Category Archives: police

Terry Stop Held Unlawful

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In United States v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an anonymous tip that a person saw a black male with a gun does not provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop in Washington, where possession of a firearm is presumptively lawful.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Brown, who is a black man, had the misfortune of deciding to avoid contact with the police. Following an anonymous tip that a black man was carrying a gun—which is not a criminal offense in Washington State—police spotted Brown, who was on foot, activated their lights, and pursued him by car, going the wrong direction down a one-way street. Before flashing their lights, the officers did not order or otherwise signal Brown to stop. Brown reacted by running for about a block before the officers stopped him at gunpoint.

Police pursued Brown for one block before stopping him and ordering him to the ground at gunpoint. The officers placed Brown in handcuffs and found a firearm in his waistband. A further search revealed drugs, cash, and other items.

Police seized Mr. Brown even though there was no reliable tip, no reported criminal activity, no threat of harm, no suggestion that the area was known for high crime or narcotics, no command to stop, and no requirement to even speak with the police.

Brown moved to suppress the evidence from the searches, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him under Terry v. Ohio. The district court disagreed and denied the motion.

ISSUE

Whether police officers were justified in briefly stopping and detaining Mr. Brown.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that an an officer may only conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  Illinois v. Wardlow.

“Here, the lack of facts indicating criminal activity or a known high crime area drives our conclusion. The Metro officers who stopped Brown took an anonymous tip that a young, black man “had a gun”—which is presumptively lawful in Washington—and jumped to an unreasonable conclusion that Brown’s later flight indicated criminal activity. At best, the officers had nothing more than an unsupported hunch of wrongdoing.”

With that, the court reasoned that the circumstances of this case fails to satisfy the standard established by Terry and Wardlow. “The combination of almost no suspicion from the tip and Brown’s flight does not equal reasonable suspicion.”

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that in Washington State, it is lawful to carry a gun. Although carrying a concealed pistol without a license is a misdemeanor offense in Washington,  the failure to carry the license is simply a civil infraction.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals downplayed Brown running from police. “No one disputes that once the Metro officer activated his patrol car lights, Brown fled,” said the Court. “But the Supreme Court has never endorsed a per se rule that flight establishes reasonable suspicion. Instead, the Court has treated flight as just one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, if an admittedly significant one. “Notably, the officers did not communicate with Brown, use their speaker to talk with him, or tell him to stop before they flashed their lights and then detained him,” said the Court. “Under these circumstances, Brown had no obligation to stop and speak to an officer.”

My opinion? Good decision. Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime under circumstances where the police may have conducted an unlawful search or seizure. Hiring competent defense is the first and best step toward gaining justice.

“Am I Free To Leave?”

RAW VIDEO: Camaro vs Police Cars After Game Stop Robbery in Houston -  YouTube

In State v. Johnson, the WA Court of Appeals held that a “seizure” of a person occurs when an officer’s words and action would have conveyed to an innocent person that his or movements are being restricted. Officers need not create a complete obstruction of an individual’s movements in order for the encounter to become a seizure.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Officer Yates and Officer George of the Lynnwood Police Department were engaged in a proactive patrol late at night in an area known to have a high rate of criminal activity. The officers observed a silver vehicle enter a motel parking lot and park in a stall. After the vehicle came to rest, about a minute and a half passed without any person entering or leaving the vehicle. The officers became suspicious that its occupants were using drugs.

The officers, both of whom were armed and in uniform, approached the vehicle on foot and stood on opposite sides adjacent to the driver’s and passenger’s doors. They shined flashlights into the vehicle’s interior to enable them to see the vehicle’s occupants and ensure that neither was holding anything that could put the officers in danger. Because the vehicle was also flanked on both sides by cars parked in adjoining stalls, the officers had minimal space to move.

Officer Yates did not see any drugs or drug paraphernalia when he shined his flashlight inside the passenger compartment. Inside were the defendant Mr. Johnson and a female passenger.

Officer Yates stood on the passenger side while Officer George stood adjacent to the driver’s door. Yates sought to start a conversation with Johnson, who was in the driver’s seat, and did so by asking, “Hey, is this Taylor’s vehicle?” In fact, there was no “Taylor”; the ruse was intended to make Johnson feel more comfortable, in the hope that he would talk with the officer. Johnson appeared confused by the question, and Yates asked, again, whether the vehicle was “Taylor Smith’s vehicle.” In response, Johnson stated that the vehicle was his own and that he had recently purchased it.

