Category Archives: Constitutional Rights

Emergency Blood Draws

Image result for hospital airlift

In State v. Inman, the WA Court of Appeals held that a warrantless blood draw was proper under exigent circumstances where: (a) the injury collision occurred in a rural area; (b) there is spotty phone service; (c) a search warrant takes 30-45 minutes to create; and (d) helicopters airlifted the DUI suspect to a hospital. A search warrant is not required before a blood sample collected under the exigent circumstances exception is tested for alcohol and drugs.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In May 2015, Inman and Margie Vanderhoof were injured in a motorcycle accident on a
rural road. Inman was the driver of the motorcycle and Vanderhoof was his passenger. Captain Tim Manly, the first paramedic on the scene, observed a motorcycle in a ditch and two people lying down in a driveway approximately 20 to 25 feet away. Captain Manly observed that Inman had facial trauma, including bleeding and abrasions on the face, and a deformed helmet. Based on Inman’s injuries, Captain Manly believed that the accident was a high-trauma incident.

Captain Manly learned from a bystander that Inman had been unconscious for approximately five minutes after the collision before regaining consciousness. Manly
administered emergency treatment to Inman, which included placing Inman in a C-Spine, a device designed to immobilize the spine to prevent paralysis.

While Captain Manly provided Inman with treatment, Sergeant Galin Hester of the Washington State Patrol contacted Vanderhoof, who complained of pelvic pain. Sergeant Hester spoke with Inman and smelled intoxicants on him.

Later, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Przygocki arrived on the scene and observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage.  He contacted Inman in the ambulance and, smelling alcohol, asked whether Inman had been drinking and driving. Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

Deputy Przygocki believed he had probable cause to believe Inman was driving under the influence. Helicopters came to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest trauma center. Deputy Przygocki knew that preparation of a search warrant affidavit takes 30-45 minutes. There was no reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area. Deputy Przygocki conducted a warrantless blood draw after reading a special evidence warning to Inman informing him that he was under arrest and that a blood sample was being seized to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood.

There is a process by which a search warrant for a blood draw may be obtained
telephonically and executed by an officer at the hospital to which Inman was being transported. However, this process is problematic and, in the experience of Officer Hester, had never worked in the past.

TRIAL COURT PROCEDURES

Inman was charged with vehicular assault while under the influence and filed a motion to
suppress evidence of the warrantless blood draw. He argued that the implied consent statute authorized a warrantless blood draw but that the implied consent statute was not constitutional, so there was no valid authority for the blood draw. He also argued that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify a warrantless blood draw in this case.

In response, the State argued that Inman’s blood was lawfully drawn pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

The trial court heard testimony from six witnesses, who testified consistently with the
factual findings summarized above. The trial court orally ruled that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw and later entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Inman filed a reconsideration motion. He argued that there was no probable cause for DUI. He also argued that, even assuming that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw, a warrant was needed to test the blood. The State disagreed.

The trial court denied Inman’s reconsideration motion. The trial court concluded that Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. In addition, the trial court concluded that the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the trial court concluded that because the blood was lawfully seized under exigent circumstances, no warrant was required to test the blood. After a stipulated facts trial, the trial court found Inman guilty of vehicular assault. Inman appealed.

COURT’S CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

  1. The Arrest Was Supported by Probable Cause.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an arrest is lawful only when supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer, at the time of the arrest, has knowledge of facts sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that an offense has been committed. Whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Here, Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. When Deputy Przygocki arrived on the scene, he observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage and, after running the license plates, knew the vehicle belonged to Inman. Deputy Przygocki learned from Sergeant Hester that Inman was in the ambulance and smelled of alcohol. Deputy Przygocki then contacted Inman in the ambulance, and Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

“Based on these facts, Deputy Przygocki knew that Inman was driving the motorcycle after drinking alcohol when he crashed. This knowledge is sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that Inman was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol,” said the Court of Appeals.

2. Exigent Circumstances Supported a Warrantless Blood Draw.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a warrantless search is impermissible under both article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless an exception to the warrant requirement authorizes the search. Drawing a person’s blood for alcohol testing is a search triggering these constitutional protections. A warrantless search is allowed if exigent circumstances exist.  The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is not practical because the delay would permit the destruction of evidence.

“The natural dissipation of an intoxicating substance in a suspect’s blood may be a factor in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless blood search, but courts determine exigency under the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.”

The Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances, obtaining a warrant was not practical. Inman and Vanderhoof were both injured from a motorcycle accident that resulted in significant front-end damage to the motorcycle, which was found in a ditch. Both Inman and Vanderhoof received emergency medical services, and Inman was receiving treatment for possible spine injuries. At the time of the blood draw, helicopters were coming to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest hospital. It would have taken at least 45 minutes to prepare and obtain judicial approval for a search warrant. Deputy Przygocki lacked reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area, so obtaining a telephonic warrant may have been a challenge.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Inman’s suppression motion. First, there was probable cause to arrest Inman for DUI. Second, exigent circumstances existed to authorize a warrantless blood draw. Third, the implied consent statute does not bar a warrantless search under exigent circumstances. Finally, a legal blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception allows testing of the blood without a warrant when there is probable cause to arrest for DUI.

My opinion? Exigent circumstances are one of many arguments that the government uses to get around search warrant requirements. Contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving DUI, blood draws, or exigent circumstances which arguably circumvent the need for officers to obtain search warrants. In difficult cases like the one described above, competent legal counsel is definitely needed to protect constitutional rights against unlawful search and seizure.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Fear The Silver Platter - BL Clifton

In State v. Martinez, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s computer hard drive which Texas police seized in Texas pursuant to a search warrant was lawfully searched by the Washington State Patrol without a Washington search warrant under the silver platter doctrine.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Carlos Martinez began working at the Monroe Police Department in 1989. He worked in several capacities, including as a Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program instructor. While working as a D.A.R.E. instructor, Martinez met A.K., who was in fifth grade at the time.

Beginning in 2001 or 2002, when A.K. was 13 or 14 years old, she began baby-sitting Martinez’s two young children.  A.K. also came to the Martinezes’ house when she was not baby-sitting. She would sometimes show up unannounced. She would help Martinez with chores and do her schoolwork at the house. At the time, Martinez was married to his then-wife Julie West.

Apparently, Martinez began touching A.K. in a sexual manner when she was 14. He also set up a video camera in the bathroom and digitally recorded her when she used the facilities.

Ms. West went on vacation. During that time, A.K. stayed at the family home. When Ms. West returned from vacation, she discovered a love note from A.K. to Martinez. She also discovered a video recording that Martinez had made of A.K. getting out of the shower and stored on the family computer. West confronted Martinez about the recording. He said he wanted to see if A.K. had cut herself on the kitchen knife as she had claimed. West claimed that when she asked Martinez why he still had the recording on the computer, he responded that it was “nice to look at.”

Not long after this, A.K. and her family moved from Monroe to Eastern Washington. Martinez and A.K. kept in touch. Martinez claims that in February 2007 they began a consensual sexual relationship when A.K. was 18 years old. In fall 2009, the Army recalled Martinez to active duty and stationed him in San Antonio, Texas. A.K. moved to Texas to be with him. They lived together for a short time.

After their relationship deteriorated in October or November 2011, Martinez gave A.K. the video recordings that he made of her in his bathroom in 2004. A.K. testified that Martinez told her he wanted to watch the tapes one last time and masturbate to them. She claimed he asked her to touch him as well. A short time later, A.K. contacted the Texas police to turn over the tapes. She also told the Texas police that she began an intimate relationship with Martinez some time before she was 16. Later, she contacted WSP.

The Texas police obtained a warrant to search Martinez’s home and seize his laptop computer and digital media storage devices. Then, a grand jury was convened in Texas to consider a possession of child pornography charge. But the grand jury refused to indict, returning a “no bill.” The case was dismissed. Texas police made a mirror image of Martinez’s computer hard drive and, at WSP’s request, sent it to WSP. Without obtaining a separate warrant, WSP searched this mirror image hard drive. Texas police also sent WSP two actual laptop computers and hard drives seized from Martinez. After obtaining a warrant, WSP searched those items.

The State initially charged Martinez with two counts of voyeurism, two counts of child molestation, one count of rape of a child in the third degree, and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Later, the State dismissed the molestation and rape charges. It tried Martinez on only one count of voyeurism and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The jury found Martinez guilty on both counts. Because the voyeurism charge occurred outside the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed that count and convicted him on only the possession count.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeals accepted review on the issues of (1) whether the warrantless search of Martinez’s computer hard drive was lawful when Texas police – and not WA law enforcement – searched the computer, and (2) whether spousal privilege applies to suppress the testimony of his ex-wife at trial.

SHORT ANSWER

The Court of Appeals held that (1) the silver platter doctrine allowed the Washington State Patrol to later examine the hard drive without a warrant, and (2) because Martinez acted
as a guardian to the victim, the spousal privilege does not apply here.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  If a government action intrudes upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of a person’s privacy rights than does the Fourth Amendment. Article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Under the Silver Platter Doctrine, however, evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the manner the evidence was obtained would violate Washington law. Evidence is admissible under this doctrine when (1) the foreign jurisdiction lawfully obtained evidence and (2) the forum state’s officers did not act as agents or cooperate or assist the foreign jurisdiction.

