Category Archives: Fifth Amendment

Invoking The Right To An Attorney During Police Interrogations

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Fifth Amendment, Homicide & Manslaughter, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

What does a police interrogation/interview room usually look like? - Quora

In State v. Wilson, the WA Court of Appeals held that a Defendant invokes his right to an attorney when he says, “So, I’m going to have to ask for legal representation, not out of resistance or— or—anything,” when interviewed by police.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Wilson was investigated for the shooting death of his ex-wife. He was transported to the police station for an interview. The interrogation was video-recorded. During the interview, the following exchange took place:

DETECTIVE: “Yeah. Do you want me to call you Mr. Wilson or Wendell?”

MR. WILSON: “Whichever you’re comfortable with.”

DETECTIVE: “Okay. Okay. Go ahead.”

MR. WILSON: “Um . . . I know I can’t afford a lawyer.”

DETECTIVE EDWARDS: “Okay.”

MR. WILSON: “So I’m going to have to ask for legal representation, not out of resistance or—or—anything . . .”

DETECTIVE EDWARDS: “Mm-hmm.”

The interview proceeded. During the interview, Mr. Wilson described the argument that concerned installing a baby gate in the kitchen, which eventually escalated with Mrs. Wilson threatening to move out. The argument took place throughout the apartment, and the two were in the master bedroom before Mr. Wilson retrieved the gun from the adjacent bedroom. Mr. Wilson stated the gun was in a closet up on a shelf in a gun case.

Mr. Wilson stated he came out of the adjacent bedroom at the same time Mrs. Wilson came out of the master bedroom. The two stood about a foot apart. When asked if he intended to shoot Mrs. Wilson when they met, Wilson said, “I said yes earlier and . . . no,” but did say he intended to hurt her, though he further stated he intended to “more scare her.”

When asked what was his intention for using the gun, Mr. Wilson stated, “It comes down to the dominance thing.” Wilson explained it showed “who’s got the power.” He agreed with the Detective that Wilson’s use of the gun showed Mrs. Wilson that he had the last word. When Mr. Wilson shot Mrs. Wilson, she was well into the room because she started backing up, looked scared, and put her hands up in a defensive position. Mr. Wilson said when he went to get the gun, it was out of “rage,” and fear never crossed his mind.

The State charged Mr. Wilson with first degree murder. In a pretrial CrR 3.5 hearing, Wilson argued his statements “I know I can’t afford a lawyer” and “I’m going to have to ask for legal representation” were an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. However, the trial court ruled Wilson did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel and the interview statements were admissible.

The State played the interview at trial. The jury convicted Wilson of first degree murder. 

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“Whether a criminal case unequivocally invoked Miranda rights is a mixed question of law and fact,” said the Court of Appeals (COA). “The question is whether, as a matter of law, it was reasonable for the detectives to conclude that the right to counsel was not invoked.”

The COA reasoned that before any custodial interrogation, a suspect must be informed that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.’ (quoting Miranda) Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.

However, the suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for counsel. If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.

The COA engaged compared  numerous prior rulings leading cases: State v. Whitaker (cited by the State) and State v. Pierce (cited by the defense).

“The point of the objective standard for invoking Miranda rights is to give law enforcement a bright line rule that can be applied without requiring questioning to cease merely if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney. It is not enough to surmise from background circumstances that a suspect probably would want counsel, and by the same token surmise from circumstances that a suspect probably would not want counsel cannot defeat a clear statement that ‘I’m going to have to ask for legal representation.’ Having reviewed de novo Wilson’s statements, their context, and the video and audio recording of the interview, we conclude Wilson unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. The admission of the interview at trial was error.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The COA therefore reversed Mr. Wilson’s judgment of conviction. It also held that in the event of retrial, the interview with the detective must be excluded as substantive evidence under Miranda.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

At Trial, Police Can’t Comment on a Defendant’s Post-Arrest Silence

Assault, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Fifth Amendment, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Van Dyke trial: Breaking down all 44 witnesses – Chicago Tribune

In State v. Palmer, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination was violated when the detective commented about the defendant’s post-arrest silence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Palmer and his girlfriend, DD, moved in together in 2013. They lived together with DD’s two biological children from a prior marriage, her son AD, and her daughter PD. Palmer and DD also had a baby together, LP. Sometime in 2014, the family moved to Washington. Palmer served as caregiver to the children and in that role disciplined both PD and AD.

