Category Archives: felony

“Rapid Recidivism” Sentencing Aggravator Upheld

Unusual Jail Sentences: When the Punishment Really Fits the Crime - A&E True Crime

In State v. Jackson, the WA Court of Appeals held the Sentencing Aggravator of committing a criminal current offense shortly after release from incarceration on a different criminal conviction was not inappropriate. The sentencing aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague simply because “shortly after” is not defined.  Also, committing Vehicular Homicide and Felony Hit and Run only 93 days after release from incarceration constituted “shortly after.”

BACKGROUND FACTS

On November 11, 2015, Mr. Jackson crashed his vehicle into a large power vault while driving under the influence of alcohol. A passenger in the vehicle died instantly from skull fractures and brain avulsion as a result of the “extremely high speed crash. The vehicle was traveling at nearly 80 miles per hour, significantly higher than the posted 25 mile per hour speed limit, when the collision occurred. Jackson’s blood alcohol content was later calculated to have been between .135g/100mL and .22g/100mL. Jackson fled the scene without reporting the collision or seeking medical care for his passenger. He also evaded police until the next morning, when he “aggressively resisted arrest.”

Following a bench trial, Jackson was convicted of Vehicular Homicide and Felony Hit and Run. The superior court found that these offenses had occurred “shortly after” Jackson’s release from incarceration on August 10, 2015. Accordingly, the court determined that, as to both convictions, the aggravating circumstance of rapid recidivism applied. At the time, Jackson had two prior felony convictions, including a conviction of second degree robbery.

For those who don’t know, Prosecutors can offer evidence of aggravating factors that would merit a harsh sentence during trial. Criminal statutes often identify specific factors that should result in harsher punishments. A common aggravating factor is a prior record of similar convictions. Other aggravating factors typically relate to the circumstances of the offense itself, such as the use of a weapon or the severity of the injuries suffered by a victim. With the exception of prior convictions, a court may not use aggravating factors to impose a harsher sentence than usual unless the jury found those factors to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on these prior convictions, the sentencing court imposed an exceptional upward sentence on Mr. Jackson based on aggravating factors. It determined that Jackson was a persistent offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. The court also determined that an exceptional sentence was appropriate and imposed a sentence of 400 months of incarceration.

Jackson appealled, in part, on arguments that the aggravating circumstance of rapid recidivism is unconstitutionally vague. He further asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he committed the offenses “shortly after being released from incarceration” under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). Thus, he argued, the court erroneously imposed an exceptional sentence based on the rapid recidivism aggravator.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under WA’s Sentencing Aggravator Statute, a sentencing court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence based on a finding that the defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration. It also acknowledged, however, the term “shortly after” is nowhere defined in the statute.

“When a statute does not define terms alleged to be unconstitutionally vague, we may look to existing law, ordinary usage, and the general purpose of the statute to determine whether the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity,” said the Court of Appeals. It further reasoned that here, Jackson committed the current offenses on November 11, 2015, after being released from incarceration on August 10, 2015—a period of 93 days. He needed to demonstrate that a person of reasonable understanding would have to guess that reoffending 93 days after release from incarceration would subject the defendant to an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). “Jackson has not done so,” said the Court of Appeals. “Accordingly, the rapid recidivism aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.”

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed Jackson’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of the rapid recidivism aggravator because he committed “impulse crimes” that are unrelated to his prior offenses”

“Here, Jackson committed offenses while highly intoxicated that resulted in the violent death of another person. He then sought to avoid accountability by fleeing the scene and aggressively resisting arrest when later discovered. He did so only 93 days after his release from incarceration. Whether Jackson’s conduct constituted rapid recidivism is a question for the finder of fact. Plainly, some rational fact finders could conclude that Jackson committed the current offenses “shortly after” his release from incarceration, and that such conduct evidenced disdain for the law, rendering Jackson particularly culpable in committing those offenses. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the resentencing court’s rapid recidivism finding.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jackson’s claims on appeal were without merit. The Court affirmed his exceptional sentence imposed by the lower court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ross: Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms Statute Is Constitutional

Philadelphia Law Firm, Kenny, Burns & McGill | New District Court Opinion on Felons and Gun Ownership

In State v. Ross, the WA Court of Appeals held that the Second Amendment does not bar the state from criminalizing the possession of firearms by felons. Consequently, Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree statute is constitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Ross was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree. His conviction was based on a prior 2010 conviction for second degree burglary. Unfortunately for Ross, his burglary conviction is a defined “serious offense” under WA’s Sentencing Reform Act.

