Category Archives: felony

Vehicular Homicide Conviction Prohibits Defendants From Owning or Possessing Firearms

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Judge Rules Bruen Doesn't Protect Felons' 2A Rights - Firearms News

(rawf8 / Shutterstock photo)

In State v. Hamilton, No. 85055-5-I (March 17, 2025), the WA Court of Appeals decided that disarming those convicted of Vehicular Homicide  is consistent with the United States’ historic tradition of firearms regulation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Hamilton was convicted of Vehicular Homicide after a jury trial. Due to his felony conviction, the court notified Hamilton that he could no longer possess firearms. He was ordered to immediately surrender his concealed pistol license and any firearms in his possession. The court also imposed conditions forbidding him from owning, using, or possessing a firearm or ammunition, consistent with the prohibition set out under statute.

On appeal, Hamilton argued that Washington’s statutes restricting his firearms post-conviction violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) discussed numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing Second Amendment. These decision include New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi. In applying stare decisis, the COA ultimately held that the overwhelming majority of courts addressing statutes that ban convicted felons from possessing firearms have rejected the contention that such laws are now unconstitutional. Next, the COA addressed Hamilton challenging the as-applied constitutionality of several Washington statutes that work in conjunction to strip a person’s right to bear arms upon conviction for a felony.

” . . . We conclude that disarming those with felony convictions is demonstrably consistent with America’s historic tradition of firearms regulation. Common law has a long history of disarming individuals, or categories of individuals, who were viewed as a danger to public order . . . The historical justification for felon bans reveals one controlling principal that applies to each historical period: violent or otherwise dangerous persons could be disarmed . . .”

“Groups of people who were categorized as presenting a danger to the public order during that era of our nation’s history included American Indians, Catholics, Quakers, slaves, and freed Black people. Such restrictions are repugnant and would fail modern constitutional scrutiny, but they nevertheless demonstrate historical precedent for restricting the firearms rights of persons perceived to be dangerous.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Finally, the COA addressed Hamilton’s argument that his felony conviction involved a “tragic accident” rather than the actual use of a firearm or political activity. The COA reasoined that Hamilton nevertheless committed a felony offense that resulted in the death of another person. As a result, reasoned the COA, his behavior places him squarely in the category of persons deemed dangerous to the public order for the purpose of historical firearms regulation.

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Hamilton’s criminal conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Search Warrant For Marijuana Grow Operation

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, marijuana, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

indoor marijuana growing property insurance

In State v. Le, No. 58336-4-II (Mar. 11, 2025)., the WA Court of Appeals held that a search warrant for an illegal cannabis grow operation does not need to include information that police checked the legal status of the grow operation and confirmed whether or not the operation is/was registered with the State.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 2017, law enforcement in Thurston County began investigating a possible illegal marijuana grow operation involving four properties. After investigating and surveilling the properties, law enforcement applied for search warrants. The warrant affidavit described the investigation and outlined numerous facts to establish probable cause. A superior court judge issued the warrants. Officers searched the four properties pursuant to the warrant and discovered over 1,000 marijuana plants. They also recovered tools, equipment, and supplies used to grow and package marijuana.

Officers arrested Ms. Le and her codefendants. The State charged Le with Drug Offenses to include unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. Le moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. She argued that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. She also argued that the affidavit did not sufficiently support probable cause because it did not indicate that officers checked the legal status of the marijuana grow operation. The trial court denied Le’s motions to suppress.

A jury found Le guilty of both counts. On appeal, Le argued thatargues that law enforcement was required to check whether the grow operations were legal and registered with the State and include that information in the affidavit.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals held that the facts in the affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause to search the properties involved. First, the affidavit described vehicle traffic and movements “consistent with individuals involved in the manufacture of marijuana.” Second, the affidavit notes that police reported smelling the odor of “fresh growing marijuana” at the defendant’s properties. Third, the affidavit outlines unusually high energy consumption at the four properties. Fourth, the affidavit stated that individuals involved in marijuana grow operations “often put the power in other people’s names to help avoid detection and investigation.” Finally, the investigations discussed in the affidavit revealed that although Ms. Le reported no income, she and other co-defendants purchased multiple homes, paid significantly high energy bills, made home improvements, and purchased multiple vehicles.

