Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

State v. Magee: Police Officers MUST Witness Traffic Infractions

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Red Light Cameras, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

In State v. Magee, the WA Supreme Court held police officers lack authority to issue traffic citations if the officer fails to witness the infraction take place.

Mr. Magee was cited for second degree negligent driving after the state patrol received reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong direction on the highway.  The dispatched trooper found Magee parked nose-to-nose with a friend’s car, facing the wrong direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp.

The trooper assumed Magee had driven against traffic in order to get in this position.  Magee was cited for negligent driving.  He challenged the infraction, arguing the officer lacked authority to issue a citation when she had not witnessed an infraction.  Unfortunately, his traffic court ruled against him.

Magee’s case found its way to the WA Supreme Court.  They reasoned that RCW 46.63.030 lists the instances where a law enforcement officer has the authority to issue a notice of traffic infraction:

(a) When the infraction is committed in the officer’s presence;

(b) When the officer is acting upon the request of a law enforcement officer in whose presence the traffic infraction was committed;

(c) If an officer investigating at the scene of a motor vehicle accident has reasonable cause to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident has committed a traffic infraction;

(d) When the infraction is detected through the use of a photo enforcement system under RCW 46.63.160; or

(e) When the infraction is detected through the use of an automated traffic safety camera under RCW 46.63.170.

The Supremes overturned Magee’s conviction after analyzing the statute: “RCW 46.63.030 plainly requires us to conclude that an officer must either be present when the infraction occurs or meet one of the other statutory circumstances before issuing a ticket. There is no contention subsections (b) through (e) apply in this case.

Instead, the State argues that the trooper actually witnessed the citable offense because the negligent behavior was “ongoing.” But negligent driving in the second degree is a moving violation. For the infraction to be valid, the movement must have been made in the officer’s presence.”

My opinion?  Again, excellent!  Officers shouldn’t hand out traffic infractions if they don’t witness the infraction happen.  PERIOD.  This violates due process.  This new opinion is (thankfully) consistent with State v. Campbell, 31 Wn.App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982).  I use Campbell in my pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence.

In Campbell, a motorist drove by a Washington State Trooper and yelled to the trooper that there was a drunk driver going southbound.  The unknown witness described the vehicle.  The Trooper caught up to the vehicle but did not observe the driver violate any traffic laws.  Nevertheless, the trooper stopped the vehicle, conducted a DUI investigation, and arrested the driver for DUI.

The Campbell court concluded that although a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop for suspected drunk driving, but before doing so, s/he must first possess a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that such a violation of law was or is presently being committed.

Good job, WA Supremes!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada: Court finds Lenity for Defendants In the Face of Statutory Ambiguity

DUI, Rule of Lenity, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Impact of Prior Criminal Convictions — #LadyJustice Speaks

In Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada: the WA Supreme Court found that a “prior offense” applies only to offenses that occurred before the current offense, and does not encompass all offenses the defendant has before sentencing.

Both Scott Winebrenner and Jesus Quezada were arrested multiple times for DUI. Each had a deferred prosecution agreement from one arrest which they violated with a subsequent arrest. For those who don’t know, a deferred prosecution is a contract entered into with the court.

Typically, a defendant obtains an alcohol evaluation which states they suffer from an alcohol problem; agrees to be on probation for five years; enters a grueling treatment regimen, and commits no new law violations.  If successful, the DUI gets dismissed.  If they fail, however, the court may revoke the entire agreement, find the defendant guilty, and issue a jail sentence.

Deferred sentences represent a “grey area” in criminal jurisprudence.  They are neither a conviction or a dismissal.  The issue was ripe to determine whether a deferred sentence counts as a prior conviction if the defendant violates the terms by garnering new charges.

Here, the Court reasoned that RCW 46.61.5055’s  use of “prior offense” is ambiguous because it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” The “rule of lenity” requires “that an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase the penalty imposed.” The Court further reasoned that offenses committed after the original offense are not “prior offenses” and cannot be considered at sentencing for the original offense.

