Category Archives: Washington State Patrol

Driving With Wheels Off the Roadway

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Driving While License Suspended/Revoked, Driving With Wheels Off Roadway, misdemeanor, police, Rule of Lenity, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Traffic Infractions, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Image result for ON RAMP

In State v. Brooks, the WA Court of Appeals held that the neutral area separating a highway on-ramp from an adjacent lane of travel does not meet the definition of “roadway.” A driver who crosses this area is properly stopped for a violation of Driving with Wheels Off Roadway under RCW 46.61.670.

BACKGROUND FACTS

While merging onto westbound U.S. Route 97 from U.S. Route 2 in Chelan County, Jena Brooks’s car crossed over a portion of the highway designated as a “neutral area.” A neutral area is a paved triangular space separating an entrance or exit ramp from an adjacent lane of highway. The neutral area between Route 97 and its merger with westbound Route 2 is marked on each side by thick white channelizing lines. The drawing below is a depiction of a neutral area similar to the one crossed by Ms. Brooks:

Image result for ON RAMP NEUTRAL AREA

A Washington State Patrol trooper observed Ms. Brooks’s vehicular activity and performed a traffic stop. Ms. Brooks was ultimately arrested for driving on a suspended license and other misdemeanor offenses.

During proceedings in district court, Ms. Brooks filed a motion to suppress, arguing her vehicle had been stopped without probable cause. The motion was denied. Pertinent to this appeal, the district court ruled Ms. Brooks’s merger over the highway’s neutral area constituted “driving with wheels off roadway,” in violation of RCW 46.61.670. 2

Ms. Brooks was subsequently convicted of several misdemeanor offenses after a jury trial. Later, she successfully appealed the suppression ruling to the superior court. It found Washington’s definition of a roadway ambiguous in the context of a highway’s neutral area. The superior court then invoked the rule of lenity and determined Ms. Brooks should not have been stopped for driving with wheels off the roadway in violation of RCW 46.61.670.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeals addressed (1) whether the term roadway is ambiguous in the current context, and (2) if the term is ambiguous, whether the rule of lenity is an available tool of statutory construction that might benefit a defendant such as Ms. Brooks.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“A highway’s neutral area is not a vehicle lane. It is too short to facilitate meaningful travel. And its triangular shape cannot consistently accommodate the size of a vehicle. Rather than being designed for vehicular travel, it is apparent the neutral area is designed as a buffer zone. It keeps vehicles separate so as to facilitate speed adjustment and, in the context of a highway on-ramp, safe vehicle merging.”

The Court further reasoned that National standards set by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD) confirmed its observations about the apparent design purpose of a highway’s neutral area. In short, the Court reasoned the MUTCD refers to the neutral area as an “island.” As such, it is an area intended for vehicle “separation.”

“Although a neutral area may be designated either by a wide or double solid white channelizing line, the two options carry no substantive significance” said the Court of Appeals. “Like a double white line, a solid white line can serve as an indicator that crossing is prohibited. The whole point of a neutral area is to exclude vehicles and promote orderly and efficient traffic flow,” said the Court of Appeals.

The Court concluded that Ms. Brooks failed to maintain her vehicle wheels on an area of the highway meeting the statutory definition of a roadway. A vehicle stop was therefore permitted under Washington’s wheels off roadway statute. Consequently, the superior court’s order on appeal from the district court is reversed.

Surprisingly, there’s quite a bit of caselaw on what constitutes “Driving With Wheels Off the Roadway.” Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges following after a police officer pullover where this citation led to arrest. It’s quite possible to suppress the fruits of a search based on unlawful stop, search and/or seizure.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Child Molestation, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, felony, Forensics, Fourth Amendment, Marital Privilege, Rape, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sex Crimes, Silver Platter Doctrine, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Spousal Privilege, Technology, voyeurism, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Fear The Silver Platter - BL Clifton

In State v. Martinez, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s computer hard drive which Texas police seized in Texas pursuant to a search warrant was lawfully searched by the Washington State Patrol without a Washington search warrant under the silver platter doctrine.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Carlos Martinez began working at the Monroe Police Department in 1989. He worked in several capacities, including as a Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program instructor. While working as a D.A.R.E. instructor, Martinez met A.K., who was in fifth grade at the time.