Meanwhile, Officer George, who was leaning over the driver’s side door, noticed a handgun placed between the driver’s seat and the door.

George alerted Yates to the presence of the firearm, drew his own handgun, opened the driver’s door and removed the weapon from Johnson’s vehicle. Subsequently, Johnson was removed from the vehicle. Meanwhile, police dispatch informed the officers that Johnson’s driver’s license was suspended in the third degree, and that he had an outstanding arrest warrant and a felony conviction. The officers then informed Johnson that he was being detained but not placed under arrest and advised him of his Miranda rights.

Eventually, Johnson was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in
the first degree.

Before trial, Johnson moved to suppress the evidence of the gun found in his possession, contending that it was found attendant to his unlawful seizure. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion. However, the judge did not make a determination as to whether Johnson was seized prior to the discovery and removal of the firearm, instead ruling that the encounter was a “social contact” and that “law enforcement had an insufficient basis to initiate a social contact.” The trial court further acknowledged that granting the motion to suppress essentially terminated the State’s case. The State appeals from the order granting Johnson’s motion.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“In a constitutional sense, the term “social contact” is meaningless. The term has been adopted by lawyers and judges to describe circumstances that do
not amount to a seizure.”

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that term has been adopted by lawyers and judges to describe circumstances that do not amount to a seizure. It explained, for example, that a social contact is said to rest someplace between an officer’s saying ‘hello’ to a stranger on the street and, at the other end of the spectrum, an investigative detention (i.e., Terry stop).

“Fortunately, seizure jurisprudence is well-developed,” said the Court. It said the WA Constitution does not forbid social contacts between police and citizens. A police officer’s conduct in engaging a defendant in conversation in a public place and asking for
identification does not, alone, raise the encounter to an investigative detention. Not
every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is an intrusion requiring an
objective justification. Thus, the police are permitted to engage persons in conversation and ask for identification even in the absence of an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.

“However, officers need not create a complete obstruction of an individual’s movements in order for the encounter to become a seizure. The test is whether a reasonable person faced with similar circumstances would feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter.”

The Court of Appeals held the search and seizure unlawful. In the instant case, the defendant was seized when officers asked for proof of his identity under a totality of the circumstances analysis as (1) the defendant was seated in a parked car that was flanked by cars parked in each of the adjoining spaces when the two uniformed officers stood adjacent to the vehicle’s doors, such that neither the defendant nor his passenger would have been able to open the doors and walk away from the vehicle without the officers moving or giving way; (2) the defendant could not move his vehicle in reverse without risking his car making contact with one or both of the officers and a barrier prevented the vehicle from pulling forward, (3) the officers illuminated the interior of the vehicle with flashlights, and (4) the officers used a ruse to begin the contact, asking “Is this Taylor’s car?” (5) when the officers approached the vehicle and initiated a conversation with Johnson, they saw him seated with a female passenger and neither officer observed any signs of drug use, (6) Johnson was cooperative with Officer Yates and answered his questions, and (7) beyond the aforementioned hunch, the officers were aware of nothing that constituted a reasonable, articulable suspicion of potential criminal activity.

With that, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in granting
Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence of the subsequently discovered firearm.

My opinion? Good decision. Please read my Legal Guide titled Search and Seizure and contact my office if you a friend or family member are arrested for a crime and believe a questionable search or seizure happened. Hiring an experienced defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Car Stop & Purse Search

Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs? | The New Republic

In State v. Lee, the WA Court of Appeals held that a passenger’s consent to a search of her purse was not spoiled by police conduct during the traffic stop.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Defendant Ms. Lee was the front seat passenger in a car driven by Mr. Peterman. Detective Tilleson initiated a traffic stop for two traffic infractions. Detective Tilleson asked Peterman for his identification, learned his license was suspended, and arrested him for first degree driving while license suspended or revoked. Peterman consented to a search of the car.

Detective Tilleson told Ms. Lee to step out to facilitate his search of the car. She left her purse inside the car. Detective Tilleson ran Lee’s identification information to determine if she had a driver’s license so she could drive the car if it was not impounded. He learned Lee had a valid driver’s license and a conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

Lee began to pace back and forth near the car. At some point, Detective Fryberg directed Lee to sit on a nearby curb. During a conversation, Lee told Detective Tilleson the purse in the car was hers. Detective Tilleson asked Lee for permission to search her purse, telling her that he was asking “due to her prior drug conviction.” He also gave Lee warnings pursuant to State v. Ferrier that she was not obligated to consent and that she could revoke consent or limit the scope of the search at any time.

