Category Archives: Forensics

Forensic Genetic Genealogy Is Admissible Evidence At Trial

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How DNA was discovered and the cases it has helped solve

In State v. Hartman  the WA Court of Appeals held a defendant has no privacy interest in bodily fluids that he “abandons” at a crime scene. A defendant also lacks standing to challenge a search of the DNA of relatives that were voluntarily uploaded to a public database.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 1986, MW, a 12-year-old girl, was raped and murdered in a Tacoma park. The killer left semen on MW’s body, but his DNA did not match that of any suspects or anyone in police databases for the next 30 years.

In 2018, police enlisted Parabon Nanolabs, a DNA technology company, to analyze the killer’s DNA and to upload it into GEDmatch, a consumer DNA database, looking for partial familial matches that would help identify the killer. Police did not secure a warrant to analyze the abandoned DNA or to compare it with DNA in the GEDmatch database.

Parabon learned that several of the killer’s cousins had DNA in the GEDmatch database. Parabon used information from the database and public records to construct family trees. Parabon then directed police to try to obtain a DNA sample from Gary Charles Hartman. Police obtained a discarded napkin containing Hartman’s DNA, and it matched the DNA from semen on MW’s body. The State charged Hartman with first degree felony murder.

Before trial, Hartman moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that Parabon’s comparison of the DNA sample from the crime scene to the GEDmatch database was unconstitutional. He also asserted that the DNA later collected from the napkin directly linking him to the murder was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. Hartman did not argue below that he had any privacy interest in DNA left at the crime scene, nor did he challenge the collection and testing of DNA from the discarded napkin.

The trial court ruled that Hartman did not have legal standing to challenge the comparison of the DNA from the crime scene to DNA in the GEDmatch database because he did not have a privacy interest in his cousins’ DNA in the database. In addition, Hartman’s relatives had voluntarily uploaded their DNA into the GEDmatch database, and the DNA that Hartman left at the crime scene was abandoned and not private. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court convicted Hartman.

Hartman appealed his conviction. He argues that analyzing the DNA sample from the crime scene and comparing it with the GEDmatch database to look for his relatives’ DNA disturbed his private affairs in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Thus, he argues that he had standing to challenge the DNA comparison. In oral argument, he asserted for the first time that he has a privacy interest in the DNA from the semen abandoned at the crime scene.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals held there is no privacy interest in commonly held DNA that a relative voluntarily uploads to a public database that openly allows law enforcement access.

“Hartman claims a privacy interest in the segments of his DNA that his relatives had in common with him. But all that police learned from the GEDmatch analysis was the killer’s familial relations, which brought them closer to learning the killer’s identity. And identifying unknown family members is the exact reason that users of consumer databases, like Hartman’s relatives, post their genetic material on those databases.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court also ruled there is no privacy interest in DNA that one abandons at a crime scene.

“Voluntary exposure to the public is relevant to our inquiry and can negate an asserted privacy interest.

Consequently, the Court reasoned that Hartman lost any privacy interest in the semen he left behind or the DNA it contained. Therefore, Hartman’s attempt to challenge any DNA analysis of the semen he left behind on MW’s body fails.

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Hartman’s convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Particularity Requirement for Search Warrants

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In State v. McKee, the WA Court of Appeals held that a search warrant that authorized the police to search and seize a large amount of cell phone data, including images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, and tasks, and authorized a “physical dump” of “the memory of the phone for examination,” violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2012, A.Z. lived with her older brother and her mother in Anacortes. All parties were addicted to heroin, methamphetamine or both. A.Z. was using heroin and methamphetamine on a daily basis during 2012.

In January 2012, A.Z.’s mother introduced A.Z. to 40-year-old Marc Daniel McKee during a “drug deal” for methamphetamine. McKee started spending a lot of time with the family and supplied them with methamphetamine. They would often “get high” together. At the end of June, McKee left to go to Alaska for work.

When McKee returned two months later, he immediately contacted A.Z. McKee told A.Z. he had heroin and methamphetamine. McKee and A.Z. spent three days together at a Burlington motel using the drugs and engaging in consensual sex.

Eventually, A.Z’s mother confronted McKee about the sexual encounters between A.Z. and McKee. Bringing another male with her A.Z.’s mother confronted McKee at a hotel room, beat him up, took his cell phone, and pulled A.Z out of the room. Later, A.Z.’s mother scrolled through the phone. She found pictures and videos of her daughter A.Z tied naked to a bed as well as videos of McKee and A.Z. having sex.

After A.Z.’s mother looked at the video clips and photographs on the cell phone, she contacted the Mount Vernon Police Department. On October 30, A.Z.’s mother met with Detective Dave Shackleton. A.Z.’s mother described the video clips and photographs she saw on the cell phone. She left the cell phone with Detective Shackleton. Later, A.Z.’s mother contacted Detective Shackleton to report that J.P., another minor female, told her that McKee gave J.P. drugs in exchange for sex. Brickley obtained a restraining order prohibiting McKee from contacting A.Z.