During a family car trip in 2016, Palmer grabbed AD by the neck, leaving a scratch. At
some point after the car trip incident, Palmer told DD that PD had touched his penis. Thereafter, PD disclosed to DD that Palmer had touched her vagina. Approximately four months after PD’s disclosure, DD contacted law enforcement. Law enforcement authorities interviewed the children on two separate occasions. Detective Ramirez participated in PD’s interview during which he learned of the accusations against Palmer.

Eventually, Detective Ramirez took Palmer into custody, read him Miranda rights, and questioned him. Ramirez ended the questioning after Palmer repeatedly refused to admit to any wrongdoing. Ramirez returned the next morning for additional questioning, but Palmer refused to talk. The State charged Palmer with one count of child molestation in the first degree and two counts of assault of a child in the second degree.

At trial, the Prosecutor questioned DSetective Ramirez and asked if he had spoken to Palmer after his initial interview. In the presence of the jury, Ramirez testified that he “went back the next morning, thinking that, you know, a day sitting in the county jail, you know, there’s some time to think, and maybe Mr. Palmer would want to do the right thing here.” Ramirez further testified that he told Palmer, “You’ve had some time to think. Do you want to talk?” and that Palmer responded that he did not want to talk.

The jury convicted Palmer of all charges.

On appeal, Palmer argued his right against self-incrimination was violated when Detective Ramirez discussed Palmer’s decision to remain silent.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court began with an engaging discussion of the Fifth Amendment. In short, a defendant’s right against self-incrimination prohibits the State from eliciting comments from witnesses about the defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence. The State may also not suggest the defendant is guilty because they chose to remain silent, because the assurance of Miranda is that remaining silent will not be penalized.

Here, the State unequivocally elicited a comment from Ramirez about Palmer’s decision
to remain silent.

“Ramirez’s testimony was a comment on Palmer’s right to remain silent. More pointedly, contrary to State v. Easter, the State suggested that Palmer was guilty due to his silence. Indeed, Ramirez testified that Palmer remained silent after being given a chance to “do the right thing” by admitting criminal conduct. This statement presupposed Palmer’s guilt and created an impossible choice: Palmer could either do right by confessing to molesting a child or do wrong by remaining silent.”

“Implicit in the ‘silence equals wrongfulness’ notion is that silence withholds the ‘truth’—that ‘truth’ being one’s criminal conduct, even if there was no criminal conduct. In this context, a defendant cannot maintain their presumption of innocence by remaining silent. A detective’s belief on this front may assist with their investigative duty, but established authority prohibits using a defendant’s right to remain silent to suggest guilt to the jury.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals concluded by saying that alone, this violation may warrant reversal and a new trial. “However, because we reverse on other grounds, we remind the State that it is forbidden from eliciting comments about Palmer’s silence during his new trial.” With that, the Court of Appeals reverse the convictions and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Miranda & Border Detention

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, Fifth Amendment, Interrogation, Miranda, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Interrogation Room - SoFlo Studio

In State v. Escalante, the WA Supreme Court held that separating a person from the normal stream of traffic and detaining them for five hours in a locked room that was inaccessible to the public or other travelers will create the type of police-dominated environment requires Miranda warnings.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In August 2017, Mr. Escalante was traveling in a van with a group of friends, heading back into Washington from Canada. They were all returning from the Shambala Music Festival in British Columbia. At the Frontier Border Crossing, patrol agents searched all vehicles coming from the festival as part of a drug enforcement operation. Escalante and his friends were directed to the secondary inspection area. Border patrol agents took their documents.

The secondary inspection lobby was an 11 x 14 foot locked room. It is not accessible to the public or other travelers. Detainees are not allowed to use the bathroom or access water without getting permission from agents and submitting to a pat-down search. Agents patted down all four men and found narcotics on the driver and one passenger, but not on Escalante or the other passenger. Agents kept all the men secured – either in the locked lobby or in the detention cells – for five hours while they searched the van.

The search uncovered drug paraphernalia and personal items containing drugs, including a backpack with small amounts of heroin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Without giving Miranda warnings, agents confronted the men with each item of drug paraphernalia and each item in which drugs were found and asked who owned it.

Escalante admitted he owned the backpack. At that time, Escalante and his companion were the only travelers in the secured lobby. Eventually, the Border Patrol Agents summoned local law enforcement and held Escalante until they arrived. These officers formally arrested Escalante and gave him Miranda warnings.

