Category Archives: No Contact Order

NCO’s & Double Jeopardy

Brett Kavanaugh, Double Jeopardy, And Presidential Pardons

In State v. Madden, the WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant who contacted a person with three separate No-Contact Orders (NCO’s) against him may only be punished for a single count of Violation of a No-Contact Order.

BACKGROUND FACTS 

Mr. Madden Jr. contacted a person with three separate no-contact orders against him. For this single act, the State charged Madden with three counts of Violating a No-Contact Order (DV). The jury found him guilty as charged. Madden appealed on arguments that his three convictions for violation of a no-contact order violated Double Jeopardy principles

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Court of Appeals began with the background that Article I, section 9 of the WA State Constitution and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect against multiple punishments for the same offense.

“When a person is charged with multiple counts of the same offense, each count must be based on a separate and distinct criminal act,” said the Court, quoting State v. Mutch.  “It must be manifestly apparent from the record, testimony, and argument that identical charges are based on separate acts.”

Furthermore – and importantly – the Court of defined what a “Unit of Prosecution” was. “Unless the legislature clearly and unambiguously intends to turn a single transaction into multiple offenses, the Rule of Lenity requires a court to resolve ambiguity in favor of one offenses,” said the Court.

Consequently, the Court reasoned that while Mr. Madden violated multiple court orders, he committed only one act constituting a “violation.” The Court further reasoned that the State cites no case in which a court allowed multiple convictions under a single statute based on a single act. Finally, the court reasoned that when a person is charged with multiple counts of the same offense, each count must be based on a separate and distinct criminal act. “Any other interpretation would lead to an unconstitutional result.”

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed counts two and three of Madden’s No-Contact Order Violation convictions.

Please read my Legal Guide Defending Against Domestic Violence Charges and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Domestic Violence crimes, including Assault and/or No-Contact Order Violations. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Virtual Dating & DV

Behind the Keyboard: Spotting Digital Dating Abuse

What defines a “virtual dating relationship,” especially in today’s age of technology, smart phones, online profiles, dating apps, etc.?

This question is asked quite often. Unfortunately, many people find themselves facing criminal charges before seeking legal advice!

In  C.C. v. J.A.H., a recent and novel case out of the New Jersey Appellate Division, a “dating relationship” under New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act can occur where parties never experienced a traditional, in-person “date.”

BACKGROUND FACTS

The parties met at a gym where the Plaintiff was an employee, and the Defendant a member.  They interacted flirtatiously, and eventually exchanged phone numbers.  This led to a proliferation of text messages between the parties – approximately 1100 text messages over a period of one month.  The Court of Appeals described the text messages as being “exchanged at all hours of the day and night” and as “sexually explicit and suggestive in nature.”  The Appellate Division also found that the Defendant declared his romantic interest during the course of these text messages.

During this period, the parties continued to interact with one another in person (described as “flirtatious” interaction by the Plaintiff), However, both sides agreed that they never went out on a date in the traditional manner.  The Defendant argued they never went on a date.  Accordingly, the Defendant argued, the Plaintiff could not obtain a No Contact Order under the Act.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In short, the New Jersey Appellate Division found that a dating relationship existed.

It characterized the issue as subjective rather than an objective analysis.  It emphasized that although the interactions between these parties may not bear any semblance to “dating” in the eyes of someone perhaps older and with a more traditional view of what it means to date somebody, for the Plaintiff (who was 22 years old), these interactions were part of a normal 21st century dating life.

Ultimately, the sheer volume of the communications and the nature of their content supported the Court’s reasoning:

“[T]he absence of what might be viewed as traditional dating activities and affirmations does not render insignificant the proliferate and exceedingly intimate communications between the parties that underscored their relationship.  Indeed, it is the nature and proliferation of those communications that constituted the parties’ “dating activities” and transformed theirs into a “dating relationship.”

New Jersey is not alone. Indeed, Washington statutes define the term in a manner consistent with the factors that guided the New Jersey Court’s analysis.  In Washington, “Dating relationship” means a social relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider in making this determination include: (a) The length of time the relationship has existed; (b) the nature of the relationship; and (c) the frequency of interaction between the parties.

My opinion? This is certainly a cautionary tale. While the law is perhaps notorious for being behind the times, technologically speaking, this decision represents an appropriate understanding of what it means to be in a dating relationship in this day and age and goes a long way to protecting victims of domestic violence who may not have been on any traditional dates, but nevertheless were involved in a dating relationship.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving Domestic Violence and/or dating relationships. Hiring an experienced criminal defense attorney is the first and best step towards justice.

Police Stop Booking Some People Into Whatcom Jail Due To Coronavirus

Image result for walk out of jail free coronavirus

Whatcom County law enforcement agencies stopped booking people into the Whatcom County Jail for certain crimes on Thursday, March 19, due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Apparently, people arrested will be booked and released for everything except certain offenses that represent a serious threat to public safety. Those crimes include domestic violence, violations of a no-contact order, felony DUI, sex offenses, burglary and other violent crimes. Those booked for misdemeanor DUI will be held until sober.