Application for a Search Warrant

On October 31, Detective Jerrad Ely submitted an application and affidavit (Affidavit) in support of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search McKee’s cell phone to investigate the crimes of “Sexual Exploitation of a Minor RCW 9.68A.040” and “Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct RCW 9.68A.050.” The court issued a search warrant.

The warrant allowed the police to obtain evidence from the cell phone described as an LG cell phone with model VX9100 currently being held at the Mount Vernon Police Department for the following items wanted:

“Images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, tasks, data/internet usage, any and all identifying data, and any other electronic data from the cell phone showing evidence of the above listed crimes.”

The search warrant authorizes the police to conduct a “physical dump” of the memory of
the cell phone for examination. On November 7, 2012, the court filed a “Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant.” The Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant states the police conducted a “Cellebrite Dump” of the cell phone on November 6. Cellebrite software obtains all information saved on the cell phone as well as deleted information and transfers the data from the cell phone to a computer.

Criminal Charges

The State charged McKee with three counts of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(1) based on the three cell phone video clips, one count of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the Second Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(2) based on the cell phone photographs, one count of Commercial Sex Abuse of J.P. as a minor in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, three counts of Distribution of Methamphetamine and/or Heroin to a person under age 18 in violation of RCW 69.50.406(1) and .401(2), and one count of Violation of a No-Contact Order in violation of RCW 26.50.110(1).

Motion to Suppress

McKee filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his cell phone. McKee asserted the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement to describe with particularity the “things to be seized.” McKee argued the warrant allowed the police to search an “overbroad list of items” unrelated to the identified crimes under investigation. McKee also argued probable cause did not support issuing a search warrant of the cell phone for the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court found the allegations in the Affidavit supported probable cause that McKee committed the crimes of sexual exploitation of a minor and dealing in depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court concluded the citation to the criminal statutes established particularity and the search warrant was not overbroad.

At trial, the jury found McKee not guilty of distribution of methamphetamine and/or heroin. The jury found McKee guilty as charged on all other counts.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants.’

“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” said the Court. “The Fourth Amendment
addresses the problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized . . .

The court further reasoned that by limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and would not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit.

“The degree of specificity required varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the types of items,” said the Court. “The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important.” The Court also quoted language from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Riley v. California and the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Samilia; both cases strongly supporting the notion that cell phones and the information contained therein are private affairs because they may contain intimate details about individuals’ lives.

“Here, the warrant cites and identifies the crimes under investigation but does not use the language in the statutes to describe the data sought from the cell phone,” said the Court. “The warrant lists the crimes under investigation on page one but separately lists the “Items Wanted” on page two.” Consequently, the Court reasoned that the description of the “Items Wanted” was overbroad and allowed the police to search and seize lawful data when the warrant could have been made more particular.

Furthermore, the Court held that the warrant in this case was not carefully tailored to the justification to search and was not limited to data for which there was probable cause. The warrant authorized the police to search all images, videos, documents, calendars, text messages, data, Internet usage, and “any other electronic data” and to conduct a “physical dump” of “all of the memory of the phone for examination.”

“The language of the search warrant clearly allows search and seizure of data without regard to whether the data is connected to the crime,” said the Court. “The warrant gives the police the right to search the contents of the cell phone and seize private information with no temporal or other limitation.” As a result, reasoned the Court, there was no limit on the topics of information for which the police could search. Nor did the warrant limit the search to information generated close in time to incidents for which the police had probable cause:

“The warrant allowed the police to search general categories of data on the cell phone with no objective standard or guidance to the police executing the warrant. The language of the search warrant left to the discretion of the police what to seize.”

With that, the Court of Appeals held the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reversed and dismissed the four convictions of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct.

My opinion? For the most part, courts look dis favorably on the searches of people’s homes, cars, phones, etc., unless the probable cause for the search is virtually overwhelming, and/or an emergency exists which would spoil the evidence if it was not gathered quickly; and/or a search warrant exists. Even when search warrants are drafted and executed, they must be particular to the search. In other words, law enforcement can’t expect that a general, non-specific search warrant is going to win the day for them and allow a fishing expedition to take place.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly followed the law. In this case, limiting the search to the crimes cited on the first page of the warrant was insufficient. The descriptions of what to be seized must be made more particular by using the precise statutory language to describe the materials sought.

Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member’s person, home, vehicle or cell phone was searched by police and evidence was seized. The search may have been unlawfully conducted in violation of your Constitutional rights.

Silver Platter Doctrine

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Fear The Silver Platter - BL Clifton

In State v. Martinez, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s computer hard drive which Texas police seized in Texas pursuant to a search warrant was lawfully searched by the Washington State Patrol without a Washington search warrant under the silver platter doctrine.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Carlos Martinez began working at the Monroe Police Department in 1989. He worked in several capacities, including as a Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program instructor. While working as a D.A.R.E. instructor, Martinez met A.K., who was in fifth grade at the time.

