Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

State v. King: Out-Of-Jurisdiction Police Cannot Arrest Unless Emergency Exists

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Terry Stop, Washington State Traffic Commission, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police make traffic stops outside Jurisdiction - YouTube

Excellent opinion.

In State v. King, the WA Supreme Court held that out-of-jurisdiction police cannot arrest unless an emergency exists.

Tyler King was riding his motorcycle southbound on Interstate 5 north of Vancouver city limits when he was stopped and issued a criminal citation for Reckless Driving by Vancouver police officer Jeff Starks. King had stood up on the pegs of his motorcycle, looked at the vehicle he was approaching, and  accelerated to pass the vehicle.

King and Starks both testified at the trial, offering different interpretations of the facts. Starks offered opinion testimony that King’s driving had been reckless, which King’s attorney did not object to at trial but then raised on appeal. King also challenged that the officer was outside of his jurisdiction without an interlocal agreement and without satisfying the statutory emergency exception.

The Supreme Court held that Officer Starks did not have jurisdiction to issue the criminal citation. They reasoned that Stark’s  interpretation of King’s actions would not have constituted “an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property.”

King did not nearly hit another car, nor run a light, nor weave across traffic lanes. He did not pop a wheelie, cut off another car, nor, for that matter, drive in reverse along the shoulder. At most, King glared at the driver of the large truck, stood on his foot pegs for three to five seconds, and accelerated at high speed past the truck.

As aforementioned, Starks could not verify that King accelerated away at what he thought was 100 m.p.h. Even so, the officer testified King slowed down as he approached other traffic and pulled over immediately when Starks signaled him to do so.

The majority concludes that the trial court was wrong to simply take the definition of reckless driving and assume that it “automatically fit within the emergency exception.” The majority also suggests that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the opinion testimony issue was foreclosed by the lack of an objection at trial.

My opinion?  Again, good decision.  Reckless Driving does not always involve racing, road rage, emergency situations or life-threatening behavior.  Let’s be frank: some people simply enjoy horsing around while driving!

The Supremes rightfully disagreed with the trial court and saw the situation for what it was: people slightly agitated with each other’s driving, a brief increase in speed, and it’s over.  Nobody goes crazy, and/or gets mad, violent or injured.  Period.  It’d be a miscarriage of justice to allow out-of-jurisdiction officers to arrest people based on those circumstances.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Iniguez: How Were the Defendant’s Speedy Trial Rights NOT Violated?

Constitutional Rights, Discovery, Due Process, felony, Jail, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Can’t agree with the Supremes on this one . . .

In State v. Iniguez, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated even though a defendant waited in jail 8 months and objected to all continuances.

Following his arrest on First Degree Robbery, Mr. Iniguez remained in custody pending a joint trial with his codefendant.  An 8-month delay between arraignment and trial took place.  During this time, the State moved for a total of four trial continuances, the last of which the State sought because it learned — belatedly — that a key witness was out of town.  Iniguez objected to all continuances.  The trial court denied his objections and pretrial motions.  At trial, the jury found Iniguez guilty.  He appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez’s conviction.  The court held the eight-month delay between arrest and trial was prejudicial and violated Iniguez’s constitutional right to speedy trial.

However, the WA Supremes decided the delay did not violate the time-for-trial court rule, CrR 3.2, and did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or Const. art. I, § 22 constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 22 of the state constitution does not offer greater protections than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Using the six-part Gunwall test, the Court determined there was no clear reason to find greater protections in the state constitution, so the two provisions should be applied similarly.

Also, under the four-factor Blakely analysis, the Court also reasoned that although the circumstances of the delay were substantial enough to presume harm to Iniguez, the level of violation of Iniguez’ speedy trial rights wasn’t enough to justify dismissing his case.

The Court ruled 5-4 against Iniguez, holding there was no constitutional violation of his right to a speedy trial.

My opinion?  My thoughts are similar to dissenting Judge Sanders.  I agree with the majority opinion that the length of delay in this case — coupled with the fact that Iniguez spent all of it in custody — gave rise to a presumption of prejudice.  The defendant’s trial delay was nearly nine months.  The delays arose because of the State’s need to interview witnesses, joinder with the co-defendant, scheduling conflicts, and the late discovery of the unavailability of a key witness one week prior to trial.

