Category Archives: Search and Seizure

Pre-Arrest Silence & Business Records Exceptions to Hearsay Rule

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In State v. Magana, the WA Court of Appeals held (1) the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of a suspect’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt, and (2) the State failed to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for the Lineup ID Report, however, the erroneous admission of the document was harmless error.

Sergio Magana Jr., an adult, met met fourteen-year-old Y.L. through Facebook. After exchanging text messages, Y.L. and Mr. Magana made plans to meet at Y.L.’s home. Mr. Magana wanted to be alone with Y.L. When the day they planned to meet arrived, Mr. Magana went inside Y.L.’s home and forcibly raped her. Not long after leaving, Mr. Magana texted and told Y.L. not to mention his name and to delete all of their text messages because her “age scared him.”
After approximately two weeks, Y.L. reported Mr. Magana’s conduct to the police. Y.L. identified Mr. Magana from a photo lineup and submitted her phone so text messages could be extracted. The police then began looking for Mr. Magana.
After about six weeks, Mr. Magana made contact with the police and spoke to a detective over the telephone. During the call, Mr. Magana arranged to meet with the police. However, he never showed up for his appointment. About a month later, Mr. Magana finally met with a police detective in person. He was advised of his Miranda rights and acknowledged that he had indeed met Y.L. over Facebook, but he denied having intercourse. Mr. Magana was charged with one count of third degree rape of a child. Following a mistrial and then a second trial, he was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the trial court. Mr. Magana appealed.
1. PRE-ARREST SILENCE.
On appeal, Mr. Magana argued the jury should not have known about his failure to appear for his initial police interview. He claims this was an improper comment on his right to silence, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule from the  United States Supreme Court’s Salinas v. Texas holds that the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of Mr. Magana’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Furthermore, although Washington State’s Constitution typically provides more protections than the U.S. Constitution, “this is not an area where our state’s constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution.”
Consequently, the Court of Appeals reasoned Mr. Magana was not under arrest or any sort of police custody. They said his scheduled police interview was voluntary, and to the extent Mr. Magana’s failure to appear for the interview was relevant, the State was entitled to present this evidence.
PHOTO LINEUP EVIDENCE.
Also on appeal, Mr. Magana argued the State’s photo lineup exhibit was hearsay and admitted into evidence without proper foundation. However, the State argued that the exhibit was a properly authenticated business record.
The Court reasoned that under RCW 5.45.020 and ER 803(6), a document may be admitted as a business record as long as a witness testifies to the document’s identity and mode of preparation, and explains that the document “was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event.”
Here, the exhibit at issue consisted of three pages. The first page is an array of six hand-numbered photos, one of which depicts Mr. Magana. The second page is entitled “Lineup ID Report,” which is a computer-generated report that documents biographical information, including dates of birth, for the six individuals depicted on the photo array. The third page is a copy of the written admonishment form Y.L. signed prior to reviewing the photo array.
However, The Court of Appeals reasoned that during the photo identification process, Y .L. failed to review the second page of the report. Also concerning was that at trial, no witness testimony was presented regarding the creation of the Lineup ID Report included on page two.
For these reasons, and because no foundation was laid for the Lineup ID Report, it was improperly admitted as a business record. Nevertheless, and given the entirety of the evidence, the erroneous inclusion of the Lineup ID Report was harmless error which did not impact the jury’s verdict. With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Magana’s convictions, but remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Protective Sweeps of Homes

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In State v. Chambers, the WA Court of Appeals decided (1) the police’s “protective sweep” of the defendant’s home was improper because the defendant was arrested outside his home and the officers did not have specific facts that other armed individuals might be inside the defendant’s home, and (2) the defendant’s 3.5 Motion to Suppress statements made to police was rightfully denied because police scrupulously honored the defendant’s Fifth Amendment invocation of his right to remain silent.

In this case, defendant Lovett Chambers was drinking at the Feedback Lounge, a neighborhood bar in West Seattle that he frequented. Chambers was a convicted felon of African-American descent who moved to Seattle in 1989, worked in the construction industry, obtained degrees in computer science and started an IT business. In 1992, he got married and later purchased a house in West Seattle with his wife. A few years later, Chambers asked his wife to buy him a Colt .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun. She did so, apparently unaware that he was a convicted felon.

On the night of the incident, Mr. Chambers had numerous drinks at the Feedback Lounge. He carried and concealed his .45 pistol.   At some point, two Caucasian men entered the bar and began drinking. The gentlemen did not know Mr. Chambers. Later, all of the gentlemen departed the bar simultaneously and walked to their respective vehicles which were parked nearby each other in the parking lot.

For reasons unknown, words were exchanged between Chambers and the two gentlemen, who apparently uttered racial epitaphs to each other, Mr. Chambers, or both. One of the gentleman – Michael Travis Hood – pulled a shovel from his vehicle; apparently to defend himself from Mr. Chambers. However, Chambers shot Mr. Hood three times with his .45 pistol. Chambers walked away, got into his car and drove home in his BMW.

Mr. Hood died from lethal gunshot wounds to his back.

Seattle police arrested Chambers at his home at 10:49 p.m. Officer Belgarde read Chambers his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. Chambers smelled of alcohol. He was “swaying,” had trouble balancing, slurred his words, and was argumentative. Officer Galbraith drove Chambers to the precinct. Officers obtained a warrant to search Chambers’ home and seized a loaded .45 caliber handgun, a spare magazine, and the BMW keys. The police impounded the BMW. Later, officers interrogated Chambers and obtained numerous incriminating statements regarding the shooting.