Lee consented to the search. When Detective Tilleson asked Lee if there was anything in her purse he should be concerned about, she said there was some heroin inside. Detectives found heroin and methamphetamine in her purse, advised Lee of her Miranda rights, and arrested her for possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver.

Before trial, Lee moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of her purse. The trial court denied Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the search of her purse. The court found “the testimony of the detectives involved was more credible than the defendant’s testimony. The trial court also determined that all of Lee’s statements were voluntary and that none were coerced. Finally, the court concluded that Lee validly consented to a search of her purse.

At the bench trial, the judge found Lee guilty as charged. Lee appealed on arguments that she did not validly consent to the search of her purse because the detectives unlawfully seized her.

LEGAL ISSUE

Whether police exceeded the reasonable scope and duration of the traffic stop by asking Ms. Lee’s consent to search her purse while mentioning her prior drug conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Court of Appeals stated that both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a warrantless search or seizure unless an exception applies. Voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.

“But an otherwise voluntary consent may be vitiated by an unlawful seizure,” reasoned the court of Appeals. “When analyzing a passenger’s consent to search the purse she left in
the car, we start with the traffic stop that led to the search.”

Here, the Court said the Fourth Amendment and WA Constitution both recognize an
investigative stop exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Terry v. Ohio. “The rationale of Terry applies by analogy to traffic stops applies by analogy to traffic stops,” said the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals explained that the proper scope of a Terry stop depends on the purpose of the stop, the amount of physical intrusion upon the suspect’s liberty, and the length of time the suspect is detained. A lawful Terry stop is limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop. “Once that purpose is fulfilled, the stop must end,” reasoned the Court.

Ultimately, the Court found that once the arrested driver consented to a search of the vehicle, it was not unreasonable for the detective to ask the passenger – here, Ms. Lee – if she consented to a search of the purse she left in the car. The detectives legitimately checked Lee’s identification to determine whether she was a licensed driver and could drive the car from the scene following Peterson’s arrest. And the search of the purse occurred roughly 18 minutes after the traffic stop began.

“We conclude Lee’s voluntary consent to search her purse was not vitiated by police conduct at the traffic stop. Specifically, under the totality of the circumstances, the police did not exceed the reasonable scope and duration of the traffic stop.”

In addition, the Court reasoned that the mention of Lee’s prior drug conviction must also be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. “Here, there was a single mention of the conviction in passing,” said the Court. “There was no physical intrusion upon Lee.”

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded that the police did not exceed the reasonable scope or duration of the traffic stop under the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, Lee failed to establish that her voluntary consent to search her purse was vitiated by police conduct. Her conviction was affirmed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving a questionable search and seizure by the police. Hiring competent and experienced defense counsel is the first and best step toward justice.

Firearms & Terry Stops

What Happens If I Get Pulled Over for DUI and I Have a Loaded Gun in My Car in Virginia? - Pack Law Group

In State v. Tarango, the WA Court of Appeals held that the presence of a firearm in public and the presence of an individual openly carrying a handgun in a “high-risk setting,” are insufficient, standing alone, to support an investigatory stop.

BACKGROUND FACTS

At around 2:00 in the afternoon on a winter day in 2016, Mr. Matthews drove to a neighborhood grocery store in Spokane, parking his car next to a Chevrolet Suburban in which music was playing loudly. A man was sitting in the passenger seat of the Suburban, next to its female driver. When Mr. Matthews stepped out of his car and got a better look at the passenger, who later turned out to be the defendant Mr. Tarango, he noticed that Mr. Tarango was holding a gun in his right hand, resting it on his thigh. Mr. Matthews would later describe it as a semiautomatic, Glock-style gun.

As he headed into the store, Mr. Matthews called 911 to report what he had seen, providing the 911 operator with his name and telephone number. The first officer to respond saw a vehicle meeting Mr. Matthews’s description parked on the east side of the store. He called in the license plate number and waited for backup to arrive. Before other officers could arrive, however, the Suburban left the parking area, traveling west.

The Suburban was followed by an officer and once several other officers reached the vicinity, they conducted a felony stop. According to one of the officers, the driver, Lacey Hutchinson, claimed to be the vehicle’s owner. When told why she had been pulled over, she denied having firearms in the vehicle and gave consent to search it.

After officers obtained Mr. Tarango’s identification, however, they realized he was under Department of Corrections (DOC) supervision and decided to call DOC officers to perform the search.