The memo suggests officers arrest, book and release people when they can, giving them notice of when to appear in court. And those who are booked on charges that pose a threat to public safety will be held until they see a judge.

At this point, seven Whatcom County residents have been diagnosed with the respiratory illness, one of whom died, according to the Whatcom County Health Department.

Whatcom County Sheriff Bill Elfo said the measures are looking out for the health of the people who work in the jail, as well as those incarcerated there.

“They’re in place because of some compelling public safety and public health issues. We want to prevent the spread of COVID-19, but do it in a way that doesn’t minimize public safety. We’re still booking and holding violent people. These are temporary measures . . . We’re trying to take the jail population as low as we can safely and reasonably do under the circumstances.” ~Sheriff Bill Elfo

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges and are jailed indefinitely in the midst of the Coronavirus Pandemic. Obviously, getting released as soon as possible is a major priority. And hiring an experienced attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Violation of No-Contact Order & Defense of Property

No-Contact Order Violation | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

In State v. Yelovich, the WA Supreme Court held that a “Defense of Property” jury instruction is not available when there is a valid court order prohibiting the defendant from contacting the protected party.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Yelovich and Ms. De Armond dated for more than five years. At some point, and during all times relevant to this case, there was a valid no-contact order prohibiting Yelovich from contacting De Armond. The order forbids Yelovich from “coming near and from having any contact whatsoever, in person or through others, by phone, mail or any means, directly or indirectly” with De Armond. It also prohibited Yelovich from causing any physical harm or bodily injury to De Armond.

On the day in question, Yelovich parked his car in the driveway of his son’s house. He was moving boxes from the garage, and an approximately four-and-a-half-foot wood fence separated him and his car. After about an hour, Yelovich believed he saw someone through the fence, but he could not identify the person. When he went to his car, which had a broken passenger window, he saw that his cell phone and other personal belongings were missing. He saw De Armond walking down the street, and he testified at trial that he “knew then that she did it.”

Yelovich was aware that he was prohibited from contacting De Armond, but he thought the police would not arrive in time to recover his phone. Although he admitted it “was an irrational, radical move,” he chased after her in his car. When he found her a few blocks later, he got out of his car and attempted to take her purse because he believed she had put his phone in it.  A struggle ensued, and De Armond testified that he was “bouncing her off the ground.” Her testimony was corroborated by a Good Samaritan who intervened. He testified that he “saw a man straddling a female. I saw him striking her,” and “he was lifting her up off the ground and slamming her on the ground.”

Both the fire department and police responded to the incident. De Armond was treated for minor injuries, including redness, bruising, and a small laceration. The responding police officer who interviewed De Armond noted she seemed intoxicated and “she had a really hard time keeping herself together.”

The State charged Yelovich with one count of felony violation of a no-contact order predicated on his assault of De Armond and one count of Bail Jumping. At trial, he argued that he was entitled to a jury instruction on defense of property because he was protecting his cell phone, which he believed De Armond had stolen.

For those who don’t know, a jury instruction is a guideline given by the judge to the jury about the law they will have to apply to the facts they have found to be true. The purpose of the instructions is to help the jury arrive at a verdict that follows the law of that jurisdiction. AT any rate, the judge refused, reasoning that Yelovich “was acting offensively, not defensively to protect property.”

The jury convicted Yelovich as charged. He appealed only his felony violation of the no-contact order on the basis that he was improperly denied a jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and Yelovich appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court improperly refuse to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of defense of property.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The SUpreme Court reasoned that under statute, Violation of a No-Contact Order is usually a gross misdemeanor, but it is elevated to a Class C felony if the restrained party assaults the protected party during the violation. Therefore, assault is an essential element of the crime of felony violation of a no-contact order, and the State must prove it occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.

Yelovich relies on Washington’s Self-Defense and Defense of Property Statute to claim that he may use defense of property as an affirmative defense. The statute states:

“The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful . . . whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary.”

Yelovich argues the statute provides “a valid affirmative defense whenever assault is charged or whenever assault is an element of the charged crime,” and therefore it may be used when the charged crime is felony violation of a no-contact order. However, Yelovich’s position ignores the critical role of the underlying no-contact order in this case.

The Court further reasoned that the standard language included in the order warned Yelovich that as the restrained party, he has the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order’s provisions.

“By the terms of the order, Yelovich has no power to engage in self-help if doing so brings him into contact with De Armond. This bright line rule ensures that victims are not left wondering whether conduct prohibited by the no-contact order might later be deemed lawful. It therefore furthers the legislature’s goal to provide victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse.”

