Category Archives: Search Warrant

AAA Questions Marijuana DUI Laws

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According to a news article from the Chicago Tribune, recent studies conducted by car insurer AAA find that blood tests given to drivers suspected of Marijuana DUI have no scientific basis.

A handful of studies released by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety found that drivers can have a low level of THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in their blood and be unsafe behind the wheel, while others with relatively high levels may not be a hazard. Below are the individual studies accompanied by capsule summaries comprising the effort:

“If you’ve had marijuana whether it’s medicinal or otherwise, don’t drive,” said AAA Chicago spokeswoman Beth Mosher, “It’s really that simple.”

The studies examined the results of more than 5,300 people nationwide who were arrested for driving under the influence of marijuana, 600 of whom tested positive for THC only, while the others had THC and other substances. This is because marijuana isn’t metabolized by the body in the same way as alcohol. The researchers compared the Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) exam results of 602 drivers that only had THC present in their blood at the time of arrest to those of 349 volunteers that took the test drug-free and sober. Ultimately, the degree to which a driver is impaired by marijuana use depends a lot on the individual, the foundation said.

The data appears confusing because AAA also looked at Washington – one of the first states to legalize marijuana – and found fatal crashes involving drivers who recently used marijuana doubled.

“ In most recent data 1 in 6 drivers who are involved in a fatal crash there had marijuana in there system,” Mosher  said.  “And as more and more states look at legalizing marijuana we see this as a concerning trend.”

Nevertheless, AAA is sending the message that the legal limits established for marijuana are arbitrary. A handful of states have moved to specify the maximum amount of active THC — the main chemical in marijuana — that drivers can have in their system. But AAA says that doesn’t work.

“We think those are meaningless,” said Mosher. “They are not backed by any science. One person can have one limit of THC in their blood and be significantly impaired and others can have that same limit and not be impaired at all,” Mosher said.

Many in law enforcement and AAA say that officer recognition of impaired drivers is really the only what to determine whether someone is too high to drive.  Of course all of this a public safety concerns as pot becomes legal across the country.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Community Caretaking” Search Upheld as Lawful

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In State v. Duncan, the WA Supreme Court decided police officers may make a limited sweep of a vehicle under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement when (1) there is reasonable suspicion that an unsecured weapon is in the vehicle and (2) the vehicle has or shortly will be impounded and will be towed from the scene. However, this exception may not be used as a pre-text for an investigative search.

A little after midnight in Yakima one summer night in 2009, someone in a car shot into a home, grazing Kyle Mullins’ head. Other people in the home called 911 for medical assistance and to report the shooting. Callers described the car as white and possibly a Subaru or Impala. Officers were dispatched and stopped Duncan’s white Ford Taurus. Officers removed Duncan and his two passengers from the car at gunpoint, ordered them to the ground, handcuffed them, and put them in separate police cars. Without a warrant, officers opened the doors and found shell casings on the floor and a gun between the front passenger seat and the door. One officer removed the gun and placed it into an evidence bag in his own patrol car. The passengers told the police that Duncan had fired from the car and tossed the gun on the front floorboards. After the car was towed to a police annex, police obtained a warrant and made a more thorough search.

Duncan was charged with six counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Duncan moved to suppress the evidence under CrR 3.6 and confessions under CrR 3.5 that flowed from the traffic stop on several grounds, including that the police had insufficient grounds to stop him and that their initial warrantless search of his car was improper. At the pretrial suppression hearing, held a year and a half after the events of that summer night, the judge found that the stop was justified and that the search was reasonable, and denied the motions.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges and found by special verdicts that Duncan was armed with a firearm. The judge sentenced Duncan to 1,159 months of incarceration, the top of the standard range. Duncan’s projected release date is March 26, 2099.

The case was appealed to the WA Supreme Court to decide the issue of whether the warrantless search of Duncan’s vehicle was lawful. The Court decided it was.

The Court reasoned that generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. Nonetheless, there are a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement which provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers of the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. The State bears the burden of showing that the search and seizure was supported by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. The fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure must be suppressed.

The Court reasoned that the search was not lawful under Arizona v. Gant for “officer safety” reasons  because the vehicles’ occupants are detained in police cars. Also the search was not lawful under the Plain View Doctrine because the officers could see the gun from outside the vehicle. Finally, the search was also not a valid inventory search because the car was not impounded.

However, the court found the search was lawful under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Under that exception, officers may make a limited sweep of a vehicle when (1) there is reasonable suspicion that an unsecured weapon is in the vehicle and (2) the vehicle has or shortly will be impounded and will be towed from the scene.

