Category Archives: Robbery

2021 Crime Report: Violent Crime Up as Washington State Sees Decrease in Police Officers

Despite Crime Rate Decrease, Majority of Americans Think It Is Increasing

Journalist Adel Toay for King5.com says that violent crime has increased in Washington. According to a crime report from the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC), violent crimes and murders increased while the number of police officers available to respond to incidents decreased in 2021.

“This is just very specific data, about crime trends, about our staffing level, about a couple of things that sort of stand out. But the numbers are all there. We’re very transparent. We wanted to get this out to everybody so that they have that information within their communities,” ~Steven Strachan, executive director of WASPC

According to the report, violent crime overall, which includes murder, aggravated assault, robbery and rape, increased by 12.3% in 2021.

There were 325 murders in 2021, an increase of 5.9% over 2020, following a 47% increase the year before. Strachan said this is the highest number of murders recorded since WASPC began collecting this data in 1980.

Hate crimes like Malicious Harassment in the state increased by 26.5% in 2021 with the most frequent offenses being intimidation and destruction of property.

Total crime overall is statistically down slightly, including a 78.8% decrease in identity theft and fraud from 2020, largely due to the huge spike in unemployment fraud during the pandemic. Other factors contributing to the statistical downward trend include a 60.9% decrease in drug offenses and a 73.6% decrease in drug arrests, due to a change in state laws.

“This is predominantly due to the Blake decision in 2021, which completely changed the ability to charge a criminal offense for personal possession of any drug,” said Strachan. In February 2021, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled the state’s simple drug possession crime statute was unconstitutional and voided it.

THE LOSS OF POLICE OFFICERS

Washington state lost nearly 500 police officers statewide in 2021 as the state’s population grew more than the population of Everett, according to the report. The number of commissioned law enforcement officers decreased 4.4%. The per capita rate of law enforcement officers fell to 1.38 per 1,000 statewide.

“When the staffing is down, the numbers are up,” said Strachan.

Strachan said it is the lowest per capita rate of officers the state has seen since WASPC began tracking this data in 1980, and it’s the lowest in the nation. The national average per capita rate for officers is 2.33 officers per 1,000, according to the FBI.

“Right now, a lot of agencies are treading water. Not every single one. Not every single agency is in a staffing crisis. Many are. These things are problems with solutions, and that is to support good policing and to recognize that public safety is important.”~Steven Strachan, executive director of WASPC

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Low-Level Robbery Won’t Get A Reduced Sentence

Why Grocery Stores are adding Supplemental Security during the Coronavirus Outbreak | CITIGUARD

In State v. Thomason, the WA Supreme Court held that the low-level, de minimis nature of some crimes can allow for an exceptional downward sentence. However, the minimal level of force used to prove Robbery makes it inappropriate to allow a downward sentence.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2018, Thomason entered Yoke’s Fresh Market grocery store in Spokane.  A plainclothes security guard, Mr. Swartz, followed Thomason around the store. Swartz watched Thomason pick up about $15 worth of meat and cheese. Thomason proceeded to another part of the store and tucked the food down his pants. Thomason then left the store without paying.

Swartz followed Thomason out and confronted him. Swartz grabbed Thomason’s arm, displayed his badge, and asked Thomason to go back inside the store. Thomason tried to pull free, and Swartz warned him that he was only making the situation worse. The two pulled at each other back and forth as Swartz tried to detain Thomason and Thomason tried to break free.

During this exchange, Thomason swung at Swartz two times. Thomason used a closed fist, aimed at Swartz’s face both times, and hit Swartz the second time with a glancing blow. Swartz yelled at his partner, a guard in training, to help. Thomason punched Swartz a third time. Swartz testified that the third punch “hurt” and caused a minor injury. His face was sore and slightly red for a day or two. Thomason escaped by pulling out of his sweatshirt and running. He was seen getting into a passenger car and was eventually apprehended.

The State charged Thomason with second degree robbery just before trial. A jury convicted him as charged.