Beginning in 2001 or 2002, when A.K. was 13 or 14 years old, she began baby-sitting Martinez’s two young children.  A.K. also came to the Martinezes’ house when she was not baby-sitting. She would sometimes show up unannounced. She would help Martinez with chores and do her schoolwork at the house. At the time, Martinez was married to his then-wife Julie West.

Apparently, Martinez began touching A.K. in a sexual manner when she was 14. He also set up a video camera in the bathroom and digitally recorded her when she used the facilities.

Ms. West went on vacation. During that time, A.K. stayed at the family home. When Ms. West returned from vacation, she discovered a love note from A.K. to Martinez. She also discovered a video recording that Martinez had made of A.K. getting out of the shower and stored on the family computer. West confronted Martinez about the recording. He said he wanted to see if A.K. had cut herself on the kitchen knife as she had claimed. West claimed that when she asked Martinez why he still had the recording on the computer, he responded that it was “nice to look at.”

Not long after this, A.K. and her family moved from Monroe to Eastern Washington. Martinez and A.K. kept in touch. Martinez claims that in February 2007 they began a consensual sexual relationship when A.K. was 18 years old. In fall 2009, the Army recalled Martinez to active duty and stationed him in San Antonio, Texas. A.K. moved to Texas to be with him. They lived together for a short time.

After their relationship deteriorated in October or November 2011, Martinez gave A.K. the video recordings that he made of her in his bathroom in 2004. A.K. testified that Martinez told her he wanted to watch the tapes one last time and masturbate to them. She claimed he asked her to touch him as well. A short time later, A.K. contacted the Texas police to turn over the tapes. She also told the Texas police that she began an intimate relationship with Martinez some time before she was 16. Later, she contacted WSP.

The Texas police obtained a warrant to search Martinez’s home and seize his laptop computer and digital media storage devices. Then, a grand jury was convened in Texas to consider a possession of child pornography charge. But the grand jury refused to indict, returning a “no bill.” The case was dismissed. Texas police made a mirror image of Martinez’s computer hard drive and, at WSP’s request, sent it to WSP. Without obtaining a separate warrant, WSP searched this mirror image hard drive. Texas police also sent WSP two actual laptop computers and hard drives seized from Martinez. After obtaining a warrant, WSP searched those items.

The State initially charged Martinez with two counts of voyeurism, two counts of child molestation, one count of rape of a child in the third degree, and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Later, the State dismissed the molestation and rape charges. It tried Martinez on only one count of voyeurism and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The jury found Martinez guilty on both counts. Because the voyeurism charge occurred outside the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed that count and convicted him on only the possession count.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeals accepted review on the issues of (1) whether the warrantless search of Martinez’s computer hard drive was lawful when Texas police – and not WA law enforcement – searched the computer, and (2) whether spousal privilege applies to suppress the testimony of his ex-wife at trial.

SHORT ANSWER

The Court of Appeals held that (1) the silver platter doctrine allowed the Washington State Patrol to later examine the hard drive without a warrant, and (2) because Martinez acted
as a guardian to the victim, the spousal privilege does not apply here.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  If a government action intrudes upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of a person’s privacy rights than does the Fourth Amendment. Article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Under the Silver Platter Doctrine, however, evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the manner the evidence was obtained would violate Washington law. Evidence is admissible under this doctrine when (1) the foreign jurisdiction lawfully obtained evidence and (2) the forum state’s officers did not act as agents or cooperate or assist the foreign jurisdiction.

“Martinez does not dispute that Texas lawfully obtained the hard drive,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. “And he does not challenge the trial court’s findings that Washington State Patrol (WSP) had no involvement in obtaining or serving the Texas warrant and that Texas police did not act as agents of WSP when they obtained or served the warrant.” Thus, under the silver platter doctrine, the evidence was admissible.