“Martinez does not dispute that Texas lawfully obtained the hard drive,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. “And he does not challenge the trial court’s findings that Washington State Patrol (WSP) had no involvement in obtaining or serving the Texas warrant and that Texas police did not act as agents of WSP when they obtained or served the warrant.” Thus, under the silver platter doctrine, the evidence was admissible.

Next, the Court of Appeals rejected Martinez’ arguments that the silver platter doctrine does not apply here because the Texas officers did not conduct any search that would be unlawful in Washington. “The doctrine requires that the State show only two things: (1) the search was lawful in Texas and (2) the Washington officers did not act as agents for Texas or cooperate or assist Texas in any way,” said the Court. “Because the State proved this, the doctrine applies.”

Search Warrant

Next, Martinez argued that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad. In response, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Furthermore, the search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.

“When a search warrant authorizes a search for materials protected by the First Amendment, a greater degree of particularity is required, and we employ a more stringent test,” said the Court. “While the First Amendment presumptively protects obscene books and films, it does not protect child pornography involving actual minors.” Also, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that the warrant was invalid for other reasons as well.

Spousal Privilege

The Court of Appeals addressed Martinez’ arguments that the trial court mistakenly admitted the testimony of his ex-wife regarding a conversation she shared with Mr. Martinez’ video of A.K. as being “nice to look at.” The Court reasoned that generally, a current or former spouse cannot be examined about confidential communications made during the marriage without the consent of the other spouse. It also explained that the marital privilege rule tries to encourage the free interchange of confidences between husband and wife that are necessary for mutual understanding and trust. “But in some situations the policies that underlie the right to invoke a testimonial privilege are outweighed by the suppression of truth that may result,” said the Court. “Thus, this spousal privilege does not apply in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed against a child for whom the spouse is a parent or guardian.”

The Court reasoned that here, West merely repeated statements by Martinez and did not comment about her belief in Martinez’s guilt. “We agree that these facts are sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martinez kept the recording for the purpose of sexual stimulation and that West’s testimony that Martinez said the recording was ‘nice to look at’ could not have materially affected the outcome of the trial,” said the Court.

Finally, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that there was prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. “The Prosecutor’s general references were unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict in light of the other incriminating evidence,” said the Court. Furthermore, Martinez does not show that his counsel’s failure to object to the Prosecutor’s case presentation was unreasonable and/or was not strategic.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Martinez’ conviction and sentence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Prosecutors Use Body Camera Evidence

Image result for police body camera evidence

Interesting feature from  a correspondent for NPR who covers law enforcement and privacy issues. In this feature, he discusses how police body cameras are becoming key tools for prosecutors.

This year, police body cameras made the transition from experimental tech to standard equipment. Sales exploded after the 2014 Ferguson protests as police departments scrambled to refute claims of abuse. Now the cameras have become routine, but they’re not making a significant dent in the number of people shot and killed by police.

In this feauture from Weekend Edition Sunday, Kaste described how body cameras have become a standard piece of equipment for the criminal justice system.

“Prosecutors now use them far more often than – for police accountability, prosecutors are using it to make cases against defendants, against members of the public who are charged with crimes,” said Kaste. He also described how a survey last year conducted by George Mason University showed that prosecutors were far more likely to have used video to prosecute a member of the public than to use the video to prosecute a police officer.

“What we have really is technology that quickly became sort of required for prosecution in general,” said Mr. Kaste. “Juries now expect it, and the police in the field kind of feel the pressure to get video of themselves finding evidence.”

Kaste answered questions on whether citizens can use body camera video to support their own claims of police abuse.

“There’s no national standard on that, and that’s becoming more and more of a bone of contention,” he said. “In a lot of places, it’s considered a public record and you can request it. But a lot of cases, you don’t get to see the video because the case is under investigation, and that kind of puts it in limbo. Or, in places like California, Police departments have cited officer privacy. They kind of almost view it as a personnel record or something, and it takes a lot to get the video out,” said Mr. Kaste.

” . . . it’s gotten to the point where at least one academic I talked to this year said we should rethink the whole system and start giving the video to a third party to control, not to the police department.”

My opinion? Ultimately body-worn cameras (BWC’s) are a good thing. They provide non-objective evidence of what really happened instead of forcing us to rely on people’s stories. However, I agree with Mr. Kaste in his argument that obtaining the video is oftentimes difficult. It makes no sense that BWC evidence is released by the very same police departments that it’s made to scrutinize. This is the fox guarding the hen house. Consequently, attorneys must be incredibly careful, diligent and consistent on arguing public disclosure requests and motions to obtain pretrial discovery of this evidence.

Contact my office if you, a friend or family member faces criminal charges involving BWC evidence. Although it might work in a defendant’s favor, the evidence can be suppressed if it’s unfairly prejudicial against defendants under the rules of evidence.