We caution, however, that the community caretaking exception is a strictly limited exception to the warrant requirement. It may not, however, be used as a pretext for an investigatory search:

“It will only rarely justify intrusion into a private place or vehicle after an arrest. However, given the facts of this case and the fact that the sweep of the vehicle occurred before our opinion in Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, was announced, we are confident that the desire to remove an unsecured gun from the vehicle was not here used as a pretext for an otherwise unlawful search.”

With that, the Court concluded that the limited search of the vehicle was lawful and affirmed Duncan’s conviction.

My opinion? For those who don’t know, pretextual searches are unlawful. They usually describes false reasons that hide the true intentions or motivations for a legal action. If a party trying to admit the evidence can establish good reasons, the opposing party – usually, the defense – must prove that the these reasons were “pretextual,” or false, and move to suppress the “fruits” of the search.

Here, I understand the Court’s logic. I’m glad the Court appreciates the unlawfulness of pretextual searches and makes distinctions in the case at hand. Unfortunately, until now, unlawful pretext searches have been mitigated and/or simply ignored by our courts for many years.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The “Textalyzer” Battles Distracted Driving & Works Like A Breathalyzer

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A police officer uses a prototype of a Textalyzer to check for texting activity on a phone. A proposed law in New York would allow police to use the technology in much the same way they use a Breathalyzer.

A very interesting and well-written news article by reporter Matt Richtel of the New York Times discussed how lawmakers from New York want to treat distracted driving like drunken driving. The newest idea is to give police officers a new device that is the digital equivalent of the Breathalyzer — a roadside test called the Textalyzer.

The idea certainly carries momentum. Richtel wrote that over the last seven years, most states have banned texting by drivers, and public service campaigns have tried many tactics — “It can wait,” among them — to persuade people to ignore their phones when driving their cars.

Nevertheless, the problem appears to be getting worse. Americans confess in surveys that they are still texting while driving, as well as using Facebook and Snapchat and taking selfies. Richtel’s article emphasized that road fatalities, which had fallen for years, are now rising sharply, up roughly 8 percent in 2015 over the previous year, according to preliminary estimates. That is partly because people are driving more, but Mark Rosekind, the chief of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, said distracted driving was “only increasing, unfortunately.”

In response, legislators and public health experts want to treat distracted driving like drunken driving. The most provocative idea is to give police officers a new device that is the digital equivalent of the Breathalyzer — a roadside test called the Textalyzer.

Richtel explained it would work like this: an officer arriving at the scene of a crash could ask for the phones of any drivers involved and use the Textalyzer to tap into the operating system to check for recent activity.

The technology could determine whether a driver had used the phone to text, email or do anything else that is forbidden under New York’s hands-free driving laws, which prohibit drivers from holding phones to their ear. Failure to hand over a phone could lead to the suspension of a driver’s license, similar to the consequences for refusing a Breathalyzer.

Richtel described how the proposed legislation faces hurdles to becoming a law, including privacy concerns. But Félix W. Ortiz, a Democratic assemblyman who was a sponsor of the bipartisan Textalyzer bill, said it would not give the police access to the contents of any emails or texts. It would simply give them a way to catch multitasking drivers, he said.

If the legislation passed in New York, it could be adopted by other states in the same way that the hands-free rules did after New York adopted them.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Bellingham Police Department Body Cameras Now Mandatory

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A news article by Samantha Wohlfiel from of the Bellingham Herald reports that starting this July, Bellingham Police Department (BPD) will require all uniformed patrol officers to wear and use body cameras.

In 2014, the BPD started a voluntary program, allowing officers to use a body camera if they were willing. Now, Police Chief Cliff Cook has decided all uniformed patrol officers will need to wear the cameras while on duty:

“I think the original pilot and then the past year and a half … has shown us that having the videos is not only beneficial in cases of prosecution of individuals for crimes, as evidence of the actions of our officers, especially when they’re appropriate . . .  It also generally helps us resolve disputes or disagreements about what may have transpired between an officer and a citizen much more quickly and in a more definitive way.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Initially, 18 officers volunteered for Bellingham’s program, and currently 34 officers are using the cameras, Cook said. He also mentioned that his police officers have noted that people often change their behavior for the better when they’re told they’re being filmed.

One of the main concerns for officers and community members has been privacy, Cook said:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Basically, the “policy” requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

The department has a mix of cameras, some that are clipped on a lapel, others that are worn on glasses, but both have easily been knocked off in situations where officers were restraining someone, Cook said, so the department may shift toward other models.

Between 2014 and 2016, the total program cost has been $315,250, which includes things such as all hardware (the cameras, clips, glasses they sit on, etc.), software and docking stations, Cook told the council.