Next, the Court of Appeals rejected Martinez’ arguments that the silver platter doctrine does not apply here because the Texas officers did not conduct any search that would be unlawful in Washington. “The doctrine requires that the State show only two things: (1) the search was lawful in Texas and (2) the Washington officers did not act as agents for Texas or cooperate or assist Texas in any way,” said the Court. “Because the State proved this, the doctrine applies.”

Search Warrant

Next, Martinez argued that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad. In response, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Furthermore, the search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.

“When a search warrant authorizes a search for materials protected by the First Amendment, a greater degree of particularity is required, and we employ a more stringent test,” said the Court. “While the First Amendment presumptively protects obscene books and films, it does not protect child pornography involving actual minors.” Also, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that the warrant was invalid for other reasons as well.

Spousal Privilege

The Court of Appeals addressed Martinez’ arguments that the trial court mistakenly admitted the testimony of his ex-wife regarding a conversation she shared with Mr. Martinez’ video of A.K. as being “nice to look at.” The Court reasoned that generally, a current or former spouse cannot be examined about confidential communications made during the marriage without the consent of the other spouse. It also explained that the marital privilege rule tries to encourage the free interchange of confidences between husband and wife that are necessary for mutual understanding and trust. “But in some situations the policies that underlie the right to invoke a testimonial privilege are outweighed by the suppression of truth that may result,” said the Court. “Thus, this spousal privilege does not apply in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed against a child for whom the spouse is a parent or guardian.”

The Court reasoned that here, West merely repeated statements by Martinez and did not comment about her belief in Martinez’s guilt. “We agree that these facts are sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martinez kept the recording for the purpose of sexual stimulation and that West’s testimony that Martinez said the recording was ‘nice to look at’ could not have materially affected the outcome of the trial,” said the Court.

Finally, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that there was prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. “The Prosecutor’s general references were unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict in light of the other incriminating evidence,” said the Court. Furthermore, Martinez does not show that his counsel’s failure to object to the Prosecutor’s case presentation was unreasonable and/or was not strategic.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Martinez’ conviction and sentence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Who Is The Toxicologist?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DUI, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Toxicologist, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for toxicologist testimony

In the deeply divided 5-4 court decision State v. Salgado-Mendoza, the WA Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) even though the defendant was not informed which State toxicologist would testify.

I originally discussed this case in my blog titled, “Prosecutors Must Reveal Toxicologist Identities in DUI Trials.” At that time, the WA Court of Appeals Division II reversed the defendant’s DUI conviction because the Prosecutor failed to give Defense Counsel the name of their Toxicologist expert witness before trial.

On appeal, however, the WA Supreme Court decided differently. It overturned the Court of Appeals and said the trial court, in fact, was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On the evening of August 11, 2012, a Washington State Patrol trooper stopped and arrested Mr. Salgado-Mendoza for DUI. His BAC test showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.103 and 0.104; which is over the .o8 limit.

Before trial, the State initially disclosed the names of nine toxicologists from the Washington State Patrol toxicology laboratory, indicating its intent to call “one of the following.” It whittled the list to three names the day before trial, but did not specify which toxicologist it would call until the morning of trial, noting that it provided the witness’s name “as soon as we had it and that’s all that we can do in terms of disclosure.”

Mendoza moved to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) based on
late disclosure, asking the court to “send a message to the state patrol crime lab and
say this isn’t okay anymore.” The trial court refused, finding no actual prejudice to the defense and observing that the practice of disclosing a list of available toxicologists rather than a specific witness was driven more by underfunding of the crime labs than by mismanagement.

Salgado-Mendoza appealed to the superior court, which found the district
court had abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the
delayed disclosure violated the discovery rules and caused prejudice. Again, however, the WA Court of Appeals disagreed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court reasoned that while the State’s disclosure practice amounted to mismanagement within the meaning of CrRLJ 8.3(b), Salgado-Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression.

The majority Court explained that under CrRLJ 8.3(b), the party seeking relief bears the burden of showing both misconduct and actual prejudice.