THE SENTENCING

At sentencing, the parties agreed that Thomason’s offender score was 10. That made his standard sentencing range 63-84 months. Thomason requested a 12-month sentence. This was a exceptional downward departure from his sentencing range.

The trial court judge considered an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The judge said that the crime was no more than a “glorified shoplifting charge” that should have been treated as a misdemeanor. Nevetheless, the judge determined that the law barred him from imposing an exceptional downward sentence. The judge imposed 63 months, the bottom of the standard range, instead.

Thomason appealed on several grounds. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The WA Supreme Court granted appellate review solely on the exceptional sentence issue.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court reasoned that Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act lists mitigating circumstances that can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range. It explained that in appropriate cases, the de minimis nature of a crime can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range. An appropriate case is one in which (1) the legislature did not consider the mitigating factor already when it listed the elements of the crime or set the standard sentence range and (2) the factor constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart below the range.”

The Court acknowledged Thomason’s argument that his crime was de minimis. The value of the items taken was low and no force was used to accomplish the taking. Although force was used to retain the property, it was “minor” force. However, the court disagreed with Thomasan’s argument that he was allowed an exceptional downward sentence.

The Court reasoned that the plain language of the robbery statute shows that the legislature did consider a defendant’s minimal use of force when it defined the crime of second degree robbery.

“As the emphasized language shows, the legislature clearly considered whether the crime of second degree robbery should punish a taking combined with a minimal showing of force. It criminalized a taking in which either ‘force’ ‘or’ no force at all—just ‘fear’—is used to accomplish the taking . . . The legislature even said that where, as here, such force or fear is used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking, the degree of force is immaterial.”~WA Supreme Court

With that, the WA Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Thomason’s conviction.

My opinion? I agree with Chief Justice Steven Gonzalez’s concurring opinion. He wrote separately because he was increasingly troubled by our controlling, unchallenged precedents and the sentencing laws they interpret.

“Washington’s sentencing guidelines suggest, among other things, that unconstrained discretion in sentencing operates to favor whites and disfavor members of minority groups,” said Justice Gonzalez. As part of the concurrence, he references an article about prosecutorial discretion and sentencing guidelines. He ended his opinion with choice parting words:

“We must find a way to live justly with one another. We must not steal from each other or strike each other. But when it happens, the State must not respond with a disproportionate punishment. I am increasingly concerned that sentences like this for what amounts to glorified shoplifting are simply not just and speak to deep problems with our sentencing systems.” ~Chief Justice Steven C. Gonzalez, WA Supreme Court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Robbery or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Confrontation, Video Testimony & COVID

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In State v. Milko, the WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant has a right to have witnesses present in the courtroom. However, that right can be overcome. Here, the trial court lawfully allowed witnesses to testify by video when they had health related concerns about contracting COVID-19.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2018, Milko on five separate occasions contacted women who were paid escorts. He
arranged to meet them at houses in Puyallup that he did not live in or own. When each
woman arrived, Milko displayed a knife in an attempt to take their money or to rape them.

The State charged Milko with 12 felony offenses related to five incidents and five
victims. The charges included Burglary, Robbery and Sex Offenses.

Milko’s trial was set for July 2020. At the time, COVID-19 had been declared a global pandemic and a national emergency in the United States. In February 2020, Governor Jay Inslee had proclaimed a state of emergency in Washington. He issued a number of proclamations designed to help curb the spread of COVID-19. The Supreme Court ordered all courts to follow the most protective public health guidance applicable in their jurisdiction and to use remote proceedings for public health and safety whenever appropriate.

Also, the CDC and the Washington Department of Health recommended social distancing measures of at least six feet between people and encouraged vulnerable individuals to avoid public spaces. The CDC encouraged people to avoid traveling because travel increased a person’s chance of getting infected and spreading COVID-19. The CDC noted that older adults and people of any age with serious underlying medical conditions, such as diabetes and asthma, were at a higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.

The trial court granted the State’s request to allow two State’s witnesses to testify remotely. One witness was SANE nurse Ms. Biddulph. The other witness was victim JA.