The State charged Chambers with murder in the second degree of Hood while armed with a deadly weapon. Chambers asserted a claim of self-defense. Before trial, Chambers filed a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house and the statements he made. The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house. The court concluded the police “were authorized to enter the house to conduct a protective sweep to ensure their safety.” The court also denied the motion to suppress Chambers’ statements to police and reasoned his “right to remain silent was scrupulously honored” under Michigan v. Mosley.

The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. By special verdict, the jury found Chambers was armed with a firearm at the time he committed the crime. The court imposed the low-end standard range sentence of 78 months plus the mandatory consecutive 60-month firearm enhancement. Chambers appealed.

  1. Evidence Seized from the House Was Obtained Through a Unlawfully Conducted “Protective Sweep,” However, The Trial Court’s Decision to Deny Chambers’ Suppression Motion Was Harmless Error.

Chambers contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his house: the Colt .45, a magazine clip with .45 caliber bullets, and the keys to the BMW.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a warrantless search and seizure unless the State demonstrates that one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a “protective sweep” of the home. The court further reasoned that under Maryland v. Buie the U.S. Supreme Court describes a protective sweep as a limited cursory search incident to arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.

The Court of Appeals decided the trial court erred in concluding the police had the authority to conduct a protective sweep of Chambers’ house. First, a warrantless search of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest” without probable cause or reasonable suspicion does not apply when the police arrest an individual outside his home.

Here, the undisputed facts do not support the warrantless entry and protective sweep of the kitchen under Buie and the court erred in denying the motion to suppress:

“The record does not support the conclusion that there were “articulable facts” that the kitchen harbored “an individual posing a danger.” The police had information that only Chambers shot Hood and was alone when he drove away. The findings establish the only individual in the house when police arrested Chambers was his spouse. The front door was open after the arrest and the police could see Sara was sitting on the living room couch watching television and remained in the living room.”

However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that the verdict would have been the same absent the trial court’s error. Chambers testified he acted in self-defense when he shot Hood with the Colt .45. Chambers admitted that he parked his BMW in front of the Beveridge Place Pub on January 21, that he kept a .45 caliber gun under the passenger seat of the BMW, and that he used the Colt .45 to shoot Hood near Morgan Junction Park. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny Chamber’s motion to suppress was harmless error.

2. Chamber’s Incriminating Statements Are Admissible.

On appeal, Mr. Chambers asserts the detectives did not “scrupulously honor” his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “No person shall be . .. compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court adopted “procedural safeguards” to protect the privilege and held that before questioning an individual in custody, the police must clearly inform the suspect of the following:

That he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Here, the Court of Appeals decided that because the circumstances leading up to the police’s interview with Chambers show the police scrupulously honored Chambers’ right to cut off questioning, the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statements Chambers made.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the record shows the police advised Chambers of his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. when he was arrested on January 21. Chambers stated he understood his rights and unequivocally said he did not want to talk to the police. The record establishes the police did not “ask the defendant any questions or persist in repeated efforts to wear him down or change his mind after he invoked his rights.” After he invoked his right to remain silent at 10:51 p.m. on January 21, the police did not question Chambers while at police headquarters. And while driving to Harborview to obtain a blood draw at 3:07 a.m. on January 22, the detectives did not ask Chambers any questions.

Nonetheless, on the way to Harborview, Chambers said he did not want to talk about what happened. While at Harborview, Chambers seemed to have “sobered up.” When they left Harborview approximately 45 minutes later, Detective Steiger advised Chambers of his Miranda rights again. Chambers stated he understood his rights and did not invoke the right to remain silent.

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded the undisputed facts support the conclusion that the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

The Court affirmed the jury verdict.

My opinion? The police should have advised Mr. Chambers of his Ferrier warnings, a topic which I have blogged many times. Ferrier warnings must be given if police officers seek to enter the home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime or contraband. Still, even if Ferrier warnings were given and Mr. Chambers denied the police entry into his home, his incriminating statements to police ultimately assigned harmless error to the unlawful search.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Holiday Drinking In The U.S.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Distracted Driving, Domestic Violence, Drowsy Driving, Drug Offenses, DUI, felony, Jail, law enforcement, marijuana, Miranda, misdemeanor, police, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, Violent Crime, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Interesting article by Christopher Ingraham of the Washington Post discusses how data on total monthly alcohol sales in the United States carries a time-tested seasonal trend: the spikes in December of each year.

Clearly, the holidays are traditionally a time for boozing it up.

For example, the Department of Health and Human Services recently updated the official federal statistics on the percent of state residents ages 12 and older who drink at least once a month. Also, Ingraham’s article discusses how various direct and indirect measures of alcohol consumption, including breathalyzer data, Web searches for hangover relief and alcohol-related traffic deaths all suggest that peak American drinking happens between Thanksgiving and New Year’s.

THE NORTHEAST

New England is home to the nation’s heaviest drinkers – New Hampshire, where about 64 percent of residents age of 12 or older drink monthly, is tops in the country. Vermont, Maine and Connecticut also come in at drinking rates above 60 percent. Hard-drinking cheese heads in Wisconsin see to it that their home is the only Midwestern state in the top tier of American drinkers.