In searching the area within reach of where Mr. Tarango had been seated, a DOC officer observed what appeared to be the grip of a firearm located behind the passenger seat, covered by a canvas bag. When the officer moved the bag to get a better view of the visible firearm—the visible firearm turned out to be a black semiautomatic—a second firearm, a revolver, fell out. Moving the bag also revealed a couple of boxes of ammunition. At that point, officers decided to terminate the search, seal the vehicle, and obtain a search warrant. A loaded Glock Model 22 and a Colt Frontier Scout revolver were recovered when the vehicle was later searched.

The State charged Mr. Tarango, who had prior felony convictions, with two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Because Mr. Tarango had recently failed to report to his community custody officer as ordered, he was also charged with Escape from community custody.

Before trial, Mr. Tarango moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that police lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, the trial court denied the suppression motion. Later, at trial, the jury found Mr. Tarango guilty as charged. He appealed.

ISSUE

The issue on appeal was whether a reliable informant’s tip that Mr. Tarango was seen openly holding a handgun while seated in a vehicle in a grocery store parking lot was a sufficient basis, without more, for conducting a Terry stop of the vehicle after it left the lot.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Tarango’s motion to suppress should have been granted because officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Mr. Tarango had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.

The Court reasoned that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless one of the few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.

“A Terry investigative stop is a well-established exception,” said the Court. “The purpose of a Terry stop is to allow the police to make an intermediate response to a situation for which there is no probable cause to arrest but which calls for further investigation . . . To conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop.”

Additionally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that in evaluating whether the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, it reminded that Washington is an “open carry” state, meaning that it is legal in Washington to carry an unconcealed firearm unless the circumstances manifest an intent to intimidate another or warrant alarm for the safety of other persons.

“Since openly carrying a handgun is not only not unlawful, but is an individual right protected by the federal and state constitutions, it defies reason to contend that it can be the basis, without more, for an investigative stop.”

Here, because the officers conducting the Terry stop of the Suburban had no information that Mr. Tarango had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals ruled that Tarango’s motion to suppress should have been granted. The Court also reversed and dismissed his firearm possession convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Midterm Elections Bring Criminal Justice Reforms

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Excellent article from the Sentencing Project describes how voters in a number of states considered ballot measures during yesterday’s Midterm Election. Criminal justice reform measures ranged from voting rights to sentencing reform.

Colorado – Abolishing Involuntary Servitude as Punishment

Coloradans approved Amendment A with 65% support; the measure removes language from the state Constitution that allows slavery and involuntary servitude to be used as punishment for the conviction of a crime. Abolish Slavery Colorado organized a broad coalition in support of the constitutional change. Supporters included faith groups and civil rights organizations.

Florida – Expanding the Vote

State residents expanded voting rights to as many as  1.4 million Floridians with a felony conviction by approving Amendment 4 with 64% support; support from 60% of voters was required to approve the ballot measure. Justice involved residents now automatically have the right to vote once they complete their prison, probation or parole sentence; persons convicted of homicide and sex offenses are excluded from the measure.

The state’s lifetime felony voting ban was among the most restrictive in the country, along with Iowa, Kentucky and Virginia which maintain lifetime voting bans for all felonies unless the governor takes action. The Florida Rights Restoration Coalition, which organized broad support for the measure, was led by directly impacted residents and garnered more than 800,000 signatures to qualify Amendment 4 for the ballot.

Florida – Retroactivity & Sentencing

Also in Florida, voters approved Amendment 11 with 62% support, a measure that allows sentencing reforms to be retroactive. The amendment repeals language from the state’s ‘Savings Clause’ in the constitution that blocks the legislature from retroactively applying reductions in criminal penalties to those previously sentenced. Statutory law changes are not automatically retroactive; the legislature still has to authorize retroactivity for a particular sentencing reform measure.

Louisiana – Requiring Unanimous Jury Consideration

Louisianans approved Amendment 2, a constitutional change requiring unanimous juries for all felony convictions.  In all other states, except Oregon, a unanimous jury vote is required to convict people for serious crimes; Louisiana was the only state where a person could be convicted of murder without a unanimous jury. Advocacy for Amendment 2 was supported by a broad coalition that advanced criminal justice reforms in recent years. The state’s Democratic and Republican parties endorsed Amendment 2, as well as community groups including Voice of the Experienced, and Americans for Prosperity.