My opinion? I’m impressed the WA Supremes supported the Rule of Lenity.   The spirit of the rule of lenity – fundamental fairness – lies at the heart of a respectable criminal justice system. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (the principle of “fair warning” motivates the lenity rule) (Holmes, J.).

At a high level of generality, we all agree that ambiguous criminal statutes must be construed in favor of the accused.  But the rule of lenity is often not taken seriously.  Glad to see the WA Supremes gave teeth back to the rule.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Patton: WA Supreme Court Acknowledges Search and Seizure Protections Afforded by Arizona v. Gant.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police Search Your Car Without a Warrant?

In State v. Patton, the WA Supreme Court held that an automobile search which happens after arrest is not justified unless the defendant is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest.

Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant.  A Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was on his property and leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat.  The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest.  Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer.

Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court found that Patton was arrested when the officer “manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody” while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, “the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence.”  The court elaborated their reasoning with the following:

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Congratulations to Justice Jim Johnson, who found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.   In Gant, the U.S. Supremes held that a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Drug Offense or any other crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. King: Out-Of-Jurisdiction Police Cannot Arrest Unless Emergency Exists

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Terry Stop, Washington State Traffic Commission, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police make traffic stops outside Jurisdiction - YouTube

Excellent opinion.

In State v. King, the WA Supreme Court held that out-of-jurisdiction police cannot arrest unless an emergency exists.

Tyler King was riding his motorcycle southbound on Interstate 5 north of Vancouver city limits when he was stopped and issued a criminal citation for Reckless Driving by Vancouver police officer Jeff Starks. King had stood up on the pegs of his motorcycle, looked at the vehicle he was approaching, and  accelerated to pass the vehicle.

King and Starks both testified at the trial, offering different interpretations of the facts. Starks offered opinion testimony that King’s driving had been reckless, which King’s attorney did not object to at trial but then raised on appeal. King also challenged that the officer was outside of his jurisdiction without an interlocal agreement and without satisfying the statutory emergency exception.

The Supreme Court held that Officer Starks did not have jurisdiction to issue the criminal citation. They reasoned that Stark’s  interpretation of King’s actions would not have constituted “an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property.”

King did not nearly hit another car, nor run a light, nor weave across traffic lanes. He did not pop a wheelie, cut off another car, nor, for that matter, drive in reverse along the shoulder. At most, King glared at the driver of the large truck, stood on his foot pegs for three to five seconds, and accelerated at high speed past the truck.

As aforementioned, Starks could not verify that King accelerated away at what he thought was 100 m.p.h. Even so, the officer testified King slowed down as he approached other traffic and pulled over immediately when Starks signaled him to do so.

The majority concludes that the trial court was wrong to simply take the definition of reckless driving and assume that it “automatically fit within the emergency exception.” The majority also suggests that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the opinion testimony issue was foreclosed by the lack of an objection at trial.

My opinion?  Again, good decision.  Reckless Driving does not always involve racing, road rage, emergency situations or life-threatening behavior.  Let’s be frank: some people simply enjoy horsing around while driving!

The Supremes rightfully disagreed with the trial court and saw the situation for what it was: people slightly agitated with each other’s driving, a brief increase in speed, and it’s over.  Nobody goes crazy, and/or gets mad, violent or injured.  Period.  It’d be a miscarriage of justice to allow out-of-jurisdiction officers to arrest people based on those circumstances.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Iniguez: How Were the Defendant’s Speedy Trial Rights NOT Violated?

Constitutional Rights, Discovery, Due Process, felony, Jail, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Can’t agree with the Supremes on this one . . .

In State v. Iniguez, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated even though a defendant waited in jail 8 months and objected to all continuances.

