Category Archives: Jury Selection

Protect Yourself Against Jury Duty Scams

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Washington State Courts - News, Reports, Court Information

According to a press release, Washington courts and residents are victimized by scams involving false claims from court officials or law enforcement officers.

“Please be advised about the following court-related scams and take appropriate precautions to protect yourself from identity and financial threats. Washington court personnel may contact you by phone, but they will never ask you to provide your personal information such as social security number or bank or credit card information.” ~ Washington Courts Press Release

“SPOOFED” CALLS FROM THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT

The Washington Supreme Court has become aware some state residents are receiving “spoofed” calls using fake caller ID information displaying the number of the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. It is unknown what the falsified callers are asking of recipients, but phone and email scams in recent years have included scam artists pretending to be with courts, police and prosecutor offices.

In its press release, the Washington Supreme Court denies making calls to residents. It is advised that if you receive such a phone call, do not give any information. Please hang up and contact law enforcement immediately. If you receive a call from someone claiming to be from the state Supreme Court, please contact us at 360-357-2074.

JURY DUTY PHONE SCAM

Washington residents have received phone calls from individuals claiming to be law enforcement officers (such as a Deputy Sheriff) or court personnel saying they’ve missed jury duty — and must pay. These callers request immediate payment to avoid issuance of a warrant related to Jury Duty. These payments have ranged from a few hundred to thousands of dollars. Typically, the payments are requested to be made via some type of pre-paid card such as “Green Dot.”

If you receive such a phone call, do not give any personal, credit card, or banking information. You should hang up and contact law enforcement immediately.

COURT APPEARANCE CYBER SCAM

A fraudulent email is being widely distributed around the U.S. with the subject line “Urgent court notice NR#73230” (or another random number) that claims the receiver is scheduled to appear in “the court of Washington” on a particular date. The receiver is then instructed to open the attached court notice and read it thoroughly and is warned about not appearing.

This is a “malware” email and will download a virus to your computer if you open the attachment. Please delete the email immediately without opening it. This email did not originate with the Administrative Office of the Courts or any Washington courts.

Jury service is as wonderful a responsibility as it is weighty. You help fulfill the right of defendants to a trial by their peers – a cornerstone of democracy. But it can be onerous, too, particularly for people who can’t afford the time off from their jobs or businesses or from caring for their children or sick loved ones. And nowadays, jury duty is subject to scams and spoofs. Be careful!

And please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“I’m On The Fence . . .”

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Buyers and Sellers: Time to Get Off the Fence | Framingham, MA Patch

In State v. Smith, No. 83187-9-I (August 21, 2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that a juror who says, “I’m on the fence” during jury selection should have been excused. If the juror is “on the fence” then the Prosecutor has not carried its burden.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Smith Nathan was charged with rape of a child in the first degree. During jury selection, Juror #27 was unable to commit to applying the presumption of innocence. When asked whether, if she disagreed with everyone else in the jury, she would be tempted to “change her vote to whatever the rest of the group thinks, even if she personally didn’t feel that way,” Juror #27 answered she would not:

“If I was a 100 percent very confident, then no. But if I was like, I believe this evidence, or whatever, but I am kind of like, on the fence, then I may agree with everyone.” ~Juror #27 (emphasis supplied)

Because Smith had exhausted his peremptories, Juror #27 was empaneled after the court denied his for-cause challenge. Later, Smith was convicted as charged. He appealed his conviction on arguments that the trial judge seated a biased juror.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying the accused has a federal and state constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. Trial judges have an independent duty to protect that right by excusing jurors who have actual or implied bias. “Actual bias” is defined by statute as “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.” RCW 4.44.170(2). 

The Court reasoned that being “on the fence” directly implicates proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If a juror is on the fence, the State has necessarily failed to satisfy its burden to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Simply agreeing with everyone when “on the fence,” means that the State has failed to meet its burden. This result contradicts the instructions on the law and deliberation process.

“There is nothing neutral about the presumption of innocence. Even after correction from the trial court, Juror #27 did not understand her duty as a juror and demonstrated an inability to serve as the law requires. Jurors who exhibit prejudice by being unwilling or unable to follow the law or participate in deliberations are unfit to serve on the jury. A jury should be composed of jurors who will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court. Jurors who cannot apply the law, including those who cannot apply the burden of proof because they fail to understand it, are not impartial.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Smith’scriminal conviction.

