Category Archives: Drug Offenses

Backpack Searches When Jailed

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In State v. Dunham, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a warrantless search of a suspect’s locked backpack pocket was a lawful inventory search where the defendant was booked into jail, a search of his person produced knives, the backpack was to be logged into the jail’s temporary storage area and the officer felt knives on the outside of the backpack.

On January 29, 2014, Sergeant Gwen Carrell of the Chehalis Police Department responded to a reported shoplifting at a local department store. Upon arrival, Sgt. Carrell met with loss prevention officers. They told Sgt. Carrell that defendant Jason Dunham had multiple knives in his backpack and that they had removed the backpack from Dunham’s reach. Sgt. Carrell placed Dunham in handcuffs for officer safety and searched him for weapons. She located two more knives on Dunham’s person, arrested Dunham for theft and booked him into jail.

Sgt. Carrell searched Dunham’s backpack for items to be logged into the jail’s temporary storage. This is called an inventory search. In short, it is every police department’s policy to inventory items to be held in its storage facility for any dangerous items. As part of this policy, knives are to be kept in secure containers, preventing them from puncturing anything.

Sgt. Carrell used Dunham’s keys to unlock the backpack pocket. She opened the pocket and observed a flashlight, a butane torch, and a glass pipe. What Sgt. Carrell thought was a knife was actually the butane torch. The residue in the glass pipe tested positive for methamphetamine. The State charged Dunham with Possession of a Controlled Substance and Theft in the Third Degree.

Dunham filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during Sgt. Carrell’s search of the locked portion of his backpack pursuant to CrR 3.6, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the inventory search was valid. Later, the trial court found him guilty on both counts at a bench trial.

Dunham appealed. He argued that the warrantless search of his backpack’s locked pocket violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. He claims that the search was not a valid inventory search.

Unfortunately for Dunham the Court of Appeals disagreed. First it reasoned that  inventory searches are an exception to the requirement that police have a warrant to search people’s personal property. Second, the Court described the purpose of an Inventory Search:

“The purpose of an inventory search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to perform an administrative or caretaking function. The principal purposes of an inventory search are to (1) protect the owner’s property, (2) protect the police against false claims of theft by the owner, and (3) protect the police from potential danger. The scope of an inventory search should be limited to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose.”

Third, the Court reasoned that Officer Carrel’s safety concern about potentially exposed knives in the locked pocket was reasonable based on the facts that (1) several knives were found on Dunham’s person, (2) additional knives were found in the unlocked portion of Dunham’s backpack, (3) one of the knives found in the backpack was unsheathed, and (4) Sgt. Carrell felt what she believed to be another knife in the locked pocket of the backpack. Therefore, a manifest necessity existed for searching the locked portion of the backpack.

Finally, the Court concluded that the inventory search was valid and affirmed Dunham’s conviction:

“Substantial evidence supports the challenged finding of fact. Given the reasonable indication that the locked portion of the backpack contained dangerous items along with Sgt. Carrell’s reasonable fear of being stabbed, we hold that a manifest necessity existed to search No. 46169-2-II 8 inside the locked portion of the backpack. Therefore the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that the inventory search was valid. We affirm Dunham’s conviction.”

My opinion? Search and seizure issues are a HUGE aspect of unlawful possession cases. The legal issues come down to whether the search was lawful, and if not, whether the evidence can be suppressed. Here, the court’s decision appears sound. Under Washington law, officers may search a suspect’s person if they feel “hard and sharp” objects through the outside of a suspect’s clothing. This is done for officer safety. Similarly, Inventory Searches are conducted under the same policy of preserving officer safety. Here, the hard and sharp objects felt through Dunham’s backpack raised a safety concern. Therefore, the search appears lawful.