“In this case, Salgado-Mendoza can demonstrate misconduct within the meaning of the rule, but not actual prejudice. He can prove misconduct because a discovery violation need not be willful—simple mismanagement will suffice. Here, the State’s failure to at least narrow the list of possible toxicology witnesses pretrial reflects mismanagement,” said the Court. “However, Salgado-Mendoza cannot show prejudice that wan’ants complete suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court held that Mr. Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony. “Because there was no abuse of discretion, we reverse the Court of Appeals.”

THE DISSENT

Justice Madsen authored the dissenting opinion. She was joined by Justices Yu, Gordon McCloud and Johnson.

In short, the dissenting judges disagreed with the majority because they believed the defendant was prejudiced by this delayed disclosure of the possible toxicologists who would testify. They reasoned that forcing a defendant to bear the burden of preparing to cross-examine a long list of witnesses when the State only intends to call one is not how our system of justice operates.

“The State cannot cite funding deficiencies and simply shift its burden of prosecution onto defense counsel,” wrote Judge Madsen. “If the State wishes to pursue prosecution, it must allocate sufficient resources to its departments so that they may operate in a way that is consistent with a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

“By under-staffing the State’s toxicology laboratory so that they cannot confirm who will testify until the day of trial, the State is not meeting this burden and defendants are being forced to compensate for the deficiency. Therefore, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Salgado-Mendoza’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.”

My opinion? I agree with the dissenting opinion. Under the Sixth Amendment and the WA Constitution, The State bears the burden of proving their charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the State must follow discovery rules under CrR 4.7. One of the State’s discovery obligations is to name their witnesses who they call to testify. Period. Collateral issues revolving around the State’s under-staffing and a lack of funding should not excuse violating a defendant’s Constitutional rights.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Independent Blood Tests

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, DUI, Evidence, Implied Consent, Jury Trial, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Vehicular Assault, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for dui blood draw

In State v. Sosa, the WA Court of Appeals Div. III decided there is no requirement that an officer performing a blood draw on a DUI suspect must advise the driver that the driver has the right to an independent blood alcohol test.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On March of 2014, defendant Jose Sosa’s vehicle crossed the center line of U.S. Route 12, causing a two-car collision. Mr. Sosa called 911 and law enforcement responded to the scene. On contact, the responding officer noticed Mr. Sosa smelled of alcohol and showed signs of impairment. In response to questioning, Mr. Sosa disclosed that he had some beer earlier but did not provide any specifics. An ambulance transported Mr. Sosa to the hospital.

At the emergency room, a state trooper contacted Mr. Sosa. Again, Mr. Sosa was noted to smell of alcohol and display signs of impairment. The trooper asked Mr. Sosa if he would be willing to do a voluntary field sobriety test. Mr. Sosa did not respond. The trooper then offered to administer a portable breath test (PBT), which would have provided a preliminary indication of Mr. Sosa’s BAC. Again, Mr. Sosa did not respond.

Based on the trooper’s observations, a warrant was obtained to procure a sample of Mr. Sosa’s blood. Three and a half hours after the accident, Mr. Sosa’s BAC was 0.12. Mr. Sosa was arrested and charged with vehicular assault.

Several days after the accident, the driver of the vehicle hit by Mr. Sosa returned to the hospital because of abdominal pain. Doctors performed a lifesaving partial splenectomy. Mr. Sosa’s case proceeded to trial. The jury found Mr. Sosa guilty of vehicular assault via all three of the charged alternatives: ( 1) operating a vehicle in a reckless manner, (2) operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and (3) operating a vehicle with disregard for the safety of others.

On appeal, Mr. Sosa argues evidence of his blood test results should have been suppressed because he was not advised, at the time of the blood draw, of the right to independent testing. Former RCW 46.61.506(6) (2010) stated: “The person tested may have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his or her own choosing administer one or more tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer. … ” On this argument, Mr. Sosa alleged his constitutional rights were violated.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Court reasoned that cases relied on by Mr. Sosa in support of his right-to-advice argument interpret prior versions of the Revised Code of Washington. The statutes in effect at the time of Mr. Sosa’s offense no longer required advice about independent testing in the context of a blood draw:

“Had Mr. Sosa’s offense taken place prior to the 2013 amendment, he undoubtedly would have been entitled to advice about independent blood testing. But this is no longer so. Our case law addressing the implied consent warning has always been based on statutory principles, not constitutional grounds.”

