Category Archives: United States Supreme Court

Second Amendment Protects Stun Guns

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In Cadtano v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment presumably extends to stun guns.

After a “bad altercation” with an abusive boyfriend put her in the hospital, Jaime Caetano found herself homeless and in fear for her life. She obtained multiple restraining orders against her abuser, but they proved futile. So when a friend offered her a stun gun “for self-defense against her former boy friend, Caetano accepted the weapon.

It is a good thing she did. One night after leaving work, Caetano found her ex-boyfriend waiting for her outside. He “started screaming” that she was “not gonna [expletive deleted] work at this place” any more because she “should be home with the kids” they had together. Caetano’s abuser towered over her by nearly a foot and outweighed her by close to 100 pounds. But she didn’t need physical strength to protect herself. She stood her ground, displayed the stun gun, and announced: “I’m not gonna take this anymore. . . . I don’t wanna have to use the stun gun on you, but if you don’t leave me alone, I’m gonna have to.” The gambit worked. The ex-boyfriend “got scared and he left her alone.”

Under Massachusetts law, however, stun guns are illegal.

When police later discovered the weapon, Ms. Caetano was arrested, tried, and convicted for violating the law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a stun gun “is not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection” because it was “not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.”

Her case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s conclusion that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use. It reasoned that law enforcement and correctional officers carry stun guns and Tasers, presumably for such purposes as nonlethal crowd control. Also, subduing members of a mob is little different from suppressing insurrections, a traditional role of the militia.  Finally, several branches of the U. S. armed services equip troops with electrical stun weapons to “incapacitate a target without permanent injury or known side effects.”

The Court also reasoned that “hundreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens,” who may lawfully possess them in 45 States. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded with powerful language stated below:

A State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people safe. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either unable or unwilling to do what was necessary to protect Jaime Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself. To make matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy its prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of a criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal weapon that may well have saved her life. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsiest of grounds. This Court’s grudging per curiam now sends the case back to that same court. And the consequences for Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her conviction likely bars her from ever bearing arms for self-defense. If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than about keeping them safe.

With that, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

My opinion? Good decision. Stun guns are non-lethal use of self-defense. They shouldn’t be outlawed or classified as a dangerous weapon.

FYI, stun guns are (mostly) legal in WA State. State law only prohibits the possession of a stun gun on school property under RCW 9.41.280.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Stingray “Spy” Devices

ACLU, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, law enforcement, Pretrial Investigations, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Stingray Devices, Technology, Text Messages, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

This undated handout photo provided by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office shows the StingRay II, manufactured by Harris Corporation, of Melbourne, Fla., a cellular site simulator used for surveillance purposes. (AP Photo/U.S. Patent and Trademark Office)

Intimidating, no?

This suitcase-sized device, called Hailstorm or Stingray, is a controversial cellular phone surveillance device manufactured by the Harris Corporation. It is designed to sweep up basic cellphone data from a neighborhood and identify unique subscriber numbers. That data is then transmitted to the police, allowing them to locate a phone without the user even making a call or sending a text message. It’s the newest, most advanced technology in spyware which essentially allows police to observe, record and otherwise pinpoint your cell phone activity. And, of course, a growing number of police departments are purchasing these devices.

Stingrays cost as much as $400,000 and acts as a fake cell tower. The system, typically installed in a vehicle so it can be moved into any neighborhood, tricks all nearby phones into connecting to it and feeding data to police. In some states, the devices are available to any local police department via state surveillance units. The federal government funds most of the purchases, via anti-terror grants.

These devices are used to spy on people’s words, locations and associations. Stingrays can capture everything from metadata (who called whom, when, and sometimes from where) to the content of calls.

A news article from USA Today titled, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA describes how numerous police agencies across the country refuse to admit whether they’ve used Stingrays in surveillance. According to the article, most police agencies deny public records requests, arguing that criminals or terrorists could use the information to thwart important crime-fighting and surveillance techniques. Police maintain that cellphone data can help solve crimes, track fugitives or abducted children or even foil a terror attack.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has investigated the use of Stingrays and has also successfully identified 54 agencies in 21 states and the District of Columbia that own Stingrays. Many agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of Stingrays in secrecy.