For more information, please review my Legal Guide titled, “Search & Seizure: Basic Issues Regarding Their Search for Weapons, Drugs, Firearms and Other Contraband.” There, I provide links to my analysis of Washington cases discussing searches of persons, vehicles, cars and homes. Also, please go the search engine of my Blog if you have specific queries about these issues.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Utah v. Strieff: High Court Upholds Unlawful Search

Attenuation Doctrine, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Evidence, Exclusionary Rule, felony, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In Utah v. Strieff, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a 5-3 vote that an illegal police stop and resulting drug arrest did not ultimately violate the Fourth Amendment because the officer later discovered the defendant had an outstanding traffic warrant.

The case began when a police officer stopped Edward Strieff on the street and ran his identification. The state of Utah concedes that this was an illegal police stop. However, when the Officer ran Strieff’s identification, it was discovered that Strieff had an outstanding traffic warrant. The officer then arrested him, searched him, and discovered drugs in his pockets. Strieff argued that the drugs should have been inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment because they are the fruits of an illegal search.

In an opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with Mr. Strieff, ruled for the State, and found there was no flagrant police misconduct:

“The evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part of his search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest.”

Furthermore, the Court also noted that although the Exclusionary Rule prohibits the admissibility of evidence which is illegally seized in violation of people’s Constitutional rights, there are several exceptions to the rule. One exception is the Attenuation Doctrine, which admits typically inadmissible evidence when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance.

The Court reasoned that the Attenuation Doctrine therefore applies here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant: “Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to his arrest.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito.

Writing in dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor blasted the majority for excusing police misconduct and undermining the Fourth Amendment:

“The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic war rants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.”

“This case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”

My opinion? I agree with Sotomayor’s dissent. Utah v. Strieff is a terrible blow to every American’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful and intrusive government searches. Period.

That aside, will Utah v. Strieff negatively impact the constitutional rights of citizens in Washington State? Probably not. We already have time-tested precedents like State v. Doughty, State v. Afana and State v. Winterstein. All of these WA Supreme Court cases – and more – are recent opinions that are factually similar to Utah v. Streiff. Fortunately, these cases have already ruled against police officers violating people’s Constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure.

As a colleague of mine said, “The rest of the country may be SOL, but Utah v. Strieff should not survive here in WA State.”

Let’s keep our fingers crossed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Refusing Field Sobriety Test is Admissible as “Consciousness of Guilt.”

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, Due Process, DUI, Evidence, Jury Trial, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Mecham, the WA Supreme Court decided that Prosecutors in DUI trials may admit evidence that a defendant is declining field sobriety tests as evidence of consciousness of guilt.

FACTS

In 2011, Officer Campbell made a traffic stop of defendant Mark Tracy Mecham. Although Mecham’s driving showed no signs of intoxication, Mecham smelled of intoxicants and had slurred speech. The officer asked Mecham to perform voluntary field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell’s observing Mecham’s eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused.

At trial, Mecham moved to suppress his refusal to perform the FSTs. Typically, trial courts grant this defense motion. In Mecham’s case, however, the trial court denied his motion and ruled that even if FSTs were a search, probable cause supported the search. Mecham’s refusal was admitted to the jury as evidence to support the Prosecutor’s theory that Mecham exhibited “Consciousness of Guilt.” The jury found Mecham guilty of DUI.

Eventually, Mecham’s case was appealed to the WA Supreme Court. He argued that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the trial court admitted evidence of his refusal to undergo FSTs.

THE DECISION

Unfortunately for Mecham, the WA Supreme Court disagreed and upheld his DUI conviction. In a deeply divided decision, the Court held that while a FST is a seizure, it is not a search either under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution or under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State may, therefore, offer evidence of a defendant’s refusal to perform FSTs. Field sobriety tests may only be administered when the initial traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer has reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence.

The lead majority opinion was authored by Justice Wiggins. Justice Fairhurst concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Fairhurst would prohibit the administration of FSTs once the defendant is already under formal arrest for an offense other then DUI. Justice Johnson dissented on the grounds that the defendant had been told by the officer who administered the FSTs that they were voluntary. Finally, Justice Gordon McCloud dissented on the grounds that FSTs are searches.

