people currently taking GLP-1s, they found, the link between being impulsive and being more prone to violence was noticeably weaker. These potential benefits in reducing addiction likely stem from how the drugs can affect people’s sense of impulse control and reward processing.

GLP-1 DRUGS AND BEHAVIOR

GLP-1s, by virtue of treating weight loss, can treat or reduce the risk of many health conditions closely tied to obesity, such as heart disease or knee pain. Some research, however, has also indicated these drugs have behavioral effects that go beyond simply reducing a person’s appetite. Numerous studies have found evidence that GLP-1s can decrease people’s harmful cravings for alcohol or other recreational drugs, for instance.

“As criminologists and violence researchers, that caught our attention because impulsivity and alcohol use are among the most established behavioral risk factors for violence. “We wanted to explore whether GLP-1 use might be associated with changes in the relationship between those risk factors and violent behavior. To our knowledge, no previous study had examined that question directly.” ~Daniel Semenza, Director of Research at the New Jersey Gun Violence Research Center at the Rutgers School of Public Health.

THE STUDY’S METHODOLOGY

The study reviewed data collected from a nationally representative survey of 7,521 U.S. adults. They specifically looked at 821 people who reported ever having taken a GLP-1, including 597 people currently on one. People were asked questions about their alcohol use and level of impulsivity, such as whether they would enjoy being in a high-speed chase or a fistfight. They were also asked (with a guarantee of confidentiality) if they had taken part in various violent crimes sometime in the past year.

Sure enough, the researchers noticed a sizeable difference between people taking a GLP-1 and people who used GLP-1s in the past but are no longer taking them.

“Among former users, people with higher levels of impulsivity and alcohol use reported much higher levels of violent behavior, which is consistent with decades of prior research. Among current users, those relationships were much less pronounced.” ~ Daniel Semenza

Overall, the link between impulsivity and violence was about 62% weaker in current GLP-1 users, while the link between alcohol use and violence was 52% weaker. That said, after conducting further analysis, there was less clear evidence of GLP-1s specifically affecting the relationship between alcohol use and violent behavior.

My opinion? Despite the findings, scientists still have a lot to learn about how these increasingly popular drugs could affect behavior in general. We’re only beginning to understand the broader behavioral effects of these medications. Much more research is needed before drawing firm conclusions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Assault or any other violent crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Crackdown On Repeat Impaired Driving

Between Memorial Day and Labor Day, DUI arrests spike dramatically across the country. Law enforcement agencies ramp up patrols, set up more checkpoints, and dedicate extra resources to catching impaired drivers.

Earlier this year, Washington State is updated its DUI laws in ways that could have significant consequences for drivers with prior DUI convictions. One of the most important changes involves how past offenses are counted when determining whether a DUI charge rises to a felony.

EXTENDED “LOOK-BACK” PERIOR FOR PRIOR DUI’S

Under the updated law, HB 1493 updates the “look-back” period used to determine whether an impaired driving offense becomes a felony by increasing it from 10 years to 15 years. This means that if a person has three or more prior DUI or physical control convictions within the past 15 years, a subsequent impaired driving offense can be charged as a felony rather than a gross misdemeanor. Also, older convictions that would not have counted under the previous 10-year rule may now be considered in charging and sentencing.

ADDITIONAL DUI LAW CHANGES

In addition to the extended look-back period, the new law also includes the following:

  • New sentencing alternatives for some felony DUI cases, including treatment-based options aimed at addressing substance use issues.
  • Expanded options for deferred prosecution, including limited eligibility for a second deferred prosecution in certain circumstances.
  • Clarifications to ignition interlock and license processes, which may affect driving privileges and reinstatement procedures after a DUI.

WHY DO THESE CHANGES IN THE LAW MATTER?

A DUI conviction—especially a felony impaired driving charge—can carry serious penalties. Longer jail sentences, extended probation, ignition interlock device requirements, and lasting impacts on your driving record and insurance. And because the new law looks further back into a person’s history, older convictions now heavily influence how current charges are handled.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Public Defenders Join Lawsuit Against WA For Funding

Public defenders are suing.