None of the delays were caused by Iniguez himself.  Indeed, he objected to continuing his case at every opportunity!  Finally, Iniguez was prejudiced because he was in jail during this entire process.  This is very substantial.  Incarceration carries detrimental effects: loss of job, disruption of family life, idleness, etc.  Time spent in jail is simply dead time.

How were Iniguez’s Speedy Trial rights NOT violated?

Again, bad decision . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kenyon: Courtroom Congestion Is No Reason For Delay

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A PACKED COURTROOM. This photo relates to the story because it is a packed courtroom like the Maycomb courtroom in Tom Rob… | Photo, Historical photos, Picture show

In State v. Kenyon, the WA Supreme Court held that courtroom congestion is no reason for delaying a trial.

On February 15, 2006, Mr. Kenyon was charged with six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was incarcerated while awaiting. After multiple delays his case eventually went to trial in August—well beyond the time limits provided by the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3).

For those who don’t know, under the speedy trial rule, a defendant who is detained in jail must have a trial set within 60 days of arraignment. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the rule’s time limits, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice so long as the defendant objects within 10 days after notice of trial date is mailed.

Some periods of time are excluded when computing the date for trial. For example, continuances granted by the court are excluded, as well as “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances” that are beyond the control of the court or of the parties.

Kenyon argued his right to a speedy trial was violated as no court was available to hear his case. The State argues the trial court properly followed the scheduled and that his attorney asked for many continuances. The trial court held the delay was “unavoidable” as the judge was presiding over another case and the other judge was on vacation.

The Supreme Court however, has said that courtroom congestion—as opposed to scheduling conflicts or trial preparation—is not a valid reason for delay.

The Court determined that despite the allowance for “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances,” the speedy trial rule still requires trial courts to document the details of unavailable judges and courtrooms. The failure to do so in this case violated Kenyon’s right to a speedy trial and the Court dismissed the charges with prejudice.

My opinion?  Clearly — and rightfully —  the Supremes gave teeth back to the  Speedy Trial Rule.  In short, trials must happen within a certain period of time; and if they don’t, and/or if the case is not continued correctly, then the case should be dismissed.  It’s that simple.

However, for the last few years (decades?) our Appeals courts have taken exception to the general rule; often to the degree where where the exceptions have swallowed the rule.  Needless to say, I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes decided Kenyon in this manner.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Seattle v. St. John: Police May Obtain a Search Warrant For a Blood Sample When Motorists Refuse to Give Breath Test.

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can I Refuse A Blood Test? - Welch and Avery

In Seattle v. St. John, the WA Supreme Court held that police may obtain a search warrant for a blood sample when motorists refuse to give a breath test.

After crashing his motorcycle in Seattle, Robert St. John was investigated for DUI. A police officer asked St. John to consent to a blood alcohol test.  St. John refused.   The officer obtained a warrant for the test.  The results were suppressed in municipal court based on a broad interpretation of a provision of the Implied Consent Law that prohibits performing the test once consent has been refused. The superior court reversed and the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Supreme Court:

1. Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

2. Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines the voluntary blood alcohol test?

3. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

The WA Supreme Court upheld the superior court and allowed the blood test evidence.  They reasoned that the Implied Consent law restricts performing a blood test pursuant to that law, but does not prohibit performing a blood test pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant (RCW 46.20.308). Similarly, the officer’s statements about the Implied Consent law did not foreclose his obtaining the warrant.

I echo the dissenting opinion of Justice Charles Sanders.  Simply put, an officer cannot force a driver to submit to a blood test if the driver refuses consent.  However, under the majority opinion’s reasoning, a driver’s refusal to consent to a Breath test is essentially meaningless.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Eriksen: Tribal Officers Can Pursue Suspects Off the Reservation

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Anatomy of a DUI investigation - Sanford Horowitz Criminal Defense, PC.