Beginning in 2001 or 2002, when A.K. was 13 or 14 years old, she began baby-sitting Martinez’s two young children.  A.K. also came to the Martinezes’ house when she was not baby-sitting. She would sometimes show up unannounced. She would help Martinez with chores and do her schoolwork at the house. At the time, Martinez was married to his then-wife Julie West.

Apparently, Martinez began touching A.K. in a sexual manner when she was 14. He also set up a video camera in the bathroom and digitally recorded her when she used the facilities.

Ms. West went on vacation. During that time, A.K. stayed at the family home. When Ms. West returned from vacation, she discovered a love note from A.K. to Martinez. She also discovered a video recording that Martinez had made of A.K. getting out of the shower and stored on the family computer. West confronted Martinez about the recording. He said he wanted to see if A.K. had cut herself on the kitchen knife as she had claimed. West claimed that when she asked Martinez why he still had the recording on the computer, he responded that it was “nice to look at.”

Not long after this, A.K. and her family moved from Monroe to Eastern Washington. Martinez and A.K. kept in touch. Martinez claims that in February 2007 they began a consensual sexual relationship when A.K. was 18 years old. In fall 2009, the Army recalled Martinez to active duty and stationed him in San Antonio, Texas. A.K. moved to Texas to be with him. They lived together for a short time.

After their relationship deteriorated in October or November 2011, Martinez gave A.K. the video recordings that he made of her in his bathroom in 2004. A.K. testified that Martinez told her he wanted to watch the tapes one last time and masturbate to them. She claimed he asked her to touch him as well. A short time later, A.K. contacted the Texas police to turn over the tapes. She also told the Texas police that she began an intimate relationship with Martinez some time before she was 16. Later, she contacted WSP.

The Texas police obtained a warrant to search Martinez’s home and seize his laptop computer and digital media storage devices. Then, a grand jury was convened in Texas to consider a possession of child pornography charge. But the grand jury refused to indict, returning a “no bill.” The case was dismissed. Texas police made a mirror image of Martinez’s computer hard drive and, at WSP’s request, sent it to WSP. Without obtaining a separate warrant, WSP searched this mirror image hard drive. Texas police also sent WSP two actual laptop computers and hard drives seized from Martinez. After obtaining a warrant, WSP searched those items.

The State initially charged Martinez with two counts of voyeurism, two counts of child molestation, one count of rape of a child in the third degree, and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Later, the State dismissed the molestation and rape charges. It tried Martinez on only one count of voyeurism and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The jury found Martinez guilty on both counts. Because the voyeurism charge occurred outside the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed that count and convicted him on only the possession count.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeals accepted review on the issues of (1) whether the warrantless search of Martinez’s computer hard drive was lawful when Texas police – and not WA law enforcement – searched the computer, and (2) whether spousal privilege applies to suppress the testimony of his ex-wife at trial.

SHORT ANSWER

The Court of Appeals held that (1) the silver platter doctrine allowed the Washington State Patrol to later examine the hard drive without a warrant, and (2) because Martinez acted
as a guardian to the victim, the spousal privilege does not apply here.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  If a government action intrudes upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of a person’s privacy rights than does the Fourth Amendment. Article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Under the Silver Platter Doctrine, however, evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the manner the evidence was obtained would violate Washington law. Evidence is admissible under this doctrine when (1) the foreign jurisdiction lawfully obtained evidence and (2) the forum state’s officers did not act as agents or cooperate or assist the foreign jurisdiction.

“Martinez does not dispute that Texas lawfully obtained the hard drive,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. “And he does not challenge the trial court’s findings that Washington State Patrol (WSP) had no involvement in obtaining or serving the Texas warrant and that Texas police did not act as agents of WSP when they obtained or served the warrant.” Thus, under the silver platter doctrine, the evidence was admissible.

Next, the Court of Appeals rejected Martinez’ arguments that the silver platter doctrine does not apply here because the Texas officers did not conduct any search that would be unlawful in Washington. “The doctrine requires that the State show only two things: (1) the search was lawful in Texas and (2) the Washington officers did not act as agents for Texas or cooperate or assist Texas in any way,” said the Court. “Because the State proved this, the doctrine applies.”

Search Warrant

Next, Martinez argued that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad. In response, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Furthermore, the search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.

“When a search warrant authorizes a search for materials protected by the First Amendment, a greater degree of particularity is required, and we employ a more stringent test,” said the Court. “While the First Amendment presumptively protects obscene books and films, it does not protect child pornography involving actual minors.” Also, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that the warrant was invalid for other reasons as well.