My opinion?

I agree with Justice McCloud’s dissent. Here’s a portion:

“An FST can reveal information about a person’s body and medical history that are unquestionably private in nature. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in addition to possible inebriation, FSTs can reveal a head injury, neurological disorder, brain tumors or damage, and some inner ear diseases. These conditions are not necessarily observable in the subject’s normal public behavior; they may well be revealed only by the special maneuvers the subject is directed to perform during the FST. Indeed, if an FST did not reveal information beyond what is readily observable by the general public, there would be no need to administer it in the first place. I therefore conclude that FSTs are searches under article I, section 7 of our state constitution.”

FSTs are a search. Period. Clearly, Officers who ask citizens to performs FSTs are seeking evidence of DUI. Because FSTs are a search, Mecham had a constitutional right to refuse to perform them unless (1) the officers had a warrant, or (2) an exception to the warrant requirement applied. Here, the Officer neither possessed or obtained a warrant for a blood test. Nor did the Officer even attempt to get a warrant.

Even more concerning, Prosecutors now have free reign to spin a citizen’s refusal of FSTs as “consciousness of guilt.” That’s unfair. Indeed, there’s a lot of debate in criminal law on whether FSTs accurately and/or scientifically indicate whether someone is DUI. These tests are, quite simply, balancing and memory tests administered under extremely uncomfortable and stressful conditions. These tests – which more of less reflect bad balance, lack of memory and preexisting health issues – simply do not accurately depict intoxication.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Unlawful Arrest for Failure to Pay Court Fines.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Bench Warrant, Constitutional Rights, Court Fines, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Legal Financial Obligations, Methamphetamine, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Sleater, the WA Court of Appeals Div. III held an arrest warrant may not issue for a defendant who fails to schedule an appearance in court to explain why she had failed to pay her court fines.

The Defendant Ms. Sleater had prior convictions for various Drug Offenses. As of April 2014, she was making a combined monthly payment of$75 toward three cases. She was also entered into Benton County’s “pay or appear” program. It required her to make her legal financial obligation (LFO) payments every month or appear to schedule a hearing to explain why she could not make the payments. The program agreement also stated that if the defendant did not make a payment and failed to schedule a hearing, “a warrant will be issued for the Defendant’s arrest.”

For months, Ms. Sleater’s mother paid the monthly fines. Her mother made a $150 on-line payment on April 17, 2014. Unfortunately, the computer did not apportion the sum among the three accounts, but applied all of the money to only one case number identified with the payment. AS a result, The other two counts were four and seven months behind.

On April 22, 2014 the clerk’s office obtained arrest warrants for Ms. Sleater since she had not made payments on those two cases and had not scheduled a hearing to explain the lack of payments.

On May 16, 2014 officers arrested Ms. Sleater on the two warrants. She possessed methamphetamine at the time of her arrest. Consequently, the prosecutor filed one count of possession of a controlled substance. Her attorney moved to suppress the evidence under CrR 3.6 on the claim that the warrants were wrongly issued. However, the trial court denied the motion and found Ms. Sleater guilty at trial.  She appealed.

The WA Court of Appeals held that the arrest warrants were invalidly issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures, and that seizure is reasonable if it serves a governmental interest which is adequate to justify imposing on the liberty of the individual.” However, it violates due process to punish defendants for failing to pay fines if the defendant cannot pay simply because they are impoverished.

“Nor can a state impose a fine and convert it to jail time solely because a defendant has no ability to pay the fine. The State must afford the defendant a hearing before jailing him for failing to pay his obligations. While the court can put the burden to prove inability to pay on the defendant, it still has a duty to inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay fines prior to jailing him.”

Here, the Court reasoned that the effect of the arrest warrants was to require Ms. Sleater to go to jail for failing to pay her LFOs without first conducting an inquiry into her ability to pay them:

“The facts of this case demonstrate the need for such an inquiry. Ms. Sleater’s mother did make a payment toward her daughter’s LFOs, but through some type of error the payment was not reflected in all three files. A hearing before the warrants issued would have allowed the court to resolve the problem without the necessity of an arrest.”