To be more precise, the King County Department of Public Defense is joining a lawsuit by rural counties that’s already in progress. The move shows that some advocates are running out of patience with the Legislature, which earlier this year retracted a proposal to dedicate some revenue from the state’s new “millionaires tax” for public defenders.

THE PROBLEM

For years, public defenders have reasoned and pleaded with Washington lawmakers to address a crisis in the courts by dramatically increasing what the state spends to provide attorneys for poor people. Unfortunately, the lawmakers haven’t taken much action. Public Defenders now see legal action as a way to force the Legislature’s hand to fund public defense.

“You don’t want to become a pessimist and say there’s no chance, but you realize you may have to have different approaches to motivate lawmakers. Sometimes, litigation is the only way.” ~Matt Sanders, Director of King County’s Public Defense Department

THE LAWSUIT

The lawsuit began in 2023, when Lincoln, Pacific and Yakima counties and the Washington State Association of Counties accused the state of neglecting its constitutional obligations by not adequately funding public defense. The suit suffered an initial setback in 2024. At this time a Superior Court Judge dismissed it, saying the counties lacked standing. But an appeals court disagreed last year and the state Supreme Court declined to intervene.

Under Washington’s longstanding approach, the Legislature has delegated its public defense obligations to the counties. This forces the counties to shoulder almost all those expenses, which total hundreds of millions of dollars each year. The counties claim the system is broken. They argue they can’t raise enough money at the local level to provide all their defendants with adequate counsel. Although the Legislature boosted its spending last year, the counties want much more.

WHY DOES THIS MATTER?

The debate matters because funding struggles and heavy caseloads have led to attorney shortages and uneven services across Washington, sometimes depriving defendants of representation and hampering prosecutions. The state Supreme Court has scheduled lower caseloads for defenders to reduce burnout and attract more recruits over time. For some counties, the new standards could exacerbate budget and staffing woes in the short term.

My opinion? Public defenders are indeed overworked. The situation is driven by systemic underfunding, high caseloads, and the growing complexity of criminal cases. This overwork not only affects the mental health and retention of attorneys but also undermines the constitutional right to effective legal representation. We urgently need reform in the public defense system.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Study: Forest Fire Smoke Leads to Increased Criminal Activity

Summer approaches. And with it, wildfires are on the rise. In Washington State, the wildfire season usually begins in early July and typically culminates in early October when regular rain returns to the Northwest. around the globe. Ever more frequent, severe and longer lasting fire hotspots are expanding to new territories, as the fingers of climate change reach farther around the planet. This isn’t just hazardous to our physical health, it’s impacting people’s mental wellbeing as well.

Interestingly, the most insidious threat is only now being understood. New research has found that wherever the smoke goes, a rise in crime may not be far behind.

THE REPORT

Doctoral researcher Lion Kircheis is a political scientist from the University of Konstanz. He analysed crime report data from the Seattle Police Department from 2013 to 2023, and identified smoky days caused by wildfires on the basis of satellite data, analyses of wind direction and local monitoring stations.

What he found surprised him. According to his report, For 11 years, assaults were higher on days when nearby wildfires had released smoke and particulate matter into the Seattle air. anD when the particulate matter increased by 7.0 μg m−3, there were 3.6 per cent more assaults on these smoky days.

“That’s equivalent to around one additional assault per day in a city the size of Seattle. The statistical increase of 3.6 per cent is not high but, crucially, it is consistent. On those days, when air pollution is up by 7.0 μg m−3, it’s not as if the sun gets blocked by a thick haze of smoke or anything – the air still looks clear. But what is striking is that even a little bit of smoke in the air has an impact on people.” ~Lion Kircheis, Political Scientist

Kircheis looked for any other likely causes for the increase in violence, such as more traffic jams or an increase in police response time. But neither of these were the case. Interestingly, domestic violence call numbers didn’t rise when wildfire smoke was present. That suggests that outdoor exposure to wildfire smoke was the culprit – not indoor air pollution.