A growing number of courts and legal authorities are increasingly wary on whether Stingrays violate citizen’s rights against unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. For example,  in FROM SMARTPHONES TO STINGRAYS: CAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT KEEP UP WITH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? attorney Brittany Hampton wrote a Note in the University of Louisville Law Review which discussed the questionable use of the Stingray devices by police agencies.

In her article, Ms. Hampton argues that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements when using their cellphones; therefore, the use of the Stingray constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. She also discusses the need for the United States Supreme Court to develop a clear warrant requirement for the monitoring of an individual using the Stingray device. Ultimately, Hampton advocates a warrant requirement for utilizing the Stingray devices for police tracking purposes because the warrantless use of the Stingray is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

My opinion? I wholeheartedly agree with Ms. Hampton, the ACLU and other legal experts on this issues. Using Stingrays is an unlawful search. Quite frankly, the government should not have carte blanche secret access to people’s cell phone use and information. It’s overly intrusive and distasteful that the government can, without warning, essentially use people’s cell data as pretextual evidence to investigate our whereabouts, listen to our conversations and ultimately charge us with crimes.

Even worse – and speaking as a criminal defense attorney – it’s disturbing that police agencies can use the information obtained from Stingrays as probable cause to obtain search warrants of people’s homes and seize evidence therein. Moreover, if I move to suppress the evidence gained from the search warrant as the fruits of an unlawful search, local police agencies deny and circumvent my Motions to Compel Evidence and Public Disclosure Requests by simply having the feds conduct the Stingray search. This is bad.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Ohio v. Clark: Child Victim Hearsay Statements Are Admissible

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Child Competence, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Sixth Amendment, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

In Ohio v. Clark, the United States Supreme Court ruled that statements made by the 3-year-old victim to his preschool teacher were properly admitted at trial, despite the fact that the 3-year-old did not testify.

Here, defendant Darius Clark sent his girlfriend away to engage in prostitution while he cared for her 3-year-old son L. P. and 18-month-old daughter A. T. When L. P.’s preschool teachers noticed marks on his body, he identified Clark as his abuser. Clark was subsequently tried on multiple counts related to the abuse of both children. At trial, the State introduced L. P.’s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark’s guilt, but L. P. did not testify. The trial court denied Clark’s motion to exclude the statements under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. A jury convicted Clark on all but one count. The state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the matter once and for all.

For those who don’t know, The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government. The right only applies to criminal prosecutions.

Here, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that L. P.’s statements at trial – which were introduced as hearsay evidence through the testimony of a school counselor – did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

In reaching its decision, the Court said it’s prior decision in Crawford v. Washington held that the Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the introduction of “testimonial” statements by a non-testifying witness, unless the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Additionally, a statement qualifies as testimonial if the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to “create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” The Court addressed why L.P.’s statements were not “testimonial:”

“L. P.’s statements were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution. They occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. L. P.’s teachers asked questions aimed at identifying and ending a threat. They did not inform the child that his answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L. P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the conversation was informal and spontaneous. L. P.’s age further confirms that the statements in question were not testimonial because statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause”

“Finally, although statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers are not categorically outside the Sixth Amendment’s reach, the fact that L. P. was speaking to his teachers is highly relevant. Statements to individuals who are not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonialthan those given to law enforcement officers.”

Furthermore, the Court found it irrelevant that the teachers’ questions and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution. “Mandatory reporting obligations do not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed at gathering evidence for prosecution.”

My opinion? I fear a slippery slope. Child victims are notoriously difficult. The first challenge is getting an interview. If defense counsel succeeds, they must be prepared to interview the child victim with a legion of DV advocates, investigating officers, parents, family friends and the Prosecutor attending the interview. And by this time, the matter has been discussed ad nauseum between the child and the aforementioned. Consequently, by the time the interview happens, the child has essentially been trained and coached to memorize a script and stick with it.