In short, the Court stated there is no independent constitutional right to such advice. Accordingly, any failure of law enforcement to advise Mr. Sosa about the right to an independent test had no bearing on the State’s evidence or Mr. Sosa’s conviction. With that, the court rejected Mr. Sosa’s challenge to his conviction based on the blood test results.

My opinion? Had Mr. Sosa’s offense taken place prior to the 2013 amendment, he undoubtedly would have been entitled to advice about independent blood testing. But this is no longer so. Washington’s implied consent law changed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, which held the taking of a DUI suspect’s blood without a warrant violates the suspect’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the exigency exception to the warrant requirement generally does not apply.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Froehrich: Unlawful Inventory Search

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Drug Offenses, Evidence, felony, Inventory Searches, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for unlawful search purse bag

In State v. Froehlich, the WA Court of Appeals Division II upheld the suppression of methampetamine found in a vehicle because the defendant’s car was unlawfully searched.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Froehlich was driving her car. She collided with a pickup truck waiting at a stop sign. After the collision, the car came to rest on the right shoulder of the highway. It was not obstructing traffic. A Washington State Patrol Trooper arrived at the scene. By this time, Froehlich was seated in the pickup truck that she had hit.

Ms. Froehlich eventually left the scene in an ambulance after talking with police at the scene. One trooper followed her to the hospital to do sobriety testing, and she was not arrested. However, the trooper at the scene of the accident decided to impound her car. At the scene, he performed an inventory search of the vehicle which also included the search of Froerich’s purse which she left inside the car. He found methamphetamine.

Ms. Froehrich was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver. Froehlich filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing in part that the Trooper had no reason to impound the car and failed to consider reasonable alternatives to impoundment. The trial court granted the motion, suppressed the evidence and ultimately dismissed the charges. The State appealed.

ANALYSIS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the impoundment was not lawful and therefore the search was not lawful because (1) under the community caretaking exception, the State did not prove that the impounding officer considered whether Froehlich, her spouse, or her friends were available to remove the vehicle; and (2) even though there was statutory authority for impoundment, the State failed to prove that the impounding officer considered all reasonable alternatives.

The Court reasoned that both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit warrantless searches unless an exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. One exception to the warrant requirement is a non-investigatory, good faith inventory search of an impounded vehicle. Law enforcement may lawfully impound a vehicle for three reasons: (1) as evidence of a crime, (2) under the community caretaking function, or (3) when the driver has committed a traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly authorized impoundment. Even if one of these reasons exists, however, an officer may impound a vehicle only if there are no reasonable alternatives.

Here, the Trooper’s impoundment of Froehlich’s car was not lawful under the community caretaking function because there were reasonable alternatives to impoundment. Here, the Trooper never asked Froehlich about arranging to have someone else remove the car as an alternative to impoundment, and the State presented no evidence that the Trooper considered Froehlich’s ability to arrange for the car’s removal.

CONCLUSION

Because Richardson unlawfully impounded the vehicle, his seizure of methamphetamine from Froehlich’s purse was unlawful.

My opinion? Good decision. Very simple, straightforward and correct analysis. As usual, I’m extremely impressed with Division II’s handling of search and seizure issues, especially when it comes to vehicle searches. Here, it’s clear that police officers cannot go about impounding people’s vehicles and searching through belongings when reasonable legal alternatives exist.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Lower .08 to .05?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, DUI, Implied Consent, Legislation, marijuana, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for dui BAC .05

Interesting article from Heather Bosch of KING 5 news reports that Washington state lawmakers are considering lowering the legal limit for driving under intoxication (DUI) from .08 to .05.

“The research shows impairment begins with the first drink,” said Representative John Lovick, D-44th District. “And I believe this after being a state trooper for 31 years.” Lovick said he based his legislation, House Bill 1874, on recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board.

According to Bosche, however, the American Beverage Institute opposes the bill and similar legislation being proposed in Hawaii and Utah. The industry group claims only a small percentage of deadly car crashes are caused by drivers with a blood alcohol concentration between .05 and .08, and that a 120-pound woman could reach .05 with just little more than one drink. A 150-pound man could reach it after two.