And, of course, socio-economic background then comes into play – although we might think we all breathe the same air, it’s not the case for those who work outdoors or do not have access to filtered indoor air.

This doesn’t mean the average person will become more violent just because they’re inhaling invisible wildfire smoke. What is more likely is that aggressive conflicts will spill over into violent actions when there is wildfire-induced smoke in the air. And it’s not just civilians who are susceptible. Police statistics suggest that officers in Seattle responded with more physical force on those smoky days.

The findings are supported by another study that used crime data from 21 major US cities from 2007 to 2020. This research showed that violent and drug-related crimes were particularly prevalent when wildfire smoke was in the air, with a 0.88 per cent increase in violent offences and a 1.35 per cent rise in drug-related crimes.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime during wildfire season. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

U.S. Supreme Court Sides With Death Row Inmate in Challenge to Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

In Pitchford v. Cain, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Black death row inmate’s criminal conviction and death sentence. By a vote of 5-4, the court agreed with Defendant Terry Pitchford that the judge at his 2006 trial had not properly analyzed whether the prosecutor in Pitchford’s case violated the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination in jury selection.

Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s  Batson v. Kentucky held the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor employed a peremptory challenge based on race.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

in 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed agrocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agree–ment and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty. During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors.

Pitchford’s counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie showing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial court declared the prosecutor’s stated reasons to be race neutral, but the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three). Nor did it make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual.

At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off defense counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and1 black juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitchford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual.

Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court. Applying the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state court had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the trial court had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to argue pretext.” The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was reasonable. The United States Supreme Court granted review.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit’s decision and sent the case back to the lower courts. Justice Kavanaugh’s delivered the majority opinion. His analysis in his opinion for the majority was succinct. “After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike,” he explained, “the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual.” Here, however, Kavanaugh emphasized that the Batson analysis was not correctly or accurately provided:

“Whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson objection.” ~U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh

Kavanaugh conceded that, in cases involving AEDPA, federal courts normally are “deferential to the state court. But deference does not mean abdication,” he stressed. And here, “the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

City of Bellingham to Lower Speed Limits

The Bellingham City Council recently voted to lower speed limits 5 to 10 mph. This means slower speeds in most neighborhoods, including arterial streets and in the downtown core.

THE DATA

In recommending the new speed limits, Public Works officials sought guidance from the “City Limits” report prepared by the National Association of City Transportation Officials. The data included the following information:

  • Over the past decade, the total number of crashes on Bellingham roads has declined, but their severity has risen.
  • From 2015 to 2019, there were five traffic deaths on Bellingham streets. That includes a 2017 crash that killed a bicyclist.
  • From 2020-2024, there were 15 traffic fatalities, including 10 bicyclists and pedestrians. Two people have been killed on Bellingham streets so far this year, including one pedestrian.
  • Bellingham has 670 “lane miles” of streets.
  • More than half of Bellingham streets have a 25 mph speed limit, and more than a third of its streets have a 35 mph limit.
  • Only 3% or streets have a limit of 50 mph or higher.
  • Lowering speed limits will require a change in city policy, which now uses a system that sets speeds as a function of how fast 85% of drivers are going on a particular street.

WILL DECREASING SPEED LIMITS LEAD TO INCREASED PRETEXTUAL POLICE STOPS?

Probabaly, yes. A pretextual traffic stop happens when a police officer pulls someone over for a minor traffic or equipment violation to try and find evidence of another more serious crime. The legality of these stops is highly controversial, relying on deeply established federal law and evolving state-specific restrictions.