My opinion? Excellent work by the defense in exhausting their peremptory challenges, moving to excuse Juror #27 for cause and preserving the record for appeal when the judge denied the motion for cause. Constitutional law requires that jurors be impartial. They must fairly evaluate evidence and wait until the end of the trial to decide on a defendant’s guilt in a criminal case.

I’ve chosen well over 40 juries in my career. Finding impartial jurors is extremely difficult. As this case shows, however, it is suitable for all parties – including the Judge and Prosecutor – to excuse impartial jurors as quickly as possible.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

WA Supreme Court Strikes Down Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Jury Selection, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Race & Law, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Equal Justice Initiative Releases Report on Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection | Death Penalty Information Center

In State v. Rhone, the WA Supreme Court overturned a 65-year-old Black man’s conviction, nearly two decades after he alleged racial discrimination in the jury selection process for his trial.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Rhone proceeded to trial on charges of first degree robbery, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, unlawful possession of a firearm, and bail jumping. During jury selection, the parties agreed to remove one of the two Black jurors in the 41-member pool for cause. The prosecution—using a peremptory challenge—struck the remaining Black venire juror. After the court swore in the jury, Rhone made the following statement:

“I don’t mean to be facetious or disrespectful or a burden to the Court. However, I do want a jury of my peers. And I notice that the prosecutor took away the Black, African-American, man off the jury. Also, if I can’t have—I would like to have someone that represents my culture as well as your culture. To have this the way it is . . . seems unfair to me. It’s not a jury of my peers. . . . I am an African-American Black male, 48 years old. I would like someone of culture, of color, that has—perhaps may have had to deal with improprieties and so forth, to understand what’s going on and what could be happening in this trial.” ~Theodore Rhone

The court understood Rhone’s statement as a Batson challenge, found no prima
facie case of discrimination and denied Rhone’s request for a new jury panel. The jury convicted him of all charges. Rhone received a life sentence without the possibility of parole for two of his convictions.

In 2010 Rhone appealed, arguing for a “bright-line rule” establishing a prima facie case of discrimination when “the last remaining minority member of the venire is peremptorily challenged.” Unfortunately, the Washington Supreme Court denied Rhone’s appeal at that time.

However,  in their 2017 ruling in City of Seattle v. Erickson, the WA Supreme Court affirmed the very rule Rhone wanted to establish — even calling it the “Rhone Rule.” The court’s decision now to overturn Rhone’s convictions allows him to finally benefit from that rule. Rhone now sought collateral relief based on Erickson.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Susan Owens wrote the court’s opinion. She reasoned that Mr. Rhone’s unsuccessful challenge to the last remaining Black juror being struck from his venire directly resulted in him facing a jury that was undoubtedly less likely to debate and consider uncomfortable issues related to race and acknowledge and mitigate implicit biases than that of a diverse jury.

“Recalling the mandate in the unique circumstances of Rhone’s case accomplishes this mission; we must allow him to benefit from the rule he proposed that ultimately became the law in this state.” ~Justice Susan Owens

With that, the WA Supreme Court reverse Rhone’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? I applaud the court’s decision. When juries have diverse makeups, it allows them to draw from various lived experiences, and offer greater perspectives. Studies have shown that all-white juries spend less time deliberating, make more errors, and consider fewer perspectives. They also convict at higher rates and convict Black defendants at higher rates than other defendants specifically.

The court’s decision is the correct step toward racial justice and equity. In announcing the reversal of Rhone’s convictions, the state Supreme Court also ordered a new trial. Rhone will finally have a jury of his peers, as the law and constitution intended.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Jury Selection & Face Masks

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Coronavirus, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Can I Skip Jury Duty Because of Covid Fears? - The New York Times

In State v. Bell, the WA Court of Appeals held that it does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights for jurors to wear face masks at jury selection.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Bell was charged with first degree assault and drive-by shooting for an attack on his coworker. During jury selection, the court denied Bell’s request that jurors wear clear face shields rather than non-transparent face masks covering their noses and mouths. At trial, Mr. Bell was found guilty as charged. He appealed on arguments that the judge’s decision to deny his request for face shields violated his right to select an impartial jury.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that starting at the beginning of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Washington courts adopted a variety of strategies to ensure that trial could continue safely. The Washington State Supreme Court, in an order issued June 18, 2020, required courts to conduct all jury trial proceedings consistent with the most protective applicable public health guidance in their jurisdiction. It also ordered courts to inform jurors of steps the court would take to combat spread of the virus, including “face masking.”