Michigan – Authorized Marijuana Possession

Michiganders approved Proposal 1, a measure that legalizes marijuana for adult recreational use. The change means residents over age 21 will be able to possess up to 2.5 ounces of marijuana on their person and up to 10 ounces in their home. The newly elected governor has signaled support to pardon justice involved residents with prior marijuana convictions and legislation is pending to require judges to expunge misdemeanor marijuana convictions.

Ohio – Rejected Felony Reclassification Measure

Ohio residents rejected Issue 1, a measure that would have reclassified certain drug offenses as misdemeanors and prohibited incarceration for a first and second offense. The measure failed with 65% voting against the sentencing reform. In recent years, voters in California and Oklahoma approved similar ballot initiatives to reclassify certain felonies as misdemeanors with a goal of state prison population reduction.

Washington – Strengthening Police Accountability

Voters passed Initiative 940 and repealed a provision in state law that made it difficult to bring criminal charges against police for deadly force. The Washington law required prosecutors to prove “evil intent” or “malice” when filing charges like manslaughter against police officers. Washingtonians approved the measure with 60% support. I-940 also requires training in de-escalation and mental health for law enforcement officers; requires police to provide first aid to victims of deadly force; and requires independent investigations into the use of deadly force.

My opinion? State initiatives provide an opportunity to civically engage communities on criminal justice policies and build momentum to challenge mass incarceration.

Midterm voters across the nation have spoken. For the most part, their decisions are a step in the right direction. We see an end to involuntary servitude in prison, granting voting rights to some convicted felons, jury unanimity, the legalization of marijuana and the strengthening of police accountability. Good.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Courtroom Disruptions

Irate Florida man Alan McCarty found guilty of threatening to kill judge  who ruled against him in custody dispute - News - - ,

In State v. Davis, the WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to question witnesses at trial was violated when the defendant was removed for being disruptive.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2014, a King County Sheriff’s deputy arrested Davis for possession of a stolen Hyundai vehicle.

Two and a half weeks later, on February 11,2014, a Federal Way Police Department officer observed a Buick parked near a park-and-ride and saw Davis standing outside the car, making furtive movements. As Davis got into the car to drive away, the officer recorded the license plate. The owner had reported the vehicle as stolen. the officer then initiated a traffic stop and arrested Davis for possession of a stolen vehicle — the Buick. A search of Davis recovered crack cocaine in his shirt pocket.

On May 19, 2014, the State charged Davis with two counts of possession of a stolen vehicle, and one count of possession of a controlled substance.

Davis motioned for standby counsel – an attorney who is appointed to assist a client who has invoked his/her right to self-representation – at numerous times throughout his pretrial proceedings. His requests were denied each time.  The court stated Davis must choose between having counsel and representing himself. Davis chose to proceed without a lawyer. The case proceeded to trial.

During trial, the The State Prosecutor attempted to continue its examination of a police officer, but Davis repeatedly interrupted to make comments about the water. The trial court temporarily retired the jury. A heated discussion took place to include the following:

THE COURT: Screaming at the top of his lungs, the jury–
THE DEFENDANT: And I’m going to continue to scream. Where’s my fucking water?
(Defendant screaming simultaneously with court)
THE COURT: I need to proceed with the trial, and I am finding that he is voluntarily absenting himself from the rest of these proceedings under State v. Garza, G-A-R-Z-A, and the record should reflect that he continues to speak on top of his lungs, swearing, accusing me of all kinds of things.
THE DEFENDANT: You’re being an asshole, and I can be one, too.
THE COURT: You’re now removed from the court.
THE DEFENDANT: Good. And fuck you very much, asshole. Fuck this kangaroo court shit.

At this point, it was after three o’clock in the afternoon. In Davis’s absence, the State continued questioning a police officer who testified as to finding crack cocaine in Davis’s pocket. The State then examined the police officer who had identified the stolen Buick, initiated the traffic stop, and arrested Davis.

The court did not give Davis an opportunity to cross-examine either officer.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals ruled that although (1) Davis did not have a right to standby counsel, and (2) the court properly removed him,  it nevertheless violated his Sixth Amendment right to representation by allowing the State to examine two of its witnesses in his absence and not affording him an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses.

The court reasoned that Davis went unrepresented during the testimony of police officers and was not given the opportunity to cross-examine them.

“He did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to representation and agree to have an empty defense table while the State questioned two critical witnesses.”