Spousal Privilege

The Court of Appeals addressed Martinez’ arguments that the trial court mistakenly admitted the testimony of his ex-wife regarding a conversation she shared with Mr. Martinez’ video of A.K. as being “nice to look at.” The Court reasoned that generally, a current or former spouse cannot be examined about confidential communications made during the marriage without the consent of the other spouse. It also explained that the marital privilege rule tries to encourage the free interchange of confidences between husband and wife that are necessary for mutual understanding and trust. “But in some situations the policies that underlie the right to invoke a testimonial privilege are outweighed by the suppression of truth that may result,” said the Court. “Thus, this spousal privilege does not apply in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed against a child for whom the spouse is a parent or guardian.”

The Court reasoned that here, West merely repeated statements by Martinez and did not comment about her belief in Martinez’s guilt. “We agree that these facts are sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martinez kept the recording for the purpose of sexual stimulation and that West’s testimony that Martinez said the recording was ‘nice to look at’ could not have materially affected the outcome of the trial,” said the Court.

Finally, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that there was prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. “The Prosecutor’s general references were unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict in light of the other incriminating evidence,” said the Court. Furthermore, Martinez does not show that his counsel’s failure to object to the Prosecutor’s case presentation was unreasonable and/or was not strategic.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Martinez’ conviction and sentence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Cell Phone Spying Is Unlawful

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In State v. Novick, The WA Court of Appeals Division II held the Defendant committed Computer Trespass in the First Degree when he installed “Mobile Spy” software on the victim’s cell phone and sent commands to activate the recording feature of the program in order to intentionally record the victim’s private communications.

David Novick and Lisa Maunu began dating in December 2013. Novick bought her a new mobile phone on March 11, 2014, and set it up for her. Unbeknownst to Maunu, Novick installed an application called Mobile Spy on Maunu’s new phone. The application allowed a person to log onto the Mobile Spy website and monitor the phone on which the application was installed.

From the Mobile Spy website, a user could access all the information stored on the monitored phone, including text messages, call logs, and e-mails. The versions of Mobile Spy software also permitted a user to send commands to the targetted phone from a “live control panel” on the website. One such command allowed a user to activate the phone’s microphone and recording features and record audio into a file that could then be downloaded from the website.

Eventually, Novick was caught after his girlfriend Maunu became suspicious. In short, Maunu became concerned because Novick expressed specific knowledge about Maunu’s health conditions, medications, doctors’ appointments, and private conversations.

With the assistance of Novick’s employer, it was discovered that Novick had downloaded over 500 audio files from Mobile Spy, searched for GPS (global positioning system) locations, and searched for particular telephone numbers.

The State charged Novick with eight counts of Computer Trespass in the First degree and eight counts of Recording Private Communications based on Novick’s use of Mobile Spy to record Maunu’s conversations. At trial, Novick was convicted on all charges.

Novick appealed on arguments that (1) the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he intentionally recorded a private communication, and (2) entry of eight convictions of each crime violated his right against double jeopardy because the correct unit of prosecution covers the entire course of conduct.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals disagree with Novick and affirmed his convictions.

  1. THE PROSECUTION SHOWED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF COMPUTER TRESPASS FIRST DEGREE.
First, the Court explained that Computer Trespass in the First Degree occurs when a person intentionally gains access without authorization to a computer system or electronic database of another and the access is made with the intent to commit another crime. The Court further reasoned that here, the underlying crime was Recording Private Communications. A person commits the crime of recording private communications when he intercepts or records private communications transmitted by any device designed to record and/or transmit said communications.
Second, the Court reasoned that a forensic review of Novick’s computer activity revealed that he intentionally logged into Mobile Spy’s webiste and sent commands from the website to Maunu’s phone. Also, Novick’s computer records showed that he visited the live control panel on Mobile Spy’s website, downloaded audio files collected from Maunu’s phone and intentionally recorded Maunu’s private communications.
Accordingly, the Court held that the State presented sufficient evidence that Novick committed the crime of Recording Private Communications, and with that, committed Computer Trespass First Degree.
2. NO EVIDENCE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Next, the Court rejected arguments that Novick’s multiple convictions for Computer Trespass and Recording Private Communications violated the prohibition against Double Jeopardy because the correct unit of prosecution for each crime covers the entire course of Novick’s conduct.
The Court began by saying the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no “person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Similarly, article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution says, “No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” In short, explained the Court, these double jeopardy provisions prohibit multiple convictions for the same offense.
Furthermore, when a defendant is convicted for violating one statute multiple times, the proper inquiry is, “What unit of prosecution has the Legislature intended as the punishable act under the specific criminal statute?” The Court explained that in order to determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation, the question becomes “what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act?” Consequently, the scope of the criminal act as defined by the legislature is considered the unit of prosecution.
The Court explained that the first step is to analyze the statute in question. If the statute does not plainly define the unit of prosecution, we next examine the legislative history to discern legislative intent. Finally, a factual analysis is conducted to determine if, under the facts of the specific case, more than one unit of prosecution is present.
Ultimately, the Court was not persuaded by Novick’s “plain language of the statute” argument the if the legislature intended a single unit of prosecution based on a course of conduct, it could have said so plainly.
“What matters is not what the legislature did not say, but what it did say,” said the Court. “The plain language of the statutes support the conclusion that the units of prosecution . . . are each separate unauthorized access and each recording of a conversation without consent.” The Court further reasoned that while Novick’s actions were somewhat repetitious, they were not continuous:
“On at least eight separate and distinct times, Novick logged onto Mobile Spy’s website, accessed Maunu’s phone by issuing a command through the live control panel, and downloaded at least eight different recordings of conversations between Maunu and various other people. Each access was separated by time and reflected a separate intent to record a separate conversation.”
The Court concluded that the State proved that Novick intentionally recorded eight private communications. Additionally, Novick’s actions constituted multiple units of prosecution, and therefore, his multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy principles. Thus, the Court affirmed Novick’s convictions.
My opinion? On the one hand, it’s shocking that citizens can be convicted of felonies by accessing mainstream computer software. Shouldn’t the software itself be outlawed instead? On the other hand, I see how parents can legally using the same software to track their minor children’s whereabouts, conversations and activities. That type of activity os not illegal.
This case presents a very good example of an atypical computer crime. We see that Computer Trespass First Degree is very similar to standard Burglary charges in that the State must prove the Defendant intends to commit a crime once they gain access to the victim’s computer system or electronic database. Recording Private Communications is a crime.  Therefore, if a defendant records private communications after gaining access, they can be found guilty of Computer Trespass in the First Degree. Simple.
Computer crime cases require experts and/or lay witnesses who are competent in discussing these matters. Speaking for the defense, it’s usually best to hire experts familiar with computer forensics to determine if/when the said access was unlawful and/or intentional. Again, the State must prove intent.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Corpus Delicti & Murder Confessions