Now, with this opinion, it seems that school counselors can testify to statements made by the child victim., and that the child not even be made available to testify. Under the Washington Rules of Evidence – which strictly follow the Federal Rules of Evidence – ER 801 says, “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement made to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Statements made by another are hearsay. Also, Hearsay is generally inadmissible. But now, under these circumstances, hearsay is admissible; and made worse by the fact that the defendant cannot confront the child witness at trial. This violates the essence of the 6th Amendment’s Confrontation clause. Period. Bad decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Rodriguez v. United States: Nonconsensual Dog Sniff of Car Held Unconstitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that absent reasonable suspicion, police extending a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) the 4th Amendment does Fourth Amendment does not tolerate a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop, (2) a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violated the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures, (3) a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the issuing of a ticket for the violation, and (4) a stop may, however, be prolonged for a dog sniff when there is independent information giving rise to an individualized suspicion that the occupants of the car are involved in a drug offense.

The 6-3 ruling is indeed a big win for the 4th Amendment.

In this case, Officer Struble, a K-9 officer, stopped the defendant Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder. After issuing a warning for the traffic offense Officer Strubble asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. Struble detained him until another police officer arrived. Struble’s dog performed a search and alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The dog found methamphetamine.

Seven or eight minutes elapsed between the time Struble issued the warning and the dog alerting to the presence of contraband.

Rodriguez faced several federal drug charges. Although he moved to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle on the basis that Officer Struble prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff search, the lower court denied Rodriguez’s motion. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the search and seizure issues.

The Court reasoned that a routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio than an arrest. Its duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission,” which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

The court further reasoned that a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission. Also, the Court was concerned that seizing citizens for traffic stops and holding them to conduct a more intrusive search with no evidence of criminal activity beyond the mere traffic stop is unlawful: “The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop.

My opinion? Great ruling! It’s rare that the Supreme Court upholds the 4th Amendment these days. Fortunately, this favorable outcome happened because the suspect asserted his rights by refusing the dog sniff. Past rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court limit 4th Amendment protections where suspects DID NOT assert their rights. See Florida v. Bostick.

Yet here’s a case where the suspect did flex their rights. Look at the outcome! It’s a testament – a reminder, if you will – that asserting your rights makes a difference. Great case.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. McNeely: U.S. Supreme Court Says Blood Draws Require a Warrant

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, DUI, Exigent Circumstances, Ignition Interlock Device, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, , ,

Harmless Error Blog: Missouri v. McNeely: Trouble for Implied Consent Laws?

In Missouri v. McNeely, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers investigating DUI must obtain search warrants for blood draws if emergency circumstances – in legal language, exigent circumstances – do not exist.

The issue decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.

The facts were such that the defendant McNeely was stopped by Missouri police for speeding and crossing the centerline. After declining to take a breath test to measure his blood and alcohol concentration (BAC), he was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for blood testing.

The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. McNeely refused to consent to the blood test, but the officer directed a lab technician to take a blood sample anyway. McNeely’s BAC sample was well above the legal limit. He was charged with Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).

The U.S. Supreme Court held that rather than applying a blanket per se exigency due to the dissipation of BAC in a person’s body, an exigency must also be based upon “special facts” under a case-by-case analysis.

The Supremes reviewed prior caselaw on this subject. In State v. McNeely, the Court pointed out that a diminishing BAC result upon the passage of time that happens during a DUI investigation is only one factor that must be considered in determining whether a warrant is required.

The Court in McNeely further stated that other factors, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can establish whether an exigency exists. In other words, a warrantless blood draw can still be conducted provided there are other factors articulated by the officer.

My opinion? McNeely is a good, straightforward decision. In short, McNeely holds that when a person refuses to voluntarily submit to a chemical test for BAC, if time permits, a warrant should be obtained. If an officer cannot get a search warrant in a reasonable time, the officer should explain in great detail why a search warrant could not be obtained.