The Court concluded that, in sum, Yelovich had sole responsibility for not violating the terms of a valid court order that forbids him from contacting De Armond, and so he had no authority to chase De Armond when he believed she had taken his phone. Accordingly, Yelovich was not entitled to a jury instruction on defense of property because his conduct violated the court order.

My opinion? Although the statute is very clear that mutual violations of the order and Defense of Property is not a defense, other defenses do exist.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges for violating a no-contact order. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pretext Traffic Stop

Image result for pretext traffic stop

In State v. Hendricks, the WA Court of Appeals held that a traffic stop for Failure to Transfer Title was not unlawfully pretextual because the stop was initiated based upon running license plates as vehicles passed him and the deputy did not recognize the vehicle’s occupants until after initiating the traffic stop.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Ms. Ciulla was named as a protected party in a no contact order issued against
Hendricks. On September 8, 2016, the State charged Hendricks with Violation of a No-Contact Order, alleging that he knowingly had contact with Ciulla. Hendricks filed a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress evidence seized from the traffic stop leading to his arrest, asserting that there was no lawful basis for the traffic stop.

At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Clallam County Sheriff’s Deputy Federline testified that he
was on duty on the evening of September 7, 2016 when he saw a Mazda pickup truck and ran the license plate of the vehicle. Upon his check of the truck’s license plate, Deputy Federline found that more than 15 days had passed since ownership of the vehicle had changed, but the title had not been transferred.

When the truck passed, Deputy Federline also saw that the truck’s back license plate was partially obscured by a trailer hitch. Deputy Federline conducted a traffic stop of the truck. When Deputy Federline made contact with the vehicle’s occupants, he recognized Ciulla in the front passenger seat and Hendricks in the back seat. Deputy Federline arrested Hendricks. Following this testimony, Hendricks argued that Deputy Federline lacked authority to stop the truck based either on a failure to timely transfer title or on an obscured license plate.

The trial court denied Hendricks’s motion to suppress. Following the trial court’s denial of his CrR 3.6 suppression motion, Hendricks waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to bench trial on a stipulated record. The trial court found Hendricks guilty of violation of no contact order. The trial court also found that Hendricks committed his offense against a family or household member. Hendricks appealed from his conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution generally prohibit searches and seizures absent a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such exception to the warrant requirement is an investigative stop as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, a landmark search and seizure case which applies to traffic violations. Also, a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless traffic stop if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or is occurring.

The court rejected Hendricks’s arguments that the failure to comply with RCW 46.12.650(5)(a)’s requirement of transferring title within 15 days of delivery of a vehicle does not constitute a traffic infraction under RCW 46.63.020 because the failure to timely transfer title is not a parking, standing, stopping, or pedestrian offense.

“The plain language of RCW 46.63.020 shows that the legislature intended to treat the failure to timely register a vehicle’s title as a traffic infraction and, thus, the trial court correctly concluded that Deputy Federline had an articulable suspicion justifying his stop of the vehicle in which Hendricks was riding as a passenger.”

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the stop was unlawfully pretextual.

Pretextual Traffic Stops

The Court reasoned that Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibits pretextual traffic stops. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358. A pretextual traffic stop occurs when a law enforcement officer  stops a vehicle in order to conduct a speculative criminal investigation unrelated to enforcement of the traffic code. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349. Whether a given stop is pretextual depends on the totality of the circumstances, “including both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior.” Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359.

I t further reasoned that a traffic stop is not pretextual even where the officer has an additional motivation for conducting the stop apart from a suspected traffic violation, so long as the officer’s purported motive in investigating a suspected traffic violation was an actual, conscious, and independent reason for the stop. State v.
Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 299-300, 290 P.3d 983 (2012).

“Hendricks suggests that Deputy Federline had suspected the vehicle’s occupants of being
involved in drug activity and used the failure to timely transfer title as a pretext to investigate the vehicle and its occupants for drug related offenses,” said the Court. “This is pure speculation without any support in the record.”

The Court reasoned that Deputy Federline was the only witness at the CrR 3.6 hearing. Furthermore, the deputy testified that he was parked at an intersection running the license plates of southbound traveling vehicles when he saw the vehicle at issue. Deputy Federline began to initiate his traffic stop after finding that the title to the vehicle at issue was not timely transferred following a change in ownership. Finally, Deputy Federline recognized Hendricks and Ciulla only after initiating the traffic stop and contacting the driver of the vehicle.

“In short, Hendricks fails to identify any evidence in the record that would have supported a claim that Deputy Federline’s traffic stop was a pretext to investigate a crime unrelated to a suspected traffic infraction.”

Consequently, the Court held that because the record lacked of any evidence supporting a claim that Deputy Federline conducted a pretextual traffic stop, Hendricks can show neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice from defense counsel’s decision to decline raising the issue at the CrR 3.6 hearing.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed Hendrick’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Particularity Requirement for Search Warrants

Image result for cell phone search

In State v. McKee, the WA Court of Appeals held that a search warrant that authorized the police to search and seize a large amount of cell phone data, including images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, and tasks, and authorized a “physical dump” of “the memory of the phone for examination,” violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2012, A.Z. lived with her older brother and her mother in Anacortes. All parties were addicted to heroin, methamphetamine or both. A.Z. was using heroin and methamphetamine on a daily basis during 2012.