“We hold that the facts outlined in the affidavit, when viewed together, established probable cause to search all four properties, regardless of the fact that the odor of marijuana was only detected at two of the four properties.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Further, the Court of Appeals held that the search warrant was valid even though the affidavit did not indicate whether the marijuana grow operations were legal and registered with the state. In short, the Court of Appeals held Ms. Le lacked legal authority to support the argument:

“The State, in response, correctly notes that no case has held that a search warrant application must affirm, as a precondition to a finding of probable cause, that officers searched the medical cannabis authorization database to confirm that the suspect does not hold a registration.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Additionally, the Court reasoned that a suspect’s presence in the registry does not mean that their possession or use of marijuana is, in all respects, lawful. Moreover, each of the locations named in the search warrant application were single-family residences. Under the law, the Liquor Control Board cannot approve a license to process cannabis at a personal residence.

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Ms. Le’s convictions.

Please review my Search & Seizure Guideline and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Most Americans Cannot Believe Violent Crime is Decreasing

Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Studies, Violent Crime, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Reported violent crime rate in the U.S. 2022 | Statista

In an article from NPR, journalists , and report that Americans can’t believe that violent crime is decreasing.

In 2020, the United States experienced one of its most dangerous years in decades. According to FBI statistics, the number of murders across the country surged by nearly 30% between 2019 and 2020, The overall violent crime rate, which includes murder, assault, robbery and rape, inched up around 5% in the same period.

But in 2023, crime in America looked very different.

VIOLENCE HAS DROPPED

“At some point in 2022 — at the end of 2022 or through 2023 — there was just a tipping point where violence started to fall and it just continued to fall . . . The national picture shows that murder is falling. We have data from over 200 cities showing a 12.2% decline in 2023 relative to 2022.” ~Jeff Asher, a crime analyst and co-founder of AH Datalytics.

Citing his own analysis of public data, Mr. Asher also found instances of rape, robbery and aggravated assault were all down too. Yet when you ask people about crime in the country, the perception is it’s getting a lot worse.

THE GALLUP POLL

A Gallup poll released in November found 77% of Americans believed there was more crime in the country than the year before. And 63% felt there was either a “very” or “extremely” serious crime problem — the highest in the poll’s history going back to 2000. So what’s going on?

WHY IS VIOLENT CRIME DECREASING?

For cities like San Francisco, Baltimore and Minneapolis, there may be different factors at play. And in some instances, it comes as the number of police officers declines, too.

Baltimore police are chronically short of their recruitment goal, and as of last September had more than 750 vacant positions, according to a state audit report. In Minneapolis, police staffing has plummeted. According to the Star Tribune, there are about 560 active officers — down from nearly 900 in 2019.

In Minneapolis, the city is putting more financial resources into nontraditional policing initiatives. The Department of Neighborhood Safety, which addresses violence through a public health lens, received $22 million in the 2024 budget. And in San Francisco, police there say they’ve been better at making arrests.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a violent crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

9th Circuit: Harassment is a Crime of Violence

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Federal Crimes & Prosecutions, felony, Harassment, Immigration, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Immigration Courts Further Limit Legal Help Available to People Facing Deportation

In Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Washington conviction for Harassment is a crime of violence. This is because the statute requires the “threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” As such, being convicted of Harassment risks deportatation for non-citizens.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2015, Rodriguez-Hernandez was an immigrant living in the United States. He served with a notice to appear alleging removability on the basis that he was not admitted or paroled into the United States (U.S.). Apparently, he faced persecution in Mexico due to threats made against his family. Rodriguez-Hernandez applied for cancellation of removal and sought asylum in the U.S.