Escalante was charged in state court with possession of heroin and LSD. He moved to suppress his statement claiming ownership of the backpack because it was obtained in custody by interrogation without Miranda warnings. However, the trial court admitted Escalante’s incriminating statement. Escalante was convicted at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case eventually made its way to the WA Supreme Court.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that individuals will not be compelled by the government to incriminate themselves. In short, the Fifth Amendment protects an individual’s right to remain silent, in and out of court, unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.

The Court also explained that in order to assure an individual freely makes the choice to talk to the police, Miranda requires that before custodial interrogation, the police inform a suspect of their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of an attorney, appointed or retained.

Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the Court concluded that a reasonable person in Escalante’s circumstances would have felt their freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest:

“Agents confiscated Escalante’s documents, routed him to a secondary inspection area, separated him from his belongings, arrested the driver of the van in which he was traveling, and detained him for five hours in a small locked lobby that was not accessible to the public or other travelers. After a lengthy detention, he was questioned using a procedure that communicated agents had found drugs and were suspicious of him. These circumstances created precisely the type of incommunicado police-dominated environment that was the concern of Miranda. We hold that Escalante was in custody and his unwarned statements should have been suppressed.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court reversed and vacated Mr. Escalante’s convictions.

My opinion? Good decision. Escalante should have been informed of his Miranda rights. Clearly, that the statements he made resulted from direct interrogation by the officers and were not spontaneous and unsolicited statements of a person who was anxious to explain.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime after giving incriminating statement and/or undergoing a questionable search or seizure. Hiring a competent and experienced defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Supreme Court Makes it Harder to Deport Legal Immigrants Who Commit Crimes.

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Federal Crimes & Prosecutions, felony, Fifth Amendment, Immigration, Skagit County Criminal Defense, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

In this Feb. 7, 2017, photo released by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, foreign nationals are arrested during a targeted enforcement operation conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aimed at immigration fugitives, re-entrants and at-large criminal aliens in Los Angeles. (Charles Reed/U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement via AP, File)

In Sessions v. Dimaya, the United States Supreme Court held that 18 U. S. C. §16(b), which defines “violent felony” for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s removal provisions for non-citizens, was unconstitutionally vague.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Respondent James Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident of the United States with two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. After his second offense, the Government sought to deport him as an aggravated felon. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California’s first-degree burglary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). While Dimaya’s appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)—was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Relying on Johnson v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that §16(b), as incorporated into the INA, was also unconstitutionally vague.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Kagan delivered the majority opinion of the Court and concluded that §16(b)’s “crime of violence” clause was unconstitutionally vague.

The Court’s opinion began by explaining that The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) virtually guarantees that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States will be deported. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). An aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.

Justice Kagan explained that Section 16’s definition of a crime of violence is divided into two clauses—often referred to as the elements clause, §16(a), and the residual clause, §16(b). The residual clause, the provision at issue here, defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach. This approach has courts ask not whether the particular facts underlying a conviction created a substantial risk; but whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk.

Justice Kagan reasoned that ACCA’s residual clause created grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime because it tied the judicial assessment of risk to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s ordinary case, but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was. Compounding that uncertainty, ACCA’s residual clause layered an imprecise “serious potential risk” standard on top of the requisite “ordinary case” inquiry. “The combination of indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime and indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony resulted in more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” said Justice Kagan.

Justice Kagan further reasoned that Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws. He explained that similar to the ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime’s ordinary case in order to measure the crime’s risk but offers no reliable way to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like. Additionally, its “substantial risk” threshold is no more determinate than ACCA’s “serious potential risk” standard. “Thus, the same two features that conspired to make ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in §16(b), with the same result,” said Justice Kagan.

Next, Justice Kagan raised and dismissed numerous arguments from the Government that §16(b) is easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmities. “None, however, relates to the pair of features that Johnson found to produce impermissible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate,” said Justice Kagan.

With that, the majority Court concluded that §16(b)’s “crime of violence” clause was unconstitutionally vague.

The Court was deeply divided. Justice Kagan’s opinion was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined.

Interestingly, it was Justice Gorsuch — a Trump nominee who sided with the four liberal-leaning justices in the ruling — who was the swing vote in this case. Despite his surprise vote, he explicitly left the door open to Congress to act, saying it should be up to lawmakers and not the courts to be explicit about the crimes that deserve automatic deportation for even legal immigrants.