In January 2012, A.Z.’s mother introduced A.Z. to 40-year-old Marc Daniel McKee during a “drug deal” for methamphetamine. McKee started spending a lot of time with the family and supplied them with methamphetamine. They would often “get high” together. At the end of June, McKee left to go to Alaska for work.

When McKee returned two months later, he immediately contacted A.Z. McKee told A.Z. he had heroin and methamphetamine. McKee and A.Z. spent three days together at a Burlington motel using the drugs and engaging in consensual sex.

Eventually, A.Z’s mother confronted McKee about the sexual encounters between A.Z. and McKee. Bringing another male with her A.Z.’s mother confronted McKee at a hotel room, beat him up, took his cell phone, and pulled A.Z out of the room. Later, A.Z.’s mother scrolled through the phone. She found pictures and videos of her daughter A.Z tied naked to a bed as well as videos of McKee and A.Z. having sex.

After A.Z.’s mother looked at the video clips and photographs on the cell phone, she contacted the Mount Vernon Police Department. On October 30, A.Z.’s mother met with Detective Dave Shackleton. A.Z.’s mother described the video clips and photographs she saw on the cell phone. She left the cell phone with Detective Shackleton. Later, A.Z.’s mother contacted Detective Shackleton to report that J.P., another minor female, told her that McKee gave J.P. drugs in exchange for sex. Brickley obtained a restraining order prohibiting McKee from contacting A.Z.

Application for a Search Warrant

On October 31, Detective Jerrad Ely submitted an application and affidavit (Affidavit) in support of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search McKee’s cell phone to investigate the crimes of “Sexual Exploitation of a Minor RCW 9.68A.040” and “Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct RCW 9.68A.050.” The court issued a search warrant.

The warrant allowed the police to obtain evidence from the cell phone described as an LG cell phone with model VX9100 currently being held at the Mount Vernon Police Department for the following items wanted:

“Images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, tasks, data/internet usage, any and all identifying data, and any other electronic data from the cell phone showing evidence of the above listed crimes.”

The search warrant authorizes the police to conduct a “physical dump” of the memory of
the cell phone for examination. On November 7, 2012, the court filed a “Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant.” The Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant states the police conducted a “Cellebrite Dump” of the cell phone on November 6. Cellebrite software obtains all information saved on the cell phone as well as deleted information and transfers the data from the cell phone to a computer.

Criminal Charges

The State charged McKee with three counts of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(1) based on the three cell phone video clips, one count of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the Second Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(2) based on the cell phone photographs, one count of Commercial Sex Abuse of J.P. as a minor in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, three counts of Distribution of Methamphetamine and/or Heroin to a person under age 18 in violation of RCW 69.50.406(1) and .401(2), and one count of Violation of a No-Contact Order in violation of RCW 26.50.110(1).

Motion to Suppress

McKee filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his cell phone. McKee asserted the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement to describe with particularity the “things to be seized.” McKee argued the warrant allowed the police to search an “overbroad list of items” unrelated to the identified crimes under investigation. McKee also argued probable cause did not support issuing a search warrant of the cell phone for the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court found the allegations in the Affidavit supported probable cause that McKee committed the crimes of sexual exploitation of a minor and dealing in depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court concluded the citation to the criminal statutes established particularity and the search warrant was not overbroad.

At trial, the jury found McKee not guilty of distribution of methamphetamine and/or heroin. The jury found McKee guilty as charged on all other counts.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants.’

“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” said the Court. “The Fourth Amendment
addresses the problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized . . .

The court further reasoned that by limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and would not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit.

“The degree of specificity required varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the types of items,” said the Court. “The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important.” The Court also quoted language from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Riley v. California and the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Samilia; both cases strongly supporting the notion that cell phones and the information contained therein are private affairs because they may contain intimate details about individuals’ lives.

“Here, the warrant cites and identifies the crimes under investigation but does not use the language in the statutes to describe the data sought from the cell phone,” said the Court. “The warrant lists the crimes under investigation on page one but separately lists the “Items Wanted” on page two.” Consequently, the Court reasoned that the description of the “Items Wanted” was overbroad and allowed the police to search and seize lawful data when the warrant could have been made more particular.

Furthermore, the Court held that the warrant in this case was not carefully tailored to the justification to search and was not limited to data for which there was probable cause. The warrant authorized the police to search all images, videos, documents, calendars, text messages, data, Internet usage, and “any other electronic data” and to conduct a “physical dump” of “all of the memory of the phone for examination.”