Among other things, the 9th Circuit addressed whether Rodriguez-Hernandez’s Harassment conviction was for a crime of violence under federal law.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The 9th Circuit began by saying that a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is a deportable offense. It also discussed Washington’s Harassment statute in depth as follows:

RCW § 9A.46.020(1) provides that: (1) A person is guilty of harassment if: (a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens: (i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (iii) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or (iv) Maliciously to do any other act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety; and (b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out (emphasis supplied).

Next, the 9th Circuit addressed whether Harassment was a violent offense:

“A crime of violence requires physical force against the person or property of another . . . However, a crime of violence “does not require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality. The standard is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. . . .”  ~9th Circuit Court of Appeals

With that reasoning, the 9th Circuit held that Rodriguez-Hernandez’ threats against his family were, in fact, crimes of violence. Therefore, because Rodriguez-Hernandez was convicted of a crime of violence, he was ineligible for cancellation of removal or asylum.

My opinion?

The 9th Circuit’s Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Garland, certainly makes Washington’s Harassment statute far more egrigious for citizens and non-citizens alike. It could possibly have the following impacts and consequences on current charges:

  • Misdemeanor harassment with a DV tag is now a deportable “crime of domestic violence,” regardless of sentence.
  • Felony harassment, under any subsection, with a sentence imposed of one year or more will be an aggravated felony “crime of violence.” [Previously only the “threaten to kill” subsection had been held to be a “crime of violence.”]
  • Felony harassment-DV will be a deportable “crime of domestic violence” regardless of sentence imposed.

Even worse, the decision could have terribly negative impacts on non-citizens with prior convictions:

  • Misdemeanor harassment-DV convictions:
    • If conviction occurred prior to July 22, 2011 and the sentence imposed (regardless of time suspended) was 365 days it will be an aggravated felony “crime of violence.” Aggravated felonies carry the most severe immigration consequences and bar eligibility for any discretionary relief from removal.
    • Regardless of date of conviction, it may now be deemed a deportable crime of domestic violence.
  • Felony harassment convictions:
    • Any felony harassment conviction with a sentence imposed (regardless of time suspended) of one year or more may be deemed an aggravated felony crime of violence. Previously, only felony harassment “threat to kill” was considered an aggravated felony crime of violence.
    • Any felony harassment-DV conviction may now be deemed a deportable crime of domestic violence, regardless of sentence.

How this decision impacts individual non-citizen defendants will depend on their current immigration status, their immigration and criminal history, and other individual circumstances. For case-specific information please consult with other immigration counsel knowledgeable in the interplay between criminal and immigration law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Rapid Recidivism” Sentencing Aggravator Upheld

Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sentencing, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Vehicular Homicide, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Unusual Jail Sentences: When the Punishment Really Fits the Crime - A&E True Crime

In State v. Jackson, the WA Court of Appeals held the Sentencing Aggravator of committing a criminal current offense shortly after release from incarceration on a different criminal conviction was not inappropriate. The sentencing aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague simply because “shortly after” is not defined.  Also, committing Vehicular Homicide and Felony Hit and Run only 93 days after release from incarceration constituted “shortly after.”

BACKGROUND FACTS

On November 11, 2015, Mr. Jackson crashed his vehicle into a large power vault while driving under the influence of alcohol. A passenger in the vehicle died instantly from skull fractures and brain avulsion as a result of the “extremely high speed crash. The vehicle was traveling at nearly 80 miles per hour, significantly higher than the posted 25 mile per hour speed limit, when the collision occurred. Jackson’s blood alcohol content was later calculated to have been between .135g/100mL and .22g/100mL. Jackson fled the scene without reporting the collision or seeking medical care for his passenger. He also evaded police until the next morning, when he “aggressively resisted arrest.”

Following a bench trial, Jackson was convicted of Vehicular Homicide and Felony Hit and Run. The superior court found that these offenses had occurred “shortly after” Jackson’s release from incarceration on August 10, 2015. Accordingly, the court determined that, as to both convictions, the aggravating circumstance of rapid recidivism applied. At the time, Jackson had two prior felony convictions, including a conviction of second degree robbery.