THE NORTHWEST

Ingraham discusses how the next tier of heavy drinking states are all in the northern part of the country. Some researchers posit that there may be a relationship between heavy drinking and latitude. At the country level, alcohol consumption tends to increase the farther you get away from the equator. This could be a function of the potential for boredom and depression during winter months when the nights are long and the days are short. For a prime example of this, see recent stories involving alcohol and misconduct among people who live in Antarctica.

RELIGIOUS STATES

Ingraham discusses other cultural factors affect some States’ attitudes about drinking. On the map above, take a look at Utah and particularly Idaho. They’re in the bottom tier of the states for drinking frequency. Utah, where only 31 percent of adults drink in a given month, comes in dead last. This is almost certainly because of the large Mormon populations in those states — 58 percent of Utahans are Mormon, as are 24 percent of people in Idaho. Mormonism generally prohibits the use of alcohol and other drugs.

There’s likely a similar religious influence in places Alabama, Mississippi and the other Southern states where drinking is low. Those states have large evangelical Christian populations, many of whom are abstainers.

HOLIDAY DUI PATROLS IN WASHINGTON STATE

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Coincidentally, the Washington State Patrol announced its increased Holiday DUI Patrol campaign of “Drive Sober Or Get Pulled Over.” Our State Troopers are extremely proactive in reaching their Target Zero goal of zero traffic fatalities by 2030.

Also, our local police and sheriff’s offices are working very hard responding to incidents of domestic violence, burglary, assault and other criminal incidents associated with holiday celebrations.

SEEK COMPETENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES THIS HOLIDAY SEASON.

For many, the holiday season is a joyous time when family and friends get together and celebrate. Naturally, our holiday merriment could involve the libations of alcohol and/or legal (and illegal) drugs.

We must enjoy the holidays safely and responsibly. Unfortunately, incidents of domestic violence, DUI, and other criminal behaviors – intentional or otherwise – can dampen our holiday festivities.

It’s never desirable to face criminal charges which could negatively affect your life for years to come. However, if you, friends or family find themselves in situations involving law enforcement, jail and/or criminal charges then contact the Law Office of Alexander Ransom as soon as possible.  I staunchly defends my clients’ constitutional rights to a fair trial, just proceedings and the suppression of evidence involving unlawful searches, seizures and self-incrimination. My practice involves saving people’s careers and reuniting families by seeking reductions and dismissals of criminal charges when appropriate.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Happy holidays!

-Alex Ransom, Esq.

State v. Murray: Improper Implied Consent Warnings Held Unimportant

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, DUI, Evidence, Implied Consent, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Murray, the WA Supreme Court held that DUI breath test results should not be suppressed even though the police officers who informed defendants did not properly inform the defendants of THC warnings. In February, I discussed Robison’s Court of Appeals decision to suppress the BAC test before the WA Supreme Court re-addressed the issue on this most recent appeal.

Late one night, a state trooper observed Robison speeding through a restaurant parking lot toward a road. The trooper had to hit his brakes to avoid a collision as Robison exited the parking lot. The trooper decided a traffic stop was in order. The trooper could smell both alcohol and cannabis coming from Robison’s car. The officer investigated Robison for DUI. Robison performed poorly on field sobriety tests and agreed to take a roadside breath test.

Based on the results, the officer arrested Robison for suspected driving under the influence (DUI) and took him to a police station. At the station, the trooper read Robison an implied consent warning from a standard form’s that did not mention the new statutory language concerning THC. The form warning did warn Robison that he was subject to having his driver’s license suspended, revoked, or denied if the test revealed he was under the influence of alcohol.

Robison argued a 3.6 motion to suppress the results of the breath test, arguing that the implied consent warning was inadequate because it did not mirror the statutory language regarding the consequences of a finding of THC in his blood. The district court commissioner concluded that the warnings accurately informed the defendant that the result of a breath test would reveal the alcohol concentration of his breath and that it would be misleading to advise or imply to the defendant that the breath test could obtain a THC reading.

Robison was found guilty. Robison appealed to the superior court, which reversed, concluding the officer had no discretion to leave out a portion of the implied consent warning. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to suppress, and the WA Supreme Court accepted review on the State’s appeal.

Ultimately, the Court affirmed the lower courts and upheld Robison’s conviction. A driver’s implied consent to a breath test for alcohol, and the arresting officer’s duty to warn of the potential consequences of the test, have been part of our statutory system for decades. Both the legal consequences of driving while intoxicated and the details and exactitude of the warning required by the legislature have changed during that time. For example, Initiative 502, which decriminalized the recreational use of cannabis, also amended the implied consent statute. In relevant part, the amended implied consent statute said:

“(c) If the driver submits to the test and the test is administered, the driver’s license, permit, or privilege to drive will be suspended, revoked, or denied for at least ninety days if: (i) The driver is age twenty-one or over and the test indicates either that the alcohol concentration of the driver’s breath or blood is 0.08 or more or that the THC concentration of the driver’s blood is 5.00 or more.”

Robison argued that since some of the statutory language was omitted during his DUI investigation, the tests must be suppressed.

However, the WA Supreme Court disagreed:

“We find no case, and none have been called to our attention, that require officers to read an irrelevant statutory warning to a driver suspected of DUI. Instead, as acknowledged by counsel at oral argument, it has long been the reasonable practice of arresting officers to omit warnings related to underage drinking and commercial drivers’ licenses when advising those over 21 or driving on a noncommercial license.”