My opinion? This decision is very good for legal immigrants facing crimes which are questionably deportable as crimes of moral turpitude and/or crimes of violence under today’s immigration laws. It’s incredibly difficult to navigate the criminal justice system, and even more so for defendants who are not citizens. Therefore, it’s imperative for legal immigrants charged with crimes to hire competent defense counsel when charged with crimes which may essentially result in deportation.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Shackled in Court

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Federal Crimes & Prosecutions, Fifth Amendment, Shackled Defendants, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for shackled defendants in courtroom

In United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lower federal court’s policy of routinely shackling all defendants in the courtroom was unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2013, the judges of the Southern District of California approached the U.S. Marshals Service and requested “a district-wide policy of allowing the Marshals Service to bring all in-custody defendants in full restraints for most non-jury proceedings.” “Full restraints” means that a defendant’s hands are closely handcuffed together, these handcuffs are connected by chain to another chain running around the defendant’s waist, and the defendant’s feet are shackled and chained together.

Starting on the first day of the policy’s implementation, the Federal Defenders of San Diego objected to the routine use of shackles and requested that each defendant’s shackles be removed. The judges routinely denied the requests, relying on the Marshals Service’s general security concerns. The judges also pointed to increasing security threats from what they viewed as changing demographics and increasing case loads in their district.

The shackling was the same regardless of a defendant’s individual characteristics. One defendant had a fractured wrist but appeared in court wearing full restraints. Nevertheless, the judge denied her motion to remove the restraints, Another defendant was vision-impaired. One of his hands was free of restraint so he could use his cane, but his other hand was shackled and secured to a chain around his waist and his legs were shackled together. His objection to the restraints was also denied.  And another defendant was shackled despite being brought into court in a wheelchair due to her “dire and deteriorating” health. The court “noted” her objection to the shackles and denied the defendant’s motion to remove the shackles.

Defendants appealed these denials to the district court and also filed motions challenging the constitutionality of the district-wide policy. The district courts denied all relief. All four cases were consolidated for review of the policy’s constitutionality.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

This 9th Circuit said that under the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court has said time and again that “liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).

Liberty from bodily restraint includes the right to be free from shackles in the courtroom, reasoned the court. Also, the right to be free from unwarranted shackles no matter the proceeding respects our founding principle that defendants are innocent until proven guilty.

“The principle isn’t limited to juries or trial proceedings,” said the Court. It also includes the perception of any person who may walk into a public courtroom, as well as those of the jury, the judge and court personnel:

“A presumptively innocent defendant has the right to be treated with respect and dignity in a public courtroom, not like a bear on a chain . . . The fact that the proceeding is non-jury does not diminish the degradation a prisoner suffers when needlessly paraded about a courtroom, like a dancing bear on a lead, wearing belly chains and manacles.”

The Court further reasoned that the most visible and public manifestation of our criminal justice system is the courtroom. “Courtrooms are palaces of justice, imbued with a majesty that reflects the gravity of proceedings designed to deprive a person of liberty or even life.” It reasoned that a member of the public who wanders into a criminal courtroom must immediately perceive that it is a place where justice is administered with due regard to individuals whom the law presumes to be innocent.

That perception cannot prevail if defendants are marched in like convicts on a chain gang. “Both the defendant and the public have the right to a dignified, inspiring and open court process. Thus, innocent defendants may not be shackled at any point in the courtroom unless there is an individualized showing of need.”

Moreover, the Court reasoned that it has a long tradition of giving correctional officials a wide berth in maintaining security within their own facilities. “But we don’t have a tradition of deferring to correctional or law enforcement officers as to the treatment of individuals appearing in public courtrooms.”

Here, in the courtroom, law enforcement officers have no business proposing policies for the treatment of parties as a class. Insofar as they have information pertaining to particular defendants, they may, of course, bring it to the court’s attention. But a blanket policy applied to all defendants infuses the courtroom with a prison atmosphere. The Marshals Service should not have proposed it and the judges should not have paid heed.

“We must take seriously how we treat individuals who come into contact with our criminal justice system—from how our police interact with them on the street to how they appear in the courtroom. How the justice system treats people in these public settings matters for the public’s perception, including that of the defendant. Practices like routine shackling and “perp walks” are inconsistent with our constitutional presumption that people who have not been convicted of a crime are innocent until proven otherwise. We must treat people with respect and dignity even though they are suspected of a crime.”