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS
  • Duration Limits: Officers cannot legally prolong a routine traffic stop beyond the time it takes to issue a warning or citation unless they develop a new, independent suspicion of a crime.
  • Consent to Search: You have the right to refuse a search of your vehicle unless the officer has probable cause or a warrant.
  • Legal Defense: Because these stops walk a fine line, experienced criminal defense lawyers often challenge the validity of the initial stop or the scope of the officer’s search in court

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a driving-related crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Admitting Evidence of “Common Scheme or Plan” Under Evidence Rule 404(b)

In  State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5 (Mar. 26, 2026), the WA Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may be admissible under ER 404(b) to show “common scheme or plan” if the prior bad acts were markedly similar to the charged crimes.  Also, the victims in the prior bad acts do not need to be markedly similar to each other for the prior bad acts to be admissible to show common scheme or plan.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Crystal Williams, a 33-year-old Black woman, was found dead in Lavizzo Park in Seattle’s Central District. Ms. Williams worked as a sex worker. Six years later, the Defendant Mr. Stearns’ DNA matched the DNA in the semen found at the crime scene. Police interviewed Mr. Stearns, who was then serving time in prison for another crime. The prosecutor determined there was probable cause to charge Mr. Stearns with Ms. Williams’ murder but failed to bring charges until 12 years later.

The State charged Mr. Stearns with felony murder in the first degree, based on first- and second-degree rape, with sexual motivation. At trial, the State offered, and the court admitted over Mr. Stearns’ objection, evidence of two of Mr. Stearns’ prior rape convictions. The State sought to admit these prior acts under the common scheme or plan exception to ER 404(b) to establish forcible compulsion and to rebut the defense of consent. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the other wrongful acts were not part of a common scheme or plan and that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.

The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice and that the court would give a limiting instruction to the jury about the purpose of the admitted evidence. The trial court stated that the ER 404(b) evidence’s relevance to prove forcible compulsion and rebut Mr. Stearns’ claim of consent was “critical” to its ruling.  The trial resulted in a hung jury. After numerous appeals and reversals, the WA Supreme Court granted certiori to decide the isue of The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior rapes under ER 404(b) to establish forcible compulsion and to rebut the defense of consent.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court discussed the parameters of Evidence Rule (ER) 404(b). Under this evidence rule, a trial court may admit the defendant’s other wrongful acts to show a common plan or scheme if the other wrongful acts are (1) proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) admitted for the purpose of proving a common plan or scheme, (3) relevant to prove an element of the crime charged or to rebut a defense, and (4) more probative than prejudicial. However, the WA Supreme Court also said a court may not admit evidence of a defendant’s other wrongful acts to show that the defendant has a propensity for criminal behavior. ER 404(b). The reason for this prohibition is the risk that the jury will simply punish a defendant for their other wrongful acts or will assume they committed the current alleged criminal act.

Next, the WA Supreme Court reasoned that when analyzing a defendant’s “common scheme or plan,” courts must consider the acts, the victims and the circumstances of the crimes. On this, the Court reasoned that evidence may be admitted under this exception when a person uses one plan to repeatedly commit separate but very similar crimes. The separate crimes do not have to be identical, but they must be markedly similar acts of misconduct against similar victims under similar circumstances. Further, the acts must have such a concurrence of common features that they are naturally explained as being part of a common plan.

Against that backdrop, the WA Supreme Court ruled that because Mr. stearns’ other acts of sexual assault were sufficiently similar to the present case, it was within the trial court’s discretion to admit that evidence under ER 404(b). First, the other wrongful acts committed by Mr. Stearns were markedly similar to the acts here: he hit each victim on the head, strangled them, and sexually assaulted them, and there is evidence that all three victims were robbed. This factor weighs strongly toward showing a common plan, said the Court.

Second, the dissimilarities between the victims do not weigh heavily in this case. Each woman was a victim of a seemingly random act of violence, who was attacked in Seattle’s Central District in a similar manner. These similarities between the victims are sufficient. Finally, the circumstances of the crimes in this case were similar in that Mr. Stearns was able to attack each victim by tricking them:

“Mr. Stearns entered BG’s home around midnight with a ruse, telling her someone was chasing him. Mr. Stearns attacked DH from behind after appearing to be passed out and lying in the gutter. While many details of Crystal Williams’ death are unknown, based on the circumstances it is likely the killer approached Ms. Williams under the guise of offering drugs or money for sex.” ~Justice Salvador A. Mungia, WA Supreme Court

With that, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Mr. Stearns’ conviction.

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