Following his arrest on First Degree Robbery, Mr. Iniguez remained in custody pending a joint trial with his codefendant.  An 8-month delay between arraignment and trial took place.  During this time, the State moved for a total of four trial continuances, the last of which the State sought because it learned — belatedly — that a key witness was out of town.  Iniguez objected to all continuances.  The trial court denied his objections and pretrial motions.  At trial, the jury found Iniguez guilty.  He appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez’s conviction.  The court held the eight-month delay between arrest and trial was prejudicial and violated Iniguez’s constitutional right to speedy trial.

However, the WA Supremes decided the delay did not violate the time-for-trial court rule, CrR 3.2, and did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or Const. art. I, § 22 constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 22 of the state constitution does not offer greater protections than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Using the six-part Gunwall test, the Court determined there was no clear reason to find greater protections in the state constitution, so the two provisions should be applied similarly.

Also, under the four-factor Blakely analysis, the Court also reasoned that although the circumstances of the delay were substantial enough to presume harm to Iniguez, the level of violation of Iniguez’ speedy trial rights wasn’t enough to justify dismissing his case.

The Court ruled 5-4 against Iniguez, holding there was no constitutional violation of his right to a speedy trial.

My opinion?  My thoughts are similar to dissenting Judge Sanders.  I agree with the majority opinion that the length of delay in this case — coupled with the fact that Iniguez spent all of it in custody — gave rise to a presumption of prejudice.  The defendant’s trial delay was nearly nine months.  The delays arose because of the State’s need to interview witnesses, joinder with the co-defendant, scheduling conflicts, and the late discovery of the unavailability of a key witness one week prior to trial.

None of the delays were caused by Iniguez himself.  Indeed, he objected to continuing his case at every opportunity!  Finally, Iniguez was prejudiced because he was in jail during this entire process.  This is very substantial.  Incarceration carries detrimental effects: loss of job, disruption of family life, idleness, etc.  Time spent in jail is simply dead time.

How were Iniguez’s Speedy Trial rights NOT violated?

Again, bad decision . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kenyon: Courtroom Congestion Is No Reason For Delay

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A PACKED COURTROOM. This photo relates to the story because it is a packed courtroom like the Maycomb courtroom in Tom Rob… | Photo, Historical photos, Picture show

In State v. Kenyon, the WA Supreme Court held that courtroom congestion is no reason for delaying a trial.

On February 15, 2006, Mr. Kenyon was charged with six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was incarcerated while awaiting. After multiple delays his case eventually went to trial in August—well beyond the time limits provided by the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3).

For those who don’t know, under the speedy trial rule, a defendant who is detained in jail must have a trial set within 60 days of arraignment. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the rule’s time limits, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice so long as the defendant objects within 10 days after notice of trial date is mailed.

Some periods of time are excluded when computing the date for trial. For example, continuances granted by the court are excluded, as well as “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances” that are beyond the control of the court or of the parties.

Kenyon argued his right to a speedy trial was violated as no court was available to hear his case. The State argues the trial court properly followed the scheduled and that his attorney asked for many continuances. The trial court held the delay was “unavoidable” as the judge was presiding over another case and the other judge was on vacation.

The Supreme Court however, has said that courtroom congestion—as opposed to scheduling conflicts or trial preparation—is not a valid reason for delay.

The Court determined that despite the allowance for “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances,” the speedy trial rule still requires trial courts to document the details of unavailable judges and courtrooms. The failure to do so in this case violated Kenyon’s right to a speedy trial and the Court dismissed the charges with prejudice.

My opinion?  Clearly — and rightfully —  the Supremes gave teeth back to the  Speedy Trial Rule.  In short, trials must happen within a certain period of time; and if they don’t, and/or if the case is not continued correctly, then the case should be dismissed.  It’s that simple.

However, for the last few years (decades?) our Appeals courts have taken exception to the general rule; often to the degree where where the exceptions have swallowed the rule.  Needless to say, I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes decided Kenyon in this manner.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Seattle v. St. John: Police May Obtain a Search Warrant For a Blood Sample When Motorists Refuse to Give Breath Test.