Here, reasoned the Court, a warrant should not have issued for defendant’s failure to pay without first determining the willfulness of that violation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed Ms Sleater’s conviction for possessing methamphetamine.

Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

AAA Questions Marijuana DUI Laws

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According to a news article from the Chicago Tribune, recent studies conducted by car insurer AAA find that blood tests given to drivers suspected of Marijuana DUI have no scientific basis.

A handful of studies released by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety found that drivers can have a low level of THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in their blood and be unsafe behind the wheel, while others with relatively high levels may not be a hazard. Below are the individual studies accompanied by capsule summaries comprising the effort:

“If you’ve had marijuana whether it’s medicinal or otherwise, don’t drive,” said AAA Chicago spokeswoman Beth Mosher, “It’s really that simple.”

The studies examined the results of more than 5,300 people nationwide who were arrested for driving under the influence of marijuana, 600 of whom tested positive for THC only, while the others had THC and other substances. This is because marijuana isn’t metabolized by the body in the same way as alcohol. The researchers compared the Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) exam results of 602 drivers that only had THC present in their blood at the time of arrest to those of 349 volunteers that took the test drug-free and sober. Ultimately, the degree to which a driver is impaired by marijuana use depends a lot on the individual, the foundation said.

The data appears confusing because AAA also looked at Washington – one of the first states to legalize marijuana – and found fatal crashes involving drivers who recently used marijuana doubled.

“ In most recent data 1 in 6 drivers who are involved in a fatal crash there had marijuana in there system,” Mosher  said.  “And as more and more states look at legalizing marijuana we see this as a concerning trend.”

Nevertheless, AAA is sending the message that the legal limits established for marijuana are arbitrary. A handful of states have moved to specify the maximum amount of active THC — the main chemical in marijuana — that drivers can have in their system. But AAA says that doesn’t work.

“We think those are meaningless,” said Mosher. “They are not backed by any science. One person can have one limit of THC in their blood and be significantly impaired and others can have that same limit and not be impaired at all,” Mosher said.

Many in law enforcement and AAA say that officer recognition of impaired drivers is really the only what to determine whether someone is too high to drive.  Of course all of this a public safety concerns as pot becomes legal across the country.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Prosecutors Must Reveal Toxicologist Identities in DUI Trials.

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In State v. Salgado-Mendoza, the WA Court of Appeals Division II reversed a defendant’s DUI conviction because the Prosecutor failed to give Defense Counsel the name of their Toxicologist expert witness before trial.

On the evening of August 11, 2012, a Washington State Patrol trooper observed Mr. Salgado-Mendoza driving his vehicle and struggling to stay in his lane of travel. The trooper stopped the vehicle. Salgado-Mendoza was investigated and arrested for DUI. His BAC test showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.103 and 0.104; which is over the .o8 limit.

Several months before his trial date on the DUI charge, Salgado-Mendoza requested that the Prosecutor disclose information about any and all expert witnesses the Prosecutor intended to call at trial. This regularly happens when defense attorneys argue motions to compel. The Prosecutor attempted to contact the toxicology lab by phone to narrow the list of possible toxicology witnesses, but was unsuccessful.

Three days before trial, Salgado-Mendoza filed a motion requesting that the court dismiss the case or exclude the toxicologist’s evidence based on governmental misconduct.

On the afternoon before trial, the State received a list of three toxicologists, one of whom might testify the next day. The State provided this list to Salgado-Mendoza.

When the parties appeared for trial on May 9, Salgado-Mendoza re-argued his motion to exclude the toxicologist’s testimony or to dismiss the DUI charge because the State had still not disclosed which toxicologist would testify. The Court denied the motion. Salgado-Mendoza was found guilty at trial.