“The language of the search warrant clearly allows search and seizure of data without regard to whether the data is connected to the crime,” said the Court. “The warrant gives the police the right to search the contents of the cell phone and seize private information with no temporal or other limitation.” As a result, reasoned the Court, there was no limit on the topics of information for which the police could search. Nor did the warrant limit the search to information generated close in time to incidents for which the police had probable cause:

“The warrant allowed the police to search general categories of data on the cell phone with no objective standard or guidance to the police executing the warrant. The language of the search warrant left to the discretion of the police what to seize.”

With that, the Court of Appeals held the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reversed and dismissed the four convictions of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct.

My opinion? For the most part, courts look dis favorably on the searches of people’s homes, cars, phones, etc., unless the probable cause for the search is virtually overwhelming, and/or an emergency exists which would spoil the evidence if it was not gathered quickly; and/or a search warrant exists. Even when search warrants are drafted and executed, they must be particular to the search. In other words, law enforcement can’t expect that a general, non-specific search warrant is going to win the day for them and allow a fishing expedition to take place.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly followed the law. In this case, limiting the search to the crimes cited on the first page of the warrant was insufficient. The descriptions of what to be seized must be made more particular by using the precise statutory language to describe the materials sought.

Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member’s person, home, vehicle or cell phone was searched by police and evidence was seized. The search may have been unlawfully conducted in violation of your Constitutional rights.

Defense of Property

Should Married Couples Deny themselves Access To Each Other's Cell Phone? –  Rocworld

In State v. Yelovich, the WA Court of Appeals held that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Assault & Arrest

Defendant Yelovich and his ex-girlfriend De Armond dated for several years before breaking up. A domestic violence no-contact order was in place that prevented Yelovich from contacting De Armond. According to Yelovich, on the morning of June 7, 2015, he was at his son’s house packing boxes in the garage and moving them to his car. While he was working, Yelovich left several items unattended in his car, which had a broken passenger-side window. One of the items was a cell phone. As Yelovich was taking a box to his car, he caught a glimpse of someone walking down the street. At that time, he could not tell who the person was.

When he reached his car, he noticed that his cell phone and other items were missing.
Yelovich walked to the middle of the street and saw that the person in the street was De
Armond. De Armond was repeatedly turning around and looking back toward Yelovich.
Yelovich immediately believed that she had taken his cell phone.

Yelovich got into his car and chased after De Armond. He drove to the end of the road a
few blocks away and turned the corner before encountering De Armond. He parked his car, got out, and demanded that she return his phone. Yelovich knew at that point that he was violating the no-contact order. But he believed that the action was necessary before De Armond disappeared with his phone.

Yelovich grabbed De Armond’s purse strap and attempted to pull the purse from her, believing that the cell phone was in the purse. De Armond resisted, holding tightly to her purse. In the struggle, De Armond fell to the ground. After a bystander intervened, law enforcement officers arrived and arrested Yelovich.

The State charged Yelovich with violating the no-contact order. The information alleged
that Yelovich had assaulted De Armond, making the violation a felony under RCW 26.50.110(4).

Trial and Conviction

At trial, the witnesses testified to the facts recited above. Yelovich proposed a jury instruction that included both defense of property and self-defense components. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that a defense of property instruction did not apply because Yelovich was not using force to prevent the cell phone from being taken; he was trying to recover the cell phone that was no longer in his possession.

A jury convicted Yelovich of the felony contact order violation. Yelovich appeals his
conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the Court of Appeals disagreed with Yelovich’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing to give a defense of property jury instruction.

“Yelovich asserted as a defense that he was justified in using force against De Armond because she had taken his cell phone,” said the Court. It reasoned, however, that Yelovich’s own testimony established that he used force in an attempt to recover the cell phone after De Armond allegedly had taken it and had left the immediate area, not to prevent De Armond from taking the cell phone in the first instance. “The issue here is to what extent a defendant can rely on the defense of property as a defense when he or she uses force to recover property that already has been taken and is no longer in his or her possession,” said the Court.

The Court further reasoned that the plain language of the “Use of Force” Statute RCW 9A.16.020(3) establishes that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property after the interference with the property has been completed.

First, the property owner can use force only if he or she is about to be injured. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner no longer is about to be injured; he or she has been injured,” said the Court.

Second, the property owner can use force only in preventing or attempting to prevent
the interference. An action taken to prevent interference must occur before the interference has been completed. Defense of property by definition is defensive rather than offensive. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner’s use of force is to recover the property, not to prevent the interference,” said the Court.

Third, the property owner can use force only if the property is lawfully in his or her
possession. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, another person has obtained possession of the property and the owner necessarily no longer has possession,” said the Court.

“Based on the language of RCW 9A.16.020(3) and relevant case law, we hold that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.”