Ross appealed. He argued that under the Second Amendment and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, Washington’s Firearms Statute RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court began with a critique of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The Court recognized, however, that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court identified several longstanding prohibitions, including possession by felons:

“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” ~WA Court of Appeals quoting District of Columbia v. Heller.

Next, the Court of Appeals analayzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. In Bruen, the Supreme Court considered and struck down New York’s regulatory licensing program requiring applicants to prove that they had “proper cause” to carry a handgun in public.

The WA Court of Appeals emphasized that Bruen was intentionally drafted to be limited in its scope. As a result, Bruen did not overrule Washington’s own time-stested caselaw on the subject matter:

“Indeed, at least 11 times the majority referenced the Second Amendment right of “law-abiding” citizens . . . Of the six justices in the majority, three wrote or joined in concurring opinions clarifying the scope of their decision. We hold that consistent with Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, the Second Amendment does not bar the state from prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons as it has done in RCW 9.41.040(1). RCW 9.41.040(1) is facially constitutional.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

Next the WA Court of Appeals adressed Ross’s argument that because his underlying crime of second degree burglary was nonviolent,  RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

“We disagree for two reasons,” said the Court. First, Ross’s attempt to distinguish violent and nonviolent felons is of his own construct. There are no prior court opinions distinguishing violent felons from nonviolent felons. Second, the legislature has defined second degree burglary as a violent crime:

“The prohibition on possession of firearms under RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) applies to any person previously convicted of “any serious offense.” A “serious offense” is defined by the same statute to include “[a]ny crime of violence.” RCW 9.41.010(42)(a). And a “crime of violence” is defined to include burglary in the second degree . . . Ross offers no support for the proposition that the legislature did not intend to define burglary in the second degree as a serious offense and a crime of violence.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Ross’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Drivers Can’t Consent to Police Searching a Passenger’s Belongings

Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs? | The  New Republic

In State v. Garner, No. 56861-6-II (2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that a driver’s consent to search their car does not extend to searching the contents of closed containers inside the car that do not belong to the driver.

BACKGROUND FACTS

A police officer arrested Mr. Garner on an outstanding warrant after stopping a car and encountering Garner as a passenger. Garner tried to flee on foot but the officer apprehended him. After placing Garner under arrest, the officer spoke with the car’s driver, who said Garner left three backpacks behind in her car. The officer asked the driver for permission to search the car and she granted it.

The officer then searched Garner’s backpacks without requesting his permission and found controlled substances. Later testing established that the controlled substances found in the backpacks were 86.9 grams of methamphetamine and 3.8 grams of heroin.

The State charged Garner with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before trial, Garner moved to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his backpacks. The trial court denied Garner’s suppression motion. After a bench trial, the trial court found Garner guilty of both counts of possession with intent to deliver.

On appeal, Mr. Garner argued that the trial court improperly denied his suppression motion.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the WA Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted Garner’s suppression motion. It reasoned that a person’s bag or closed container heightened protection under the federal and state constitutions. It emphasized that the Washington Supreme Court has also recognized an expectation of privacy in purses, briefcases, and other traditional containers of personal belongings.

Here, the defendant passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the backpacks he left inside the car when he fled from the police during a traffic stop.  He did not abandon the backpacks or relinquish his privacy interest in them because he was in the vehicle with permission, and took steps to conceal the backpacks from the officer before fleeing.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that that the driver’s consent to search her car did not extend to Garner’s backpacks.

“Garner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpacks. And while Washington case law does not squarely address whether a passenger has a reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in another’s car, our cases point to the conclusion that Garner did not relinquish his expectation of privacy when he left his backpacks in the driver’s car. Unlike the defendant in Samalia, Garner did not leave his backpacks in a stolen car. He left them in a car he had occupied with the driver’s permission.”

“And unlike the defendant in Reynolds, he did not remove the backpacks from the car and leave them on the road. Rather, Garner, who lacked housing, left his belongings with a person he knew. Moreover, Garner never disclaimed ownership of the backpacks. He took the time to put two of the backpacks on the vehicle’s rear floorboard and tried stowing the third backpack under the driver’s seat. The circumstances lend themselves to the conclusion that he intended to safeguard the backpacks until he could recover them.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Garner’s convictions because the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. This is especially true if Search and Seizure issues are involved. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

New Bill Strengthens Prosecution of Hate Crimes

Say No To Hate Crimes - City of Renton

A bill passed in Washington is expanding the state’s definition of a hate crime and strengthens the ability to prosecute those crimes. Governor Jay Inslee signed Senate Bill 5623 into law on April 6 after it was passed with overwhelming support in the House and Senate earlier this year.