For those who don’t know, Prosecutors can offer evidence of aggravating factors that would merit a harsh sentence during trial. Criminal statutes often identify specific factors that should result in harsher punishments. A common aggravating factor is a prior record of similar convictions. Other aggravating factors typically relate to the circumstances of the offense itself, such as the use of a weapon or the severity of the injuries suffered by a victim. With the exception of prior convictions, a court may not use aggravating factors to impose a harsher sentence than usual unless the jury found those factors to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on these prior convictions, the sentencing court imposed an exceptional upward sentence on Mr. Jackson based on aggravating factors. It determined that Jackson was a persistent offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. The court also determined that an exceptional sentence was appropriate and imposed a sentence of 400 months of incarceration.

Jackson appealled, in part, on arguments that the aggravating circumstance of rapid recidivism is unconstitutionally vague. He further asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he committed the offenses “shortly after being released from incarceration” under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). Thus, he argued, the court erroneously imposed an exceptional sentence based on the rapid recidivism aggravator.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under WA’s Sentencing Aggravator Statute, a sentencing court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence based on a finding that the defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration. It also acknowledged, however, the term “shortly after” is nowhere defined in the statute.

“When a statute does not define terms alleged to be unconstitutionally vague, we may look to existing law, ordinary usage, and the general purpose of the statute to determine whether the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity,” said the Court of Appeals. It further reasoned that here, Jackson committed the current offenses on November 11, 2015, after being released from incarceration on August 10, 2015—a period of 93 days. He needed to demonstrate that a person of reasonable understanding would have to guess that reoffending 93 days after release from incarceration would subject the defendant to an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). “Jackson has not done so,” said the Court of Appeals. “Accordingly, the rapid recidivism aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.”

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed Jackson’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of the rapid recidivism aggravator because he committed “impulse crimes” that are unrelated to his prior offenses”

“Here, Jackson committed offenses while highly intoxicated that resulted in the violent death of another person. He then sought to avoid accountability by fleeing the scene and aggressively resisting arrest when later discovered. He did so only 93 days after his release from incarceration. Whether Jackson’s conduct constituted rapid recidivism is a question for the finder of fact. Plainly, some rational fact finders could conclude that Jackson committed the current offenses “shortly after” his release from incarceration, and that such conduct evidenced disdain for the law, rendering Jackson particularly culpable in committing those offenses. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the resentencing court’s rapid recidivism finding.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jackson’s claims on appeal were without merit. The Court affirmed his exceptional sentence imposed by the lower court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ross: Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms Statute Is Constitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Philadelphia Law Firm, Kenny, Burns & McGill | New District Court Opinion on Felons and Gun Ownership

In State v. Ross, the WA Court of Appeals held that the Second Amendment does not bar the state from criminalizing the possession of firearms by felons. Consequently, Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree statute is constitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Ross was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree. His conviction was based on a prior 2010 conviction for second degree burglary. Unfortunately for Ross, his burglary conviction is a defined “serious offense” under WA’s Sentencing Reform Act.

Ross appealed. He argued that under the Second Amendment and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, Washington’s Firearms Statute RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court began with a critique of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The Court recognized, however, that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court identified several longstanding prohibitions, including possession by felons:

“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” ~WA Court of Appeals quoting District of Columbia v. Heller.

Next, the Court of Appeals analayzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. In Bruen, the Supreme Court considered and struck down New York’s regulatory licensing program requiring applicants to prove that they had “proper cause” to carry a handgun in public.