Salgado-Mendoza appealed his conviction to the superior court. Finding that the district court had abused its discretion by (1) not excluding the toxicologist’s testimony due to the State’s violation of the discovery rules and mismanagement of the case in failing to disclose its witness prior to trial, and (2) excluding the defense expert’s testimony about the breath-alcohol testing machine, the superior court reversed the DUI conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. The State appealed to the WA Court of Appeals.

Ultimately, the WA Court of Appeals held that the Prosecutor violated the discovery rules under CrRLJ 4.7(d) by failing to take reasonable steps to obtain the name of its witness in a timely manner. It reasoned that the Prosecutor had an obligation to attempt to acquire and then disclose that information from the toxicology lab. Consequently, the Prosecutor’s failure to provide the defense with a specific witness’s name before trial is not reasonable. This, in turn, amounted to governmental misconduct under CrRLJ 8.3(b).

Furthermore, the Court held that Prosecutor’s misconduct was prejudicial and that the exclusion of the toxicologist’s testimony was the proper remedy. The Court emphasized this remedy was necessary because the issue was an issue of public importance:

“On retrial, the State should ensure that it provides the name and address of the person or persons it intends to call at trial or comply with CrRLJ 4.7(d) when preparing for the new trial.”

My opinion? Good decision. It is extremely difficult to provide a competent and adequate defense when Prosecutors do not follow the rules of discovery.

For those who don’t know, a Prosecutor must follow many procedures when trying cases. The following procedures expedite a fair trial and protect the constitutional rights of the defendant: (i) promote a fair and expeditious disposition of the charges, whether by diversion, plea, or trial; (ii) provide the defendant with sufficient information to make an informed plea; (iii) permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial; (iv) reduce interruptions and complications during trial and avoid unnecessary and repetitious trials by identifying and resolving prior to trial any procedural, collateral, or constitutional issues; (v) minimize the procedural and substantive inequities among similarly situated defendants; (vi) effect economies in time, money, judicial resources, and professional skills by minimizing paperwork, avoiding repetitious assertions of issues, and reducing the number of separate hearing; and (vii) minimize the burden upon victims and witnesses.

Here, knowing the names of the Prosecutor’s witnesses before trial is simply fair. Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Neurology of Risky Driving Behavior

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Boating Under the Influence, Cell Phone, Department of Licensing, Distracted Driving, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, Eluding, felony, Ignition Interlock Device, Implied Consent, marijuana, Miranda, misdemeanor, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Reckless Driving, Studies, Traffic Infractions, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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A very interesting article from the Association for Psychological Science discusses how a team of Canadian psychological scientists is looking at the personality, cognitive, and neurobiological factors that contribute to reckless driving behavior. By better understanding the patterns of emotional processing and risk perception shown by repeat offenders, the researchers hope to design interventions that more effectively target these subgroups of dangerous drivers.

The evidence certainly exists. According to the article, drunk driving accounts for 35-40% of all driver fatalities in Canada and the United States, and drunk driving crashes kill more than 10,000 Americans every year. Amazingly, an estimated 30% of DUI offenders will continue to drink and drive, even after being arrested and punished.

“Surprisingly, these drivers usually don’t consider themselves as risk takers,” lead author Thomas G. Brown of McGill University said. “If drivers don’t believe they are risky, they will not accept the need to change. On the other hand, if we and they don’t understand their behavior, how can they be expected to change it effectively?”

The study began when Brown and his colleagues recruited four groups of male drivers who had different criminal histories: 36 men with at least two convictions for drunk driving (DUI group); 28 reckless drivers with at least three speeding violations in the past two years (speeders); 27 men with arrests for both DUI and speeding (DWI-speeders); and 47 low-risk drivers with no history of serious traffic offenses (control group).

According to the article, participants completed a battery of personality and impulsivity assessments, ranging from a Big Five personality measure to an executive control task that assessed their sensitivity to punishment and reward. Participants’ cortisol response, a hormonal reaction to stress, was measured by collecting saliva samples before and after they completed a timed mental arithmetic task previously shown to elicit stress.