“This bill takes the common sense step of recategorizing hate crimes as crimes against a person and also provides our communities with the justice they deserve in the wake of these traumatic crimes.” ~ King County Prosecuting Attorney Leesa Manion

Senator Manka Dhingra sponsored the legislation. She states that Hate Crime offenses are reclassified as crimes against persons. The bill also replaces the phrase “physical injury” with “assault” in the definition of Hate Crime to account for more situations. Assaults that are meant to intimidate and demean, like spitting on someone, will now be grounds for prosecution as a Hate Crime.

ESB 5623 modifies the conduct that constitutes a Hate Crime offense to include when a person maliciously and intentionally assaults a victim because of the person’s perception of certain characteristics about the victim. Including the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or disability.

SB 5623 will allow courts to impose therapeutic treatment for offenders meant to rehabilitate them. This is something that the victims of hate crimes often ask for in court. The bill also expands the definition of a hate crime. Right now, assaults have to result in a physical injury for it to be considered a hate crime.

Under the new bill, assaults that are meant to intimidate or demean but don’t result in injury can be considered a hate crime. An example of that would be spitting on someone. Supporters of the bill say hate crimes are corrosive to society and make communities feel unwelcome.

In Washington state, there were more than 500 hate crimes committed against a person in 2021, according to the Department of Justice. Their data shows the biggest motivators of hate crimes are largely race and ethnicity, followed by sexual orientation and then religion.

If prosecuted for a Hate Crime offense, the trier of fact may infer that a person intended to threaten a victim if the person committed one of the following acts:

  • Burns a cross on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of African American heritage.
  • Defaces the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika.
  • Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property.
  • Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated.
  • Damages, destroys or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim’s person without the victim’s authorization.
  • Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the person perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.

Words alone do not constitute a Hate Crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a Hate Crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.

A Hate Crime offense is a class C felony and is punishable by a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. In addition, the victim of a Hate Crime offense may bring a civil cause of action against the perpetrator. Claims can include actual damages, punitive damages of up to $100,000, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The bill will go into effect this summer, on July 23.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Hotel Room Hosts Can’t Consent To Police Searching Other Guest’s Bags

Single-use plastic bags will be banned in Colorado by 2024 with bag fees set to start in 2023 under new law

In State v. Giberson, No. 56081-0-II (April 4, 2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that the host of a hotel room lacks authority allowing police to search a guest’s grocery bags located inside the room.  A person has a reasonable privacy interest in grocery bags, which are are “traditional repositories of personal belongings.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May of 2020, police received a tip from a confidential informant that Mr. Giberson planned a drug deal at a nearby motel. Police journeyed to the motel. They conducted surveillance of room #106. Police contacted a person named Mr. Goedker after Goedker departed room #106.

Goedker stated that he was the sole occupant of motel room #106. He said he had been residing there for approximately 10 days. He stated that the defendant Mr. Giberson had stopped by earlier that day. Giberson and a person named Ms. Hopkins remained in the room. Goedker said that there were bags in the motel room belonging to Giberson.

Police opened the door to Room #106. They saw Giberson and an associate sitting at a table. Both Giberson and the associate were detained and removed from the room.

The detectives then searched two plastic grocery bags on the floor next to the door. Inside one of the grocery bags they found a digital scale and two baggies containing heroin.  After searching the bags, police asked Goedker if they belonged to him. Goedker denied ownership and stated that the bags belonged to Giberson.

The State charged Giberson with possession of heroin with the intent to deliver. Before trial, Giberson moved to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the plastic grocery bags. The trial court denied the suppression motion. It reasoned that Gibson lacked standing to challenge the search of his bags. Ultimately, the court also found Giberson guilty as charged. Giberson appealed his conviction. He argued that the search of his grocery bags was unlawful because Goedker could not give consent to search his possessions.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Giberson had standing to challenge the search of his bags.

“A defendant has automatic standing under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution to challenge a search when (1) possession is an essential element of the charged offense and (2) the defendant was in possession of the item searched at the time of the challenged search,” said the Court. Here, Giberson has automatic standing to challenge the search. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that Giberson did not have standing.