“The move would target responsible and moderate social drinkers while ignoring the hardcore drunk drivers who pose the greatest threat to safety,” said American Beverage Institute Managing Director Sarah Longwell. In short, Longwell says what’s needed is better enforcement of current laws: “We have to focus on the real problem and not be distracted by feel-good legislation that criminalizes perfectly responsible behavior,” said Longwell.

Representative John Lovick agrees that current laws could be better enforced, but says lowering the alcohol limit to .05 would be “a great first step in letting the public know that we are serious about keeping people who drive drunk, off the streets.”

Bosche reports that a public hearing before the House Transportation Committee will be held Tuesday. The bill already cleared the House Public Safety committee, but not without controversy.

“There will be a few ‘no’ votes on this side of the aisle,” Representative Dave Hayes (R-10th District) said during a recent hearing. “My personal viewpoint on this is just the fact that I don’t believe it’s necessary to reduce the blood alcohol level, based on testimony and my own personal experience in processing DUIs.” Hayes is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office.  Lovick is the former Snohomish County Sheriff.

The National Transportation Safety Board has said that if every state lowered the legal blood alcohol limit to .05, it would save 1,000 lives every year.

Interestingly, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) does not support the measure, calling it a “waste of time” because most people who are under .08 can pass field sobriety tests.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Holiday Drinking In The U.S.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Distracted Driving, Domestic Violence, Drowsy Driving, Drug Offenses, DUI, felony, Jail, law enforcement, marijuana, Miranda, misdemeanor, police, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, Violent Crime, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Interesting article by Christopher Ingraham of the Washington Post discusses how data on total monthly alcohol sales in the United States carries a time-tested seasonal trend: the spikes in December of each year.

Clearly, the holidays are traditionally a time for boozing it up.

For example, the Department of Health and Human Services recently updated the official federal statistics on the percent of state residents ages 12 and older who drink at least once a month. Also, Ingraham’s article discusses how various direct and indirect measures of alcohol consumption, including breathalyzer data, Web searches for hangover relief and alcohol-related traffic deaths all suggest that peak American drinking happens between Thanksgiving and New Year’s.

THE NORTHEAST

New England is home to the nation’s heaviest drinkers – New Hampshire, where about 64 percent of residents age of 12 or older drink monthly, is tops in the country. Vermont, Maine and Connecticut also come in at drinking rates above 60 percent. Hard-drinking cheese heads in Wisconsin see to it that their home is the only Midwestern state in the top tier of American drinkers.

THE NORTHWEST

Ingraham discusses how the next tier of heavy drinking states are all in the northern part of the country. Some researchers posit that there may be a relationship between heavy drinking and latitude. At the country level, alcohol consumption tends to increase the farther you get away from the equator. This could be a function of the potential for boredom and depression during winter months when the nights are long and the days are short. For a prime example of this, see recent stories involving alcohol and misconduct among people who live in Antarctica.

RELIGIOUS STATES

Ingraham discusses other cultural factors affect some States’ attitudes about drinking. On the map above, take a look at Utah and particularly Idaho. They’re in the bottom tier of the states for drinking frequency. Utah, where only 31 percent of adults drink in a given month, comes in dead last. This is almost certainly because of the large Mormon populations in those states — 58 percent of Utahans are Mormon, as are 24 percent of people in Idaho. Mormonism generally prohibits the use of alcohol and other drugs.

There’s likely a similar religious influence in places Alabama, Mississippi and the other Southern states where drinking is low. Those states have large evangelical Christian populations, many of whom are abstainers.

HOLIDAY DUI PATROLS IN WASHINGTON STATE

Image result for wa state patrol target zero

Coincidentally, the Washington State Patrol announced its increased Holiday DUI Patrol campaign of “Drive Sober Or Get Pulled Over.” Our State Troopers are extremely proactive in reaching their Target Zero goal of zero traffic fatalities by 2030.

Also, our local police and sheriff’s offices are working very hard responding to incidents of domestic violence, burglary, assault and other criminal incidents associated with holiday celebrations.