In State v. Eriksen, the WA Supreme Court decided that tribal police officers can pursue motorists beyond the limits of tribal lands after having observed them commit a traffic infraction on the reservation.

A Lummi Nation Police Department officer witnessed a motorist on the reservation driving at night with high beams and drifting across the center divider.  He began following the vehicle and activated his emergency lights.  After traveling a quarter mile the car pulled into a gas station located off the reservation.  The police officer witnessed the driver, Loretta Eriksen, hop over the car’s center console and into the passenger’s seat.  The officer detained Eriksen until a Whatcom County police deputy arrived, who arrested her for DUI.

Ms. Eriksen was convicted for DUI.  The trial court said Lummi Nation’s inherent sovereign power authorizes tribal police to continue in “fresh pursuit” of offenders who drive off the reservation.

The Supreme Court agreed.  It reasoned  that the Lummi Nation is a sovereign nation with inherent authority to enforce its laws and detain Indians or non-Indians who violate those laws.  Courts have long recognized the right of law enforcement officers to cross jurisdictional lines when in hot pursuit of a violator.

The court said this doctrine should apply to sovereign tribal nations as well.  “The Lummi Nation Police Department has authority under the Lummi Nation’s sovereign authority and under the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act of 1985, chapter 10.93 RCW, to enforce its laws by continuing the ‘fresh pursuit’ of suspects off the reservation and then detaining these suspects until authorities with jurisdiction arrive.”

My opinion?  I’m not surprised.  Recently, the WA Supremes have deciding other “hot pursuit” cases in similar fashion.  Indeed, in State v. Rivera-Santos, a recent case which my blog covered earlier this month, the WA Supremes decided that a defendant, who drove under the influence of alcohol in both Washington and Oregon, could be convicted of a DUI in both states without violating his constitutional rights IF law enforcement was engaged in hot pursuit across state lines.

Additionally, I’ve found the criminal justice system is extra tough on defendants who “elude” law enforcement with high-speed chases.  Eluding is a fairly serious felony, especially if the defendant already has felony convictions on their criminal record.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kyllo: When It Makes Sense, Argue Self Defense

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Ineffective Assistance, Jury Trial, Self-Defense, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Undercover inmate describes violence in jail

In State v. Kyllo the WA Supreme Court held that the  jury instruction misstated the law on Self-Defense. Moreover, the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured.

On June 12, 2004, while an inmate at the Cowlitz County jail on other charges, Mr. Kyllo was involved in a fist fight with another inmate during the course of which Kyllo bit the other inmate’s ear off. Kyllo was charged with second degree assault and he claimed he acted in self-defense.

At trial, Defense counsel proposed a self-defense jury instruction that stated:

A person is entitled to act on appearances in defending himself, if that person believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that he is in actual danger of great bodily harm, although it afterwards might develop that the person was mistaken as to the extent of the danger. Actual danger is not necessary for the use of force to be lawful.

Kyllo was convicted on the charge of second degree assault. On appeal, he asserted ineffectual assistance of counsel, arguing that the instruction above improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Barbara Madsen writing a unanimous opinion.

The Court held that the jury instruction misstated the law, and that the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured — “One is not required to believe he is about to be grievously harmed or killed.”

The Court held that Kyllo was denied effective assistance of counsel, and remanded the case for a new trial.

My opinion?  Excellent decision.  Reminds defense attorneys to stay cognizant of the jury instructions they provide.  For those who don’t know, a jury instruction is an instruction given by the court to a jury at the conclusion of presentation of all evidence in a trial, and after the lawyer’s closing arguments, to advise the jury of the law that applies to the facts of the case, and the manner in which they should conduct their deliberations.  The attorneys prepare the instructions.

Here, the defense attorney gave the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  The instruction presents a good starting point for the circumstances surrounding this particular case (Convict A is mad-dogging Convict B, Convict B attacks Convict A first  — and acting on Convict A’s appearances — because he believes Convict A will attack and get the advantage of surprise).  Unfortunately, the instruction, by itself wasn’t enough.