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the search of Gibson’s bags was lawful.

The Court reasoned that warrantless searches are unlawful under the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Valid consent is an exception allowing for a warrantless search. However, consent to search an area does not necessarily provide authorization to search belongings of a third person inside the area. Here, Goedker did not own, possess, or control Giberson’s grocery bags. Therefore, Goedker did not have authority to consent to the search of Giberson’s bags.

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that a search is unconstitutional if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched.  Here, Giberson clearly sought to preserve as private the drugs and digital scale by placing them in his grocery bag. The Court addressed whether Giberson had a privacy interest in storing his belongngs in plastic bags:

“Grocery bags can be characterized as ‘traditional repositories of personal belongings.” People certainly put personal grocery items and other personal items obtained in a grocery store like prescription medications in such bags. And common experience tells us that people also use grocery bags to carry other personal items. For example, this may be true for people such as those experiencing homelessness who may not have space for their personal items. Giberson reasonably could expect that others would not search his grocery bags without his consent. Therefore, we conclude that Giberson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grocery bags.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded that Goedker’s authority to give consent to search his hotel room did not extend to the search of Giberson’s grocery bags. Furthermore, Giberson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those bags. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the heroin and digital scale found in the search of the grocery bags. Giberson’s conviction was reversed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Hands Are Not An “Instrument or Thing” Used to Prove Assault Third Degree

Fold Your Hands — Coffee + Crumbs

In State v. Altman, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction for Assault Third Degree because there was no evidence that the defendant used anything other than his hands to assault the victim.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The victim A.W. alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Mr. Altman. The State charged Altman with second degree assault with sexual motivation, alleging he intentionally assaulted A.W. by strangulation or suffocation. Alternatively, the State charged Altman with third degree assault with sexual motivation for causing bodily harm to A.W. by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm. The State also charged Altman with second degree rape and unlawful imprisonment with sexual motivation

During closing arguments, the State argued that Altman’s hands were a “thing” used to
support a lesser alternative charge of third degree assault:

“I submit to you the State is not saying that there was a weapon used in this case. I submit to you that we’re not saying there was an instrument that was used in this case. However, it also says it can be from a thing likely to produce bodily harm. And I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, a thing can be anything.” State Prosecutor.

The jury found Altman not guilty of second degree rape, second degree assault by
strangulation with sexual motivation, and unlawful imprisonment with sexual motivation.
However, the jury found Altman guilty of a lesser alternative charge of third degree assault. Mr. Altman appealed on arguments that the evidence was insufficient to show that he assaulted A.W. with an “instrument or thing.”

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began with a discussion of the elements required to prove Assault Third Degree. In short, a person is guilty if he “causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.”

“The issue here is whether a hand meets the statutory requirement of “other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm,” said the Court. The Court reviewed State v. Marohl, as reliable caselaw precedent. In Marohl, the court suggested that a casino floor could fall within the statute if it was used to smash someone’s head. Also, the Marohl court applied the dictionary definition to “instrument” and “thing,” describing both as:

“Here, in light of Marohl’s definition of “instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm, hands do not qualify. The State relied solely on Altman’s hands to support the lesser alternative charge of third degree assault. Hands are not a “utensil” or “implement.” Nor are hands “an inanimate object.” Instead, hands are an extension of a person.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that there is no other evidence that Altman used anything other than his hands when grabbing and squeezing A.W.’s neck. Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the essential element of “a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm” for third degree assault.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Altman’s conviction for third degree assault with prejudice.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Assault or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Locked Out 2022: Estimates of People Denied Voting Rights

The state of ex-felons' voting rights, explained - Vox

An insightful report from The Sentencing Project describes how an estimated 4.6 million Americans are barred from voting due to a felony conviction.

Laws in 48 states ban people with felony convictions from voting. In 2022, an estimated 4.6 million Americans, representing 2 percent of the voting-age population, will be ineligible to vote due to these laws or policies, many of which date back to the post-Reconstruction era. In this election year, as the United States confronts questions about the stability of its democracy and the fairness of its elections, particularly within marginalized communities, the impact of voting bans on people with felony convictions should be front and center in the debate.