SEEK COMPETENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES THIS HOLIDAY SEASON.

For many, the holiday season is a joyous time when family and friends get together and celebrate. Naturally, our holiday merriment could involve the libations of alcohol and/or legal (and illegal) drugs.

We must enjoy the holidays safely and responsibly. Unfortunately, incidents of domestic violence, DUI, and other criminal behaviors – intentional or otherwise – can dampen our holiday festivities.

It’s never desirable to face criminal charges which could negatively affect your life for years to come. However, if you, friends or family find themselves in situations involving law enforcement, jail and/or criminal charges then contact the Law Office of Alexander Ransom as soon as possible.  I staunchly defends my clients’ constitutional rights to a fair trial, just proceedings and the suppression of evidence involving unlawful searches, seizures and self-incrimination. My practice involves saving people’s careers and reuniting families by seeking reductions and dismissals of criminal charges when appropriate.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Happy holidays!

-Alex Ransom, Esq.

State v. Murray: Improper Implied Consent Warnings Held Unimportant

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, DUI, Evidence, Implied Consent, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for implied consent warnings marijuana

In State v. Murray, the WA Supreme Court held that DUI breath test results should not be suppressed even though the police officers who informed defendants did not properly inform the defendants of THC warnings. In February, I discussed Robison’s Court of Appeals decision to suppress the BAC test before the WA Supreme Court re-addressed the issue on this most recent appeal.

Late one night, a state trooper observed Robison speeding through a restaurant parking lot toward a road. The trooper had to hit his brakes to avoid a collision as Robison exited the parking lot. The trooper decided a traffic stop was in order. The trooper could smell both alcohol and cannabis coming from Robison’s car. The officer investigated Robison for DUI. Robison performed poorly on field sobriety tests and agreed to take a roadside breath test.

Based on the results, the officer arrested Robison for suspected driving under the influence (DUI) and took him to a police station. At the station, the trooper read Robison an implied consent warning from a standard form’s that did not mention the new statutory language concerning THC. The form warning did warn Robison that he was subject to having his driver’s license suspended, revoked, or denied if the test revealed he was under the influence of alcohol.

Robison argued a 3.6 motion to suppress the results of the breath test, arguing that the implied consent warning was inadequate because it did not mirror the statutory language regarding the consequences of a finding of THC in his blood. The district court commissioner concluded that the warnings accurately informed the defendant that the result of a breath test would reveal the alcohol concentration of his breath and that it would be misleading to advise or imply to the defendant that the breath test could obtain a THC reading.

Robison was found guilty. Robison appealed to the superior court, which reversed, concluding the officer had no discretion to leave out a portion of the implied consent warning. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to suppress, and the WA Supreme Court accepted review on the State’s appeal.

Ultimately, the Court affirmed the lower courts and upheld Robison’s conviction. A driver’s implied consent to a breath test for alcohol, and the arresting officer’s duty to warn of the potential consequences of the test, have been part of our statutory system for decades. Both the legal consequences of driving while intoxicated and the details and exactitude of the warning required by the legislature have changed during that time. For example, Initiative 502, which decriminalized the recreational use of cannabis, also amended the implied consent statute. In relevant part, the amended implied consent statute said:

“(c) If the driver submits to the test and the test is administered, the driver’s license, permit, or privilege to drive will be suspended, revoked, or denied for at least ninety days if: (i) The driver is age twenty-one or over and the test indicates either that the alcohol concentration of the driver’s breath or blood is 0.08 or more or that the THC concentration of the driver’s blood is 5.00 or more.”

Robison argued that since some of the statutory language was omitted during his DUI investigation, the tests must be suppressed.

However, the WA Supreme Court disagreed:

“We find no case, and none have been called to our attention, that require officers to read an irrelevant statutory warning to a driver suspected of DUI. Instead, as acknowledged by counsel at oral argument, it has long been the reasonable practice of arresting officers to omit warnings related to underage drinking and commercial drivers’ licenses when advising those over 21 or driving on a noncommercial license.”

The Court further reasoned that the Implied Consent warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted.