According to the article, the projected costs moving forward are about $35,000 to $56,000 per year each of the next two years for renewed data storage management.

Another concern was, of course, privacy:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

The current policy requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

My opinion? This is a step in the right direction. Body cameras make everyone behave better. They also catch evidence of what really transpired. Good move, BPD.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pearson: DUI Blood Draw Held Unlawful

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In State v. Pearson the WA Court of Appeals Division I held that (1) exigent circumstances did not support a warrantless blood draw for marijuana, (2) it’s reversible error to discuss the .05 THC limit in a DUI case that arose prior to the passage of I-502.

Defendant Tamisha Pearson was a medicinal marijuana patient due to numerous health problems. She struck a pedestrian with her car, pulled over and called 911. Seattle Police Officers arrived. Officer Jongma was a drug recognition expert. Pearson initially denied consuming any drugs or alcohol that day. She agreed to perform field sobriety tests.

Some of Pearson’s behavior during the sobriety tests indicated she was impaired. Pearson told Officer Jongma that she is authorized to consume medicinal marijuana and that she had smoked earlier in the day. Based on that, Officer Jongma arrested Pearson for suspicion of Vehicular Assault and DUI.

Officer Jongma transported Pearson to Harborview Medical Center for a blood draw. They arrived at the hospital at approximately 5:26 pm—2 hours after the initial collision and 1 hour and 20 minutes after Officer Jongma arrived on the scene. At approximately 5:50 pm, a nurse drew Pearson’s blood without her consent and without a warrant. A toxicologist analyzed Pearson’s blood sample for cannabinoids on February 21, 2012. The analysis determined Pearson’s THC concentration was approximately 20 nanograms.

On August 18, 2012, the City of Seattle charged Pearson in Seattle Municipal Court on one count of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating drug. The court initially granted Pearson’s motion to suppress the blood evidence.

TRIAL

At trial, the City introduced testimony of forensic toxicologist Justin Knoy of the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory. Over Pearson’s objection, the City elicited testimony from Knoy that the per se legal limit of THC concentration under Washington law was 5 nanograms. At the time, however, no per se limit for THC concentration in Washington existed when the accident occurred. The jury found Pearson guilty of DUI.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Court of Appeals addressed four issues: (1) whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless extraction of Pearson’s blood, (2) whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless testing of Pearson’s blood, (3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to include Pearson’s proposed jury instruction, and (4) whether the trial court erred when it permitted Knoy to testify that the per se legal limit for THC concentration was 5 nanograms.

1.Exigent Circumstances did NOT Exist to Justify Extracting & Testing Pearson’s Blood.

First, the Court of Appeals decided the City failed to show that obtaining a warrant would have significantly delayed collecting a blood sample. It reasoned that the natural dissipation of THC in Pearson’s bloodstream alone did not constitute an exigency sufficient to bypass the warrant requirement.

2. Trial Court Mistakenly Admitted Testimony From Toxicologist.

Second, the Court of Appeals decided the trial mistakenly admitted testimony from the toxicologist regarding THC limits. At the time, evidence of the .05 legal THC limit was NOT in effect when the offense occurred and was irrelevant to the central question at trial—whether Pearson’s ability to drive was lessened in any appreciable degree by her use of marijuana. The court reasoned the evidence was highly prejudicial because the blood test showed that Pearson had a THC concentration of 20 nanograms. Consequently, evidence of the current per se legal THC limit of 5 nanograms invited the jury to retroactively apply law that was not in effect at the time of the alleged offense and conclude that the blood evidence alone was sufficient to prove guilt.

3. The Defendant’s Jury Instruction Was Properly Denied. 

At trial, the lower court denied the Defendant’s proposed jury instruction:

It is not unlawful for a person to consume a drug and drive. The law recognizes that a person may have consumed a drug and yet not be under the influence of it. It is not enough to prove merely that a driver had consumed a drug.

The Court of Appeals held that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to include Pearson’s proposed jury instruction because she was able to argue her theory of the case based on the instructions given.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction and remanded it back to the lower court.

My opinion? Good rulings; especially the one regarding the mistakenly-admitted testimony from the Toxicologist. I-502’s legal limits regarding THC was not in effect at that time. Having a witness testify to limits was, therefore, a mistake.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Keodara: Overbroad Search Warrant for Cell Phone

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In State v. Keodara, the WA Court of Appeals ruled that a search warrant was overbroad in violation of the particularity requirement because it allowed police to search a cell phone “for items that had no association with any criminal activity and for which there was no probable cause whatsoever.”