This 2022 report updates and expands upon 20 years of work chronicling the scope and distribution of felony disenfranchisement in the United States (see Uggen, Larson, Shannon, and Pulido-Nava 2020; Uggen, Larson, and Shannon 2016; Uggen, Shannon, and Manza 2012; Manza and Uggen 2006; Uggen and Manza 2002). As in 2020, we present national and state estimates of the number and percentage of people disenfranchised due to felony convictions, as well as the number and percentage of the Black and Latinx populations impacted. Although these and other estimates must be interpreted with caution, the numbers presented here represent our best assessment of the state of felony disenfranchisement as of the November 2022 election.

AMONG THE REPORT’S KEY FINDINGS:

  • An estimated 4.6 million people are disenfranchised due to a felony conviction, a figure that has declined by 24 percent since 2016, as more states enacted policies to curtail this practice and state prison populations declined modestly. Previous research finds there were an estimated 1.2 million people disenfranchised in 1976, 3.3 million in 1996, 4.7 million in 2000, 5.4 million in 2004, 5.9 million in 2010, 6.1 million in 2016, and 5.2 million in 2020.
  • One out of 50 adult citizens – 2 percent of the total U.S. voting eligible population – is disenfranchised due to a current or previous felony conviction.
  • Three out of four people disenfranchised are living in their communities, having fully completed their sentences or remaining supervised while on probation or parole.
  • In three states – Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee – more than 8 percent of the adult population, one of every 13 adults, is disenfranchised.
  • Florida remains the nation’s disenfranchisement leader in absolute numbers, with over 1.1 million people currently banned from voting, often because they cannot afford to pay court-ordered monetary sanctions. An estimated 934,500 Floridians who have completed their sentences remain disenfranchised, despite a 2018 ballot referendum that promised to restore their voting rights.
  • One in 19 African Americans of voting age is disenfranchised, a rate 3.5 times that of non-African Americans. Among the adult African American population, 5.3 percent is disenfranchised compared to 1.5 percent of the adult non-African American population.
  • More than one in 10 African American adults is disenfranchised in eight states – Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia.
  • Although data on ethnicity in correctional populations are unevenly reported and undercounted in some states, a conservative estimate is that at least 506,000 Latinx Americans or 1.7 percent of the voting eligible population are disenfranchised.
  • Approximately 1 million women are disenfranchised, comprising over one-fifth of the total disenfranchised population.

My opinion? Many states restore voting rights to individuals automatically after they exit jail or prison. Others continue the bar on voting even while on probation or parole. A few permanently disenfranchise people with a past conviction or require they petition the government to have their voting right restored. Fortunately, In 2021, Governor Inslee signed legislation restoring voting rights to people convicted of felonies automatically after release from prison.

Losing your right to vote is a terrible consequence of a criminal conviction. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

At Trial, Police Can’t Comment on a Defendant’s Post-Arrest Silence

Van Dyke trial: Breaking down all 44 witnesses – Chicago Tribune

In State v. Palmer, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination was violated when the detective commented about the defendant’s post-arrest silence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Palmer and his girlfriend, DD, moved in together in 2013. They lived together with DD’s two biological children from a prior marriage, her son AD, and her daughter PD. Palmer and DD also had a baby together, LP. Sometime in 2014, the family moved to Washington. Palmer served as caregiver to the children and in that role disciplined both PD and AD.

During a family car trip in 2016, Palmer grabbed AD by the neck, leaving a scratch. At
some point after the car trip incident, Palmer told DD that PD had touched his penis. Thereafter, PD disclosed to DD that Palmer had touched her vagina. Approximately four months after PD’s disclosure, DD contacted law enforcement. Law enforcement authorities interviewed the children on two separate occasions. Detective Ramirez participated in PD’s interview during which he learned of the accusations against Palmer.

Eventually, Detective Ramirez took Palmer into custody, read him Miranda rights, and questioned him. Ramirez ended the questioning after Palmer repeatedly refused to admit to any wrongdoing. Ramirez returned the next morning for additional questioning, but Palmer refused to talk. The State charged Palmer with one count of child molestation in the first degree and two counts of assault of a child in the second degree.

At trial, the Prosecutor questioned DSetective Ramirez and asked if he had spoken to Palmer after his initial interview. In the presence of the jury, Ramirez testified that he “went back the next morning, thinking that, you know, a day sitting in the county jail, you know, there’s some time to think, and maybe Mr. Palmer would want to do the right thing here.” Ramirez further testified that he told Palmer, “You’ve had some time to think. Do you want to talk?” and that Palmer responded that he did not want to talk.

The jury convicted Palmer of all charges.