The Court reasoned that here, application of this three part test and the statutory language show that a defense of property instruction was not appropriate. First, Yelovich was not present at his car when De Armond allegedly removed the cell phone. He discovered that the cell phone was gone only after it already had been taken. Second, at that point De Armond had completed the alleged taking and had possession of the phone. Third, De Armond had left the area of Yelovich’s control – his car – and was a few blocks away. Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that De Armond’s theft of Yelovich’s cell phone, if it occurred, already had been completed when Yelovich chased after De Armond and accosted her. Yelovich was attempting to recover the cell phone, not to prevent its theft.

The Court furthe rreasoned that Yelovich was not about to be injured when he accosted De Armond; he already had been injured through the loss of his cell phone. He was not attempting to prevent a theft; the theft already had occurred. And Yelovich no longer had possession of the cell phone; the phone allegedly was in De Armond’s possession.

“Therefore, defense of property under RCW 9A.16.020(3) cannot apply and there was no evidence to support Yelovich’s other proposed instruction,” said the Court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

No-Contact Order Lengths

Domestic Violence Battery No Contact Orders – William Moore Law Firm

In State v. Granath, the WA Court of Appeals held that the lower court erred by refusing to lift a post-conviction No-Contact Order when the defendant fulfilled all the conditions of her sentence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Defendant Wendy Granath was charged with sending a series of harassing
e-mails to her estranged husband. She was convicted in King County District
Court on one count of Cyberstalking and one count of Violation of a No-Contact
Order. Both offenses were designated as crimes of Domestic Violence.

On November 8, 2012, the court imposed a 24-month suspended sentence. The court ordered 24 months of supervised probation and imposed fines and fees totaling $1,808.

Also on November 8, 2012, the court issued a No-Contact Order. The
order form was captioned as a post conviction domestic violence No-Contact Order authorized by RCW 10.99.050. The order directed Granath not to threaten, stalk, harass, or contact her estranged husband or keep him under surveillance, and not to knowingly come within 500 feet of him, his residence, his school, or his workplace. The order warned, “Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 26.50 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest.”

Notably, the order form includes a blank space for the expiration date:

4. This no-contact order expires on: __________. Five years from today if no date is entered.

In Granath’s case, the district court did not enter a date in the blank, so by
default, the order was set to expire on November 8, 2017.

At any rate, the district court “closed the case” in December 2014 after Granath paid the fines. At this point, the no-contact condition of her sentence no longer remained in effect.

Granath moved to have the No-Contact Order vacated on the ground that it expired when she completed her sentence. However, the district court denied the motion. The court characterized a No-Contact Order issued under RCW 10.99.050 as a “stand-alone” order and found that such an order can “survive on its own” for a full five years even if the underlying sentence is completed earlier.

Granath appealed to King County Superior Court. The superior court
affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted Granath’s motion for review.

ISSUE

The legal issue was whether the legislature Intended to criminalize violation of a post conviction No-Contact Order entered as a condition of sentence if the violation is committed after that sentence has been served.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court summarized the parties’ arguments. It acknowledged that Granath contends that under RCW 10.99.050(1), the no-contact order expires at the same time as the sentence containing the no-contact condition. In her case, that was in December 2014. The State, however, argues the No-Contact Order expires five years after the sentence was imposed.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals took issue with the State’s argument. It said that the State’s idea that a No-Contact order may remain in effect for a ‘statutory maximum’ of some kind is not expressed in RCW 10.99.050; it is derived from State v. Armendariz. In that case, though, the maximum duration of the No-Contact order was derived from felony sentencing statutes, not from RCW 10.99.050.

“The State fails to come to grips with the plain language of RCW 10.99.050(1),” said the Court. It also criticized the State’s arguments as wrongfully interpreted policy arguments under LAWS OF 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 105, § 1; RCW 10.99.010.

The Court found that Granath was found guilty of a crime, she was sentenced, and a condition of the sentence restricted her contact with the victim. The district court was required by the statute to record the condition of the sentence as a no-contact order. However, once Granath completed her sentence and her case was closed, the No-Contact condition of sentence expired. The separate no-contact order expired at the same time. The district court erred by denying Granath’s motion to vacate the No-Contact Order.

“We conclude a no-contact order authorized by RCW 10.99.050(1) must reflect a no-contact condition of the sentence actually imposed. The No-contact order terminates when the no-contact condition of sentence terminates.”

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling that the No-Contact Order in this case be preserved for 5 years.

My opinion? Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Armstrong: Prosecutor Not Obligated to Bring Video Evidence

Image result for am/pm store video crime

I’m often asked by Clients, “Why can’t you make the Prosecution get video surveillance evidence from crime scene?” This recent case explains why.

In State v. Armstrong, the WA Supreme Court held that the Prosecutor’s failure to obtain a copy of the AM/PM store’s surveillance video prior to the store’s destruction of the video pursuant to the store’s policy, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights.