“Washington was not alone in taking these steps to ensure the safety of jurors, court staff, counsel, parties, and the general public during a global health emergency. Many other jurisdictions did the same. Some of those jurisdictions have seen challenges to their pandemic-induced jury selection procedures similar to the one Bell brings. Courts have uniformly rejected these challenges.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bell’s motion. “It did not adopt procedures that no reasonable person could support,” it stated. “The trial court was responsive to Bell’s concerns throughout the selection process.” The Court of Appeals emphasized that Mr. Bell had the option to conduct voir dire online if he wished. This would have permitted access to the potential jurors’ faces, albeit at the cost of some of their body language. “He did not take advantage of this option, instead requesting that jurors wear face shields,”  stated the Court of Appeals.

“Here, the trial court’s decision to require potential jurors to wear face masks may have deprived Bell of some portion of his ability to assess their demeanor. But jurors’ discomfort at being forcibly unmasked in a crowded room around a group of strangers in the midst of a pandemic may have also affected their demeanor and impeded accurate determination of their mood and credibility. And their tone of voice, body language, eyes, and other aspects of their demeanor remained as accessible as they normally would have been.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, during a pandemic, it required jurors to wear face masks during jury selection.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Exhaust Your Peremptory Challenges

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Jury Selection, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Peremptory Challenge, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense

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In State v. Talbott, the WA Supreme Court held that at trial, a defendant may not appeal the seating of a juror if the defendant could have struck that juror with a peremptory challenge. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2018, Mr. Talbott was arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated first degree murder that occurred in 1987. The victims – Jay Cook and his girlfriend Tanya Van Cuylenborg – were a couple visiting from Canada. Their bodies were found in Snohomish County and Skagit County, respectively. Van Cuylenborg’s body displayed evidence of sexual assault. Despite a multicounty law enforcement effort to solve the murders, no arrests were made. It was not until 30 years later that law enforcement, with the assistance of a genealogist, identified Mr. Talbott as the source for DNA that was collected in 1987.

Jury Selection At Trial

During voir dire, Talbott moved to excuse juror 40 on a challenge for cause. A challenge for cause is a request to disqualify a potential juror for specific reasons. Typical reasons include an acquaintanceship with either of the parties. It also includes a juror’s prior knowledge that would prevent impartial evaluation of the evidence presented in court, bias, prejudice, or an inability to serve (such as being seriously mentally ill)

The judge denied the defendant’s motion to challenge juror 40 for cause. At the end of voir dire, the court provided both parties the opportunity to raise any additional for-cause challenges. However, both parties – the State and Defense Counsel – declined.

The parties then exercised peremptory challenges. This is one of a limited number of special jury challenges given to each party before trial.  A peremptory challenge results in the exclusion of a potential juror without the need for any reason or explanation – unless the opposing party presents a prima facie argument that this challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex.

After the State exercised its first peremptory challenge, juror 40 moved into the jury box. Talbott never attempted to use a peremptory challenge to remove juror 40. He affirmatively accepted the panel after exercising only four of his six peremptory challenges. Talbott had at least two additional peremptory challenges that he did not use on any prospective juror. Thus, Talbott explicitly agreed to be tried by a jury that included juror 40.

Talbott was convicted and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. He appealed, contending, among other things, that the seating of juror 40 violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

WA Supreme Court Justice Mary Yu wrote the Court’s majority opinion, which was agreed  to unanimously by the other justices.

Justice Yu began opined that criminal defendants have the constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. However, the burden of preventing trial errors rests squarely upon counsel for both sides. State v. Farley. Therefore, even defense counsel in a criminal case must attempt to correct errors at trial, rather than saving them for appeal in case the verdict goes against them.

Next, the Court raised and dismissed Talbott’s legal arguments regarding peremptory challenges and long history of precedent cases on the issue. First, the Court rejected Talbott’s argument that State v. Clark should have been rejected in light of State v. Fire.

“He is incorrect,” wrote the Court. “Fire did not overrule Clark. The two cases address different scenarios because the appellant in Fire exhausted their peremptory challenges and the appellant in Clark did not.” Moreover, the Court wrote that the holdings of Clark and Fire were consistent with each other. It is only in dicta that the opinions seem to contradict one another. “It is this dicta in Fire that has created some confusion and uncertainty in this area of the law,” said Justice Yu.