The officer must be able to articulate what factors were present that created an exigent circumstance. Also, and importantly, “exigent circumstance” cannot be a result of the officer’s conduct. There must be objective, independent facts articulating why exigent circumstances exist to get a warrant.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Supreme Court Wary of Warrantless Blood Tests in DUI Cases

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, DUI, felony, Ignition Interlock Device, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Miami Police Usually Need a Search Warrant to Draw Your Blood for a DUI

Good stuff. The Supreme Court is considering requiring police to get a search warrant before forcing drunken-driving suspects to have blood draws.

In State of Missouri v. McNeely, the defendant was pulled over for speeding. He failed field sobriety tests and refused to take a breath test. The officer then took McNeely to a nearby hospital, where a technician drew blood over the handcuffed suspect’s objection. The legal issue is whether blood draws taken under these circumstances violate a defendant’s Constitutional rights. If so, the blood test  is suppressed and inadmissible to a jury if the case proceeds to jury trial.

The prosecution argues that getting a nighttime warrant takes an average of two hours, by which point a person’s blood-alcohol level may have dropped below the legal limit.  Alcohol typically dissipates in the bloodstream at a rate of 0.015 to 0.020 percentage points an hour. The limit in Missouri is 0.08 percent.

McNeely’s defense attorney argues that Missouri’s Implied Consent law allows drivers the right to refuse a blood test. All 50 states have implied-consent laws in some form. In short, Implied Consent law says drivers who refuse a blood or breath test automatically lose their license for a year.

My opinion? Police should get warrants. Period. Getting a warrant is the proper remedy when defendants exercise their Constitutional rights. Also, it doesn’t take long to get one. Police can call a judge while driving a defendant to the jail. Judges typically issue warrants over the phone.

Due to the passage of I-502, this issue is especially relevant in WA. I-502 allows for citizens to possess small amounts of marijuana. Unfortunately, when it comes to DUI arrests, I-502 set the legal limit for THC is the bloodstream at only 5 nanograms. This is a very low amount, especially for citizens who are licensed to smoke marijuana.

In other blogs I predicted that the passage of I-502 would probably convince law enforcement to immediately transport citizens investigated for DUI straight to the hospital to undergo blood tests. Blood draws are necessary to determine nanogram levels (they also detect alcohol levels). I also predicted that unlawfully obtained blood tests would soon become the subject matter of intense pretrial litigation.

Was the officer trained in drug DUI detection? Was the blood draw performed by someone who is medically licensed? Was it performed within 2 hours of the defendant being pulled over? Was the blood test tampered with? Can the prosecution properly establish the chain of custody of all persons who handled the blood sample? And now, according to the above case, can law enforcement simply circumvent the warrant requirement and obtain blood draws if the defendant refuses?

All of these issues are the subject matter of intense legal arguments. A good trial attorney will argue pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained and/or tainted evidence. Yes, this pending case is a big deal.

We’ll see what happens. . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Adams: The WA Supremes On a Hot Roll With Yet ANOTHER Decision re. Illegal Car Searches

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Jail, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can the Police Legitimately Search My Vehicle Without a Warrant? - FindLaw

“1-2-3!”

You hear this shouted in fight gyms and boxing matches around the world.  It’s a quick, concise statement of one of the deadliest 3-punch combinations in the sport.   It’s a left jab, followed by a right cross and ending with a left hook (consider opposite hands if you’re southpaw).  The jab opens the opponent’s defense and establishes punching range.  The right cross – your power hand – does damage.  The coup de gras left hook should result in more major pain, a knockdown or knockout; especially if ANY of the punches land flush on the chin or temple.  At any rate, somebody is getting hurt.  Or put to sleep.

For the month of August, the WA Supremes issued a 1-2-3 combination with State v. Tibbles, State v. Afana and now State v. Adams; all three decisions upholding the U.S. Supreme Court’s Arizona v. Gant which held that police may search a vehicle incident to arrest “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”

Lat’s talk about State v. Adams.  On May 24, 2006, Deputy Volpe observed Coryell Adams sitting in a parked car outside a casino.  Volpe checked the license plate number and learned that Adams had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving with a revoked license.