Finally, the Court reasoned that the Constitution enshrines a fundamental right to be free of unwarranted restraints. “Thus, we hold that if the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant.” Courts must decide whether the stated need for security outweighs the infringement on a defendant’s right. This decision cannot be deferred to security providers or presumptively answered by routine policies, said the Court. “All of these requirements apply regardless of a jury’s presence or whether it’s a pretrial, trial or sentencing proceeding. Criminal defendants, like any other party appearing in court, are entitled to enter the courtroom with their heads held high.”

My Opinion? Excellent decision. Unless a defendant is particularly dangerous to themselves or others, there is simply no reason to parade them around the court like animals. It’s degrading, demoralizing and reduces respect for the criminal justice system; especially if defendants are not yet found guilty for crimes.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Unlawful Property Seizure

Assault, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Fifth Amendment, Harassment, Jury Trial, Property Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for forfeit your property

In State v. Rivera, the WA Court of Appeals Div. II decided a trial court lacks authority to order defendants to forfeit their property as a condition of their felony sentencing.

BACKGROUND & FACTS

On September 20, 2014, Alicia Clements arrived at defendant Kevin Rivera’s home to serve him papers concerning a civil matter. Ms. Clements exited her vehicle to tape the documents to a post near Mr. Rivera’s driveway. While Clements was posting the paperwork, Rivera and his wife came out the front door and into the driveway. Rivera yelled at Clements that she was trespassing and needed to leave.

As Clements was getting back into her car, Rivera took down the documents she posted and approached her car to return them. In the process of returning the documents, Rivera shattered the driver’s side window on Clements’s car, causing glass to cascade into the car and onto the street.

Ms. Clements claimed that her window was completely rolled up and that Rivera had deliberately punched through the window with the documents in hand, striking her twice with his fist in the process. However, Rivera stated that Clements’s window was still open when he returned the documents, but that because Clements was attempting to roll up her windows, his fingers caught the edge of the window causing it to shatter.

Both Rivera and Clements called 911. Pierce County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to the incident. Mr. Rivera for assault. The State charged Rivera with second degree assault by battery under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), felony harassment, and third degree malicious mischief.

At trial, Rivera conceded that he had broken Clements’s window, but argued he did so accidentally rather than intentionally. The jury convicted Rivera of second degree assault and third degree malicious mischief. As part of his sentence, Rivera was required to forfeit “all property.”

CONCLUSION & ANALYSIS.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked authority to order property forfeiture as a sentencing condition.

It reasoned that under State v. Roberts, 185 Wn. App. 94, 96, 339 P.3d 995 (2014), the authority to order forfeiture of property as part of a judgment and sentence is purely statutory.. In other words, a trial court has no inherent power to order forfeiture of property in connection with a criminal conviction.

With that, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by ordering forfeiture of seized property as a sentencing condition.

My opinion? Good decision. I’ve never heard of courts seizing a defendant’s property as a condition of sentencing. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment states that a person may not be deprived of property by the government without “due process of law,” or fair procedures. Typically, if property is an issue, then courts can lawfully order a defendant to pay restitution to the victim for the loss or damage to victim’s property. This makes sense. But to actually take a defendant’s property as a sentencing condition? No.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pre-Arrest Silence & Business Records Exceptions to Hearsay Rule

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Business Record, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, felony, Fifth Amendment, Hearsay, Jury Trial, Miranda, Pre-Arrest Silence, Search and Seizure, Self-Incrimination, Sex Crimes, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Magana, the WA Court of Appeals held (1) the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of a suspect’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt, and (2) the State failed to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for the Lineup ID Report, however, the erroneous admission of the document was harmless error.