“Thus, we take this opportunity to clarify that a party who does not exhaust their peremptory challenges and accepts the jury panel cannot appeal the seating of
a particular juror.” ~Justice Mary Yu, WA Supreme Court

My opinion? Justice Yu issued a straightforward and academic ruling. A party may not appeal the seating of a juror if the party could have struck that juror with a preemptory challenge.  Parties are obliged to use their preemptory challenges to strike jurors they unsuccessfully moved to excuse for cause.  Finally, it appears that a party may only appeal the jury’s composition if the party exhausted their preemptory challenges.

The take-away? Exercise your peremptory challenges at trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Conviction Reversed Because Prosecutor Failed to Give Race-Neutral Reasons for Striking Jurors.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, GR 37, Jury Selection, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Race & Law, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

The Evolving Debate Over Batson's Procedures for Peremptory Challenges - National Association of Attorneys General

In State v. Tesfasilasye, the WA Supreme Court reversed a sex offense conviction under GR 37 because the prosecutor failed to give race-neutral reasons for striking two minority jurors.

A brief explanation of GR 37 is necessary. When the WA Supreme Court adopted GR 37 in 2018, it became the first court in the nation to adopt a court rule aimed at eliminating both implicit and intentional racial bias in jury selection. The rule expanded the prohibition against using race based peremptory challenges during jury selection. Not only was intentional race discrimination outlawed, but also challenges based on “implicit, institutional, and unconscious” race and ethnic biases were rejected.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant Mr. Tesfasilasye is a Black Eritrean immigrant whose primary language is Tigrigna. Tesfasilasye worked for Solid Ground as a driver for people with disabilities. C.R.R. used Solid Ground’s services. The alleged victim, C.R.R. is visually impaired. She sometimes uses a wheelchair due to balance issues.

The day after Tesfasilasye drove C.R.R. home, C.R.R. reported that Mr. Tesfasilasye assaulted her the day before. The State charged Tesfasilasye with third degree rape. During voir dire, the State brought peremptory challenges against Juror #25, an Asian woman, and Juror #3, a Latino.

The State sought to use a peremptory strike against Juror #25, an Asian woman. Tesfasilasye raised a GR 37 objection. The State denied it was striking Juror #25 because she was an Asian woman. The State called the court’s attention to the fact it was not seeking to strike the other Asian woman in the panel. Instead, the State contended it wanted to strike Juror# 25. The trial court overruled the GR 37 objection and granted the peremptory challenge.

Next, the State sought a peremptory challenge against Juror #3, the Latino. The court granted the peremptory challenge. However, the trial judge’s oral ruling was not based on
whether a reasonable juror could view race as a factor as required by GR 37.

The jury found Tesfasilasye guilty of third degree rape. Tesfasilasye appealed. He alleged that an objective observer could have viewed race as a factor for striking Juror #25 and Juror #3 as prohibited by GR 37. The Court of Appeals affirmed Tesfasilasye’s conviction. The WA Supreme Court granted review.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“Our constitutions require a fair and impartial jury,” wrote Justice Gonzalez. “The parties and the jurors themselves have the right to a trial process free from discrimination.” Next, Justice Gonzalez discussed the nefarious use of peremptory challenges to strike qualified jurors without providing a reason. “These challenges however have a history of being used based largely or entirely on racial stereotypes or generalizations,” he said.

Justice Gonzalez explained how GR 37 was an attempt to address the shortcomings of Batson v. Kentucky. Batson was a landmark case prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to automatically exclude potential members of the jury because of their race. “The protections under Batson were not robust enough to effectively combat racial discrimination during jury selection,” said Justice Gonzalez. In short, Batson failed to require a trial judge to make rulings without considering systemic and unconscious racial bias.

Justice Gonzalez explained that under GR 37, a peremptory challenge shall be denied if an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of a peremptory challenge. He described at great length why both Juror #25 and Juror #3 were wrongfully struck by the State and concluded as follows:

“We hold that under these facts, an objective observer could view race as a factor for striking both Juror #25 and Juror #3. Tesfasilasye asks this court to reverse his conviction. The State does not dispute that the remedy for a GR 37 violation is reversal. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.” Chief Justice Steven Gonzalez, WA Supreme Court.