The Court further reasoned that the Implied Consent warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted.

With that, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Robison’s convictions.

My opinion? Bad decision. Like I said before, DUI investigations involving Implied Consent Warnings must keep up with today’s legislative amendments and other changing laws. The law is the law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Common Authority” Vehicle Searches

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In State v. Vanhollebeke, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided a vehicle owner’s consent to search overrode the driver’s express objections.

On the night of November 10, 2014, Sergeant Garza pulled the truck over that was facing the wrong way on a one-way street. Sergeant Garza got out of his patrol car and approached the truck. The defendant Mr. Vanhollebeke got out of the truck and started walking toward Sergeant Garza. Sergeant Garza ordered Mr. Vanhollebeke to get back in the truck. Mr. Vanhollebeke then said he had locked himself out of the truck. This unusual behavior made Sergeant Garza suspicious.

Dispatch advised that Mr. Vanhollebeke’s license was suspended. Dispatch also advised that Mr. Vanhollebeke was not the registered owner of the truck, and that the truck belonged to a man named Bill Casteel. Sergeant Garza’s plan at this point was to cite Mr. Vanhollebeke for driving with a suspended license and then release him.

However, another police officer noticed a glass pipe with a white crystal substance on it sitting in plain view near the dashboard, which he believed was drug paraphernalia. Also, the truck’s steering column was “punched,” which indicated the truck was stolen. The officers did not release Mr. Vanhollebeke and kept him in their custody.

The officers asked for permission to search the truck. Mr. Vanhollebeke refused. Sergeant Garza contacted Mr. Casteel, the actual owner of the truck, at Casteel’s home. Mr. Casteel told Deputy Barnes that Mr. Vanhollebeke had permission to use the truck. Casteel also gave police permission to search his truck and gave Deputy Barnes a key to it.

Deputy Barnes returned directly to the scene. He used the key to open the truck and began to search it. He looked under the driver’s seat and saw a revolver. The glass pipe tested positive for methamphetamine. The officers confirmed through dispatch that Mr. Vanhollebeke had a prior felony conviction.

The State charged Mr. Vanhollebeke with first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Mr. Vanhollebeke argued a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the physical evidence on the grounds that he had refused to give the officers consent to search the truck and also that the stop’s length and scope were unreasonable. However, the trial court admitted the evidence and denied Mr. Vanhollebeke’s motion to suppress. The jury convicted Mr. Vanhollebeke.

Vanhollebeke appealed on the issue of whether Mr. Casteel’s consent overrode Mr. Vanhollebeke’s express objection to search.

The Court of Appeals upheld the search. It reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees people the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are generally illegal unless they fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, one exception is consent to search by a person with authority over the place or thing to be searched. This exception includes consent given by a third person, other than the defendant.

The court further reasoned that to grant valid consent, the third party must have common authority over the place or thing to be searched. The court explained that common authority does not mean that the third party has a mere property interest in the place or thing being searched. Rather, to establish lawful consent by virtue of common authority, (1) a consenting party must be able to permit the search in his own right, and (2) it must be reasonable to find that the defendant has assumed the risk that a co-occupant might permit a search.

The court decided Mr. Vanhollebeke’s right to use the truck was dependent on the owner’s unrevoked permission:

“Here, Mr. Vanhollebeke had the actual right to exclude all others from the truck except for Mr. Casteel. For this reason, Mr. Vanhollebeke did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy if Mr. Casteel wanted to search his own truck or allow another person to do so.”

With that, the Court concluded Mr. Casteel’s consent to search his truck overrode Mr. Vanhollebeke’s objection. Therefore, the search did not violate Mr. Vanhollebeke’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Vanhollebeke’s CrR 3.6 motion to suppress. Vanhollebeke’s conviction was affirmed.

My opinion? Common authority search issues don’t happen very often in criminal defense. But when they do, it’s imperative to hire competent criminal defense who can leverage a strong motion to suppress the evidence and/or divide the “common parties” to the search. Perhaps the greatest lesson to learn is to simply avoid transporting illegal contraband in plain view within borrowed vehicles.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Trump On Crime.

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Like it or not, Donald Trump won.

Criminal defense attorneys serving their clients must survey the aftermath and ponder how Mr. Trump’s administration approaches issues of criminal justice. What is Trump’s stance on the “War on Drugs?” How does his stance embrace the growing legalization of marijuana among the States? How does Mr. Trump view the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unlawful searches and seizures? How does Trump view the discord between police and communities of color? Will Trump’s administration seek the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants who commit crimes? How does he feel about the death penalty? These issues – and many others – affect many defendants facing criminal charges.

If the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, we look no further than Mr. Trump’s comments over the years; especially his comments during his campaign.

THE WAR ON DRUGS: 1990 & 2015

In 1990, Trump argued that the only way to win the War on Drugs was to legalize drugs and use the tax revenue to fund drug education programs. As he put it, “You have to take the profit away from these drug czars.” In his 2000 book,The America We Deserve, he stated that he’d never tried drugs “of any kind.”

Fast-forward 25 years, and now Trump is opposed to legalization. “I say it’s bad,” he told the crowd at the Conservative Political Action Conference in June, in response to a question about Colorado’s legal weed. “Medical marijuana is another thing, but I think recreational marijuana is bad. And I feel strongly about that.” Regarding states’ rights, Trump said, “If they vote for it, they vote for it. But they’ve got a lot of problems going on right now, in Colorado. Some big problems. But I think medical marijuana, 100 percent.”