“This remains the case despite his decision to represent himself,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. “As reflected above, cases from other jurisdictions support this conclusion. We are unaware of authority supporting a contrary result.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that leaving Davis without representation at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to representation and remanded for a new trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

I-940 Passed By Voters

Initiative 940, modifying law regulating police use of deadly force, passes  with strong support | The Seattle Times

Excellent article from Seattle Times reporter Steve Miletich informs us that Initiative 940,  the measure that would remove a 32-year-old barrier in state law that has made it virtually impossible to bring criminal charges against police officers believed to have wrongfully used deadly force, has passed with strong support.

Passage of the measure means that prosecutors will no longer have to prove law-enforcement officers acted with “evil intent” — or so-called “malice” — when considering whether to file criminal charges such as manslaughter. Washington is the only state with such restrictive language.

The measure passed with 60 percent of the vote statewide. In King County, support exceeded 70 percent.

According to Miletich, a spokesperson for the I-940 campaign said the win means “Washington becomes the first state in the nation to pass a police training and accountability measure in response to a national conversation about use of force and relationships between law enforcement and the communities they serve.”

I-940 requires proof that a reasonable officer would have used deadly force in the same circumstance and sincerely believed the use of deadly force was warranted. I-940 also requires de-escalation and mental-health training for police; requires officers to administer first aid to a victim of deadly force; and requires independent investigations into the use of deadly force.

At one point, state legislators passed a compromise bill earlier this year that addressed concerns raised by some law-enforcement organizations about certain wording in the initiative.

I-940 proponents accepted the bill, agreeing to keep the initiative off the ballot. But the state Supreme Court agreed with a challenger that the initiative couldn’t be modified by the Legislature and must be presented to the voters in its original form.

My opinion? Excellent. It’s about time. All of us want to ensure our families, communities and law enforcement officers as safe. But last year, more people were killed in encounters with law enforcement than in 45 other states, and almost a third of those killed were experiencing a mental health crisis. No officer wants to find themselves in this situation, but right now officers in Washington aren’t provided with enough training to help them de-escalate a potentially deadly encounter.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Ruse” Searches Held Unconstitutional.

Image result for ruse search

In Whalen v. McMullen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an officer’s warrantless entry into a home via a ruse such as by asking the homeowner for assistance in a fictitious criminal investigation, violates the Fourth Amendment. A “ruse” entry is when a known government agent misrepresents his purpose in seeking entry.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

While investigating Kathleen Whalen for fraud related to her application for social security benefits, Washington State Patrol officer McMullen gained both her cooperation and entrance into her home by requesting her assistance in a fictitious criminal investigation. During his investigation, McMullen secretly videotaped Whalen both outside and inside her home. No criminal charges were ever lodged against Whalen, but the Washington Disability Determination Services division (“DDS”) of the Washington Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) used at her social security hearing the footage surreptitiously filmed inside her home.

Whalen brought suit against McMullen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that McMullen’s entry into her home without a warrant and under false pretenses violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

LEGAL ISSUES

(1) whether McMullen’s warrantless entry into Whalen’s home under false pretenses was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether it was clearly established that such an entry was a Fourth Amendment violation.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Ninth Circuit held that McMullen violated Whalen’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but agreed with the lower federal district court that McMullen had qualified immunity from suit because the right was not clearly established.

A. Whether the Officer’s Conduct Violated the Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit explained that the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, instructs that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

“Without question, the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections,” said the Court, citing Lewis v. United States. “Indeed, at the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when a government agent obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area. The Court distinguished between “undercover” entries, where a person invites a government agent who is concealing that he is a government agent into her home, and “ruse” entries, where a known government agent misrepresents his purpose in seeking entry. The former does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as long as the undercover agent does not exceed the scope of his invitation while inside the home.

However, it also reasoned that a ruse entry – one when the suspect is informed that the person seeking entry is a government agent but is misinformed as to the purpose for which the agent seeks entr – cannot be justified by consent. This is because access gained by a government agent, known to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing, violates the Fourth Amendment’s bar against unreasonable searches and seizures if such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of the government’s investigation.

In this case, McMullen identified himself as a law enforcement officer and requested Whalen’s assistance in a fictitious investigation, gaining entry into her home using this ruse.

“McMullen appealed to Whalen’s trust in law enforcement and her sense of civic duty to assist him in his “identity theft” investigation. McMullen’s description of an identity theft investigation was perfectly plausible, and Whalen readily agreed to cooperate. But there was no identify theft investigation underway. McMullen lied to Whalen about his real purpose—to investigate her for possible social security fraud. Whalen’s consent to McMullen’s entry into her home is vitiated by his deception.”