 

Domestic Violence & Cell Phone Privacy

Image result for washington privacy act

In State v. Smith, the WA Supreme Court held that the accidental recording of a domestic violence confrontation between the defendant and his wife was admissible at trial and did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Washington Privacy Act.

BACKGROUND FACTS

John Garrett Smith and Sheryl Smith were married in 2011. On the evening of June 2, 2013, the Smiths engaged in an argument at their home that turned violent. During the incident, Mr. Smith used the home’s landline cordless phone to dial his cell phone in an attempt to locate the cell phone. The cell phone’s voice mail system recorded the incident because Mr. Smith left the landline open during his attempt to find his cell phone. This voice mail contained sounds of a woman screaming, a male claiming the woman brought the assault on herself, more screams from the female and name calling by the male.

Mr. Smith punched and strangled Mrs. Smith to the point of unconsciousness and then left their home. When Mrs. Smith regained consciousness, her eyes were black and swollen shut, her face was swollen and bleeding, and she had difficulty breathing.’ Mrs. Smith was hospitalized for several days due to the severity of her injuries, which included a facial fracture and a concussion. For months after the assault, she suffered severe head pain, double vision, nausea, and vertigo.

The State charged Mr. Smith with attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and second degree assault for the incident.

The Motion to Suppress & Trial

Prior to trial, Mr. Smith filed a motion to suppress the audio recording found on his cell phone that captured part of the incident, including him threatening to kill his wife. Mr. Smith argued that Ms. Williams had unlawfully intercepted the recording pursuant to the Washington Privacy Act, when she listened to the voice message left on his phone. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that Ms. Williams’s conduct did not constitute an interception. The court also ruled that Washington’s Privacy Act, which prohibits the recording of private conversations without consent, did not apply because the information was accidentally recorded.

The case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Mr. Smith guilty of attempted second degree murder, second degree assault, and the related special allegations of domestic violence, but acquitted him of the remaining counts and the aggravator. Mr. Smith was sentenced to a standard range sentence of 144 months.

The Appeal

He appealed, and his appellate argument focused on the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Smith continued to assert that the recording was unlawfully admitted because Ms. Williams had unlawfully intercepted it.

The Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Smith’s conviction for attempted second degree murder, holding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the recording of the incident because (1) the recording was of a “private conversation” and (2) Mr. Smith had unlawfully recorded the “private conversation,” despite the fact that the recording was made inadvertently. The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Smith’s assertion that Ms. Williams had unlawfully intercepted the conversation, and decided the case on a different issue, that is, whether Mr. Smith’s actions violated the privacy act. The State sought review on the issue of how the privacy act is to be properly applied in this case.

ISSUE

Whether the voice mail recording is admissible in Mr. Smith’s criminal prosecution.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court  reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstated Mr. Smith’s attempted second degree murder conviction.

The Court reasoned that accidental, inadvertent recording on a cell phone voice mail of a domestic violence assault did not contain a “conversation” within the meaning of the privacy act, where the recorded verbal exchange consisted mostly of sounds of a woman screaming, a male claiming the woman brought the assault on herself, more screams from the female, name calling by the male, and the man stating he will kill the woman when she told him to get away. Furthermore, the owner of the cell phone was deemed to have consented to the voice mail recording due to his familiarity with that function.

The lead opinion was authored by Justice Madsen and signed by Justices Wiggins, Johnson and Owens. Justice González concurred in the result on the grounds that the defendant cannot invade his own privacy and cannot object about a recording he made being used against himself. Justice Gordon McCloud authored a separate concurring opinion, which was signed by Justices Stephens, Yu, and Fairhurst, in which she stated that the verbal exchange on the recording constitutes a “private” conversation which was solely admissible pursuant to statute.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Poll: 6 In 10 Black Americans Say Police Unfairly Stopped Them Or A Relative

Image result for black motorist stopped by police

News article by Joe Neel  of NPR says that a new poll out this week finds that 60 percent of black Americans say they or a family member have been stopped or treated unfairly by police because they are black. In addition, 45 percent say they or a family member have been treated unfairly by the courts because they are black. The poll is a collaboration between NPR, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.

The poll reveals the consequences of these stops for black Americans personally and across society — 31 percent of poll respondents say that fear of discrimination has led them to avoid calling the police when in need. And 61 percent say that where they live, police are more likely to use unnecessary force on a person who is black than on a white person in the same situation.

Previous polls have asked similar questions, but ours is unique in that it’s the first to ask about lifetime experiences with policing. It’s part of NPR’s ongoing series “You, Me and Them: Experiencing Discrimination in America.”