Volpe followed Adams as he drove to a Taco Bell parking lot.  Volpe drove onto the same lot, activated her emergency lights, and parked about eight feet behind Adams’ car.  As she stepped out of her patrol car, Adams stepped out from his car, stood near the driver’s side door and began yelling at Volpe, challenging the stop as racial profiling.  After Volpe repeatedly ordered Adams back into his car, Adams “took 4-5 steps away from the car” and stepped into an adjacent parking stall where he continued to yell and wave his arms.  At Volpe’s request, another deputy arrived and Adams calmed down.  He was then placed under arrest.

After Adams failed to identify himself, Volpe frisked Adams and removed his keys and his wallet, which contained documents identifying him as the registered owner of the vehicle.  The other deputy unlocked Adams’ car. After Volpe placed Adams in the back of her patrol car and read him his rights, she searched his vehicle and found a small black bag containing cocaine in the center console.  He was charged with Possession of Cocaine.  The case wound its way into the WA Supreme Court.  During that time, the U.S. Supremes decided Arizona v. Gant, which was alluded to earlier.

Similar to State v. Afana, the State argued the officer acted in “good faith” when arresting Adams.  However, the WA Supremes made short work of the case:

“Our recent decision in Afana resolves this case.  In Afana we rejected the State’s argument that “good faith” reliance on pre-Gant case law constitutes an exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.  We explained the distinction between an officer’s “good faith” reliance on statutes that were subsequently declared unconstitutional to establish probable cause to arrest . . . [B]ecause the State concedes that Gant applies to the search in this case, and because we have declined to recognize a “good faith” exception based on pre-Gant case law in Afana, we reverse the conviction in this case.”

My opinion?  Criminal defense attorneys have reason to raise a glass and toast the WA Supremes.  These decisions are a fitting end to the summer of 2010.  Take notice, prosecutors: Gant and its Washington progeny are here to stay.  These cases won’t be skirted by “exigent circumstances.”  They won’t be distinguished by “good faith.”  Hurray to a new millennium in cases involving car searches and seizures. 🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Afana: ANOTHER Awesome Decision re. Illegal Car Searches

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, DUI, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Unreasonable Search and Seizure - Passengers, Tire Chalking, Warrantless Searches

In State v. Afana, the WA Supreme Court held the warrantless search of a vehicle incident to passenger arrest was unlawful, and there is no “good faith” exception under the Washington Constitution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

At 3:40 a.m., Deputy Miller noticed a car which was legally parked on a city street in Spokane County.  He became suspicious, parked his cruiser behind the vehicle, shone his spotlight on it, and made contact.  Two people were inside.  The driver said they were watching a movie on his portable DVD player.  Deputy Miller ran warrant checks on both individuals.  He discovered a warrant existed for the passenger, Ms. Bergeron, for the crime of Criminal Trespass.  He arrests her.

Deputy Miller searched the car and found a black cloth bag behind the driver’s seat.  The bag contained a crystalline substance which looked like methamphetamine.  He also found a glass marijuana pipe, needles, and plastic scales.  Deputy Miller arrested Mr. Alfana, the driver, on Drug Charges.

The case wound up for review before the WA Supreme Court.  in the meantime, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).  There, the Court said that police may search a vehicle incident to arrest “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”

The Court reasoned that, pursuant to Gant, nothing justified the search that happened after arrest.  Although the warrant for Bergeron’s arrest gave Deputy Miller a basis to arrest her, he had no reason to believe that the vehicle she occupied contained evidence of her underlying crime, namely, Criminal Trespass.  The deputy also lacked reason to believe that she posed a safety risk because she was already in custody in the backseat of the patrol vehicle.