With that, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Robison’s convictions.

My opinion? Bad decision. Like I said before, DUI investigations involving Implied Consent Warnings must keep up with today’s legislative amendments and other changing laws. The law is the law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Bellingham Police Department Body Cameras Now Mandatory

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Body camera, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Miranda, misdemeanor, Obstructing, police, Police Dogs, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Qualified Immunity, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Technology, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for bellingham police body cameras

A news article by Samantha Wohlfiel from of the Bellingham Herald reports that starting this July, Bellingham Police Department (BPD) will require all uniformed patrol officers to wear and use body cameras.

In 2014, the BPD started a voluntary program, allowing officers to use a body camera if they were willing. Now, Police Chief Cliff Cook has decided all uniformed patrol officers will need to wear the cameras while on duty:

“I think the original pilot and then the past year and a half … has shown us that having the videos is not only beneficial in cases of prosecution of individuals for crimes, as evidence of the actions of our officers, especially when they’re appropriate . . .  It also generally helps us resolve disputes or disagreements about what may have transpired between an officer and a citizen much more quickly and in a more definitive way.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Initially, 18 officers volunteered for Bellingham’s program, and currently 34 officers are using the cameras, Cook said. He also mentioned that his police officers have noted that people often change their behavior for the better when they’re told they’re being filmed.

One of the main concerns for officers and community members has been privacy, Cook said:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Basically, the “policy” requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

The department has a mix of cameras, some that are clipped on a lapel, others that are worn on glasses, but both have easily been knocked off in situations where officers were restraining someone, Cook said, so the department may shift toward other models.

Between 2014 and 2016, the total program cost has been $315,250, which includes things such as all hardware (the cameras, clips, glasses they sit on, etc.), software and docking stations, Cook told the council.

According to the article, the projected costs moving forward are about $35,000 to $56,000 per year each of the next two years for renewed data storage management.

Another concern was, of course, privacy:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

The current policy requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

My opinion? This is a step in the right direction. Body cameras make everyone behave better. They also catch evidence of what really transpired. Good move, BPD.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Proposed Law Would Require Bartenders to Cut Drunk People Off

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, Legislation, marijuana, misdemeanor, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

A news article written by S.E. Smith of www.care2.com reveals that a new bill was introduced into the California State Assembly that would require bartending personnel and managers to undergo training in how to handle alcohol and cut off intoxicated customers.

Under the Responsible Interventions for Beverage Servers Training Act of 2016 (RIBS), Assembly Bill 2121 would require bartenders to intervene when a bar customer has had too much to drink. The law, which if passed would go into effect in 2020, hopes to save lives decrease DUI, and curb drunk drivers. Bartenders would be required to complete a minimum of four training hours on subjects like recognizing intoxication and understanding the physical and social effects of alcohol. The course would also examine state laws surrounding beverage service. Every three years, participants would need to renew their certifications.

Although the California Business & Professions Code reveals that bartenders have always practiced some discretion in this area, the bill would create a more robust legal framework and provide bars with specific training requirements for staff. Furthermore, the legislation would ensure that bartenders across the state follow the same curriculum when they learn how to interact with customers.

According to S.E. Smith, one of the most frustrating parts of the job can involve making judgement calls about when someone has had too much to drink and needs to go home. Some states – including Washington State – have “cut off” laws requiring bartenders to stop serving intoxicated customers. Most have laws barring service to people who are already drunk. Individual bars also have their own policies and procedures for handling customers.

Drunk drivers are the main concern here. Intoxicated people who hurt themselves — an uninsured person who requires care for a broken limb, for instance —  may create public health nuisances and expenses. However, when intoxicated people get in cars, the decision can be fatal.

S.E. Smith emphasizes that 30 people die as a result of drunk driving every day in the United States, including sober drivers in other vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists. One third of traffic deaths can be attributed to intoxicated driving.

My opinion? Similar to Ms. Smith, this bill is a step in the right direction. Many of my DUI clients tell me they were over-served at the bars they frequented before being pulled over for DUI. It helps to have backup — like policies a bartender can apply — to remind a customer that they’re breaking the law if they kept serving.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.