FACTS & BACKGROUND

A no-contact order existed prohibiting Defendant Dennis Armstrong from contacting his former partner, Nadia Karavan. Nonetheless, on April 20, 2014, they agreed to meet at a bus stop in violation of the No-Contact Order. As the two talked, Armstrong became angry. He yelled and hit the wall of the bus stop shelter. Armstrong then hit Karavan twice in the face with an open fist.

After a brief struggle, Karavan ran to a nearby AM/PM gas station, and Armstrong followed her. According to the store clerk, Todd Hawkins, the two exchanged words. Armstrong followed Karavan around the store for several minutes, and Karavan asked Hawkins to call the police several times. When Hawkins finally called the police, Armstrong left the store.

Officers responded to the 911 call. Officer Martin noticed that Karavan had a slightly swollen, red abrasion on the side of her face.

Armstrong denied spending time inside the AM/PM. In response, the officers told Armstrong that surveillance video from the AM/PM would show what really happened. The officers repeatedly emphasized the video and told Armstrong that he should “tell the truth” because they had the “whole thing on video.”

The State charged Armstrong with a domestic violence felony violation of a court order.

Before trial and again during trial, Armstrong moved to discharge his counsel. One of his reasons was that counsel failed to give him the surveillance video as he requested. The prosecutor told the court that the State had never possessed the video. The court denied Armstrong’s motions.

At trial, Hawkins (the AM/PM employee) testified that there were about 16 cameras around the store: a few of which covered the gas pumps and one that may have shown a slight, low view shot of the bus stop. Although Hawkins testified that police had requested surveillance video from AM/PM in the past, no officer requested footage from the night of this incident. Hawkins had previously reviewed the video from that night and testified that it showed what he described in his testimony, but per AM/PM policy, the video had since been destroyed.

At trial, the officers gave various reasons why they never collected the video. Officer Martin testified that she heard Officer Elliot ask about the video, but she assumed it was the responsibility of someone else at the scene to investigate the video. Officer Rodriguez testified that he never viewed the video. He simply followed Officer Elliot’s lead when the two were questioning Armstrong. Officer Elliot was unavailable to testify at trial. Detective Rande Christiansen, who had been assigned to do the follow-up investigation on the case, testified that he did not investigate any video from the AM/PM because he did not know such video existed.

The jury returned a general guilty verdict despite the lack of surveillance video evidence.

On appeal – and with other arguments, Armstrong claimed that the police violated his right to due process because they failed to collect video surveillance from the AM/PM after using that video as a tool when interviewing Armstrong at the scene.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court held that Armstrong failed to show that the police acted in bad faith when they did not collect video surveillance that was only potentially useful evidence.

The Court reasoned that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, criminal prosecutions must conform with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness, and criminal defendants must have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Consequently, the prosecution has a duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense and a related duty to preserve such evidence for use by the defense.

The court also reasoned that although the State is required to preserve all potentially material and favorable evidence, this rule does not require police to search for exculpatory evidence. And in order to be material exculpatory evidence – that is, evidence which has value to the defense of which can alter or shift a fact-finder’s decision on guilt or innocence – the evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.

Finally, the court reasoned that the police’s failure to preserve “potentially useful evidence” was not a denial of due process unless the suspect can show bad faith by the State. The presence or absence of bad faith turns on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. Also, acting in compliance with its established policy regarding the evidence at issue is determinative of the State’s good faith.

“Armstrong asserts that the video surveillance was potentially useful evidence,” said the Court. “Therefore, he must show that the police acted in bad faith.” According to Armstrong, the police acted in bad faith because they told him during the interview that they were going to collect the video but they never actually collected it. Armstrong describes this as the police acting with an “extreme cavalier attitude” toward preserving potentially useful evidence. The Court further reasoned that beyond this failure to collect the video, Armstrong offers no evidence of bad faith, such as improper motive.

“Armstrong has failed to show that the police acted in bad faith when they failed to collect the surveillance video from the AM/PM. The testimony of the officers indicates that the video went uncollected due to mere oversight. Armstrong has presented no evidence that the police had an improper motive. At most, Armstrong has shown that the investigation was incomplete or perhaps negligently conducted, but that is not enough to show bad faith.”

With that, the Court upheld his conviction.

My opinion? I understand the Court’s opinion insofar as the Prosecution should not be burdened with providing exculpatory evidence, especially if that evidence is unimportant – or not material – to the larger issues of guilt.

However, I would object to the AM/PM employee  discussing the  video as facts that are not admitted into evidence. Under this objection when the attorney claims that “the question assumes facts not in evidence,” what he is really saying is that the facts that are being presented to the witness are presumably not yet in evidence and therefore, how can this witness properly answer the question if those facts have not been put before this jury?