Source: On the Issues: Donald Trump on Drugs.

Apparently, Trump opposes recreational marijuana and endorses medical marijuana. Unfortunately, his stances can become problematic for states like Washington, Colorado and a handful of others which have already passed initiatives allowing its citizens to possess small amounts of marijuana for recreational purposes. Will Trump’s administration reverse these State initiatives? Will Trump’s administration violate federal court opinions which have slowly de-prioritized federal prosecutions of marijuana cases in states which have legalized marijuana? How will drug prosecutions and/or convictions under Trump’s administration affect citizens receiving federal benefits to include welfare, social security and financial aid?

Only time will tell.

CRIME, THE 4TH AMENDMENT AND THE RACIAL DIVIDE BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR.

Trump’s recent comments at the First Presidential Debate at Hofstra University, Sept. 26, 2016, moderated by Lester Holt of NBC News gives telling insights on these issues.

Q: What should be done about crime?

TRUMP: “Stop and frisk worked very well in New York. It brought the crime rate way down. You take the gun away from criminals that shouldn’t be having it. We have gangs roaming the street. And in many cases, they’re illegal immigrants. And they have guns. And they shoot people. And we have to be very vigilant. Right now, our police, in many cases, are afraid to do anything. We have to protect our inner cities, because African-American communities are being decimated by crime.”

Q: “Stop-and-frisk was ruled unconstitutional in New York, because it largely singled out black and Hispanic young men.”

TRUMP: “No, you’re wrong. Our new mayor refused to go forward with the case. They would have won on appeal. There are many places where it’s allowed.”

Q: “The argument is that it’s a form of racial profiling.”

TRUMP: “No, the argument is that we have to take the guns away from bad people that shouldn’t have them. You have to have stop-and-frisk.”

Some background information and “fact-checking” is necessary to understand this discussion.

Recently, in Floyd v. City of New York, U.S. District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled that New York City police violated the U.S. Constitution in the way that it carried out its stop-and-frisk program, calling it “a form of racial profiling” of young black and Hispanic men. Apparently, there were 4.4 million stops made by New York City police between January 2004 and June 2012, and 83 percent of them were made of blacks and Hispanics — even though those racial groups represented 52 percent of the city’s population in 2010.

During trial, Judge Scheindlin found that 14 of the 19 stops constituted an unconstitutional stop or unconstitutional frisk. Ultimately, Judge Scheindin found the NYPD’s execution of its stop and frisk policy was unconstitutional.

My opinion?  Sure, most would agree we want guns and criminals off our streets. However, if stop and frisk policies involve systematically targeting certain racial groups, then these policies are simply unlawful. Period. Given his statements during the debates, I fear Trump’s administration may create, endorse and execute criminal justice policies which ultimately violate Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizure.

2. How do you heal the racial divide?

TRUMP: “We need law and order. If we don’t have it, we’re not going to have a country. I just got today the endorsement of the Fraternal Order of Police. We have endorsements from almost every police group, a large percentage of them in the US. We have a situation where we have our inner cities, African- Americans, Hispanics are living in he’ll because it’s so dangerous. You walk down the street, you get shot.”

3. Do you see a crisis in the US of white police officers shooting unarmed blacks?

TRUMP: “It’s a massive crisis. It’s a double crisis. I look at these things, I see them on television. And some horrible mistakes are made. But at the same time, we have to give power back to the police because crime is rampant. I believe very strongly that we need police. Cities need strong police protection. But officers’ jobs are being taken away from them. And there’s no question about it, there is turmoil in our country on both sides.”

4. Do you understand why African Americans don’t trust the police right now?

TRUMP: “Well, I can certainly see it when I see what’s going on. But at the same time, we have to give power back to the police because we have to have law and order. And you’re always going to have mistakes made. And you’re always going to have bad apples. But you can’t let that stop the fact that police have to regain control of this tremendous crime wave that’s hitting the US.”

THE SUPREME COURT

According to Politico Magazine, Trump will probably pick ultra-conservative judges to fill anticipated vacancies in the United States Supreme Court. In an article titled, “How President Trump Could Reshape the Supreme Court – and the Country,” reporter Jeffrey Rosen surmises that Trump’s lasting legacy could be his power to shape the Supreme Court.

Apparently, during the third presidential debate, Trump described the 21 judicial candidates he has identified:

“They will be pro-life. They will have a conservative bent. They will be protecting the Second Amendment. They are great scholars in all cases, and they’re people of tremendous respect. They will interpret the Constitution the way the Founders wanted it interpreted, and I believe that’s very important.”

Apparently, Trump’s judicial picks are pro-law enforcement on issues involving government searches and seizures. This bodes negatively for preserving Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure.

Also, Trump vows to give more power to police to handle the racial divide between police and communities of color. My opinion? That’s similar to dousing a forest fire with gasoline. or allowing a fox to guard your henhouse. Police aren’t experts at policing themselves. What is needed are the reinforcement of police accountability policies as well as a substantial shift with the culture of today’s police departments.

Let’s be frank: the unjustified killing of citizens at the hands of police can no longer go unpunished, especially in the face of indisputable video evidence. In those cases, police must be held accountable for the crimes they commit against the citizens they are sworn to serve and protect. It’s the only way to rebuild trust between police and the communities of color.