Consequently, reasoned the Court, it was entirely immaterial that McMullen could have lawfully searched Whalen’s home by securing her consent without using a ruse. “His argument is akin to justifying a warrantless search on the ground that a warrant would have been issued if one had been sought,” said the Court. Regardless of whether Whalen would have consented to McMullen’s entry into her home if he had not used a ruse, she did not validly consent here.

“Once we add to this the fact that McMullen videotaped his entire visit, any illusion that this was not a Fourth Amendment search evaporates. McMullen had two cameras running while he was talking with Whalen, and at least one of the cameras captured his entire visit inside her home. Of course it was a search: not only was McMullen there to observe Whalen, but he had also been asked specifically to seek evidence concerning Whalen’s use of an electric wheelchair, how wheelchair accessible the house was, were the wheelchairs used, were clothes on them, etc.”

With that, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McMullen’s entry into Whalen’s home without consent or a warrant in the course of a civil fraud investigation related to Whalen’s benefits claim was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

B. Whether the Violation Was “Clearly Established.”

Here, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in order to hold McMullen personally liable under § 1983, Whalen’s right to be free from a search in this context must have been clearly established. To be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

“The right Whalen asserts was not clearly established,” said the Court. “Therefore, officer McMullen was entitled to qualified immunity from this suit.”

My opinion? Good decision, mostly. I’m happy to see the Ninth found that the officer’s ruse violated Ms. Whalen’s constitutional rights. And although I would’ve liked to see the Ninth Circuit award Ms. Whalen damages for the violation of her rights, the reality is that it’s extremely difficult to succeed on suing police for misconduct.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Racial Profiling of Latinos in LA County

Excellent article by Joel Rubin and Ben Poston of the LA Times examines a disturbing trend. Apparently, more than two-thirds of the drivers pulled over by the Domestic Highway Enforcement Team were Latino, according to a Times analysis of Sheriff’s Department data. And sheriff’s deputies searched the vehicles of more than 3,500 drivers who turned out to have no drugs or other illegal items, the analysis found. The overwhelming majority of those were Latino.

Several of the team’s big drug busts have been dismissed in federal court as the credibility of some deputies came under fire and judges ruled that deputies violated the rights of motorists by conducting unconstitutional searches.

The Times analyzed data from every traffic stop recorded by the team from 2012 through the end of last year — more than 9,000 stops in all — and reviewed records from hundreds of court cases. Among its findings:

  • Latino drivers accounted for 69% of the deputies’ stops. Officers from the California Highway Patrol, mainly policing traffic violations on the same section of freeway, pulled over nearly 378,000 motorists during the same period; 40% of them were Latino.
  • Two-thirds of Latinos who were pulled over by the Sheriff’s Department team had their vehicles searched, while cars belonging to all other drivers were searched less than half the time.
  • Three-quarters of the team’s searches came after deputies asked motorists for consent rather than having evidence of criminal behavior. Several legal scholars said such a high rate of requests for consent is concerning because people typically feel pressured to allow a search or are unaware they can refuse.
  • Though Latinos were much more likely to be searched, deputies found drugs or other illegal items in their vehicles at a rate that was not significantly higher than that of black or white drivers.

From top to bottom: L.A. County Sheriff’s Deputies search a motorist’s suitcase. Also a deputy uses a device for measuring density to search for hidden drugs and clutches some tools he uses to perform vehicle searches. (Myung J. Chun / Los Angeles Times)

The L.A. County Sheriff’s Department said that racial profiling plays no role in the deputies’ work and that they base their stops only on a person’s driving and other impartial factors.

In December, Sheriff Jim McDonnell heaped praise on the team, ticking off its accomplishments in a lengthy statement. “The importance of this mission cannot be overstated,” the sheriff said.

But several legal and law enforcement experts said the department’s own records strongly suggest the deputies are violating the civil rights of Latinos by racially profiling, whether intentionally or not.

“When they say, ‘We’re getting all these drugs out of here,’ they are not taking into account the cost,” said David Harris, a law professor at the University of Pittsburgh who studies racial profiling by police. “They are sacrificing their own legitimacy in the community as a whole and the Latino community in particular.”

Kimberly Fuentes, research director for the California League of United Latin American Citizens, described The Times’ findings as “extremely disturbing and troubling” and said the advocacy organization would demand a meeting with Sheriff’s Department officials.

“These findings risk tarnishing any trust between the Sheriff’s Department and the Latino community,” Fuentes said.