At trial, the five victims and several investigating officers testified in person about the
incidents giving rise to the charges. Biddulph testified by two-way video about examining BP and completing a rape kit for her. JA testified by two-way video about Milko contacting her for her paid escort services in Florida and raping her at knifepoint. The trial court instructed the jury that the State was offering JA’s testimony only to establish identity, a common scheme or plan, and/or modus operandi.

The jury found Milko guilty of all charges except for attempted first degree robbery. He appealed on arguments that the trial court violated the confrontation clause by allowing witnesses to testify by video because of COVID-19 concerns.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Court of Appeals (COA) explained that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a person accused of a crime has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Nevertheless, the COA quoted  Maryland v. Craig, and other cases holding that video testimony does not violate the confrontation clause if it ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective confrontation.

Here, the COA upheld the trial court’s findings that Biddulph’s traveling to Washington would place her and her children at risk of negative health consequences regarding COVID-19 were warranted. Biddulph in particular had health concerns about her one year-old daughter, who had compromised health. And the court made a finding that Biddulph’s health care provider “advised against travel in order to protect the health of Ms. Biddulph and her small child.” The court’s ultimate finding was that Biddulph could not travel to Washington to testify because travel will place her at a significantly higher risk of exposure to the virus.

“Accommodating Biddulph’s health concerns was more than a matter of convenience,” said the COA. In addition, it reasoned that concern for the health of a third person may be sufficient to support a finding of necessity. “This is especially true in a pandemic. Given the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, the risk to the health of Biddulph and her child if Biddulph was required to travel to Washington was significant and more than de minimis.”

The COA also found that the trial court found that JA’s health concerns due to her diabetes and asthma were warranted. These conditions would “place her at a higher risk of suffering severe health consequences if she were to contract COVID 19.”  Further, the COA upheld the trial court’s findings that JA’s conditions “make it difficult, if not impossible, to wear a face mask for an extended period of time, including on a cross-country flight.” The court’s ultimate finding was that “J.A.’s health is currently compromised, and she is at a higher risk of serious medical complications should she contract COVID-19.”

“We conclude that these findings support the conclusion that video testimony was necessary to protect JA’s health. Accommodating JA’s health conditions was more than a matter of convenience. Given the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, the risk to JA’s health if she was required to travel to Washington was significant and more than de minimis.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The COA concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing Biddulph and JA to testify remotely by video and their testimony did not violate Milko’s confrontation right. Consequently, the COA affirmed Milko’s convictions and sentence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Protecting Pot Shops

Brazen Weed Dispensary Robbery Happened At 4:20 AM | NowThis - YouTube

Great article from King 5 discusses the Washington Senate passing a pot shop protection bill.

Senate Bill 5927 adds a year to a prison sentence of someone convicted of first- or second-degree robbery of a cannabis retailer. It’s the same sentence that is given to someone who robs a pharmacy.

The passage of the bill in the Senate follows rising concerns over violent robberies at cannabis shops. This bill would make improvements for not just the benefit of the retailers themselves, but for the public safety of the community as a whole.

“When people would ask the infamous bank robber Willie Sutton why he robbed banks, Sutton simply replied, ‘Because that’s where the money is.’ Well, that’s why people rob marijuana retailers. Due to federal banking rules, these businesses are almost entirely cash-only operations, making them a target for robberies and a magnet for criminals.” ~Bill sponsor Sen. Jim Honeyford (R-Sunnyside)

Tom Bout, the founder of the Cannabis Professionals Network, made a spreadsheet tracking the crimes he could find records for. He counted more than 30 crimes since November 2021.

A spokesperson for the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board said it has been working to communicate safety guidelines with business owners.

The state Liquor and Cannabis Board said it is communicating these safety tips with cannabis retailers:

  • Hire armed security guards
  • Make frequent cash deposits so there isn’t much cash available in shops
  • Post signs in businesses explaining that staff don’t have access to much cash
  • Clearly communicate safety guidelines with staff so they know what to do in the event of a robbery.