Equally important, we need policies which increase training on de-escalation techniques and decrease police militarization models which involves the use of military equipment and tactics by law enforcement officers. This includes decreasing the use of armored personnel carriers, assault rifles, submachine guns, flashbang grenades, grenade launchers, sniper rifles, and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams if more reasonable alternatives are possible.

THE DEATH PENALTY

Put simply, Mr. Trump as a staunch advocate of the death penalty.

“A life is a life, and if you criminally take an innocent life you’d better be prepared to forfeit your own. My only complaint is that lethal injection is too comfortable a way to go.”

“I can’t believe that executing criminals doesn’t have a deterrent effect . . . Young male murderers, we are constantly told, are led astray by violent music and violent movies. Fair enough. I believe that people are affected by what they read, see, hear, and experience. Only a fool believes otherwise. So you can’t say on one hand that a kid is affected by music and movies and then turn around and say he is absolutely not affected when he turns on the evening news and sees that a criminal has gone to the chair for killing a child. Obviously, capital punishment isn’t going to deter everyone. But how can it not put the fear of death into many would-be killers?”

Source: The America We Deserve, by Donald Trump, pp. 102-104, July 2, 2000.

JAILING AND DEPORTATION OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS.

According to the Huffington Post, Trump vows to immediately deport or imprison up to 3 million undocumented immigrants.  Trump said he would launch what could be the largest mass deportation effort in modern history, vowing to immediately deport a number of people comparable to the record-setting figure that President Barack Obama carried out over two terms in office.

This should come as no surprise. According to a recent article from the Washington Post, Trump’s proposal calls for the deportation of undocumented immigrants who have committed violent crimes. Trump said he would push for two new laws aimed at punishing criminal aliens convicted of illegal reentry and removing “criminal immigrants and terrorists,” including previously deported unauthorized immigrants. He said he would name these laws after victims killed by people in the United States illegally.

Although Trump’s removal of undocumented immigrants at this pace is apparently limited to convicted felons, his enthusiasm for removals suggests that overall deportations will likely rise when he takes office, after declining sharply last year.

Clearly, Trump’s presidency shall affect our nation’s approach to crime and punishment. Consequently, it’s imperative to hire defense counsel who is competent handling drug charges, death penalty crimes, violent crime, racial injustice and immigration issues. Today’s defense counsel must stay abreast of today’s ever-changing political landscape.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Knock & Announce” Was Too Short.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Ineffective Assistance, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, marijuana, police, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for cops break down door

In State v. Ortiz, the WA Court of Appeals Division III held that police violated a defendant’s rights when they forced entry into his home after waiting only 6-9 seconds of their “knock and announce” during the early morning.

In late July 2011, Wapato Police Sergeant Robert Hubbard viewed the backyard of the defendant’s property from the vantage point of a cooperative neighbor. He saw two marijuana plants. Sergeant Hubbard was granted a search warrant for the property.

on August 11, 2011, at approximately 6:4 7 a.m., Sergeant Hubbard and 11 other police officers executed the search warrant at the property. He knocked on the door three times, announced “police search warrant,” waited one to two seconds, and repeated that process twice more. Hearing nothing inside the home, the officers breached the front door and entered the home.

Upon searching the property, the officers found 41 marijuana plants in various stages of growth and other evidence of a grow operation. Mr. Ortiz was eventually charged with one count of manufacture of a controlled substance, one count of involving a minor in an unlawful controlled substance transaction, and several other counts not relevant on appeal.

At the end of trial, the jury found Mr. Ortiz guilty.

On appeal, Mr. Ortiz argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorney failed to challenge the execution of the search warrant for failure to comply with the knock and announce rule.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals began by explaining that effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. First, the defendant must show he received deficient representation. Second, the defendant must show he suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.

“KNOCK & ANNOUNCE” RULE.

Next, the court explained the “knock and announce” rule. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a non-consensual entry by the police be preceded by an announcement of identity and purpose on the part of the officers. This is part of the constitutional requirement that search warrants be reasonably executed.

In WA State, the parallel requirement of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution is codified in RCW 10.31.040. It states, “To make an arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door, or windows of a dwelling house or other building, or any other enclosure, if, after notice of his or her office and purpose, he or she be refused admittance.”

The Court explained that in order to comply with the “Knock & Announce” statute, the police must, prior to a non-consensual entry, announce their identity, demand admittance, announce the purpose of their demand, and be explicitly or implicitly denied admittance. The requirement of a demand for admittance and an explicit or implicit denial of admittance have been merged into a ‘waiting period,’ often linked to whether the police officers are refused admittance.

Strict compliance with the rule is required unless the State can demonstrate that one of the two exceptions to the rule applies: exigent circumstances or futility of compliance. Finally, the proper remedy for an unexcused violation is suppression of the evidence obtained by the violation.

Here, the only disputed issue was whether the police waited long enough before they broke down the door. The answer to this question depends upon the circumstances of the case.

The Court elaborated that the reasonableness of the waiting period is evaluated in light of the purposes of the rule, which are: ( 1) reduction of potential violence to both occupants and police arising from an unannounced entry, (2) prevention of unnecessary property damage, and (3) protection of an occupant’s right to privacy.