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In State v. Young, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided the defendant’s confession to murder was properly admitted because the State presented ample independent evidence of (1) the fact of death, and (2) a causal connection between the death and a criminal act.

On the morning of July 4, 2013, John Young entered the Desert Food Mart in Benton City and asked the cashier to call 911 because he had witnessed a shooting of a man named Jacob. Police were summoned. As the investigation proceeded, Mr. Young became a suspect. He was brought in for questioning, and consented to audio and video recording of an interview.

During the interview, an officer read Mr. Young Miranda warnings and obtained his agreement that he understood he was now a suspect and any statements he made could be used against him. Mr. Young then confessed that Jacob was involved in a drug deal gone wrong. With the assistance of an accomplice named Joshua Hunt,  Mr. Young admitted he fired one shot into Jacob’s head near the temple-cheek region, killing him.

Mr. Young also confessed that he and Mr. Hunt disposed of their shoes and gun by putting the items into a backpack and throwing the backpack into a river. Later, police recovered the shoes and gun.  The shoes matched footprints and shoe patterns that had been found in the sand near Jacob’s body. The Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory determined that all of the bullets recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the Charter pistol found in the backpack.

Mr. Young was charged with first degree murder.

During a 3.5 hearing, Young’s attorney lawyer stipulated to the admission of the videotaped interview, telling the court:

“We believe it’s in our interests to actually stipulate to the 3.5 hearing, and I’ve discussed that with Mr. Young, and I know the Court will make its own inquiries, but he knows and understands he has a right to that hearing, but we believe it’s in our benefit and strategic interest to proceed with the stipulation.”

The court questioned Mr. Young, who stated he understood he had a right to a hearing on the admissibility of the statements but was agreeing instead that all of his statements were admissible.

During trial, Mr. Young’s videotaped confession was played for the jury. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Mr. Young appeals.

Mr. Young argued his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by stipulating to the admission of Mr. Young’s confession when there was no independent evidence apart from his confession, under the corpus delecti rule, sufficient to establish all the elements of first degree murder.

For those who don’t know, corpus delicti is a term from Western jurisprudence referring to the principle that a crime must be proved to have occurred before a person can be convicted of committing that crime.

The Court of Appeals rejected Young’s arguments. It reasoned that in a homicide case, the corpus delecti generally consists of two elements: (1) the fact of death, and (2) a causal connection between the death and a criminal act. It can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, which need not be enough to support a conviction or send the case to the jury. In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti independent of a defendant’s statements, the Court assumes the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to the State.

Here, the corpus of the crime of murder was amply established by (1) a dead person; (2) multiple gunshot wounds that established a casual connection with a criminal act; (3) testimony eliminating the possibility of self-inflicted wounds; and (4) the recovery of the weapon miles away from the dead body.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the State is not required to present independent evidence of the defendant’s mental state. It reasoned the State is not required to present independent evidence sufficient to demonstrate anything other than the fact of death and a causal connection between the death and a criminal act.

Finally, the Court rejected Mr. Young’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

“It appears from his closing argument that Mr. Young’s trial lawyer believed his client’s videotaped interview would advance that argument. Mr. Young fails to demonstrate that his trial lawyer lacked a strategic reason for the stipulation.”

With that, the Court of Appeals confirmed Mr. Young’s conviction.