Even more interesting, participants also completed a session of simulated driving that included driving on virtual highways, merging lanes, turning at intersections, and avoiding pedestrians.

The researchers found that different subgroups of risky drivers had distinctive neurobiological profiles. Compared to the low-risk control group, speeders were prone to making decisions based on thrill-seeking and a need for high levels of stimulation. Repeat DUI offenders, in contrast, had the lowest level of risk-taking behavior while sober.

“One possibility in line with the present results is that once heavy drinking has occurred, more impulsive drivers are more vulnerable to alcohol’s disruptive effects on the behavioral control mechanisms required to avoid DWI,” the researchers explain.

All of the dangerous driving groups exhibited significant blunting in their cortisol stress response compared with the control group. Cortisol, along with other stress hormones, influences cognitive processes that range from risk assessment to encoding emotional memories. These results suggest that dysregulation of the body’s cortisol response could act as a neurobiological marker for risky driving behavior.

“Relative to the other [risky driving] profiles considered here, the profile exhibited by group DUI may be the most amenable to interventions that aim to augment recall of the negative consequences of DUI behavior and pre-emptively decouple alcohol use from driving,” the researchers conclude.

Stated differently, interventions designed to improve drivers’ recall of the negative consequences of drinking and driving are effective for preventing drunk driving. This explains the findings why repeat DUI offenders had the lowest level of risk-taking behavior while sober.

My opinion? The study is interesting, for sure. Not surprisingly, the criminal justice system uses many of these these psychological deterrents to “decouple alcohol use from driving.” When it comes to DUI cases, gaining a worthwhile reduction of the charges often means the defendant obtaining an alcohol/drug evaluation, attending mandatory treatment, attending AA meetings and attending a Victim Impact Panel. Additionally, the financial costs of DUI fines and mandatory ignition interlock devices are constant reminders to DUI offenders that future risky behavior is simply not worth it.

That said, hiring a competent DUI attorney to fight DUI charges might be a worthy endeavor. The basic legal issues surrounding a DUI arrest are (1) whether the stop was lawful, (2) whether there was enough evidence to arrest, (3) whether the officer informed the defendant of Implied Consent Warnings, and (4) whether the defendant either (a) refused the BAC breathalyzer machine or (b) blew over .08 and/or had .05 nanograms of active THC in their blood when pulled over.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pearson: DUI Blood Draw Held Unlawful

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In State v. Pearson the WA Court of Appeals Division I held that (1) exigent circumstances did not support a warrantless blood draw for marijuana, (2) it’s reversible error to discuss the .05 THC limit in a DUI case that arose prior to the passage of I-502.

Defendant Tamisha Pearson was a medicinal marijuana patient due to numerous health problems. She struck a pedestrian with her car, pulled over and called 911. Seattle Police Officers arrived. Officer Jongma was a drug recognition expert. Pearson initially denied consuming any drugs or alcohol that day. She agreed to perform field sobriety tests.

Some of Pearson’s behavior during the sobriety tests indicated she was impaired. Pearson told Officer Jongma that she is authorized to consume medicinal marijuana and that she had smoked earlier in the day. Based on that, Officer Jongma arrested Pearson for suspicion of Vehicular Assault and DUI.

Officer Jongma transported Pearson to Harborview Medical Center for a blood draw. They arrived at the hospital at approximately 5:26 pm—2 hours after the initial collision and 1 hour and 20 minutes after Officer Jongma arrived on the scene. At approximately 5:50 pm, a nurse drew Pearson’s blood without her consent and without a warrant. A toxicologist analyzed Pearson’s blood sample for cannabinoids on February 21, 2012. The analysis determined Pearson’s THC concentration was approximately 20 nanograms.

On August 18, 2012, the City of Seattle charged Pearson in Seattle Municipal Court on one count of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating drug. The court initially granted Pearson’s motion to suppress the blood evidence.