Bout said the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board is not doing enough to protect cannabis retailers.

“They have not communicated with the stores. Like, you’d think that they would put on an alert to let everyone know that this has happened,” he said during a previous interview.

Interesting times, no? Years ago, selling and possessing marijuana was illegal. Nowadays, we’re passing laws bringing enhanced penalties to people who rob our pot shops.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

 

Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Most humiliating experience of my life:' Black North Carolina man after false burglar alarm - ABC News

In United States v. Holiday, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the police officer’s opening of the defendant’s unlocked front door constituted a search that was not justified by Exigent Circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because officers had no reason to believe that an emergency existed.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Holiday was tried and convicted for seven counts of armed robbery and three instances of attempted armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. 1951. The federal district court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of eighty-five years’ imprisonment.

At his trial, the Government sought to admit police body camera footage taken during an unrelated police encounter at the defendant’s home in connection with the report of child abuse in a vehicle registered to the defendant’s home. In the footage, the defendant was wearing shoes that matched the description of the shoes the suspect was wearing at an ARCO gas station in one of the robberies.

The body camera footage was taken on February 7, 2017. It was taken after police received a report that a man was hitting a child in the backseat of a blue Jaguar. In a “contemporaneous line” of actions from the report of the incident, police ran the license plate and found it was registered to a person with the initials M.B.

The bodycam video shows that when the officers arrived at the defendant’s  address, one of them knocked on the front door, tried the handle, and found it was unlocked. The officer pushed the door open but remained standing on the threshold. Holiday and his wife were on their way to the door when the officer opened it. They told the officers that their children were at school and that they did not own a blue Jaguar. There is no indication that the officers saw a blue Jaguar at or near Holiday’s residence. The officers took Holiday’s name and left.

Mr. Holiday moved to suppress the bodycam footage of this exchange on the ground that it was collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the federal district trial court denied Mr. Holiday’s motion to suppress the aforementioned bodycam evidence.  Later, Holiday was found guilty. The court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of eighty-five years’ imprisonment.

Holiday appealed on grounds that the trial court errored by denying his motion to suppress the body camera footage of him.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the 9th Circuit reasoned that The San Diego Police Department did not obtain a
warrant to search Holiday’s home in connection with the report of child abuse in a blue Jaguar registered to Holiday’s address.

“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment, unless subject to an established exception,” said the 9th Circuit, quoting  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).

Next, the 9th Circuit addressed the Government’s argument that the search was legal because it was pursuant to the Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement (Exigent Circumstances).

Ultimately, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Government. The court reasoned that the officers’ opening of the unlocked front door constituted a search that was not justified by the emergency exception as the officers had no reason to believe that the child victim was is the home at the address where the Jaguar was registered. There was no indication that the incident in the Jaguar had ended, and no blue Jaguar was at the address when the officers arrived.

“The officers’ conduct does not fall within the scope of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.” ~ 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The 9th Circuit concluded, however, that the error in admitting the body camera evidence was harmless because of the strength of the other evidence that the defendant committed the ARCO robbery.

Please review my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime and the police search/seizure might be unlawful. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

FBI Releases 2019 Hate Crime Statistics

Pie chart depicting breakdown of motivations of bias-motivated crimes in the Hate Crime Statistics, 2019 report.

In a press release issued today, the FBI gave Hate Crime Statistics, 2019, which is the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program’s latest compilation about bias-motivated incidents throughout the nation. The 2019 data, submitted by 15,588 law enforcement agencies, provide information about the offenses, victims, offenders, and locations of hate crimes.

Law enforcement agencies submitted incident reports involving 7,314 criminal incidents and 8,559 related offenses as being motivated by bias toward race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender, and gender identity.

Victims of Hate Crime Incidents

  • According to the report, there were 7,103 single-bias incidents involving 8,552 victims. A percent distribution of victims by bias type shows that 57.6% of victims were targeted because of the offenders’ race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 20.1% were targeted because of the offenders’ religious bias; 16.7% were victimized because of the offenders’ sexual-orientation bias; 2.7% were targeted because of the offenders’ gender identity bias; 2.0% were victimized because of the offenders’ disability bias; and 0.9% were victimized because of the offenders’ gender bias.
  • There were 211 multiple-bias hate crime incidents, which involved 260 victims.