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can I Refuse A Blood Test? - Welch and Avery

In Seattle v. St. John, the WA Supreme Court held that police may obtain a search warrant for a blood sample when motorists refuse to give a breath test.

After crashing his motorcycle in Seattle, Robert St. John was investigated for DUI. A police officer asked St. John to consent to a blood alcohol test.  St. John refused.   The officer obtained a warrant for the test.  The results were suppressed in municipal court based on a broad interpretation of a provision of the Implied Consent Law that prohibits performing the test once consent has been refused. The superior court reversed and the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Supreme Court:

1. Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

2. Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines the voluntary blood alcohol test?

3. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

The WA Supreme Court upheld the superior court and allowed the blood test evidence.  They reasoned that the Implied Consent law restricts performing a blood test pursuant to that law, but does not prohibit performing a blood test pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant (RCW 46.20.308). Similarly, the officer’s statements about the Implied Consent law did not foreclose his obtaining the warrant.

I echo the dissenting opinion of Justice Charles Sanders.  Simply put, an officer cannot force a driver to submit to a blood test if the driver refuses consent.  However, under the majority opinion’s reasoning, a driver’s refusal to consent to a Breath test is essentially meaningless.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Eriksen: Tribal Officers Can Pursue Suspects Off the Reservation

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Anatomy of a DUI investigation - Sanford Horowitz Criminal Defense, PC.

In State v. Eriksen, the WA Supreme Court decided that tribal police officers can pursue motorists beyond the limits of tribal lands after having observed them commit a traffic infraction on the reservation.

A Lummi Nation Police Department officer witnessed a motorist on the reservation driving at night with high beams and drifting across the center divider.  He began following the vehicle and activated his emergency lights.  After traveling a quarter mile the car pulled into a gas station located off the reservation.  The police officer witnessed the driver, Loretta Eriksen, hop over the car’s center console and into the passenger’s seat.  The officer detained Eriksen until a Whatcom County police deputy arrived, who arrested her for DUI.

Ms. Eriksen was convicted for DUI.  The trial court said Lummi Nation’s inherent sovereign power authorizes tribal police to continue in “fresh pursuit” of offenders who drive off the reservation.

The Supreme Court agreed.  It reasoned  that the Lummi Nation is a sovereign nation with inherent authority to enforce its laws and detain Indians or non-Indians who violate those laws.  Courts have long recognized the right of law enforcement officers to cross jurisdictional lines when in hot pursuit of a violator.

The court said this doctrine should apply to sovereign tribal nations as well.  “The Lummi Nation Police Department has authority under the Lummi Nation’s sovereign authority and under the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act of 1985, chapter 10.93 RCW, to enforce its laws by continuing the ‘fresh pursuit’ of suspects off the reservation and then detaining these suspects until authorities with jurisdiction arrive.”

My opinion?  I’m not surprised.  Recently, the WA Supremes have deciding other “hot pursuit” cases in similar fashion.  Indeed, in State v. Rivera-Santos, a recent case which my blog covered earlier this month, the WA Supremes decided that a defendant, who drove under the influence of alcohol in both Washington and Oregon, could be convicted of a DUI in both states without violating his constitutional rights IF law enforcement was engaged in hot pursuit across state lines.

Additionally, I’ve found the criminal justice system is extra tough on defendants who “elude” law enforcement with high-speed chases.  Eluding is a fairly serious felony, especially if the defendant already has felony convictions on their criminal record.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kyllo: When It Makes Sense, Argue Self Defense

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Ineffective Assistance, Jury Trial, Self-Defense, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Undercover inmate describes violence in jail

In State v. Kyllo the WA Supreme Court held that the  jury instruction misstated the law on Self-Defense. Moreover, the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured.

On June 12, 2004, while an inmate at the Cowlitz County jail on other charges, Mr. Kyllo was involved in a fist fight with another inmate during the course of which Kyllo bit the other inmate’s ear off. Kyllo was charged with second degree assault and he claimed he acted in self-defense.