Pew Research poll in 2016 asked whether people had been unfairly stopped by police because of race or ethnicity in the previous 12 months and found that 18 percent of black people said yes. A 2015 CBS News/New York Times poll asked whether this had ever happened and found 41 percent of black people said yes.

Neel reports that the NPR poll differs from Pew in that NPR asked not only about a much longer period but also whether people had been unfairly stopped or treated because of their race or ethnicity. Also the NPR poll differ from CBS in that NPR included the word “unfairly.” Finally, the NPR poll differs from both the Pew and CBS polls because NPR asked whether a person or a family member had had this experience, which gives a better sense of the presence of these experiences in respondents’ life and surroundings.

Neel also reports that the black American data from our poll, released Tuesday, were compiled from 802 black Americans as part of a large national representative probability survey of 3,453 adults from Jan. 26 to April 9. The margin of error for the full black American sample is plus or minus 4.1 percentage points.

It is imperative to contact a competent attorney if you, a friend or family member were pulled over, searched and/or seized by police under suspicious circumstances.

Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Excessive Tasing

Image result for police tasing

In Jones v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that any reasonable officer would have known that continuous, repeated, and simultaneous tasings could only be justified by an immediate or significant risk of serious injury or death to officers or the public. However, such force generally cannot be used on a prone suspect who exhibits no resistance, carries no weapon, is surrounded by sufficient officers to restrain him and is not suspected of a violent crime.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In the early morning of December 11, 2010, Officer Mark Hatten of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department pulled over Anthony Jones for a routine traffic stop. Hatten ordered Jones out of the car so he could pat him down for weapons. Jones obeyed at first but then started to turn toward Hatten. Scared of the much larger Jones, Hatten drew his firearm, pointed it at Jones and ordered him to turn back around. Instead, Jones sprinted away.

Hatten called for backup and pursued Jones. Hatten didn’t believe deadly force was necessary because Jones hadn’t threatened him and didn’t appear to have a weapon.

As he waited for other officers to arrive, Hatten used his taser to subdue Jones. Hatten fired his taser twice, causing Jones’s body to “lock up” and fall to the ground face down with his hands underneath him. Hatten proceeded to kneel on Jones’s back in an attempt to handcuff Jones, keeping his taser pressed to Jones’s thigh and repeatedly pulling the trigger.

Hatten continued to tase Jones even after backup arrived. Backup consisted of four officers: Richard Fonbuena on Hatten’s right side, who helped handcuff Jones; Steven Skenandore, who controlled Jones’s legs and feet; Timothy English at Jones’s head, who applied a taser to Jones’s upper back; and Michael Johnson, who arrived last and ordered the tasing to stop. Johnson wanted his officers to “back off on the tasers so that Jones’s muscles would relax.” According to Johnson, Jones “didn’t look like he was physically resisting” and there were “enough officers” to take Jones into custody.

In all, Jones was subjected to taser shocks for over ninety seconds: Hatten tased Jones essentially nonstop that whole time—with some applications lasting as long as nineteen seconds—and, for ten of those seconds, English simultaneously applied his taser.

Once the officers stopped tasing Jones, his body went limp. They sat him up but Jones was nonresponsive and twitching; his eyes were glazed over and rolled back into his head. The officers tried and failed to resuscitate him. Jones was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. The coroner’s report concluded that “police restraining procedures”—including the tasings—contributed to Jones’s death.

Jones’s parents sued the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and all of the officers involved in restraining Jones. They alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations as well as various state law torts. However, the lower district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The plaintiff’s appealed.

LEGAL ISSUE

Whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they’re alleged to have caused the death of a suspect by using tasers repeatedly and simultaneously for an extended period.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

As a preliminary matter, the Court of Appeals held that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, the lower district court abused its discretion by failing to give plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to substitute the proper party and thus cure the defective complaint.

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the officers were reasonable in the degree of force they deployed. They held that the officers’ repeated and simultaneous use of tasers for over ninety seconds was unreasonable and that a jury could reasonably conclude that the officers knew or should have known that these actions created a substantial risk of serious injury or death:

” . . . any reasonable officer would have known that continuous, repeated, and simultaneous tasings could only be justified by an immediate or significant risk of serious injury or death to officers or the public.”

The Court also reasoned that that such force generally cannot be used on a prone suspect who exhibits no resistance, carries no weapon, is surrounded by sufficient officers to restrain him and is not suspected of a violent crime. Furthermore, it reasoned that given that there was clearly established Fourth Amendment law and a jury could reasonably conclude that the officers used excessive force, the question of qualified immunity must proceed to trial.

Furthermore, the Court held that the plaintiff’s state law battery and negligence claims were triable, and should not have been dismissed by the lower district court. It said that while there was no evidence that any of the officers acted out of hostility or improper motive, there was a factual dispute as to whether the repeated and simultaneous tasings were so excessive under the circumstances that they amounted to willful or deliberate disregard of Jones’s rights. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded plaintiffs’ battery and negligence claims.