My opinion? A pullover and search of your vehicle is unlawful if the reason for the pullover/search is racial profiling. Racial profiling is the practice of targeting individuals for police or security detention based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain minority groups are more likely to engage in unlawful behavior. Examples of racial profiling by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are illustrated in legal settlements and data collected by governmental agencies and private groups, suggesting that minorities are disproportionately the subject of routine traffic stops and other security-related practices.

Also, pretextual searches are also unlawful. Pretext is an excuse to do something or say something that is not accurate. Pretexts may be based on a half-truth or developed in the context of a misleading fabrication. Pretexts have been used to conceal the true purpose or rationale behind actions and words. A pretextual search and arrest by law enforcement officers is one carried out for illegal purposes such as to conduct an unjustified search and seizure.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member was charged with a crime after being racially profiled and/or pulled over for unlawful pretext. I provide zealous representation to all defendants facing these circumstances.

Policing for Profit

Image result for civil asset forfeiture

Excellent article by Steven Robert Allen , Director of Public Policy, ACLU of New Mexico discusses how a federal judge declared “Policing for Profit” – better known as “Civil Asset Forfeiture” – unconstitutional.

For those who don’t know, Civil Asset Forfeiture allows police to seize — and then keep or sell — any property they allege is involved in a crime. Owners need not ever be arrested or convicted of a crime for their cash, cars, or even real estate to be taken away permanently by the government.

“With civil asset forfeiture, police literally accuse your stuff of a crime, and you as the owner have to prove that your stuff is innocent.”  – Steven Robert Allen, ACLU

Here’s an example: In 2010 Stephen Skinner and his son Jonathan, both African-American, were on a road trip to Las Vegas, Nevada, for a vacation when they were pulled over by New Mexico State Police for going 5 mph over the speed limit. The trooper searched their rental car and found several thousand dollars in cash and coins in their luggage that the two men had set aside for gaming at the casinos. The trooper called Skinner, then in his late 50s, “boy” and released him with a warning that “it’s not over.”

And sure enough, it wasn’t.

As they passed through Albuquerque, police and federal agents pulled them over on a pretext once again, went straight to their luggage, and confiscated their cash with no justification other than the racist assumption that two black men traveling with a big wad of cash must have come by it illegally. Neither Stephen or Jonathan were ever actually accused of a crime, much less convicted. Yet now the cops had their vacation money, and this money grab was perfectly legal.

In his article, Mr. Allen writes that most people who have property seized in this manner give it up as lost. The cost of hiring an attorney to argue before a judge that your property is “innocent” or, in other words, was not criminally acquired or used in the commission of a crime, often exceeds the value of the property. This is big business for police departments across the United States, who rely on these seized assets to pad their budgets. The Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm, estimates that in 2014 alone the Department of Justice took in $4.5 billion in forfeited assets. The assets taken in annually by local and state police departments are doubtless even higher.

In 2015, the ACLU of New Mexico, in collaboration with the Institute for Justice, the Drug Policy Alliance, and the Rio Grande Foundation, helped pass a bill that abolished civil asset forfeiture, requiring police to obtain a criminal conviction in court before they can take a person’s property. The bill also requires that any forfeited assets must go into a state general fund to reduce the profit motive inherent in this law enforcement practice. The bill passed unanimously, and New Mexico now has the strongest protections against civil asset forfeiture in the nation.

One person, Arlene Harjo, finally filed a lawsuit against the department with the help of the Institute for Justice, and, last week, she won. A federal judge handed down a landmark ruling that Albuquerque’s vehicle seizure program violates residents’ constitutional rights by taking their property before they’ve been convicted of a crime.

“This is a major moment in the fight against the unjust practice of civil asset forfeiture,” writes Allen. “Not only will New Mexico law enforcement agencies be forced to comply with our state prohibition against the practice, but this victory establishes an important legal precedent that victims of civil asset forfeiture can use to fight back nationwide.”

And indeed, the problem is not just in New Mexico. In 2015, the ACLU sued an Arizona county attorney and county sheriff challenging that state’s civil asset forfeiture laws, which create perverse and unconstitutional incentives for law enforcement to build multimillion-dollar slush funds that they get to control.

My opinion? This is excellent work from the ACLU and a wonderful decision from the federal courts. More than anything, this ruling out of New Mexico is a powerful reminder that brave individuals can still take a stand against systems of injustice, crack their foundations, and bring them tumbling to the ground. All it takes is a few people like Stephen Skinner and Arlene Harjo who say, “Enough. Not today. No more.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.