Offenses by Crime Category

  • Of the 5,512 hate crime offenses classified as crimes against persons in 2019, 40% were for intimidation, 36.7% were for simple assault, and 21% were for aggravated assault. Fifty-one (51) murders; 30 rapes; and three offenses of human trafficking (commercial sex acts) were reported as hate crimes. The remaining 41 hate crime offenses were reported in the category of other.
  • There were 2,811 hate crime offenses classified as crimes against property. The majority of these (76.6%) were acts of destruction/damage/vandalism. Robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, and other offenses accounted for the remaining 23.4% of crimes against property.
  • Two hundred thirty-six (236) additional offenses were classified as crimes against society. This crime category represents society’s prohibition against engaging in certain types of activity such as gambling, prostitution, and drug violations. These are typically victimless crimes in which property is not the object.

In Washington, Malicious Harassment is a crime you may face in addition to any other existing charges if the prosecution has deemed that there is sufficient cause to believe that your actions were motivated by personal bias or bigotry. Malicious Harassment is a Class C Felony. The statute reads:

“(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:

(a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person;

(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or

(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a “reasonable person” is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same mental, physical, or sensory handicap as the victim. Words alone do not constitute malicious harassment unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute malicious harassment if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.”

The jury must put themselves into the shoes of what the statute defines as a reasonable individual, rather than their own mindset.  From a defense standpoint, the prosecutor’s burden of proof may be difficult to properly enact if the jurors are not members of the group that the alleged hate crime has offended. Moreover, not all crimes that occur between people of different races and nationalities are necessarily hate crimes.

Please contact my office if you or a loved one is currently facing charges for a hate crime, and/or Malicious Harassment. Defending against these allegations is difficult, and there is very little room for negotiation. Hiring competent and experienced defense counsel is your first and best step towards justice.

Cell Site Location Information

Image result for cell site location information

In Carpenter v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that the government generally needs a search warrant to collect troves of location data about the customers of cellphone companies.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In April 2011, police arrested four men suspected of committing a string of armed robberies at Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in and around Detroit. One of the men confessed that the group had robbed nine different stores in Michigan and Ohio between December 2010 and March 2011, supported by a shifting ensemble of 15 other men who served as getaway drivers and lookouts. The robber who confessed to the crimes gave the FBI his own cellphone number and the numbers of other participants; the FBI then reviewed his call records to identify still more numbers that he had called around the time of the robberies.

In May and June 2011, the FBI applied for three federal court orders from magistrate judges to obtain “transactional records” from various wireless carriers for 16 different phone numbers. As part of those applications, the FBI recited that these records included “all subscriber information, toll records and call detail records including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from [the] target telephones from December 1, 2010 to present,” as well as “cell site information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls.”

The FBI also stated that these records would “provide evidence that Timothy Carpenter and other known and unknown individuals” had violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The magistrates granted the applications pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, under which the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when “specific and articulable facts show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”

The government later charged Carpenter with six counts of aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, and aiding and abetting the use or carriage of a firearm during a federal crime of violence. Before trial, Carpenter and Sanders moved to suppress the government’s cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the records could be seized only with a warrant supported by probable cause. The district court denied the motion.

At trial, seven accomplices testified that Carpenter organized most of the robberies and
often supplied the guns. They also testified that Carpenter and his half-brother Sanders had served as lookouts during the robberies. According to these witnesses, Carpenter typically waited in a stolen car across the street from the targeted store. At his signal, the robbers entered the store, brandished their guns, herded customers and employees to the back, and ordered the employees to fill the robbers’ bags with new smartphones. After each robbery, the team met nearby to dispose of the guns and getaway vehicle and to sell the stolen phones.