The WA Court of Appeals emphasized that Bruen was intentionally drafted to be limited in its scope. As a result, Bruen did not overrule Washington’s own time-stested caselaw on the subject matter:

“Indeed, at least 11 times the majority referenced the Second Amendment right of “law-abiding” citizens . . . Of the six justices in the majority, three wrote or joined in concurring opinions clarifying the scope of their decision. We hold that consistent with Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, the Second Amendment does not bar the state from prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons as it has done in RCW 9.41.040(1). RCW 9.41.040(1) is facially constitutional.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

Next the WA Court of Appeals adressed Ross’s argument that because his underlying crime of second degree burglary was nonviolent,  RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

“We disagree for two reasons,” said the Court. First, Ross’s attempt to distinguish violent and nonviolent felons is of his own construct. There are no prior court opinions distinguishing violent felons from nonviolent felons. Second, the legislature has defined second degree burglary as a violent crime:

“The prohibition on possession of firearms under RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) applies to any person previously convicted of “any serious offense.” A “serious offense” is defined by the same statute to include “[a]ny crime of violence.” RCW 9.41.010(42)(a). And a “crime of violence” is defined to include burglary in the second degree . . . Ross offers no support for the proposition that the legislature did not intend to define burglary in the second degree as a serious offense and a crime of violence.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Ross’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Drivers Can’t Consent to Police Searching a Passenger’s Belongings

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs? | The New Republic

In State v. Garner, No. 56861-6-II (2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that a driver’s consent to search their car does not extend to searching the contents of closed containers inside the car that do not belong to the driver.

BACKGROUND FACTS

A police officer arrested Mr. Garner on an outstanding warrant after stopping a car and encountering Garner as a passenger. Garner tried to flee on foot but the officer apprehended him. After placing Garner under arrest, the officer spoke with the car’s driver, who said Garner left three backpacks behind in her car. The officer asked the driver for permission to search the car and she granted it.

The officer then searched Garner’s backpacks without requesting his permission and found controlled substances. Later testing established that the controlled substances found in the backpacks were 86.9 grams of methamphetamine and 3.8 grams of heroin.

The State charged Garner with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before trial, Garner moved to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his backpacks. The trial court denied Garner’s suppression motion. After a bench trial, the trial court found Garner guilty of both counts of possession with intent to deliver.

On appeal, Mr. Garner argued that the trial court improperly denied his suppression motion.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the WA Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted Garner’s suppression motion. It reasoned that a person’s bag or closed container heightened protection under the federal and state constitutions. It emphasized that the Washington Supreme Court has also recognized an expectation of privacy in purses, briefcases, and other traditional containers of personal belongings.

Here, the defendant passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the backpacks he left inside the car when he fled from the police during a traffic stop.  He did not abandon the backpacks or relinquish his privacy interest in them because he was in the vehicle with permission, and took steps to conceal the backpacks from the officer before fleeing.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that that the driver’s consent to search her car did not extend to Garner’s backpacks.

“Garner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpacks. And while Washington case law does not squarely address whether a passenger has a reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in another’s car, our cases point to the conclusion that Garner did not relinquish his expectation of privacy when he left his backpacks in the driver’s car. Unlike the defendant in Samalia, Garner did not leave his backpacks in a stolen car. He left them in a car he had occupied with the driver’s permission.”

“And unlike the defendant in Reynolds, he did not remove the backpacks from the car and leave them on the road. Rather, Garner, who lacked housing, left his belongings with a person he knew. Moreover, Garner never disclaimed ownership of the backpacks. He took the time to put two of the backpacks on the vehicle’s rear floorboard and tried stowing the third backpack under the driver’s seat. The circumstances lend themselves to the conclusion that he intended to safeguard the backpacks until he could recover them.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Garner’s convictions because the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. This is especially true if Search and Seizure issues are involved. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

New Bill Strengthens Prosecution of Hate Crimes

Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Hate Crimes, Legislation, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Race & Law, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Say No To Hate Crimes - City of Renton

A bill passed in Washington is expanding the state’s definition of a hate crime and strengthens the ability to prosecute those crimes. Governor Jay Inslee signed Senate Bill 5623 into law on April 6 after it was passed with overwhelming support in the House and Senate earlier this year.