In a twist, however, The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower district court’s dismissal of the
Fourteenth Amendment claim. It said that even assuming all the facts Plaintiffs alleged, there was no evidence that the officers acted with a purpose of harming Jones that was unconnected to a legitimate law enforcement objective.

In another twist, the Court of Appeals held that the Plaintiffs’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims failed because there was no evidence that the decision to arrest Jones lacked justification, let alone that it was made in bad faith. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the dismissal of that claim.

My opinion? A well-reasoned, good decision. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of some of the Plaintiffs’ claims due to lack of evidence, the Court was ultimately convinced that the officers’ repeated and simultaneous use of tasers for over ninety seconds was unreasonable. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Who Is The Toxicologist?

Image result for toxicologist testimony

In the deeply divided 5-4 court decision State v. Salgado-Mendoza, the WA Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) even though the defendant was not informed which State toxicologist would testify.

I originally discussed this case in my blog titled, “Prosecutors Must Reveal Toxicologist Identities in DUI Trials.” At that time, the WA Court of Appeals Division II reversed the defendant’s DUI conviction because the Prosecutor failed to give Defense Counsel the name of their Toxicologist expert witness before trial.

On appeal, however, the WA Supreme Court decided differently. It overturned the Court of Appeals and said the trial court, in fact, was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On the evening of August 11, 2012, a Washington State Patrol trooper stopped and arrested Mr. Salgado-Mendoza for DUI. His BAC test showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.103 and 0.104; which is over the .o8 limit.

Before trial, the State initially disclosed the names of nine toxicologists from the Washington State Patrol toxicology laboratory, indicating its intent to call “one of the following.” It whittled the list to three names the day before trial, but did not specify which toxicologist it would call until the morning of trial, noting that it provided the witness’s name “as soon as we had it and that’s all that we can do in terms of disclosure.”

Mendoza moved to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) based on
late disclosure, asking the court to “send a message to the state patrol crime lab and
say this isn’t okay anymore.” The trial court refused, finding no actual prejudice to the defense and observing that the practice of disclosing a list of available toxicologists rather than a specific witness was driven more by underfunding of the crime labs than by mismanagement.

Salgado-Mendoza appealed to the superior court, which found the district
court had abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the
delayed disclosure violated the discovery rules and caused prejudice. Again, however, the WA Court of Appeals disagreed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court reasoned that while the State’s disclosure practice amounted to mismanagement within the meaning of CrRLJ 8.3(b), Salgado-Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression.

The majority Court explained that under CrRLJ 8.3(b), the party seeking relief bears the burden of showing both misconduct and actual prejudice.

“In this case, Salgado-Mendoza can demonstrate misconduct within the meaning of the rule, but not actual prejudice. He can prove misconduct because a discovery violation need not be willful—simple mismanagement will suffice. Here, the State’s failure to at least narrow the list of possible toxicology witnesses pretrial reflects mismanagement,” said the Court. “However, Salgado-Mendoza cannot show prejudice that wan’ants complete suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court held that Mr. Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony. “Because there was no abuse of discretion, we reverse the Court of Appeals.”

THE DISSENT

Justice Madsen authored the dissenting opinion. She was joined by Justices Yu, Gordon McCloud and Johnson.

In short, the dissenting judges disagreed with the majority because they believed the defendant was prejudiced by this delayed disclosure of the possible toxicologists who would testify. They reasoned that forcing a defendant to bear the burden of preparing to cross-examine a long list of witnesses when the State only intends to call one is not how our system of justice operates.

“The State cannot cite funding deficiencies and simply shift its burden of prosecution onto defense counsel,” wrote Judge Madsen. “If the State wishes to pursue prosecution, it must allocate sufficient resources to its departments so that they may operate in a way that is consistent with a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

“By under-staffing the State’s toxicology laboratory so that they cannot confirm who will testify until the day of trial, the State is not meeting this burden and defendants are being forced to compensate for the deficiency. Therefore, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Salgado-Mendoza’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.”

My opinion? I agree with the dissenting opinion. Under the Sixth Amendment and the WA Constitution, The State bears the burden of proving their charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the State must follow discovery rules under CrR 4.7. One of the State’s discovery obligations is to name their witnesses who they call to testify. Period. Collateral issues revolving around the State’s under-staffing and a lack of funding should not excuse violating a defendant’s Constitutional rights.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Don’t Search My Tent!