My opinion? Good decision. The State has another opportunity for trial. Next time, let’s  hope they avoids striking jurors for race-based reasons.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

 

Flowers v. Mississippi: Supreme Court Finds Race-Based Peremptory Strikes Unlawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Criminal Justice, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Selection, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , , ,

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In Flowers v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the State’s peremptory strikes in the defendant’s first four trials strongly supported the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in the defendant’s sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Curtis Flowers was tried six separate times for the murder of four employees of a Mississippi furniture store. Flowers is black. Three of the four victims were white. At the first two trials, the State used its peremptory strikes on all of the qualified black prospective jurors.

In each case, the jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death, but the convictions were later reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court based on prosecutorial misconduct. At the third trial, the State used all of its 15 peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors, and the jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death.

The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed again, this time concluding that the State exercised its peremptory strikes on the basis of race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. Flowers’ fourth and fifth trials ended in mistrials. At the fourth, the State exercised 11 peremptory strikes—all against black prospective jurors. No available racial information exists about the prospective jurors in the fifth trial.

At the sixth trial, the State exercised six peremptory strikes—five against black prospective jurors, allowing one black juror to be seated. Flowers again raised a Batson challenge, but the trial court concluded that the State had offered race-neutral reasons for each of the five peremptory strikes. The jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Flowers appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented.

Kavanaugh began by discussing the history behind the landmark Batson v. Kentucky. In his majority opinion he explained that under Batson, once a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown by a defendant, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial judge then must determine whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for discrimination.

“Four categories of evidence loom large in assessing the Batson issue here, where the State had a persistent pattern of striking black prospective jurors from Flowers’ first through his sixth trial,” said Justice Kavanaugh.

The Court reasoned that here, a review of the history of the State’s peremptory strikes in Flowers’ first four trials strongly supports the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent:

“The State tried to strike all 36 black prospective jurors over the course of the first four trials. And the state courts themselves concluded that the State had violated Batson on two separate occasions. The State’s relentless, determined effort to rid the jury of black individuals strongly suggests that the State wanted to try Flowers before a jury with as few black jurors as possible, and ideally before an all-white jury.”

The Court also reasoned that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ sixth trial followed the same discriminatory pattern as the first four trials.

“Disparate questioning can be probative of discriminatory intent,” said the Court.  “Here, the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors—145 questions asked of 5 black prospective jurors and 12 questions asked of 11 white seated jurors.”

Consequently, along with the historical evidence from the earlier trials, as well as the State’s striking of five of six black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, the dramatically disparate questioning and investigation of black prospective jurors and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial strongly suggest that the State was motivated in substantial part by a discriminatory intent.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that comparing prospective jurors who were struck and not struck is an important step in determining whether a Batson violation occurred. “Here, Carolyn Wright, a black prospective juror, was struck, the State says, in part because she knew several defense witnesses and had worked at Wal-Mart where Flowers’ father also worked,” said the Court. “But three white prospective jurors also knew many individuals involved in the case, and the State asked them no individual questions about their connections to witnesses. White prospective jurors also had relationships with members of Flowers’ family, but the State did not ask them follow-up questions in order to explore the depth of those relationships.”

Finally, the Court ruled that the State also incorrectly explained that it exercised a peremptory strike against Wright because she had worked with one of Flowers’ sisters and made apparently incorrect statements to justify the strikes of other black prospective jurors. “When considered with other evidence, a series of factually inaccurate explanations for striking black prospective jurors can be another clue showing discriminatory intent,” said the Court. Consequently, the trial court at Flowers’ sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Pp. 26–30.

With that, the Supreme Court reversed Flowers’ conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court.

My opinion? Good decision. Although the facts and allegations are terrible for Mr. Flowers, prosecutors simply cannot use exercise race-based peremptory challenges to get justice.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Right to Impartial Jury

Assault, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Criminal Justice, Domestic Violence, felony, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Race & Law, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, Witness Tampering, , , , ,

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In State v. Phillips, the WA Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not violate an African-American defendant’s right to an impartial jury by dismissing a prospective juror despite the juror’s feelings that African American men are more prone to violence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On July 1, 2016, Mr. Phillips came home late after his wife Ms. Philips was in bed asleep with their infant daughter. Ms. Philips told Mr. Phillips to leave her alone. Their daughter called 911 and reported that Mr. Phillips was hitting Ms. Philips. When Mr. Phillips saw his daughter was calling the police, he knocked the phone from her hands.