Here, the Court believed the waiting period of 6-9 seconds was unreasonable:

“In this case, due to the early hour of the search, the occupants were foreseeably asleep. Six to nine seconds was not a reasonable amount of time for them to respond to the police, and thus no denial of admittance can be inferred. Even Sergeant Hubbard admitted it would not be a surprise that sleeping occupants would be unable to respond in that amount of time. In addition, the purposes of the rule were not fulfilled due to the property damage done by battering in the door. The police did not comply with the rule.”

Although the State presented cases where the “knock and announce” rule was adhered to after police officers breached entry quickly after announcing, the Court nevertheless reasoned that in each of those cases the defendants were both present and awake. But here, the officers did not have any indication the home’s occupants were present or awake.

Because the police violated the knock and announce rule, and there is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason for failing to challenge the search, counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress the evidence. This deficiency, reasoned the court, prejudiced the defendant.

The Court concluded that Mr. Ortiz established that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The court reversed his convictions and remanded the case back to the trial court with directions to suppress the fruits of the illegal search.

My opinion? Excellent decision. Search and seizure issues like this are incredibly interesting. For more information on the case law surrounding these issues please review my Legal Guide titled, Search & Seizure: Basic Issues Regarding Their Search for Weapons, Drugs, Firearms and Other Contraband.

And please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Possessing Controlled Substances for Family Members.

"Plain Meaning" Rule, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, felony, Jury Trial, Search and Seizure, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for giving pills to family

In State v. Yokel, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that it’s a valid defense for defendants to possess a controlled substance pursuant to a household member’s valid prescription.

On February 15, 2015, a police officer discovered defendant Mary Yokel’s car parked in front of a motel room. Yokel had an active arrest warrant. Officer Croy knocked on the motel room door and made contact with Yokel. He then arrested Yokel on the warrant and searched her person incident to arrest. During the search, Officer Croy located one pill in Yokel’s pants pocket and verified it was Vicodin, containing hydrocodone. Yokel said she was holding the Vicodin pill for her daughter, who has a valid prescription. The State charged Yokel with two counts of possession of a controlled substance.

At trial, Yokel wanted to introduce evidence that she possessed the Vicodin pursuant to her 16-year-old daughter’s valid prescription. Yokel’s defense was that on the day in question, she had taken two of the pills out of the Vicodin bottle, gave one to her daughter, and put the other one in her pocket after determining that her daughter should not take two pills.

However, the trial judge denied Yokel’s motion to continue the case to allow her daughter to testify. Also, the court granted the Prosecutor’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding Yokel’s daughter’s valid Vicodin prescription.

As a result, at trial, Yokel was not allowed to testify that she possessed the controlled substance for the purpose of administering it to her daughter. The jury found Yokel guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance (hydrocodone). Yokel appealed.

  1. RCW 69.50.4013(1) PROVIDES THE DEFENSE THAT DEFENDANTS MAY HOLD PRESCRIPTION PILLS FOR FAMILY MEMBERS.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals agreed with Yokel that RCW 69.50.4013(1) permits a defendant to possess a household member’s valid prescription for a controlled substance. It reasoned the statute provides an affirmative defense to a person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance obtained “directly from” or “pursuant to” a valid prescription. By including these different phrases in the statute, the legislature indicated its intent that each phrase have a different meaning.

Additionally, former RCW 69.50.308 (2013), one of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act’s statutes, allows practitioners to dispense controlled substances to an “ultimate user” pursuant to a prescription. The Act defines an “ultimate user” as an individual who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for the individual’s own use.

Consequently, reasoned the Court, this definition of “ultimate user” indicates the legislature’s intent to allow an ultimate user to possess a controlled substance for the use of another household member:

“Interpreting former RCW 69.50.4013(1) as prohibiting ultimate users from lawfully possessing a controlled substance prescribed to another household member leads to an absurd result. Reading the statute in such a way criminalizes behavior that may involve a common caretaking function. For example, a son who picks up his bedridden father’s prescription medication or a mother who administers a prescription medication to her infant daughter would be in violation of the statute.”

2. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.

The Court of Appeals said the trial court violated Yokel’s constitutional right to present a defense when it suppressed her from testifying why she held the pill for her daughter. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense to the crimes charged.

Here, a defendant has the right to present admissible evidence in her defense and must show the evidence is at least minimally relevant to the fact at issue in her case.  Further, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction supporting her theory of the case if there is substantial evidence in the record supporting it. “The trial court effectively barred Yokel from presenting a defense because it excluded all evidence regarding her daughter’s prescription and declined to give her proposed affirmative defense instruction,” reasoned the Court. “In light of our ruling above, the instruction and all evidence in support thereof should have been allowed at trial.”

The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court misinterpreted former RCW 69.50.4013(1) and, as a result, denied Yokel the right to present a defense. Therefore, it reversed Yokel’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The court rightfully went to arguments of statutory construction and interpreted the plain meaning of the statute to reach its decision. Well done.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Deadly Force Not Justified.