TRIAL

At trial, the City introduced testimony of forensic toxicologist Justin Knoy of the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory. Over Pearson’s objection, the City elicited testimony from Knoy that the per se legal limit of THC concentration under Washington law was 5 nanograms. At the time, however, no per se limit for THC concentration in Washington existed when the accident occurred. The jury found Pearson guilty of DUI.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Court of Appeals addressed four issues: (1) whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless extraction of Pearson’s blood, (2) whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless testing of Pearson’s blood, (3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to include Pearson’s proposed jury instruction, and (4) whether the trial court erred when it permitted Knoy to testify that the per se legal limit for THC concentration was 5 nanograms.

1.Exigent Circumstances did NOT Exist to Justify Extracting & Testing Pearson’s Blood.

First, the Court of Appeals decided the City failed to show that obtaining a warrant would have significantly delayed collecting a blood sample. It reasoned that the natural dissipation of THC in Pearson’s bloodstream alone did not constitute an exigency sufficient to bypass the warrant requirement.

2. Trial Court Mistakenly Admitted Testimony From Toxicologist.

Second, the Court of Appeals decided the trial mistakenly admitted testimony from the toxicologist regarding THC limits. At the time, evidence of the .05 legal THC limit was NOT in effect when the offense occurred and was irrelevant to the central question at trial—whether Pearson’s ability to drive was lessened in any appreciable degree by her use of marijuana. The court reasoned the evidence was highly prejudicial because the blood test showed that Pearson had a THC concentration of 20 nanograms. Consequently, evidence of the current per se legal THC limit of 5 nanograms invited the jury to retroactively apply law that was not in effect at the time of the alleged offense and conclude that the blood evidence alone was sufficient to prove guilt.

3. The Defendant’s Jury Instruction Was Properly Denied. 

At trial, the lower court denied the Defendant’s proposed jury instruction:

It is not unlawful for a person to consume a drug and drive. The law recognizes that a person may have consumed a drug and yet not be under the influence of it. It is not enough to prove merely that a driver had consumed a drug.

The Court of Appeals held that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to include Pearson’s proposed jury instruction because she was able to argue her theory of the case based on the instructions given.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction and remanded it back to the lower court.

My opinion? Good rulings; especially the one regarding the mistakenly-admitted testimony from the Toxicologist. I-502’s legal limits regarding THC was not in effect at that time. Having a witness testify to limits was, therefore, a mistake.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Proposed Law Would Require Bartenders to Cut Drunk People Off

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A news article written by S.E. Smith of www.care2.com reveals that a new bill was introduced into the California State Assembly that would require bartending personnel and managers to undergo training in how to handle alcohol and cut off intoxicated customers.

Under the Responsible Interventions for Beverage Servers Training Act of 2016 (RIBS), Assembly Bill 2121 would require bartenders to intervene when a bar customer has had too much to drink. The law, which if passed would go into effect in 2020, hopes to save lives decrease DUI, and curb drunk drivers. Bartenders would be required to complete a minimum of four training hours on subjects like recognizing intoxication and understanding the physical and social effects of alcohol. The course would also examine state laws surrounding beverage service. Every three years, participants would need to renew their certifications.

Although the California Business & Professions Code reveals that bartenders have always practiced some discretion in this area, the bill would create a more robust legal framework and provide bars with specific training requirements for staff. Furthermore, the legislation would ensure that bartenders across the state follow the same curriculum when they learn how to interact with customers.

According to S.E. Smith, one of the most frustrating parts of the job can involve making judgement calls about when someone has had too much to drink and needs to go home. Some states – including Washington State – have “cut off” laws requiring bartenders to stop serving intoxicated customers. Most have laws barring service to people who are already drunk. Individual bars also have their own policies and procedures for handling customers.

Drunk drivers are the main concern here. Intoxicated people who hurt themselves — an uninsured person who requires care for a broken limb, for instance —  may create public health nuisances and expenses. However, when intoxicated people get in cars, the decision can be fatal.

S.E. Smith emphasizes that 30 people die as a result of drunk driving every day in the United States, including sober drivers in other vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists. One third of traffic deaths can be attributed to intoxicated driving.