Image result for police search tent homeless

In State v. Pippin, the WA Court of Appeals held that a person has a constitutional privacy interest in a tent that is unlawfully erected on public property.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Pippin was a homeless man, living in a tent-like structure on public land in Vancouver. As part of an attempt to notify individuals of a new camping ordinance which prohibits camping on public land without permission, police officers approached Pippin’s tent and requested that he come out. Because Pippin did not come out after an uncertain amount of time and because of noises they heard in the tent, the officers felt they were in danger. One officer lifted a flap of Pippin’s tent to look inside. In the tent, the officers observed a bag of methamphetamine. Pippin was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

He moved to suppress the evidence derived from the officer basically lifting the flap and looking into the tent, arguing that it was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The Court granted his motion and dismissed  the charge.

The State appealed on arguments that (1) the trial court erred in determining that Pippin had a privacy interest in his tent under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, and (2) if Pippin’s tent is entitled to constitutional privacy protection, the trial court erred in concluding that the officers’ act of opening and looking into the tent was not justified as a protective sweep or through exigent circumstances based on officer safety.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeals held that Pippin’s tent and its contents were entitled to constitutional privacy protection under article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution.

The Court reasoned that Article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution mandates that “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” It then analyzed different cases under the WA Supreme Court. In short, prior opinions have held that the State unreasonably intruded into a person’s private affairs when it obtained long distance telephone toll records through a pen register, examined the contents of a defendant’s trash placed on the curb for pickup, randomly checked hotel registries to determine who were guests at a hotel, attached a global positioning system tracking device to a defendant’s vehicle, and read through text messages on a cell phone.

The Court’s analysis focused on (1) the historical protections afforded to the privacy interest, (2) the nature of information potentially revealed from the intrusion, and (3) the implications of recognizing or not recognizing the asserted privacy interest.

“Pippin’s tent allowed him one of the most fundamental activities which most individuals enjoy in private—sleeping under the comfort of a roof and enclosure. The tent also gave him a modicum of separation and refuge from the eyes of the world: a shred of space to exercise autonomy over the personal. These artifacts of the personal could be the same as with any of us, whether in physical or electronic form: reading material, personal letters, signs of political or religious belief, photographs, sexual material, and hints of hopes, fears, and desire. These speak to one’s most personal and intimate matters.”

The Court further reasoned that the temporary nature of Pippin’s tent does not undermine any privacy interest, nor does the flimsy and vulnerable nature of an improvised structure leave it less worthy of privacy protections. “For the homeless, those may often be the only refuge for the private in the world as it is,” said the Court.

Under the case law above, Pippin’s tent was the sort of closed-off space that typically shelters the intimate and discrete details of personal life protected by article I, section 7.

The court concluded by saying that all three examined factors—the historical protections, the intimate details revealed from a search, and the implications of recognizing the interest—weigh in favor of finding that Pippin’s tent functioned as part of his private affairs worthy of protection from unreasonable intrusions.

“Accordingly, we hold that Pippin’s tent and its contents fell among those “privacy interests which citizens of this state . . . should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant. As such, Pippin’s tent and contents are protected under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.”

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court held that because the State failed to show that an arrest was taking place, the protective sweep exception does not apply.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The homeless have rights, too. Just because one lives in a tent without a front door to knock on, doesn’t mean that police can intrude on one’s public affairs. There was no “exigent circumstance” or “officer safety issue” justifying the intrusion. Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

‘Sanctuary’ Cities Targeted by ICE in Immigration Raids

Image result for ice raids sanctuary cities

Erik Ortiz reported that a federal operation to arrest undocumented immigrants netted nearly 500 people in cities and states that have openly opposed the Trump administration’s deportation initiatives.

According to Ortiz, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials said last Thursday that its four-day “Operation Safe City” targeted people in residing in the so-called “Sanctuary Cities” of New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Denver, Washington and Baltimore as well as Cook County, Illinois; Santa Clara County in California’s Bay Area; Portland, Oregon; and Massachusetts.

Officials in those places — some referring to themselves as “sanctuary  communities” — have been vocal about not fully cooperating with federal immigration authorities, at times clashing with state leaders who support President Donald Trump’s agenda. Sanctuary communities have passed ordinances limiting compliance with federal immigration laws and seek to shield undocumented immigrants who may be deported simply over their immigration statuses or low-level criminal offenses.

“Sanctuary jurisdictions that do not honor detainers or allow us access to jails and prisons are shielding criminal aliens from immigration enforcement and creating a magnet for illegal immigration,” Tom Homan, ICE’s acting director, said in a statement. “As a result, ICE is forced to dedicate more resources to conduct at-large arrests in these communities.”

It is not unusual for ICE to round up immigrants by the hundreds or even low thousands, although the latest raid comes on the heels of a planned operation that would have targeted about 8,400 undocumented immigrants this month.