Also at trial, the Government admitted cell-site location information (CSLI) provided by Carpenter’s wireless carriers. The State’s expert witness created maps showing that Carpenter’s phone was within a half-mile to two miles of the location of each of the robberies around the time the robberies happened. Hess used MetroPCS call-detail records, for example, to show that Carpenter was within that proximity of a Detroit Radio Shack that was robbed around 10:35 a.m. on December 13, 2010. Specifically, MetroPCS records showed that at 10:24 a.m. Carpenter’s phone received a call that lasted about four minutes. At the start and end of the call, Carpenter’s phone drew its signal from MetroPCS tower 173, sectors 1 and 2, located southwest of the store and whose signals point northeast.

After the robbery, Carpenter placed an eight-minute call originating at tower 145, sector 3, located northeast of the store, its signal pointing southwest; when the call ended, Carpenter’s phone was receiving its signal from tower 164, sector 1, alongside Interstate 94, north of the Radio Shack. The expert witness provided similar analysis
concerning the locations of Carpenter’s phone at the time of a December 18, 2010 robbery in Detroit; a March 4, 2011 robbery in Warren, Ohio; and an April 5, 2011 robbery in Detroit. See Carpenter App’x at 12-15.

The jury convicted Carpenter on all of the Hobbs Act counts and convicted him on all but one of the gun counts. Carpenter’s convictions subjected him to four mandatory-minimum prison sentences of 25 years, each to be served consecutively, leaving him with a Sentencing Guidelines range of 1,395 to 1,428 months’ prison. The district court sentenced Carpenter to 1,395 months’ imprisonment. He appealed his convictions and sentences.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court.

Preliminarily, the Court held that the Government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search. It reasoned that Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests but certain expectations of privacy as well.

“Thus, when an individual seeks to preserve something as private, and his expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, official intrusion into that sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause,” said the Court.

“Tracking a person’s past movements through CSLI partakes of many of the qualities of GPS monitoring considered in Jones—it is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”

The Court further reasoned that cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as the term is normally understood. “First, cell phones and the services they provide are such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life, that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society,” said the Court. “Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the user’s part beyond powering up.”

Finally, the Court reasoned that the Government did not obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring Carpenter’s cell-site records. It acquired those records pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show reasonable grounds for believing that the records were relevant and material to an ongoing investigation. “That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant,” said the Court. “Consequently, an order issued under §2703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Not all orders compelling the production of documents will require a showing of probable cause.”

Justice Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch also filed a dissenting opinion.

It’s imperative to hire competent defense counsel willing to argue motions to suppress information that the Government creatively – and sometimes illegally – obtains. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are arrested for crimes involving searches of cell phones and/or cell phone records.

“Joining” Multiple Offenses

Image result for rap sheet

In State v. Bluford, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided a trial court correctly joined a defendant’s multiple counts of robbery for one trial. The similarities between the crimes were adequate for the offenses to be cross admissible to establish a modus operandi.

The State charged Charles Bluford with nine felony counts. These included seven counts of Robbery in the First Degree plus a charge of Rape in the First Degree of one victim and Indecent Liberties of a separate victim.

The State initially charged Bluford under three different cause numbers, but moved to join all the counts for trial. Bluford moved to sever five of the counts from the others. The court considered these cross motions at the same hearing and joined all counts for trial.

The jury found Bluford guilty of eight counts and acquitted him of one count of Robbery. It sentenced him to life without the possibility of release. Bluford appeals.

The Court of Appeals began by discussing the statute and court rule regarding the “joinder” of criminal offenses. RCW 10.37.060 states the following:

When there are several charges against any person, or persons, for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts or transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses, which may be properly joined, instead of having several indictments or informations the whole may be joined in one indictment, or information, in separate counts; and, if two or more indictments are found, or two or more informations filed, in such cases, the court may order such indictments or informations to be consolidated.

Also, CrR 4.3 says the following:

Two or more offenses may be joined in one charging document, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both: (1) Are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) Are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

The court reasoned that the joinder rule promotes the public policy goal of conserving judicial resources. Also, joinder is appropriate unless it is so “manifestly prejudicial” that it outweighs the need for judicial economy. In other words, courts may not join offenses if it would prejudice the defendant.