My opinion? This case represents a fairly straightforward analysis of the corpus delicti defense. I’ve had great success when it applies, and have managed to get many criminal charges reduced or dismissed under this defense. However, the corpus delicti defense is extremely narrow.

Aside from the defendant’s confession, there must be virtually NO independent evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. Here, other evidence existed which implicated Mr. Young and the defense was found inapplicable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Recorded Arguments & Privacy.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Evidence, Forensics, law enforcement, Pretrial Investigations, Privacy, Self-Incrimination, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Technology, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Smith, the WA Court of Appeals Division II held that an accidentally recorded argument between the defendant and his wife was improperly admitted at trial and violated the Washington Privacy Act.

John and Sheryl were a married couple. On June 2, 2013, they were in their residence drinking. They became intoxicated and began to argue. John began to beat and strangle Sheryl, who lost consciousness due to the strangling. Sometime during the attack, John used the residence’s landline telephone to try to locate his cell phone.

Unable to do so, he was unaware that his actions activated his cell phone’s voice mail function, which started recording part of the dispute. In that recording, John is heard yelling insults at Sheryl. Sheryl responded to these statements by screaming unintelligibly or asking him to stop or leave her alone. At one point during the recording, Sheryl tells John to “Get away,” to which he responds, “No way. I will kill you.”

Shortly after the voice mail was recorded, John left the residence. Sheryl called 911 and reported that John had beaten her. A police officer with the Vancouver Police Department arrived at the residence, and Sheryl was transported to the hospital. John’s cell phone was retrieved and taken by the police. John was later arrested and charged with first degree attempted murder (domestic violence), second degree attempted murder (domestic violence), first degree assault (domestic violence), and second degree assault (domestic violence).

Before trial, John moved to suppress the cell phone voice mail recording based on RCW 9.73.030, which applies to intercepting, recording and/or the divulging of private communications under the WA Privacy Act. The trial court held a CrR 3.6 hearing and denied his motion.

At John’s bench trial, the recorded voice mail, 911 phone calls, and photographs of Sheryl’s injuries were admitted into evidence. The trial court found John guilty of second degree attempted murder and second degree assault, both with domestic violence enhancements.

John appealed on three issues: (1) whether the recorded voice mail’s contents are a conversation; (2) if the contents are a conversation, whether it was private; and (3) if a private conversation, whether it was recorded or intercepted.

For the following reasons, the Court held that John recorded a private conversation in violation of RCW 9.73.030.

1. DID A CONVERSATION TAKE PLACE?

Amidst screaming from Sheryl, the following communications took place:

John: “You think you’re bleeding?. . . . You’re the most fucked up person. Give me back the phone.”

Sheryl: “Get away.”

John: “No way. I will kill you.”

Sheryl: “I know.”

John: “Did you want to kill me? Give me back my phone.”

Sheryl: “No. Leave me alone.”

The Court reasoned that the contents of the recorded voice mail constituted a conversation. Although Sheryl’s screams alone would not constitute a conversation, these screams were responsive to statements that John was making to Sheryl and were scattered throughout the entire dispute, which contained repeated verbal exchanges between the two individuals as outlined above. Within this context, Sheryl’s screams serve as an expression of sentiments responsive to John’s yelling and thus constitute part of a conversation.

2. WAS THE CONVERSATION PRIVATE?

The Court held that the conversation was private. Here, a domestic dispute occurred between two married persons in the privacy of their home. It reasoned that the location of the conversation, the relationship between the parties, and the absence of third parties all declare the privacy of the conversation. Therefore, reasoned the Court, John had a “subjective intention and reasonable expectation that the conversation with Sheryl would be private.”

3. IF THE CONVERSATION WAS PRIVATE, WAS IT RECORDED OR INTERCEPTED?

The Court held that the WA Privacy Act was violated when John accidentally recorded a private conversation without Sheryl’s consent. It reasoned that the WA Privacy Act requires the consent of all parties to a private conversation. Further, the case law has implied that no third party is required to record a conversation. In other words, a party to a private conversation can also be the person who impermissibly records the conversation. Thus, reasoned the Court, John’s recording of this conversation can violate the privacy act, even though he accidentally made himself a party to it.

Based on the above, the Court reversed and remanded the second degree attempted murder conviction, but affirmed the second degree assault conviction.

My opinion? Although my sympathies go out to the victim, the Court’s decision was correct. Privacy is a mysterious subject matter in our ever-changing world. Cell phones and other devices allow us to record anything, any time, anywhere. The fact is, most of us don’t know even know we’re even being recorded in our daily lives. So you can imagine a scenario where accidental recordings become the subject for intense litigation.