As a matter of practice, I believe both a self defense instruction AND and “Acting on Appearances” instruction work best in combination with each other.  Speaking from my own trial experience, everyone on the street embraces self defense.  It allows us to fight back when we’re attacked.  Simple.

However, the soft-spoken pacifists out there (who are INCREDIBLY hard to spot at jury selection) are downright offended by the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  Many juries simply cannot promote violence beyond the context of self defense.  Yet even a pacifist will fight to save their own life.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rivera-Santos: Why Crossing State Lines – Intoxicated – Is Double Trouble

Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Two DUI arrests made in southern Arizona following Labor Day weekend

In State v. Rivera-Santos, the WA Supreme Court determined that the defendant, who drove under the influence of alcohol in both Washington and Oregon, could be convicted of a DUI in both states without violating his constitutional rights.

Rivera-Santos led police on a chase that started on the Washington side of I-5 and ended on the Oregon side. He was found to have a blood-alcohol content level of .17 percent (more than twice the legal limit), and convicted by an Oregon court of driving under the influence. He was also charged with a DUI in Clark County District Court, but Rivera-Santos argued that it should be dismissed under the constitutional protections against double-jeopardy (i.e. being punished twice for the same crime).

Justice Fairhurst wrote that convicting Rivera-Santos in Washington would not be double-jeopardy, as it was a separate crime.  He drove while drunk in Oregon, and was punished for that by an Oregon court. He also drove while drunk in Washington, and a Washington court could punish him for that separate crime.

My opinion?  If it looks like a duck, smells like a duck, then it must be a duck.  Said differently, this legal decision looks like double jeopardy, smells like double jeopardy, therefore it must be double jeopardy.

For those who don’t know, “Double Jeopardy” happens when defendants are prosecuted twice for the same offense.  It’s unconstitutional.  The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.’ U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).

Here, the WA Supremes stated that Mr. Rivera-Santos committed two different crimes in two different states.  Fine, I can agree with that.  HOWEVER, I disagree with their decision that charging these crimes is not double jeopardy.  Why do I disagree?  Because these “two crimes” arose from the same facts and circumstances.

Mr. Rivera-Santos did not steal candy from a 7-11 in Oregon, cross State lines, and then steal candy from a 7-11 in Washington.  The crime of DUI is, essentially, driving while intoxicated.   Although Mr. Rivera-Santos drove across State lines while intoxicated, he was DUI only one time during that crossing.  Therefore, he should only be punished once.   Anything more is double jeopardy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. McCormick: Sex Offender’s Suspended Sentence Remains Revoked

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Due Process, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Rape, Sentencing, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

PPT - The Basics of Sex Offender Sentencing in Washington PowerPoint Presentation - ID:253013

In State v. McCormick, the WA Supreme Court held the plain language of Washington’s SSOSA statute does not require proof that a violation was willful before a SSOSA sentence may be revoked.

David McCormick was convicted of first degree rape of a child for raping his 11-year-old granddaughter. He was sentenced to over 10 years in prison, but given a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) that suspended the prison term provided he abide by certain restrictions, including that he “not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate”

Unfortunately, McCormick’s community corrections officer was tipped off that McCormick had been regularly visiting a St. Vincent De Paul Food Bank located in a building used as part of an elementary school. This was not McCormick’s first violation of the SSOSA terms, and the trial court revoked the sentencing alternative.

McCormick argued that the State should have been required to prove that his violation was willful, that the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process require proof that such a violation was willful before revoking a suspended sentence, and that there was insufficient evidence.

However, the Court held that the plain language of the SSOSA statutes do not require proof that a violation was willful before a sentence may be revoked, that post-conviction due process requirements do not require proof of willfulness, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Justice Fairhurst wrote the majority opinion and was joined by seven other justices.

Justice Sanders dissented, asserting that “[t]he State should at least be constitutionally required to prove McCormick reasonably should have known the food bank was an area where minors are known to congregate.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Garvin: WA Supremes Held “Squeeze Search” Unlawful

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, felony, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Know Your Rights: Stop-and-Frisk | ACLU of DC

In State v. Garvin, the Court held that police officers cannot “squeeze” a defendant’s pockets to determine the nature of objects in the pocket.