King County Sheriff’s deputies responded to the 911 call and found the house in chaos. Mr. Phillips was arrested and booked into jail. From jail, Mr. Phillips repeatedly called Mrs. Philips demanding that she get him out and expressing his anger at the police having been called. Mr. Phillips was charged with Assault in the Second Degree Domestic Violence (DV) and Tampering With a Witness.

Jury Selection

During jury selection, the trial judge asked if any of the jurors had personal experience
with domestic violence. Juror 10 was among the members who raised their hand. When asked to elaborate, he explained that his sister and his wife’s sister-in-law were both involved in abusive relationships with intimate partners.

Juror #10 also revealed an experience in college after an intramural basketball game when an African American player on the opposing team assaulted him. Juror 10 explained, “nothing came of it, but it left an emotional imprint.” He further elaborated,

“And this is an emotional truth. I don’t live this way; I don’t believe this; but I’m also aware that feelings happen in reality that black men are more prone to violence . . . It was also notable that afterwards when, you know, the gym supervisor was called and there was just a huddle on the spot, and then, of course there was denial and, you know, dismissiveness of it. And that’s another narrative; that those who are violent try to get out of it; so those are two personal emotions imprints that are there, as well.”

From these comments, both the State Prosecutor and Mr. Philips’ defense attorney asked numerous questions to Juror #10. Ultimately, neither the State nor defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge or moved to strike Juror #10 for cause. Later, Juror #10 served on the jury.

Ultimately, the jury found Phillips guilty of second degree assault and found the State prove aggravating circumstances. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the witness tampering charge, and it was dismissed. Mr. Philips was sentenced to 120 months.

He appealed. One of the issues was whether Juror #10 should have been struck from serving on the jury panel.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Philips’ conviction.

The Court started by giving a substantial amount of background on the issue of jury selection. It said the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 22, of the Washington Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury.

Furthermore, in order to ensure this constitutional right, the trial court will excuse a juror for cause if the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. The presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of prejudice.

Also, at trial, either party has a statutory right to challenge a prospective juror for cause. “Actual bias is a ground for challenging a juror for cause,” said the Court of Appeals. “Actual bias occurs when there is the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.”

Furthermore, Under State v. Irby, RCW 2.36.110 and CrR 6.4 it is the judge’s duty to excuse potential jurors from  jury service if they have manifested unfitness as a juror by reason of bias, prejudice, indifference, inattention or any physical or mental defect. These court precedents, statutes and court rules give a trial judge an independent obligation to excuse a juror, regardless of inaction by counsel or the defendant.

However, the Court of Appeals ultimately reasoned that the present case was distinguishable from Irby.

Also, the Court of Appeals reasoned that defense counsel was alert to the possibility of biased jurors.

“Defense counsel actively questioned Juror #10, including questioning whether, despite juror 10’s concerns, the juror would follow the court’s instructions and base his decision on the evidence presented,” reasoned the court of Appeals. “As a result, defense counsel did not challenge Juror #10. This suggests that defense counsel observed something during voir dire that led counsel to believe Juror #10 could be fair.”

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals said it was also significant that Phillips used his peremptory challenges to strike several jurors, but had one peremptory challenge remaining when he accepted the jury, including Juror #10. “Again, this suggests that defense counsel either wanted juror 10 on the jury, or did not want one or both the next potential jurors on the panel,” said the Court of Appeals.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror #10 for cause and upheld Mr. Philips’ conviction.

My opinion? Bad decision.

I’ve conducted nearly 40 jury trials, which is more experience than most criminal defense attorneys have. In my experience, potential jurors have a tendency to mitigate, justify, deny, back-pedal and just plain cover up any biases they have. It’s human nature. Therefore, if any juror states they have a biases which prejudice a criminal defendant, then that juror should be excused. Period.

Unfortunately, it appears Defense Counsel also failed to strike Juror #10. That is unfortunate as well. As the judge said, however, this may have been strategic. Perhaps Defense Counsel wanted to avoid impaneling a potential juror who was actually more biased than Juror #10. We don’t know.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Jury Bias

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Federal Crimes & Prosecutions, Identity Theft, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Search Warrant, Sixth Amendment, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

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In United States v. Kecheczian, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a trial court mistakenly  allowed a juror to decide an aggravated identity theft and possession of unauthorized access devices case, when the juror admitted during jury selection that she had her social security number previously stolen and she was unable to explicitly state that she could put her personal biases aside.