The court applied the four-factors guide from State v. Cotten to determine whether prejudice results from joinder:

(1) the strength of the State’s evidence on each of the counts; (2) the clarity of the defenses on each count; (3) the propriety of the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the consideration of evidence of each count separately; and (4) the admissibility of the evidence of the other crimes.

The Court applied the Cotten factors.

First, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court correctly determined that the strength of the State’s evidence for each count was equivalently strong.

Second, Bluford asserted a general denial for each count. Therefore, he could not have been prejudiced by inconsistent defenses because his defenses were all the same.

Third, Bluford argues that the court’s instructions to the jury at the end of the case did not instruct the jury that it could not consider the evidence of other crimes as propensity evidence. However, Bluford failed to request such an instruction. And the trial court is not required to give such an instruction if the defendant fails to request one.

Fourth, the court determined that the evidence of each count would be cross admissible for the other counts for the purpose of showing modus operandi. It reasoned that although ER 404(b) prohibits introducing evidence of other bad acts as propensity evidence, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, plan, or identity. Under the modus operandi exception, evidence of other bad acts is admissible to show identity if the method employed in the commission of crimes is so unique that proof that an accused committed one of the crimes creates a high probability that he also committed the other crimes with which he is charged. The modus operandi must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.

In Bluford’s case, the trial court determined that the crimes were cross admissible for the following reasons:

Each incident occurred within an approximately two month period. Each incident occurred during hours of darkness. Each incident occurred in the Seattle metro area. Each incident occurred in a residential area. The defendant was a stranger to each victim. In each incident, the victims were alone when  . . . a male approached with a handgun and gave verbal demands to the victims. The descriptions of the handgun by the victims are similar. Four of the victims gave a description of the vehicle, which matches the vehicle the defendant was later found inside. Two of the three female victims were sexually assaulted during the course of the robberies. Although one of the female victims was not sexually assaulted during the robbery, she ran away at the time of the robbery, thereby limiting the opportunity for the defendant to sexually assault her . . . Therefore, although none of the incidents are a carbon copy of the others, the incidents are strikingly similar. Additionally, in each case the perpetrator approached the victim as he or she exited a car. And when the victim did not cooperate, the perpetrator forcefully took his or her property or assaulted the victim.

Consequently, modus operandi was proven. Finally, because Bryant failed to renew his motion to sever during trial, he technically failed to preserve for review the issue of severance.

Bluford’s convictions were upheld. However, the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence of life without the possibility of release and remanded for resentencing.

My opinion?

At trial, Prosecutors commonly try joining a defendant’s multiple offenses. As stated above, doing so creates judicial efficiency and shows propensity evidence under ER 404(b). Still, competent defense attorneys should try to sever multiple counts anyway; and most important RENEW THE MOTION DURING TRIAL. Failing to do so effectively waives the issue to be preserved for appeal.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Jail Phone Conversations Are Admissible At Trial

In State v. Dere, the Court of Appeals Division I held that a telephone conversation between a jail inmate and a person outside the jail is not a private communication when the participants are advised that the call will be recorded and must confirm their understanding that they are being recorded. Also, a recording of such a conversation is admissible evidence against the noninmate as well as against the inmate.

Defendant Zakaria Dere was a co-defendant in a Robbery. Before the trial, Dere posted bail and was released from custody. Dere received several calls from Mohamed Ali, a codefendant who remained in jail. Their conversations were recorded by the jail’s telephone system.

Unfortunately for Dere, the recordings gave evidence that Dere was an accomplice in the robbery. He argued a CrR 3.5 motion to suppress., however, the trial court denied his motion. Ultimately, Dere’s statements were used against him by the State at his trial. He was found guilty of Robbery. He appealed.