An officer pulled Anthony Garvin over for a traffic infraction. When he noticed a knife on the seat next to Garvin, the officer ordered Garvin out of the car and conducted a search for additional weapons. In the process he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine. At trial the officer testified, “We don’t really pat anymore. It’s more of a squeeze search.”

Garvin moved to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court denied the motion. He was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and Court of Appeals upheld the conviction.  The WA Supreme Court granted review.

The court reasoned that the officer was not allowed to manipulate objects within the clothing, and his “squeeze method” exceeded the scope of a valid frisk under the “stop and frisk” rule articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  The court added, “Without probable cause and a warrant, an officer is limited in what he can do.  He cannot arrest a suspect, he cannot conduct a broad search.”

My opinion?  Yaaaay!!

Many clients get arrested because police officers obtain evidence unlawfully.  It’s an outrage!  This case is beautiful.  I can’t wait to argue a Garvin motion in my future attempts to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence.   🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Sutherby: Great Case Regarding Improper Prosecution and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Ineffective Assistance, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Rape, Sentencing, Sex Crimes, Unit of Prosecution, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Malicious Prosecution Cases in South Carolina - King Law

In State v. Sutherby, the WA Supreme Court threw out a Rape of a Child conviction for improper prosecution and ineffective counsel. Shortly before Christmas 2004, the Sutherby’s five-year-old granddaughter (“L.K.”) stayed with them for two nights at their Grays Harbor home. Based on the girl’s accusations, Mr. Sutherby was arrested and charged with multiple sex offenses to include first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation.

A subsequent search of his personal computer found child pornography, and he was charged with 10 counts of possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He was convicted by a jury on all counts and appealed.

The Court here considered two issues: “(1) what is the proper unit of prosecution for possession of child pornography under former RCW 9.68A.070 (1990), and (2) did Sutherby receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney’s failure to seek a severance of the child rape and molestation charges from the possession of child pornography charges?”

Sutherby argued that he should have been sentenced on only one count of possession of child pornography under the criminal statute, formerly RCW 9.68A.070, rather that separate counts for each image. The court noted that the U.S. and Washington constitutions both protect a defendant from being punished more than once for the same offense. The statute provided “[a] person who knowingly possesses visual or printed matter depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a class C felony.”

The court said that “any” is vague, and determined defendants who possess multiple images should only be charged with a single count of possession. The court remanded the sentencing of Sutherby for a single count of possession.

Sutherby also sought reversal of his convictions for child rape and child molestation based on his trial attorney’s failure to move for severance of the child pornography counts from these charges. As the court noted, severance of charges is important when there is a risk that the jury will use the evidence of one crime to infer the defendant’s guilt for another crime or to infer a general criminal disposition.

The case against Sutherby for possession of child pornography was strong, and could have influenced the jury on the rape and molestation charges. The court agreed that Sutherby demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney’s failure to seek severance of the charges. The Supreme Court reversed Sutherby’s convictions for child rape and molestation and remanded for retrial.

My opinion?  Yes, society HATES sex crimes; especially when children are possibly involved.  Here, however, the Supremes correctly looked beyond the nature of the crime and addressed how the case was botched by the Prosecutor and defense attorney alike.  Clearly, the Supremes sent a message: stacking charge after charge is, simply, unconstitutional.  Multiple images does not = multiple charges!  We creep into the realm of  unlawful Double Jeopardy.

Additionally, State v. Sutherby teaches defense attorneys about ineffective assistance of counsel.  Oftentimes, prosecutors will try adding additional charges on totally unrelated events before trial.  This tactic, if successfully done, makes juries suspicious that the defendant “must be a bad person, otherwise they wouldn’t have acquired all these criminal charges.”

In other words, the juries become prejudiced toward the defendant, and might decide the cases accordingly.  This type of outcome kills justice.  Defense attorneys must avoid sloppiness and BE CAREFUL.  We cannot allow the State to unfairly prejudice our clients at the 11th hour before trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.