BACKGROUND FACTS

After receiving a tip that Mr. Kechedzian was linked to a fugitive operating a large credit card fraud ring, federal agents conducted a trash pull from Kechedzian’s residence. In his trash, they found two counterfeit credit cards and, based on this, the agents obtained a search warrant. The resulting search of Kechedzian’s residence and cars uncovered two USB drives containing 1,451 stolen credit card numbers in text files, a Bluetooth-enabled “skimming device” commonly used to steal credit card information from gas station pumps, and several cards with stolen data re-encoded on the magnetic strips. Bank records revealed that many of the stolen card numbers had been used fraudulently at gas stations and other retail establishments across the United States.

Kechedzian was charged with two counts of possession of 15 or more Unauthorized Access Devices and two counts of Aggravated Identity Theft. The case proceeded to trial. At the beginning of jury selection, the federal district court judge read a general statement of the case, laying out the charges against Kechedzian. The judge then asked the following:

“Does anyone feel, just based on the charges in this case, based on what this case is about, that they could not be fair and impartial to both sides? Does anyone feel that way at this point in time?”

Juror # 3 raised her hand. From there, she informed the court she was a past victim of identity fraud. Furthermore, she did not know whether she could put aside her biases. Later, at sidebar, defense counsel sought to have Juror # 3 excused for cause. However, the judge denied the motion.

“I think at the end of the day she confirmed or committed to the principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof,” said the judge. “I would deny the motion.” Consequently, Juror # 3 sat on Kechedzian’s jury.

The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Kechedzian was sentenced to 65 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The district court also ordered $114,134.76 in restitution. Kechedzian timely appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & DECISION

The Court of Appeals began by saying the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by an impartial jury, and the bias or prejudice of even a single juror is enough to violate that guarantee. Accordingly, the presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless. The error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.  And any doubts regarding bias must be resolved against the juror. One important mechanism for ensuring impartiality is voir dire, which enables the parties to probe potential jurors for prejudice. After voir dire, counsel may challenge a prospective juror for cause, and a partial or biased juror should be removed if there is a showing of either implied or actual bias.

“Here, Kechedzian alleges bias under both theories,” said the Court.

Actual Bias Analysis

It explained that actual bias is the more common ground for excusing jurors for cause. Actual bias is the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality. Actual bias involves an inability to act impartially or a refusal to weigh the evidence properly It can be revealed through a juror’s express answers during voir dire, but it can also be revealed by circumstantial evidence during questioning.

The Court said that in contrast, implied bias is presumed only in extraordinary cases. “In analyzing implied bias, we look to whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.”

Implied Bias Analysis

This Court described “implied bias” as applying to those extreme situations where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.  Furthermore, the implied bias inquiry is an objective one. Even if a juror states or believes that she can be impartial, the court may find implied bias based on the circumstances.

The Court noted that here, although Juror # 3 was previously a victim of identity theft, this is not the type of “extreme” situation where we find implied bias. “Thus, we focus our analysis on the actual bias inquiry,” said the Court.

The Court reasoned that Juror #3 was ultimately asked if she could set aside her feelings, and act impartially and fairly to both sides of the case. She responded: “I believe so, yes.” The Court said that statement—“I believe so, yes”—appears somewhat equivocal. However, none of Juror #3’s equivocal statements could be understood as affirmative statements of impartiality. The Court reasoned that here, Juror #3 explicitly noted that she was unsure if she could put her personal biases aside.

“A juror can understand the presumption of innocence and burden of proof, yet still let personal prejudice infect her ability to be impartial.”

“When a juror is unable to state that she will serve fairly and impartially despite being asked repeatedly for such assurances, we can have no confidence that the juror will lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences and render a fair and impartial verdict,” said the Court. “Because this is precisely what occurred here, the district court was obligated to excuse Juror #3 for cause under an actual bias theory.”

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? Good decision. In my trial experience, potential jurors who have suffered as victims of crime tend to be pro-prosecution. A potential juror who does not know if they can be fair or impartial should be excused for cause. Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Race-Based Jury Selection

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, misdemeanor, Race & Law, Resisting Arrest, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Violent Crime, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In City of Seattle v. Erickson, the WA Supreme Court held that the Prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a minority juror was a prima facie showing of racial discrimination requiring a full analysis under Batson v. Kentucky.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2013, Matthew Erickson, a black man, was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with Unlawful Use of a Weapon and Resisting Arrest. After voir dire, the City of Seattle (City) exercised a peremptory challenge against tjuror #5, who was the only black juror on the jury panel. After the jury was empaneled and excused from the courthouse with the rest of the venire, Erickson objected to the peremptory challenge, claiming the strike was racially motivated. The court found that there was no prima facie showing of racial discrimination and overruled Erickson’s objection.