My opinion? Similar to Ms. Smith, this bill is a step in the right direction. Many of my DUI clients tell me they were over-served at the bars they frequented before being pulled over for DUI. It helps to have backup — like policies a bartender can apply — to remind a customer that they’re breaking the law if they kept serving.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Robison: Implied Consent & Pot DUI

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In State v. Robison,  the WA Court of Appeals Division I held that a BAC test requires suppression when the officer giving the breath to a driver suspected of marijuana DUI fails to provide that driver with Implied Consent warnings required by that statute.

On June 29, 2013, Washington State Patrol Trooper B.S. Hyatt stopped Darren J. Robison for traffic violations. Trooper Hyatt smelled intoxicants and marijuana. Trooper Hyatt asked how long it had been since Robison had smoked marijuana. Robison responded that it had been a couple of hours. Trooper Hyatt arrested Robison. At the Tulalip Police Department, officers read Robison an “Implied Consent Warning for Breath” form, which Robison stated he understood and signed.

The form included warnings only about alcohol and did not include any marijuana-related warnings. The two breath tests given Robison both produced results over the legal limit. The State charged Robison with DUI. Robison asked the district court to suppress evidence based on an illegal stop and to suppress the breath test because Robison did not receive all required implied consent warnings.

The district court denied the motion. It concluded that Trooper Hyatt had probable cause to stop Robison. The district court also took judicial notice that the breath test used cannot detect THC, and that its purpose was to determine the alcohol concentration in Robison’s breath. The district court decided that the implied consent warnings given accurately informed Robison of the consequences of the breath tests, which “were all the warnings that were legally required on the date of violation given the decision facing the defendant.” The district court found Robison guilty but stayed his sentence pending his appeal. Robison appealed to the superior court.

The superior court reversed the district court. It found that the marijuana-related warnings were a significant part of the required implied consent warnings and the failure to give these warnings under the circumstances made the warnings given incomplete and misleading. The superior court suppressed the test results and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its decision.

Ultimately, the WA Court of Appeals granted the State’s request for discretionary review of the superior court’s decision.

First, the Court of Appeals gave background on how police officers apply Washington’s Implied Consent Laws in DUI investigations. Before giving a breath test to a person reasonably believed to be driving under the influence, an officer must provide that person with certain warnings required by statute. Specifically, an officer must inform the driver of his right to refuse the test or to have additional tests done.

The Court reasoned that the officer’s warning must also state that refusal to take the test will result in license revocation, that the refusal may be used at a criminal trial, and that the driver may be eligible for an ignition interlock license. Pertinent to this case, the officer must also warn about the consequences of certain test results. This warning has changed several times in recent years.

The court further explained that in 2012, Washington voters enacted Initiative 502, which legalized some uses of marijuana. This initiative also amended Washington’s Implied Consent laws by adding a warning about marijuana test results.

In this case, Trooper Hyatt warned Robison about the consequences of test results showing an alcohol concentration in his breath. However, Trooper Hyatt failed to warn Robison of the consequences of test results showing a prohibited level of THC concentration in his blood. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the BAC test was properly suppressed because of this omission.

Additionally, the Court rejected the State’s argument that (1) an arresting officer has discretion to edit implied consent warnings as he deems appropriate to the facts of a case, and (2) the officer’s incomplete warning was harmless. Here, Robison smelled of marijuana when arrested and admitted smoking marijuana to the arresting officer. “Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robison would have agreed to take the breath test had he received the THC warning.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that because the State cannot show that an officer gave Robison all the statutorily required warnings, it cannot establish the foundation required for admission of the breath tests given to him. “While cases have characterized this result as suppression, when the State cannot show that it complied with the implied consent statute, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof for admission of evidence it offers to prove guilt. The defendant does not have to show prejudice in this circumstance.”

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision to suppress Robison’s BAC test.

My opinion? Good decision.  DUI investigations involving Implied Consent Warnings must keep up with today’s legislative amendments. The law is the law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.