On appeal, Palmer argued his right against self-incrimination was violated when Detective Ramirez discussed Palmer’s decision to remain silent.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court began with an engaging discussion of the Fifth Amendment. In short, a defendant’s right against self-incrimination prohibits the State from eliciting comments from witnesses about the defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence. The State may also not suggest the defendant is guilty because they chose to remain silent, because the assurance of Miranda is that remaining silent will not be penalized.

Here, the State unequivocally elicited a comment from Ramirez about Palmer’s decision
to remain silent.

“Ramirez’s testimony was a comment on Palmer’s right to remain silent. More pointedly, contrary to State v. Easter, the State suggested that Palmer was guilty due to his silence. Indeed, Ramirez testified that Palmer remained silent after being given a chance to “do the right thing” by admitting criminal conduct. This statement presupposed Palmer’s guilt and created an impossible choice: Palmer could either do right by confessing to molesting a child or do wrong by remaining silent.”

“Implicit in the ‘silence equals wrongfulness’ notion is that silence withholds the ‘truth’—that ‘truth’ being one’s criminal conduct, even if there was no criminal conduct. In this context, a defendant cannot maintain their presumption of innocence by remaining silent. A detective’s belief on this front may assist with their investigative duty, but established authority prohibits using a defendant’s right to remain silent to suggest guilt to the jury.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals concluded by saying that alone, this violation may warrant reversal and a new trial. “However, because we reverse on other grounds, we remind the State that it is forbidden from eliciting comments about Palmer’s silence during his new trial.” With that, the Court of Appeals reverse the convictions and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Prosecutor’s Use of Term “Mexican Ounce” At Trial Was Race-Based Misconduct

Mexican Ounce (Minus Tax) : r/heroin

 In  State v. Ibarra-Erives (9/19/2022), the WA Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s drug conviction because the Prosecutor ‘s use of the term “Mexican ounce” at trial was an intentional appeal to jurors’ potential bias.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In June 2018, the Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force executed a search warrant to recover drugs and related evidence in an apartment. A detective persuaded Mr. Ibarra Erives to open the door. Officers then “pulled him out onto the front landing” and arrested him. On the kitchen counter, police found white powder later determined to be methamphetamine.

On the closet shelf in a bedroom, officers discovered a backpack. The backpack contained
seven one-ounce “bindles” of methamphetamine and five bindles of heroin. The backpack did not contain any information identifying its owner. On the shelf next to the backpack, police found a digital scale and a box of plastic sandwich bags.

Ibarra-Erives admitted that he “temporarily” lived at the apartment. He told police he sometimes slept on the couch and sometimes on the pile of blankets officers observed in bedroom where they found the backpack. Ibarra-Erives said the prescription medication and clothes found on the floor of the bedroom were his. But he denied owning the backpack.

When police searched Ibarra-Erives’ pockets, they found a broken glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine that had white residue and burn marks on it. He also had $591 in cash in his wallet. The State charged Ibarra-Erives with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver.

At trial, Ibarra-Erives, who is Latinx, used a Spanish interpreter. During the State’s case in chief, the prosecutor questioned the lead detective about the amount of drugs found in the backpack in room. The detective testified that each “bindle” of methamphetamine weighed 28 grams, or 1 ounce. He then described the bindles of heroin, which each weighed 24.6 grams. He explained that for heroin, “25 grams is considered an ounce.”

When asked why, the detective responded, “I don’t know what the answer is to why, but the term on the street is it’s a Mexican ounce across the board, regardless of who is selling or buying 25 grams of a Mexican ounce.” Then in his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor twice emphasized that each bindle of heroin had been packaged as a “Mexican ounce.”

The jury convicted Ibarra-Erives as charged. He appealed his conviction on arguments that the prosecutor’s remarks suggested that a Latinx person likely packed or possessed the drugs.  He argues the prosecutor used this gratuitous reference to connect him to the drugs. Consequently, this terminology invoked stereotypes of Mexican drug-dealing and dishonesty against him.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reversed Ibarra-Erives’ conviction.

The Court reasoned that a prosecutor’s zealous pursuit of justice is not without boundaries. However, prosecutors have a duty to the defendant to uphold their right to a fair trial.