Many clients ask me if recorded conversations between themselves and alleged victims/witnesses are admissible at trial. Clearly, the answer is “No” under the WA Privacy Act unless the participants are (1) aware that their conversation is being recorded, and (2) expressly consent to the recording. Interesting stuff. This case was a good decision upholding our privacy rights in the face of today’s technological advancements.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Voodoo Science” Debunked

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DNA, Due Process, Evidence, Forensics, Homicide & Manslaughter, Prison, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Race & Law, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Studies, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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Interesting article from the Wall Street Journal written Alex Kozinski , a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals since 1985, discusses how the U.S. has relied on flawed forensic evidence techniques for decades, resulting in false convictions.

According to Judge Kozinski, the White House released a report that fundamentally changes the way many criminal trials are conducted. The new study from the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) examines the scientific validity of forensic-evidence techniques—DNA, fingerprint, bitemark, firearm, footwear and hair analysis. It concludes that virtually all of these methods are flawed, some irredeemably so.

The study indicates that only the most basic form of DNA analysis is scientifically reliable. Some forensic methods have significant error rates and others are rank guesswork. “The prospects of developing bitemark analysis into a scientifically valid method” are low, according to the report. In plain terms, says Judge Kozinski, “Bitemark analysis is about as reliable as astrology.” Yet many unfortunate defendants languish in prison based on bad science.

Even more disturbing, the article states that forensic scientists – who are often members of the prosecution team – sometimes see their job as helping to get a conviction. This can lead them to fabricate evidence or commit perjury, says Judge Kozinski. Many forensic examiners are poorly trained and supervised. They sometimes overstate the strength of their conclusions by claiming that the risk of error is “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” or “microscopic.” The report calls such claims “scientifically indefensible,” but jurors generally take them as gospel when presented by government witnesses who are certified as scientific experts.

Apparently, problems with forensic evidence have plagued the criminal-justice system for years.

The PCAST report recommends developing standards for validating forensic methods, training forensic examiners and making forensic labs independent of police and prosecutors. “All should be swiftly implemented,” says Judge Kozinski, who adds that preventing the incarceration and execution of innocent persons is as good a use of tax dollars as any:

“Among the more than 2.2 million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails, countless may have been convicted using unreliable or fabricated forensic science. The U.S. has an abiding and unfulfilled moral obligation to free citizens who were imprisoned by such questionable means. If your son or daughter, sibling or cousin, best friend or spouse, was the victim of voodoo science, you would expect no less.”

My opinion? Jurors rely HEAVILY on forensic evidence in their deliberations. And it makes sense: it’s a huge task to weigh evidence and sift through the rhetoric of arguments from the prosecution and defense. Cold, hard, quantifiable and scientific facts make it easy for jurors to render decisions.

Consequently, the information from this report is both good and bad news. It’s good because the truth about  “voodoo science” in the courtroom has finally surfaced to the mainstream. It’s bad because hundreds, if not thousands of innocent people are convicted of crimes and serve years in prison based on unreliable evidence for crimes they didn’t commit.

Fortunately, there’s hope. According to Judge Kozinski, the report “provides a road map for defense lawyers to challenge prosecution experts.” Excellent.

Competent attorneys should immediately gain an understanding of challenging prosecution experts who bring voodoo science in the courtroom. It’s the only way to shed light on this grim subject and bring justice to our courts.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

FBI DNA Database Error

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Here is a letter from the WA State Crime Lab outlining some errors that have been discovered in the FBI DNA database that was used by the lab when “estimating the significance of having included an individual as a possible contributor to a forensic DNA typing profile.”

The Federal DNA Database Unit (FDDU) analyzes DNA markers from buccal and blood samples of federal convicted offenders, arrestees facing federal charges, individuals convicted of certain District of Columbia offenses, as well as non-U.S. citizens detained under the authority of the United States of America, for development of DNA profiles that are uploaded to the National DNA Index System (NDIS).

The FBI does not believe the errors will materially affect any assessment of evidence. Although the WA State Crime Lab agrees, it also acknowledges that “some probabilities will be slightly stronger while some others will be slightly weaker.”   They have updated the databases as of June 3, 2015 and any case files completed before this scheduled for trial or that are subject to discovery or public disclosure will have the probability estimates recalculated.  Only if there is a difference greater than 10-fold will  an amended report be issued.

My opinion? Many of us believe DNA evidence is SO foolproof. And for the most part, when calculated correctly, it is. However, errors like these to our system of justice. Jurors, victims, defendants, Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys heavily rely on DNA evidence to prove whether the defendant actually committed the alleged crime. The evidence is excruciatingly important to cold-case murders and sex offenses. Please, WA State Crime Lab, test and retest your samples when updating the database!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Study: Youth Tolerance Of Marijuana May Increase Chances of DUI

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, Due Process, DUI, Evidence, Forensics, law enforcement, marijuana, Studies, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Study offers support for the notion of e-cigarettes as a gateway drug

A new study from the journal Pediatrics suggests ways to reduce the risk that children will drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs as teenagers.

The study found that 12-year-old children who believed marijuana could help them relax or was otherwise beneficial were more likely to drive under the influence when they were 16. The study also showed these minors were also significantly more likely to ride with someone else who was buzzed, drunk or high behind the wheel.