“This bill takes the common sense step of recategorizing hate crimes as crimes against a person and also provides our communities with the justice they deserve in the wake of these traumatic crimes.” ~ King County Prosecuting Attorney Leesa Manion

Senator Manka Dhingra sponsored the legislation. She states that Hate Crime offenses are reclassified as crimes against persons. The bill also replaces the phrase “physical injury” with “assault” in the definition of Hate Crime to account for more situations. Assaults that are meant to intimidate and demean, like spitting on someone, will now be grounds for prosecution as a Hate Crime.

ESB 5623 modifies the conduct that constitutes a Hate Crime offense to include when a person maliciously and intentionally assaults a victim because of the person’s perception of certain characteristics about the victim. Including the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or disability.

SB 5623 will allow courts to impose therapeutic treatment for offenders meant to rehabilitate them. This is something that the victims of hate crimes often ask for in court. The bill also expands the definition of a hate crime. Right now, assaults have to result in a physical injury for it to be considered a hate crime.

Under the new bill, assaults that are meant to intimidate or demean but don’t result in injury can be considered a hate crime. An example of that would be spitting on someone. Supporters of the bill say hate crimes are corrosive to society and make communities feel unwelcome.

In Washington state, there were more than 500 hate crimes committed against a person in 2021, according to the Department of Justice. Their data shows the biggest motivators of hate crimes are largely race and ethnicity, followed by sexual orientation and then religion.

If prosecuted for a Hate Crime offense, the trier of fact may infer that a person intended to threaten a victim if the person committed one of the following acts:

  • Burns a cross on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of African American heritage.
  • Defaces the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika.
  • Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property.
  • Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated.
  • Damages, destroys or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim’s person without the victim’s authorization.
  • Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.

Words alone do not constitute a Hate Crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a Hate Crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.

A Hate Crime offense is a class C felony and is punishable by a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. In addition, the victim of a Hate Crime offense may bring a civil cause of action against the perpetrator. Claims can include actual damages, punitive damages of up to $100,000, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The bill will go into effect this summer, on July 23.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Hotel Room Hosts Can’t Consent To Police Searching Other Guest’s Bags

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, felony, Fourth Amendment, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Single-use plastic bags will be banned in Colorado by 2024 with bag fees set to start in 2023 under new law

In State v. Giberson, No. 56081-0-II (April 4, 2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that the host of a hotel room lacks authority allowing police to search a guest’s grocery bags located inside the room.  A person has a reasonable privacy interest in grocery bags, which are are “traditional repositories of personal belongings.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May of 2020, police received a tip from a confidential informant that Mr. Giberson planned a drug deal at a nearby motel. Police journeyed to the motel. They conducted surveillance of room #106. Police contacted a person named Mr. Goedker after Goedker departed room #106.

Goedker stated that he was the sole occupant of motel room #106. He said he had been residing there for approximately 10 days. He stated that the defendant Mr. Giberson had stopped by earlier that day. Giberson and a person named Ms. Hopkins remained in the room. Goedker said that there were bags in the motel room belonging to Giberson.

Police opened the door to Room #106. They saw Giberson and an associate sitting at a table. Both Giberson and the associate were detained and removed from the room.

The detectives then searched two plastic grocery bags on the floor next to the door. Inside one of the grocery bags they found a digital scale and two baggies containing heroin.  After searching the bags, police asked Goedker if they belonged to him. Goedker denied ownership and stated that the bags belonged to Giberson.

The State charged Giberson with possession of heroin with the intent to deliver. Before trial, Giberson moved to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the plastic grocery bags. The trial court denied the suppression motion. It reasoned that Gibson lacked standing to challenge the search of his bags. Ultimately, the court also found Giberson guilty as charged. Giberson appealed his conviction. He argued that the search of his grocery bags was unlawful because Goedker could not give consent to search his possessions.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Giberson had standing to challenge the search of his bags.