WASHINGTON PRIVACY ACT

The Court of Appeals addressed Dere’s argument that the admission of the recordings violated the Washington Privacy Act under RCW 9.73. Under this statute, recordings obtained in violation of the act are inadmissible for any purpose at trial. The act also makes it unlawful to intercept or record private communications transmitted by telephone without first obtaining the consent of all participants in the communication. Dere cited State v. Modica in arguing that a communication is private when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and where that expectation is reasonable.

Despite Dere’s arguments, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Dere’s conversations with Ali were not private communications. Dere and Ali did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephone conversations because they knew their calls were recorded and subject to monitoring. “Because the calls were not private communications, the privacy act does not apply,” reasoned the Court.

WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed Dere’s claims that the recording of his calls violated his constitutionally protected privacy rights. The Court reasoned that although Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution generally protects the privacy of telephone conversations, calls from a jail inmate are not private affairs deserving of protection:

” A jail recording system . . . and its operation typically demonstrates that at least one participant in a conversation has consented to the recording. The inspection of other forms of communication with inmates, such as ingoing and outgoing mail and packages, is not an invasion of a privacy interest protected by the Washington Constitution so long as the inmate is informed of the likelihood of inspection.”

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded there was no violation of Dere’s constitutional privacy interests. The Court upheld Dere’s Robbery conviction.

My opinion? Obviously, this case shows that suppressing jail inmate conversations is difficult to impossible; especially when the automated voice informs the callers that the conversations are being recorded. I always advise my jailed clients to limit their phone conversations with friends and family members.

Speaking from experience, I’ve conducted many trials where Prosecutors use recorded jail inmate against my clients in attempts to incriminate them. Usually, the recorded conversations are suppressible on other grounds as being prejudicial, irrelevant, confusing, misleading etc. under ER 403. Still, trying to suppress incriminating statements is a terrible position to be in; especially when avoidable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Threatening Note = Robbery

 

In  State v. Farnsworth, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained threats sufficient enough to support a conviction for robbery.

On October 15,2009, defendants Charles Farnsworth and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to “rob” a bank. The plan was for McFarland to wait outside in the car while Farnsworth entered a bank wearing a wig and sunglasses as a disguise, and retrieve money. Farnsworth would present a note to the teller, which read, “No die packs, no tracking devices, put the money in the bag.”

They executed the plan. The bank teller handed Farnsworth about $300 in small bills, and McFarland left. Farnsworth and McFarland drove away, but they were pulled over and arrested a few blocks from the bank. Both were charged with Robbery in the First Degree pursuant to RCW 9A.56.200(1 )(b) (robbery committed in a financial institution).

Both defendants had long criminal histories. Farnsworth faced the possibility of a life sentence under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 if convicted of this robbery, as he was previously convicted of a 2004 Robbery and a 1984 Vehicular Homicide in California. The POAA requires a life sentence when a repeat offender commits a third felony that is classified as a “most serious offense” (often referred to as a “third strike”).

Farnsworth went to trial and was found guilty. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. Farnsworth appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support robbery because (1) there was no threat of force and (2) he agreed to aid only a theft, not a robbery. The case ended up the WA Supreme Court.

The court upheld Farnsworth’s conviction.  It reasoned that sufficient evidence supports an implied threat of force:

“Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. When a person demands money at a bank, with no explanation or indication of lawful entitlement to money, it can imply a threat of force because without such a threat, the teller would have no incentive to comply. An ordinary bank teller could reasonably infer an implied threat of harm under these circumstances.”

Because of this implicit threat, reasoned the Court, banks have security guards and distinctive policies in place to prevent harm flowing from precisely these types of encounters.

The Court also reasoned that the defendants were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat. “In fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime,” said  the Court.

Finally, the Court reasoned that no errors deprived Farnsworth of a fair trial. With that, the Court affirmed Farnsworth’s conviction for first degree robbery.

My opinion? It’s generally difficult to see how threatening notes create a basis to support a prosecution and conviction for Robbery, which can be a Class or a Class B violent felony “strike” offense. Still, a threatening note passed to a bank teller in a financial institution must be taken seriously. This is, in fact, how most bank robberies happen.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.