“Prosecutors commit misconduct when they use arguments designed to arouse the passions or prejudices of the jury . . . These kinds of arguments create a danger that the jury may convict for reasons other than the evidence produced at trial. In cases where race should be irrelevant, racial considerations, in particular, can affect a juror’s impartiality and must be removed. ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that an objective observer could view the prosecutor’s references “Mexican ounce” to describe the way heroin was packaged for sale as an intentional appeal to the jury’s potential bias. The term specifically suggests that the defendant was more likely to have possessed drugs packed to a “Mexican ounce” because he speaks Spanish and appears to be Latinx.

“Testimony that heroin is packaged in an amount commonly sold on the street is probative of an intent to sell the drugs. But the street term attributing that practice to a particular racial or ethnic group is not. And when the defendant appears to be a member of that same racial or ethnic group, such comments improperly suggest that he is more likely to have packaged or possessed the drugs.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

My opinion? Good decision.  The prosecution took advantage of despicable stereotypes. In the State’s closing argument at trial, the prosecutor used the term “Mexican ounce” two times. The prosecutor’s use of the term was an apparently intentional appeal to jurors’ potential bias. It improperly suggested that Mr. Ibarra-Erives was more likely to have possessed drugs packed to a “Mexican ounce” merely because he speaks Spanish and appeared to be Latinx.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a drug offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Limits of Expert Witness Testimony

Expert Witness - Dr. Elisabeth "Eli" Sheff

In State v. Caril, the WA Court of Appeals held that a lower trial court did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by prohibiting the defendant’s expert witness from testifying to hearsay statements from another psychologist’s report.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Caril was convicted of second degree murder. He asserts he was in a state of compromised mental health when he stabbed and killed a person.

During the night of June 22-23, 2017, Mr. Ross, Ms. Nguyen, and Mr. Pimenthal enjoyed a night out with a group of friends. In the early morning hours, they obtained take-out meals and sat on the curb outside the restaurant to eat. From across the street, an individual shouted, “Shut the fuck up,” and threw a two-liter soda bottle in their direction. It landed by their feet. Ross shouted back that throwing the bottle was a “good way to get your ass kicked.”

Ross observed the individual – later identified as the defendant Mr. Caril – walk across the street. He walked towards the group brandishing a knife. Ross told everyone to “run” and that the approaching individual had a knife. Nguyen and Ross withdrew. Unfortunately, Pimenthal was not able to do so in time. While running away, Ross saw Caril stab Pimenthal. Nguyen saw Caril “punch” Pimenthal three times in the chest. Mr. Hussen, who observed these events from his car nearby, exited his vehicle and shouted at Caril. Hussen asked if Carilwas “crazy” and “why” he stabbed Pimenthal. Caril asked Hussen if he “wanted some too.” Pimenthal died from his injuries.

Caril was charged with first degree murder. He was later charged with an additional count of second degree murder.

At trial, Caril, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, called an expert psychologist. The expert testified that Caril lacked the capacity to form criminal intent at the time of the incident. The trial court allowed this testimony. However, the trial judge prohibited Caril’s expert witness from testifying to hearsay statements from another psychologist’s report that the expert relied on. The court reasoned that the excluded statements concerned the collateral issues of Caril’s competency to stand trial and potential future need for civil commitment.

Caril was acquitted of first degree murder, but the jury found him guilty of the lesser included crime of second degree murder (intentional murder) with a deadly weapon. Caril was found guilty of second degree murder (felony murder) with a deadly weapon on count II.

On appeal, Caril argued the trial judge abused his discretion and violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by prohibiting the defendant’s expert witness from testifying to hearsay statements from another psychologist’s report.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court Appeals said that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense. This right is not, however, absolute. It may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process, including the exclusion of evidence considered irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible.

Furthermore, an expert witness is permitted to base an opinion on facts or data that are not admissible in evidence. Ths can happen under ER 703 if the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Consequently, the trial court has discretion to determine the extent to which the expert may convey this information.

Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the hearsay statements were relevant to explain the basis for the expert’s opinion. However, it further reasoned that admitting them could confuse or mislead the jury. This was because the hearsay statements concerned collateral issues related to the defendant’s competency to stand trial and potential future need for civil commitment.  Moreover, the probative value of the statements was low. They were inadmissible as substantive evidence and relevant only for the purpose of providing additional context for the expert’s opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Homicide, Manslaughter or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.



Alexander F. Ransom

Attorney at Law
Criminal Defense Lawyer

119 North Commercial St.
Suite #1420
Bellingham, WA 98225

117 North 1st Street
Suite #27
Mount Vernon, WA 98273

Phone: (360) 746-2642
Fax: (360) 746-2949

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