But the Department of Homeland Security scrapped the operation after the agency said it was halting nationwide enforcement actions in the wake of hurricanes Irma and Harvey. This latest effort indicates the administration is ready to renew its efforts.

“ICE’s goal is to build cooperative, respectful relationships with our law enforcement partners to help prevent dangerous criminal aliens from being released back onto the streets,” Homan said.

According to ICE, of the 498 people arrested this week, 317 had criminal convictions. Some were also categorized as “immigration fugitives,” “previously deported criminal aliens,” and/or associated with a gang.

Most of the criminal convictions were for driving under the influence as well as assault- and drug-related offenses, ICE said. Others were arrested for marijuana possession, traffic offenses and even charges of being a “peeping tom.”

City officials declared Portland a sanctuary city in March, and its mayor, Ted Wheeler, has criticized the Trump administration’s push to end the Obama-era program that has allowed undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children to remain in the country.

The administration, meanwhile, has faced setbacks as it seeks to overhaul immigration — an issue that has failed repeatedly to gain traction in Congress. Weeks ago, a U.S. district judge in northern Illinois gave sanctuary cities a temporary victory, saying the Justice Department can’t withhold public safety grants to Chicago because officials there don’t want to impose certain immigration policies.

My opinion? As a criminal defense attorney, my role is to protect people’s Constitutional Rights under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I have a natural inclination to prevent warrantless, unlawful searches and seizures.

That said, I understand if the government declares a state of emergency holding that exigent circumstances warrants the immediate seizure and deportation of undocumented immigrants.

However, there’s lots of controversy surrounding the subject of ICE raids on Sanctuary Cities. Some civil rights advocates say the raids fit with the Trump administration’s pattern of scapegoating, criminalizing, and demonizing immigrants. Also, courts have said that holding someone without a warrant could violate their constitutional rights, putting jailers at risk of lawsuits. Finally, others have accused Trump’s attack on sanctuary cities as a malignant executive power grab that subverts the Spending Clause and tramples the 10th Amendment.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Visions of Freedom

Photoville: "Photo Requests from Solitary" captures the dream life of  prisoners in isolation — Quartz

In her article titled Visions of Freedom, author Hanna Kozlowska discusses  a New York art exhibit where artists capture the artistic requests of inmates held in solitary confinement.

The project “Photo Requests from Solitary” offers inmates held in solitary confinement a chance to ask for any image that they want, and to get their request fulfilled by professional photographers, artists. The inmates’ ideas range from the mundane to the elaborate—from a simple photo of a frog in its natural habitat, to an imaginary scene where a black man dramatically unshackles.

According to Kozlowska, the exhibition opened Sept. 13 as part of Photoville, a photography festival in New York’s Brooklyn Bridge Park. Viewers see the requests and the photos alike. It’s meant to raise awareness about solitary confinement, as a movement to abolish isolation in New York prisons is gaining ground. Meanwhile, the photos, sent to inmates in their cells, provide them some form of relief in conditions of extreme sensory deprivation and isolation proven to be psychologically damaging.

“The idea is that human imagination can survive even this,” said Jean Casella co-director of the watchdog group Solitary Watch. “When you ask people what they want to see, there’s never any shortage of images or fantasies… Part of the message of this show is that you can’t take that away, no matter what you do.” The exhibit also shows the inmate’s detailed requests, which the organizers say are just as powerful, if not more moving to the viewer.

The project started in 2009, within a group working to shut down the notorious Tamms Correctional Center, a super-max prison in Illinois. The inmates were strictly isolated from each other and the outside world, says Laurie Jo Reynolds, an artist and activist.

When discussing a poetry exchange with inmates, someone asked if they could send the prisoners photos. But with each photo sent, the inmate would have to give up one of their own. Reynolds asked: “Why not ask them what they want?”

Tamms was shut down in 2013, and the project was expanded to other states. The Brooklyn exhibition shows requests and photos from New York.

Over the years, certain categories emerged in what the inmates wanted to see in their cells. “I think those categories are useful in thinking about the experience of being in prison,” Reynolds says.

My opinion? It’s a wonderful idea. Legally speaking, there’s strong debate that solitary confinement is “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Cruel and unusual punishment includes torture, deliberately degrading punishment, or punishment that is too severe for the crime committed.

Artistically speaking, inspiration can come from many places. Dark and lonely places; even, where people are forgotten, downtrodden, separated from families and their aspirations destroyed by their choices and terrible circumstances. What do prisoners think about when placed in solitary confinement? What does one dream and yearn for? These visions of freedom are powerful indeed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.



Alexander F. Ransom

Attorney at Law
Criminal Defense Lawyer

119 North Commercial St.
Suite #1420
Bellingham, WA 98225

117 North 1st Street
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Mount Vernon, WA 98273

Phone: (360) 746-2642
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