At trial, Defense counsel proposed a self-defense jury instruction that stated:

A person is entitled to act on appearances in defending himself, if that person believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that he is in actual danger of great bodily harm, although it afterwards might develop that the person was mistaken as to the extent of the danger. Actual danger is not necessary for the use of force to be lawful.

Kyllo was convicted on the charge of second degree assault. On appeal, he asserted ineffectual assistance of counsel, arguing that the instruction above improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Barbara Madsen writing a unanimous opinion.

The Court held that the jury instruction misstated the law, and that the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured — “One is not required to believe he is about to be grievously harmed or killed.”

The Court held that Kyllo was denied effective assistance of counsel, and remanded the case for a new trial.

My opinion?  Excellent decision.  Reminds defense attorneys to stay cognizant of the jury instructions they provide.  For those who don’t know, a jury instruction is an instruction given by the court to a jury at the conclusion of presentation of all evidence in a trial, and after the lawyer’s closing arguments, to advise the jury of the law that applies to the facts of the case, and the manner in which they should conduct their deliberations.  The attorneys prepare the instructions.

Here, the defense attorney gave the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  The instruction presents a good starting point for the circumstances surrounding this particular case (Convict A is mad-dogging Convict B, Convict B attacks Convict A first  — and acting on Convict A’s appearances — because he believes Convict A will attack and get the advantage of surprise).  Unfortunately, the instruction, by itself wasn’t enough.

As a matter of practice, I believe both a self defense instruction AND and “Acting on Appearances” instruction work best in combination with each other.  Speaking from my own trial experience, everyone on the street embraces self defense.  It allows us to fight back when we’re attacked.  Simple.

However, the soft-spoken pacifists out there (who are INCREDIBLY hard to spot at jury selection) are downright offended by the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  Many juries simply cannot promote violence beyond the context of self defense.  Yet even a pacifist will fight to save their own life.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rivera-Santos: Why Crossing State Lines – Intoxicated – Is Double Trouble

Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Two DUI arrests made in southern Arizona following Labor Day weekend

In State v. Rivera-Santos, the WA Supreme Court determined that the defendant, who drove under the influence of alcohol in both Washington and Oregon, could be convicted of a DUI in both states without violating his constitutional rights.

Rivera-Santos led police on a chase that started on the Washington side of I-5 and ended on the Oregon side. He was found to have a blood-alcohol content level of .17 percent (more than twice the legal limit), and convicted by an Oregon court of driving under the influence. He was also charged with a DUI in Clark County District Court, but Rivera-Santos argued that it should be dismissed under the constitutional protections against double-jeopardy (i.e. being punished twice for the same crime).

Justice Fairhurst wrote that convicting Rivera-Santos in Washington would not be double-jeopardy, as it was a separate crime.  He drove while drunk in Oregon, and was punished for that by an Oregon court. He also drove while drunk in Washington, and a Washington court could punish him for that separate crime.

My opinion?  If it looks like a duck, smells like a duck, then it must be a duck.  Said differently, this legal decision looks like double jeopardy, smells like double jeopardy, therefore it must be double jeopardy.

For those who don’t know, “Double Jeopardy” happens when defendants are prosecuted twice for the same offense.  It’s unconstitutional.  The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.’ U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).

Here, the WA Supremes stated that Mr. Rivera-Santos committed two different crimes in two different states.  Fine, I can agree with that.  HOWEVER, I disagree with their decision that charging these crimes is not double jeopardy.  Why do I disagree?  Because these “two crimes” arose from the same facts and circumstances.

Mr. Rivera-Santos did not steal candy from a 7-11 in Oregon, cross State lines, and then steal candy from a 7-11 in Washington.  The crime of DUI is, essentially, driving while intoxicated.   Although Mr. Rivera-Santos drove across State lines while intoxicated, he was DUI only one time during that crossing.  Therefore, he should only be punished once.   Anything more is double jeopardy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.