Erickson was convicted on both counts.

Erickson appealed the municipal court’s decision to King County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the municipal court, finding that the circumstances surrounding the challenge did not raise any inference that the juror was stricken because of his race. The judge did not address whether Erickson’s motion was timely.

ISSUES

The WA Supreme Court granted review of Erickson’s appeal on the following issues:

1. Did Erickson waive his right to a Batson challenge when he objected after the jury was empaneled and both the jury and venire excused?

2. Did the trial court error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the City struck juror #5?

BATSON V. KENTUCKY: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND ON RACE-BASED PEREMPTORY STRIKES

For those who don’t know, in Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court created a 3-step process for enforcing the constitutional rule against excluding a potential juror based on race. First, the defense must show that the circumstances at trial raise an inference of discrimination. Second, the prosecutor must give a nonracial reason for the strike. Third, the court decides if the prosecutor intentionally discriminated against the juror because of race. The decision was made to stop the unfair practice of race-based peremptory strikes of qualified minority jurors because at that time, prosecutors could easily mask their efforts to exclude racial minorities from jury service.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court ruled that Erickson did not waive His Right to a Batson challenge when he objected to the striking of a juror after the jury was empaneled but before testimony was heard. It reasoned that a number of federal courts also allow Batson challenges after the jury has been sworn. Read together, the case law has adopted rules requiring that a Batson challenge be brought at the earliest reasonable time while the trial court still has the ability to remedy the wrong.

“These cases recognize that judges and parties do not have instantaneous reaction time, and so have given both trial courts and litigants some lenience to bring Batson challenges after the jury was been sworn,” said the Court. “This is in line with our own jurisprudence.”

The Court further stated that objections should generally be brought when the trial court has the ability to remedy the error, and allowing some challenges after the swearing in of the jury does not offend that ability.

“Although the timing was not ideal, the Batson challenge was raised when the trial court still had an opportunity to correct it,” said the Court. “So even though Erickson brought his Batson challenge after the jury was empaneled, the trial court still had adequate ability to remedy any error. Therefore, Erickson made a timely Batson challenge.”

Second, the WA Supreme Court Court ruled that the trial court did, in fact, error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the Prosecutor struck juror #5.

Here, and in bold strokes, the Court changed how Batson is applied in Washington so that striking a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group automatically triggers a full Batson analysis by the trial court:

“The evil of racial discrimination is still the evil this rule seeks to eradicate,” the court explained, writing that “this alteration provides parties and courts with a new tool, allowing them an alternate route to defend the protections espoused by Batson. A prima facie case can always be made based on overt racism or a pattern of impermissible strikes. Now, it can also be made when the sole member of a racially cognizable group is removed using a peremptory strike.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court carved the following bright-line rule adopted from State v. Rhone:

“We hold that the trial court must recognize a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose when the sole member of a racially cognizable group has been struck from the jury. The trial court must then require an explanation from the striking party and analyze, based on the explanation and the totality of the circumstances, whether the strike was racially motivated.”

In other words, the peremptory strike of a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group on a jury panel does in fact, constitute a prima facie showing of racial motivation. Also, the trial court must ask for a race-neutral reason from the striking party and then determine, based on the facts and surrounding circumstances, whether the strike was driven by racial reasons.

The WA Supreme Court reverse Erickson’s conviction and remanded his case back to the trial court for a new trial.

My opinion? I’m very pleased. I wrote about unlawful race-based peremptory strikes in my blog on State v. Saintcalle; a WA Supreme Court case having similar dynamics, peremptory strikes and Batson challenges to the case at hand. In that post, I was very disappointed that the WA Supreme Court failed to fix a systemic problem of Prosecutors exercising race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection.

Finally, the WA Supreme Court has become more proactive in stopping this unfair, unconstitutional practice. It’s not enough for Prosecutors to give utterly superficial reasons for striking minority jurors when the real reason for striking them is blatantly staring us in the face. Now, and finally, Prosecutors must prove that their decision to strike is not race-based. This subtle, yet oh-so-important shift in perspective effectively addresses what’s really happening during jury selection and makes a solution toward preventing race-based peremptory strikes. Excellent.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.