42 U.S.C. § 1983, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Deadly Force, law enforcement, Police Misconduct, Qualified Immunity, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In A.K.H. v. City of Tustin, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the government could not justify a police officer’s use of deadly force during the officer’s attempted investigatory stop of Mr. Herrera.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

Defendant Osvaldo Villarreal, a police officer in Tustin, California, fatally shot Benny Herrera during an attempted investigatory stop. Herrera was on foot. Officer Villarreal was in his patrol car and had just driven up beside Herrera. Herrera was in the middle of the roadway, moving in the direction of traffic. His left hand was free and visible; his right hand was in his sweatshirt pocket. Villarreal commanded Herrera to take his hand out of his pocket. Less than a second later, just as Herrera’s hand came out of his pocket, Villarreal shot him twice, killing him. Herrera was unarmed. Villarreal does not claim that he saw, or thought he saw, a weapon in Herrera’s hand.

Relatives of Herrera (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Villarreal and the City of Tustin alleging that Villarreal used excessive force against Herrera in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Villarreal moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which would have effectively dismissed the lawsuit against him. However, the federal district court denied the Officer’s motion.

Officer Villarreal brought an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He argued that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, his actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the district court therefore erred in denying him qualified immunity.

THE ISSUES.

The Ninth Circuit reasoned it must ask two questions to determine whether Officer Villarreal is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. First, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, did Villarreal use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Second, if Villarreal used excessive force, did he violate a clearly established right?

THE COURT’S ANALYSIS.

Quoting Tennessee v. Garner, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Deadly Force is permissible only if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.

Here, the Ninth Circuit found Officer Herrera used excessive force in violation of Mr. Herrera’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court reasoned that (1) the crime at issue was a domestic dispute that had ended before the police became involved; (2) the deceased did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, as the officer did not believe the deceased was armed and the officer did not see a weapon; (3) although the deceased did not comply with the officer’s commands to remove his hand from his sweatshirt pocket, he did not attempt to flee; and (4) the officer escalated to deadly force approximately 1 second after issuing the command to the deceased to remove his hand from his pocket. “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude that Villarreal violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law when he shot and killed Herrera.”

CONCLUSION.

In its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit said the following:

“It has long been clear that a police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, that is precisely what Officer Villarreal did here.”

My opinion? Great decision. Straightforward, direct, constitutionally sound and accurate. I’m happy the Ninth Circuit saw this case for what it was.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Stop & Frisk” of Friends

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, law enforcement, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Flores, the WA Supreme Court  decided that police officers may seize a defendant’s companions if officers can articulate a reason based specifically on safety concerns for the officers, the arrestee, his or her companions, or other citizens.
 On November 2, 2013, an anonymous source reported to the Moses Lake Police Department that Giovanni Powell pointed a gun at someone’s head. Officer Kyle McCain was first to arrive at the scene of the incident. Officer McCain was familiar with Powell, and was soon updated that Powell had an arrest warrant.
 Officer McCain arrived at the reported address. He observed Powell, whom he recognized, and another person (later identified as Flores) walking down the street together. McCain did not recognize Flores and did not have any reason to suspect Flores of criminal activity.
 McCain parked across the street from Powell and Flores, got out of his car, drew his side arm, held it pointed at the ground, and ordered Powell to stop. As this was occurring, other officers arrived. Mr. Flores told officer he possessed a firearm in his pants. It was removed and secured. The State charged Flores with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree.
 Flores brought a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress all evidence of the gun. The judge granted the motion, which ultimately resulted in dismissal of the charges. The State appealed, and Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The State appealed again to the WA Supreme Court.
 The court addressed the issue of whether it violates article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution for an officer to seize the nonarrested companion of an arrestee to secure the scene of an arrest.
 The court reasoned that an individual is seized when, under the circumstances, an individual’s freedom of movement is restrained and the individual would not believe he is free to leave or decline a request due to an officer’s use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin. This determination is made by objectively looking at the actions of the law enforcement officer.
 The court reasoned that an officer does not meet the standard required for a Terry stop in cases like this: “Terry must be met if the purpose of the officer’s interaction with the passenger is investigatory. For purposes of controlling the scene of the traffic stop and to preserve safety there, we apply the standard of an objective rationale.”
 Consequently, the Court gave factors from the WA Court of Appeals Div. III  decision State v. Mendes for determining what “an objective rationale” means when it comes to seizing a defendant’s companions. These Mendes factors include (but are not limited to) the arrest, the number of officers, the number of people present at the scene of the arrest, the time of day, the behavior of those present at the scene, the location of the arrest, the presence or suspected presence of a weapon, the officer’s knowledge of the arrestee or the companions and potentially affected citizens.
 “This is not an exhaustive list, and no one factor by itself justifies an officer’s seizure of non-arrested companions,” said the Court. “When determining whether there is an objective rationale, the court should look at all the circumstances present at the scene of the arrest.”
 Applying this “Objective Rationale Test,” the Court found that Officer McCain justifiably seized Mr. Flores to secure the scene of Powell ‘s arrest, and that the Officer’s actions were justified. The WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, found the seizure was lawful and ruled the evidence of the gun should not have been suppressed.
 Justice McCloud dissented under arguments that officers must comply with Terry at the scene of an arrest, and that the new “Objective Rationale Test” adopted by the Court effectively circumvented time-tested case law:
“This holding creates a new exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and we don’t have the power to create it–only the (United States) Supreme Court does. It’s also a new exception to our court’s consistent statements, for decades, that article I, section 7 provides more protection for individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment.”
 My opinion? The officers would have eventually found Mr. Flores’s firearm anyway if they followed protocol under a Terry stop. But they didn’t. Therefore, and similar to Justice McCloud, I’m concerned whether the “Objective Rationale Test” was wrongfully created to become another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.