Furthermore, the fact that the driver, Afana, was unsecured at the time of the search does not justify the search.  This is so because he was not under arrest at the time the search was conducted, and Gant held that “police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”  Here, the only arrestee was Bergeron; who was already in the backseat of the police cruiser.

The Court addressed the State’s “Good Faith” exception to warrantless searches.  Historically, this exception allows an otherwise unconstitutional search or seizure if the police officer believes the search was constitutional/reasonable at the time.  Here, the court rejected the State’s “Good Faith” argument because there was no probable cause to conduct the illegal search in the first place.  The evidence was suppressed.

My opinion?  August is a BIG month for handing down post Gant-related decisions (please refer to my blog on State v. Tibbles).  I’m really impressed with how the WA Supremes are handling Gant.  They aren’t chipping away at Gant with BS opinions.  They are, in fact, honoring Gant.  Afana was a unanimous decision, with only one Justice dissenting.  Horray!  🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Berghuis v. Thompkins: Miranda Applies, BUT Defendants MUST Clearly Invoke Constitutional Rights

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Duress Defense, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Interrogation, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Self-Incrimination, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Why Interrogation in Jail May Not Count as “Custodial”: The Supreme Court Makes New Law in Howes v. Fields | Sherry F. Colb | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal suspect must specifically invoke the right against self-incrimination in order for constitutional protections to apply.

The case centered around the interrogation of Van Chester Thompkins, who was suspected of Homicide. He remained virtually silent for hours in police custody before giving a few brief responses to police questions. Most significantly, Thompkins answered “yes” when asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” The statement was introduced at trial and Thompkins was convicted.

In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that criminal suspects who do not clearly state their intention to remain silent are presumed to have waived their 5th Amendment rights. Ironically, suspects must literally open their mouths and speak in order for their silence to be legally protected. The new rule will defer to police in cases where the suspect fails to unambiguously assert their right to remain silent.

My opinion?  Naturally, I’m concerned about any retreat from the basic principle that criminal suspects should not be compelled or coerced into incriminating themselves.  The opinion is wrong because it creates additional challenges for suspects who already understand too little about how their constitutional rights apply during police interrogations.

Fortunately, however, the Berghuis decision leaves intact the best strategy for handling any police interrogation: keeping your mouth shut. Requiring suspects with limited legal knowledge to clearly assert their rights may seem a bit strict, but it’s irrelevant if the suspect never says a word to begin with. The point of the 5th Amendment isn’t to protect you after you’ve foolishly incriminated yourself; it’s to remind you that you’re not obligated to answer police questions in the first place.

Ultimately, the burden is on each of us to understand our rights and use that information to make the best decisions. It’s unlikely that any Supreme Court decision will ever change the fact that remaining silent is your best and only strategy if police ask you incriminating questions.

I can’t stress this enough: your attorney can suppress unlawfully obtained evidence IF you clearly assert your rights.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Graham v. Florida: Court Strikes Down “Cruel & Unusual” Sentencing on Minor

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Due Process, felony, Juvenile, United States Supreme Court, , ,

What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment? - YouTube

In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender to life in prison without parole when the crime does not involve murder, given the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual” punishment.

Petitioner Graham was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime.  under a plea agreement, the Florida trial court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld adjudication of guilt.  Subsequently, the trial court found that Graham violated the terms of his probation by committing additional crimes.  The trial court adjudicated Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in prison for the Burglary.  Because Florida abolished its parole system, the life sentences left Graham no possibility of release.  He challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.

The U.S. Supremes sided with Graham, and reasoned the inadequacy of penological theory to justify life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the limited culpability of such offenders, and the severity of these sentences all lead the Court to conclude that Graham’s sentence was cruel and unusual.  Moreover, defendants who do not kill, or foresee that life will be taken are less deserving of such punishments than are murderers.

Finally, the court reasoned that serious nonhomicide crimes may be devastating in their harm, but in terms of moral depravity and the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be compared to murder in their severity.

My opinion?  The U.S. Supremes made the right decision.  It seems Draconian to impose a life sentence on a minor who committed a non-homicide crime.  Period.

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