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

No-Contact Order Held Invalid

Image result for no contact order

In State v. Torres, the WA Court of Appeals decided a lower court improperly imposed a 5-year no contact order between the defendant and his son in a Witness Tampering prosecution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mario Torres is the father of M.T. (born 2003) and N.B. (born 2012). N.B. lived with his mother. However, on the morning of December 22, 2014, he was left in Mr. Torres’s care while N.B.’s mother went shopping. M.T. was also with Mr. Torres at the time. On December 23, N.B.’s mother and grandmother took him to receive medical care after he was found unresponsive. N.B. died a few days later. N.B.’s injuries suggested his death was a homicide.

Police Interview With M.T.

Part of law enforcement’s investigation into N.B. ‘s death involved a forensic interview of M.T. He originally told the interviewer that N.B. was responsive while in Mr. Torres’s care and ate some “Chicken McNuggets” during this time. But M.T. later told the interviewer this was not true. M.T. then said that he heard a loud bang while Mr. Torres was caring for N.B. and N.B. started loudly crying. Mr. Torres later told M.T. he had accidentally stepped on N.B. ‘s leg causing him to fall and strike the bedpost. M.T. never saw N.B. get up again after this. M.T. told the interviewer that both his parents approached him at his grandmother’s home earlier that day and told him to make up a story about N.B. eating Chicken McNuggets, and not mention that N.B. had bumped his head. Additionally, Mr. Torres allegedly told M.T. to “make up lies” about what happened.

Police interview with Mr. Torres.

The police talked to Mr. Torres the day after M.T’s interview. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Mr. Torres denied injuring N.B. but admitted N.B. fell and struck his head on a bedpost. Mr. Torres also admitted he did not want M.T. to talk to the police and had a private conversation with him to outline what M.T. would say. Mr. Torres claimed he told M.T. to tell the truth and say Mr. Torres did not cause the injuries to N.B. He did not offer any specific details on what M.T. was told.

Criminal Charges, Guilty Verdicts, Sentencing & the 5-Year No Contact Order.

The State charged Mr. Torres with one count of Witness Tampering under RCW 9A.72.120(l)(c). Although the case progressed toward trial, Mr. Torres ultimately pled guilty and entered an Alford plea on February 25. His case then proceeded directly to sentencing. During the sentencing colloquy, the court ultimately imposed a five-year no-contact order, prohibiting Mr. Torres from all contact with M.T. except by written mail. Mr. Torres also received a sentence of six months and $1,960 in court fines. Torres appealed.

For those who don’t know, a no contact order is also called a restraining order, and prohibits a person from being in physical or verbal contact with another person. The court must order the no contact agreement, and usually specifies how many feet, or yards, away the individuals must stay from one another. If broken the defendant may receive a fine, or jail time with a felony or misdemeanor charge.

COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION AND REASONING.

The Court began with stating RCW 9.94A.505(9) authorizes a trial court to impose crime related prohibitions as sentencing conditions. A No-Contact Order is such a prohibition. The court further reasoned that conditions interfering with fundamental rights, such as the right to a parent-child relationship, must be “sensitively imposed” so they are “reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order.” A trial abuses its discretion if the trial court employs the wrong legal standard.

The Court further reasoned that here, at sentencing, the trial court imposed a five-year no-contact order, prohibiting almost all contact between Mr. Torres and his son. The Court reasoned that in so doing, the court failed to acknowledge Mr. Torres’s fundamental right to parent his child or explain why a five year prohibition on all personal contact was reasonably necessary to further the State’s interests. “This was error, even under the deferential abuse of discretion standard,” said the Court of Appeals. “While the trial court certainly can impose a no-contact order to advance the State’s fundamental interests in protecting children, it must do so in a nuanced manner that is sensitive to the changing needs and interests of the parent and child.”

“The State suggests we can infer the reasons for the court’s no-contact order from the record. We disagree. The record before us is scant. The trial judge did not explain why he decided to impose a no-contact order that was 10 times longer than what was requested by the State. We are unable to discern the court’s likely reasoning from the limited information presented. It is the trial court’s duty to balance the competing interests impacted by a no contact order.”

With that, the WA Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court for further reconsideration – and instructions – on re-creating the no contact order.

“How to Create a No Contact Order.”

This portion of the Court opinion was very instructive to the lower court. For example, it was instructed that the trial court shall first address whether a no-contact order remains reasonably necessary in light of the State’s interests in protecting M.T. from harm. If it is, then the court shall endeavor to narrowly tailor the order, both in terms of scope and duration. When it comes to the order’s scope, the court shall consider less restrictive alternatives, such as supervised visitation, prior to restricting all personal contact between Mr. Torres and his child. In addition, the court’s order should recognize that “what is reasonably necessary to protect the State’s interests may change over time.” Accordingly, the court shall consider whether the scope of the no-contact order should change over time. The court shall also reconsider whether the ultimate length of the no-contact order remains appropriate. Finally, the trial court should keep in mind that a sentencing proceeding is not the ideal forum for addressing parenting issues.

My opinion? This was a great decision. I’m impressed that the Court of Appeals gave specific instructions on creating no contact orders in the future.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.