Sergio Magana Jr., an adult, met met fourteen-year-old Y.L. through Facebook. After exchanging text messages, Y.L. and Mr. Magana made plans to meet at Y.L.’s home. Mr. Magana wanted to be alone with Y.L. When the day they planned to meet arrived, Mr. Magana went inside Y.L.’s home and forcibly raped her. Not long after leaving, Mr. Magana texted and told Y.L. not to mention his name and to delete all of their text messages because her “age scared him.”
After approximately two weeks, Y.L. reported Mr. Magana’s conduct to the police. Y.L. identified Mr. Magana from a photo lineup and submitted her phone so text messages could be extracted. The police then began looking for Mr. Magana.
After about six weeks, Mr. Magana made contact with the police and spoke to a detective over the telephone. During the call, Mr. Magana arranged to meet with the police. However, he never showed up for his appointment. About a month later, Mr. Magana finally met with a police detective in person. He was advised of his Miranda rights and acknowledged that he had indeed met Y.L. over Facebook, but he denied having intercourse. Mr. Magana was charged with one count of third degree rape of a child. Following a mistrial and then a second trial, he was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the trial court. Mr. Magana appealed.
1. PRE-ARREST SILENCE.
On appeal, Mr. Magana argued the jury should not have known about his failure to appear for his initial police interview. He claims this was an improper comment on his right to silence, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule from the  United States Supreme Court’s Salinas v. Texas holds that the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of Mr. Magana’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Furthermore, although Washington State’s Constitution typically provides more protections than the U.S. Constitution, “this is not an area where our state’s constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution.”
Consequently, the Court of Appeals reasoned Mr. Magana was not under arrest or any sort of police custody. They said his scheduled police interview was voluntary, and to the extent Mr. Magana’s failure to appear for the interview was relevant, the State was entitled to present this evidence.
PHOTO LINEUP EVIDENCE.
Also on appeal, Mr. Magana argued the State’s photo lineup exhibit was hearsay and admitted into evidence without proper foundation. However, the State argued that the exhibit was a properly authenticated business record.
The Court reasoned that under RCW 5.45.020 and ER 803(6), a document may be admitted as a business record as long as a witness testifies to the document’s identity and mode of preparation, and explains that the document “was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event.”
Here, the exhibit at issue consisted of three pages. The first page is an array of six hand-numbered photos, one of which depicts Mr. Magana. The second page is entitled “Lineup ID Report,” which is a computer-generated report that documents biographical information, including dates of birth, for the six individuals depicted on the photo array. The third page is a copy of the written admonishment form Y.L. signed prior to reviewing the photo array.
However, The Court of Appeals reasoned that during the photo identification process, Y .L. failed to review the second page of the report. Also concerning was that at trial, no witness testimony was presented regarding the creation of the Lineup ID Report included on page two.
For these reasons, and because no foundation was laid for the Lineup ID Report, it was improperly admitted as a business record. Nevertheless, and given the entirety of the evidence, the erroneous inclusion of the Lineup ID Report was harmless error which did not impact the jury’s verdict. With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Magana’s convictions, but remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Protective Sweeps of Homes

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, Exclusionary Rule, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Fifth Amendment, Homicide & Manslaughter, Interrogation, law enforcement, Miranda, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Protective Sweep, Search and Seizure, Self-Defense, Self-Incrimination, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Chambers, the WA Court of Appeals decided (1) the police’s “protective sweep” of the defendant’s home was improper because the defendant was arrested outside his home and the officers did not have specific facts that other armed individuals might be inside the defendant’s home, and (2) the defendant’s 3.5 Motion to Suppress statements made to police was rightfully denied because police scrupulously honored the defendant’s Fifth Amendment invocation of his right to remain silent.

In this case, defendant Lovett Chambers was drinking at the Feedback Lounge, a neighborhood bar in West Seattle that he frequented. Chambers was a convicted felon of African-American descent who moved to Seattle in 1989, worked in the construction industry, obtained degrees in computer science and started an IT business. In 1992, he got married and later purchased a house in West Seattle with his wife. A few years later, Chambers asked his wife to buy him a Colt .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun. She did so, apparently unaware that he was a convicted felon.

On the night of the incident, Mr. Chambers had numerous drinks at the Feedback Lounge. He carried and concealed his .45 pistol.   At some point, two Caucasian men entered the bar and began drinking. The gentlemen did not know Mr. Chambers. Later, all of the gentlemen departed the bar simultaneously and walked to their respective vehicles which were parked nearby each other in the parking lot.

For reasons unknown, words were exchanged between Chambers and the two gentlemen, who apparently uttered racial epitaphs to each other, Mr. Chambers, or both. One of the gentleman – Michael Travis Hood – pulled a shovel from his vehicle; apparently to defend himself from Mr. Chambers. However, Chambers shot Mr. Hood three times with his .45 pistol. Chambers walked away, got into his car and drove home in his BMW.

Mr. Hood died from lethal gunshot wounds to his back.