“A defendant has automatic standing under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution to challenge a search when (1) possession is an essential element of the charged offense and (2) the defendant was in possession of the item searched at the time of the challenged search,” said the Court. Here, Giberson has automatic standing to challenge the search. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that Giberson did not have standing.

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the search of Gibson’s bags was lawful.

The Court reasoned that warrantless searches are unlawful under the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Valid consent is an exception allowing for a warrantless search. However, consent to search an area does not necessarily provide authorization to search belongings of a third person inside the area. Here, Goedker did not own, possess, or control Giberson’s grocery bags. Therefore, Goedker did not have authority to consent to the search of Giberson’s bags.

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that a search is unconstitutional if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched.  Here, Giberson clearly sought to preserve as private the drugs and digital scale by placing them in his grocery bag. The Court addressed whether Giberson had a privacy interest in storing his belongngs in plastic bags:

“Grocery bags can be characterized as ‘traditional repositories of personal belongings.” People certainly put personal grocery items and other personal items obtained in a grocery store like prescription medications in such bags. And common experience tells us that people also use grocery bags to carry other personal items. For example, this may be true for people such as those experiencing homelessness who may not have space for their personal items. Giberson reasonably could expect that others would not search his grocery bags without his consent. Therefore, we conclude that Giberson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grocery bags.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded that Goedker’s authority to give consent to search his hotel room did not extend to the search of Giberson’s grocery bags. Furthermore, Giberson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those bags. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the heroin and digital scale found in the search of the grocery bags. Giberson’s conviction was reversed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Hands Are Not An “Instrument or Thing” Used to Prove Assault Third Degree

Assault, Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Fold Your Hands — Coffee + Crumbs

In State v. Altman, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction for Assault Third Degree because there was no evidence that the defendant used anything other than his hands to assault the victim.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The victim A.W. alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Mr. Altman. The State charged Altman with second degree assault with sexual motivation, alleging he intentionally assaulted A.W. by strangulation or suffocation. Alternatively, the State charged Altman with third degree assault with sexual motivation for causing bodily harm to A.W. by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm. The State also charged Altman with second degree rape and unlawful imprisonment with sexual motivation

During closing arguments, the State argued that Altman’s hands were a “thing” used to
support a lesser alternative charge of third degree assault:

“I submit to you the State is not saying that there was a weapon used in this case. I submit to you that we’re not saying there was an instrument that was used in this case. However, it also says it can be from a thing likely to produce bodily harm. And I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, a thing can be anything.” State Prosecutor.

The jury found Altman not guilty of second degree rape, second degree assault by
strangulation with sexual motivation, and unlawful imprisonment with sexual motivation.
However, the jury found Altman guilty of a lesser alternative charge of third degree assault. Mr. Altman appealed on arguments that the evidence was insufficient to show that he assaulted A.W. with an “instrument or thing.”

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began with a discussion of the elements required to prove Assault Third Degree. In short, a person is guilty if he “causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.”

“The issue here is whether a hand meets the statutory requirement of “other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm,” said the Court. The Court reviewed State v. Marohl, as reliable caselaw precedent. In Marohl, the court suggested that a casino floor could fall within the statute if it was used to smash someone’s head. Also, the Marohl court applied the dictionary definition to “instrument” and “thing,” describing both as:

“Here, in light of Marohl’s definition of “instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm, hands do not qualify. The State relied solely on Altman’s hands to support the lesser alternative charge of third degree assault. Hands are not a “utensil” or “implement.” Nor are hands “an inanimate object.” Instead, hands are an extension of a person.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that there is no other evidence that Altman used anything other than his hands when grabbing and squeezing A.W.’s neck. Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the essential element of “a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm” for third degree assault.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Altman’s conviction for third degree assault with prejudice.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Assault or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.



Alexander F. Ransom

Attorney at Law
Criminal Defense Lawyer

119 North Commercial St.
Suite #1420
Bellingham, WA 98225

117 North 1st Street
Suite #27
Mount Vernon, WA 98273

Phone: (360) 746-2642
Fax: (360) 746-2949

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