“Youth view marijuana use as less dangerous than drinking,” the study authors wrote. “We must begin to address how changing views of marijuana might increase risk for not only marijuana use, but other behaviors.”

Driving under the influence is common among American teenagers. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that 10% of high school students do so in any given month, and more than 20% have been passengers of someone driving under the influence.

So researchers from Rand Corp. in Santa Monica and Arlington, Va., went looking for risk factors in middle school that could predict these dangerous behaviors in high school. They turned to data from a substance use prevention program called CHOICE that was tested in 16 middle schools in greater Los Angeles.

The Rand researchers focused on 1,124 students who completed detailed surveys in 2009 (when their average age was 12.2 years old), 2011 (when their average age was 14.3) and 2013 (when their average age was 16.3 and 88% were eligible to drive in California). The majority of these students (57%) were girls, and half were Latino.

Using statistical models to control for the students’ age, gender, race and ethnicity, school and whether their mothers had graduated from high school, the researchers identified several factors that seemed to predict unsafe driving at age 16.

According to the study, those who held more tolerant ideas about marijuana when they were 12 (in sixth or seventh grade) were 63% more likely than their peers to admit either driving under the influence themselves or to ride with someone who was under the influence

Additionally, 12-year-olds who felt most confident that they could resist marijuana use wound up being 89% more likely to mix alcohol and drugs with cars, motorcycles or other vehicles. This finding surprised the researchers, they wrote.

By the time the students were 14, some of the risk factors had changed. Those who said they had used alcohol in the last month were more than twice as likely as their peers to drive under the influence or ride with an intoxicated driver two years later.

Also, those whose friends used marijuana were 2.4 times more likely to be involved in unsafe driving later, and those whose family members used marijuana were 54% more likely to do the same.

And positive beliefs about marijuana still mattered — 14-year-olds who had them were still 67% more likely to mix alcohol, drugs and motor vehicles at age 16.

The researchers noted that marijuana has taken on a benign image among middle schoolers “as medical and recreational marijuana legalization increases in our country, adolescents are becoming more accepting of marijuana use,” they wrote. “This highlights the need to address these types of beliefs as early as sixth grade.”

My opinion? If these studies are accurate, they merely reveal our need to EDUCATE our youth about drugs, alcohol and vehicles. In short, DRUGS/ALCOHOL AND VEHICLES DON’T MIX. It doesn’t matter what type of drug you’re taking; whether it be prescription, medical marijuana or street drugs. Don’t do drugs and drive. And it doesn’t matter what type of alcohol you’re drinking. Don’t drink and drive.  If your doctor informs you that taking your prescription medication may affect your ability to operate a motor vehicle, then please think twice about operating a motor vehicle.

I’ve assisted many clients facing DUI charges of varying degrees. However, studies like this show that society is becoming less tolerant and sympathetic toward individuals charged with DUI. It takes a very competent and experienced defense attorney to reveal the science, forensics and idiosyncrasies of DUI litigation in today’s anti-drug climate.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Martines: WA Supreme Court Finds Defendant Guilty of DUI on Blood Test Case

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, Forensics, law enforcement, marijuana, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Bad news.

In State v. Martines, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the WA Court of Appeals Division I. I blogged about this case last year in State v. Martines: More Good Caselaw on Blood tests Taken After DUI Arrests. There, the WA Court of Appeals version of State v. Martines held that the blood test performed on Martines was an unlawful warrantless search. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that drawing blood and testing blood constitute separate searches, each of which requires particular authorization, and that the warrant here authorized only a blood draw.

The original Martines opinion appeared strong. It was rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely; which requires police officers to obtain search warrants for blood draws in DUI cases when exigent circumstances do not otherwise exist. It also followed Washington State legalizing marijuana, thus necessitating stronger regulations and monitoring of blood tests performed during DUI investigations.

The WA Supreme Court decided differently in a short, scathing opinion signed by all justices.

First, the Court held that a warrant authorizing the testing of a blood sample for intoxicants does not require separate findings of probable cause to suspect drug and alcohol use so long as there is probable cause to suspect intoxication that may be caused by alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both.

Second, the Court  further held that the search warrant lawfully authorized testing Martines’s blood sample for intoxicants because it authorized a blood draw to obtain evidence of DUI. In other words, the search of Martines’s blood did not exceed the bounds of the search warrant when a sample of Martines’s blood was extracted and tested for intoxicants anyway.

My opinion?

Bad decision. I’m amazed the WA Supremes didn’t discuss Missouri v. McNeely at all. Not once. McNeely profoundly and significantly evolved search and seizure law concerning blood draws in DUI investigations. Indeed, McNeely was the underpinnings for Division One Court of Appeals case State v. Martinez. Yet the WA Supremes ignore McNeely as if it didn’t exist. Ignoring case precedents violates stare decisis, plain and simple.

Hopefully, this case gets appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for further review.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.