Seattle police arrested Chambers at his home at 10:49 p.m. Officer Belgarde read Chambers his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. Chambers smelled of alcohol. He was “swaying,” had trouble balancing, slurred his words, and was argumentative. Officer Galbraith drove Chambers to the precinct. Officers obtained a warrant to search Chambers’ home and seized a loaded .45 caliber handgun, a spare magazine, and the BMW keys. The police impounded the BMW. Later, officers interrogated Chambers and obtained numerous incriminating statements regarding the shooting.

The State charged Chambers with murder in the second degree of Hood while armed with a deadly weapon. Chambers asserted a claim of self-defense. Before trial, Chambers filed a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house and the statements he made. The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house. The court concluded the police “were authorized to enter the house to conduct a protective sweep to ensure their safety.” The court also denied the motion to suppress Chambers’ statements to police and reasoned his “right to remain silent was scrupulously honored” under Michigan v. Mosley.

The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. By special verdict, the jury found Chambers was armed with a firearm at the time he committed the crime. The court imposed the low-end standard range sentence of 78 months plus the mandatory consecutive 60-month firearm enhancement. Chambers appealed.

  1. Evidence Seized from the House Was Obtained Through a Unlawfully Conducted “Protective Sweep,” However, The Trial Court’s Decision to Deny Chambers’ Suppression Motion Was Harmless Error.

Chambers contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his house: the Colt .45, a magazine clip with .45 caliber bullets, and the keys to the BMW.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a warrantless search and seizure unless the State demonstrates that one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a “protective sweep” of the home. The court further reasoned that under Maryland v. Buie the U.S. Supreme Court describes a protective sweep as a limited cursory search incident to arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.

The Court of Appeals decided the trial court erred in concluding the police had the authority to conduct a protective sweep of Chambers’ house. First, a warrantless search of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest” without probable cause or reasonable suspicion does not apply when the police arrest an individual outside his home.

Here, the undisputed facts do not support the warrantless entry and protective sweep of the kitchen under Buie and the court erred in denying the motion to suppress:

“The record does not support the conclusion that there were “articulable facts” that the kitchen harbored “an individual posing a danger.” The police had information that only Chambers shot Hood and was alone when he drove away. The findings establish the only individual in the house when police arrested Chambers was his spouse. The front door was open after the arrest and the police could see Sara was sitting on the living room couch watching television and remained in the living room.”

However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that the verdict would have been the same absent the trial court’s error. Chambers testified he acted in self-defense when he shot Hood with the Colt .45. Chambers admitted that he parked his BMW in front of the Beveridge Place Pub on January 21, that he kept a .45 caliber gun under the passenger seat of the BMW, and that he used the Colt .45 to shoot Hood near Morgan Junction Park. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny Chamber’s motion to suppress was harmless error.

2. Chamber’s Incriminating Statements Are Admissible.

On appeal, Mr. Chambers asserts the detectives did not “scrupulously honor” his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “No person shall be . .. compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court adopted “procedural safeguards” to protect the privilege and held that before questioning an individual in custody, the police must clearly inform the suspect of the following:

That he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Here, the Court of Appeals decided that because the circumstances leading up to the police’s interview with Chambers show the police scrupulously honored Chambers’ right to cut off questioning, the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statements Chambers made.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the record shows the police advised Chambers of his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. when he was arrested on January 21. Chambers stated he understood his rights and unequivocally said he did not want to talk to the police. The record establishes the police did not “ask the defendant any questions or persist in repeated efforts to wear him down or change his mind after he invoked his rights.” After he invoked his right to remain silent at 10:51 p.m. on January 21, the police did not question Chambers while at police headquarters. And while driving to Harborview to obtain a blood draw at 3:07 a.m. on January 22, the detectives did not ask Chambers any questions.

Nonetheless, on the way to Harborview, Chambers said he did not want to talk about what happened. While at Harborview, Chambers seemed to have “sobered up.” When they left Harborview approximately 45 minutes later, Detective Steiger advised Chambers of his Miranda rights again. Chambers stated he understood his rights and did not invoke the right to remain silent.

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded the undisputed facts support the conclusion that the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

The Court affirmed the jury verdict.

My opinion? The police should have advised Mr. Chambers of his Ferrier warnings, a topic which I have blogged many times. Ferrier warnings must be given if police officers seek to enter the home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime or contraband. Still, even if Ferrier warnings were given and Mr. Chambers denied the police entry into his home, his incriminating statements to police ultimately assigned harmless error to the unlawful search.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.