In 2011, the defendant Say Keodara was involved in a shooting at a bus stop.  Several weeks later, police arrested him for an unrelated incident. They searched his backpack and found his cell phone. Outside the backpack police found drugs, drug packaging and drug paraphernalia.  An officer submitted an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone.

The affidavit made several generalizations about drug dealers and gang members in support of the officer’s conclusion that there was evidence of crime on the cell phone. The judge issue the warrant pursuant to the affidavit, which ultimately allowed police to search Keodara’s entire phone without any limitations.  Police searched the phone and found evidence that the State used when trying Mr. Keodara for the shooting at the bus stop.

Keodara was charged with Murder in the First Degree, three counts of Assault in the First Degree (each with a separate firearm enhancement), and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 831 months of prison (69.25 years).

On appeal, Keodara argued that the evidence from his phone should have been suppressed because the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, §7 of the Washington State Constitution. He also argued that his substantial prison sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

Ultimately, the court held that although the search of Keodara’s phone violated the federal
constitution, the failure to suppress the evidence was harmless. It also held that Keodara’s sentence violated the 8th Amendment because the court failed to Keodara’s youth and other age-related factors into account. Accordingly, the court affirmed Keodara’s conviction but remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that a warrant is overbroad if it fails to describe with particularity items for which probable cause exists to search. In this case, the affidavit for the warrant for Keodara’s phone contained blanket statements about what certain groups of offenders tend to do and what information they tend to store in particular places. Furthermore, the warrant’s language also allowed Keodara’s phone to be searched for items that had no association with any criminal activity and for which there was no probable cause whatsoever. The court also said the following:

Here, no evidence was seized that would have linked Keodara’s phone to the crimes listed in the warrant-unlawful possession of firearms, possession with intent to deliver or sell narcotics, or assault. Nothing in the record suggests that anyone saw Keodara use the phone to make calls or take photos. In addition, the phone was found in a backpack, separate from the drug paraphernalia or the pistol. There was no indication that evidence of firearms or drugs were found with the phone. We conclude that the warrant was overbroad and failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals also held that the trial court committed harmless error in admitting evidence police found on the phone:

Here, the untainted evidence of Keodara’s guilt was strong. Cellular phone tower records placed him near the location of the shooting, two eyewitnesses identified him, and another witness testified that Keodara contacted him and told him about the shooting. We find that the trial court’s denial of Keodara’s motion to suppress does not warrant reversal and, accordingly, we affirm his convictions.

The Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of whether Keodara’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. In short, the court said, “Yes.” It reasoned that the trial court did not take into account that Keodara was a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes or consider other age related factors that weigh on culpability or his capacity for rehabilitation. Based on that, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed in this case violated Keodar’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

My opinion? Good decision. It appears that, more and more, our courts are rightfully acknowledging a Defendant’s youth at sentencing.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Meza: Freezing Funds Without a Warrant Is Unlawful

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In State v. Meza, the WA Court of Appeals Division II held that a trial court’s order to freeze the defendant’s bank account was not a search warrant, and therefore did not satisfy the warrant requirement for the seizure of funds.

In June 2014, John Armstrong spoke with the Lewis County sheriff’s office and alleged that Rafael Meza had swindled money from him. Deputy Justin Rogers investigated Armstrong’s allegations. Rogers contacted the Twin Star Credit Union and verified that Meza held an account that had received large wire transfers recently. Rogers also learned from Mansfield that Meza recently had informed him that he was planning to go to Mexico.

Rogers served Twin Star Credit Union with a valid search warrant for Meza’s account information. Meza’s bank statements showed a check and four wire transfers from Mansfield totaling $105,000, with the last transfer on June 18. They also showed a single wire transfer from Armstrong in the amount of $15,000 on April 11. Meza’s checking account showed that between October 2013 and June 2014, he withdrew approximately $89,000 in cash in 41 transactions involving between $3,000 and $5,000 each.

On June 27, 2014, the State charged Meza with one count of Theft in the First Degree. On the same day, the State presented an ex parte “Motion for an Order Freezing and Holding Funds” to the judge. The State asserted that the funds in Meza’s credit union accounts were “evidence in a felony offense.” The State’s motion was based on the probable cause affidavit filed with the information and asserted that there was “a high likelihood, based on the affidavit regarding probable cause, that Meza will remove said funds and leave the country.”

Importantly, the State did not request a search warrant for the credit union funds or reference CrR 2.3 in its motion.

Nevertheless, the trial court signed an order directing Twin Star Credit Union to “freeze and hold all accounts in the name of . . . Meza . . . as evidence in a criminal proceeding, until further order of this Court.” Also, neither the motion nor the order cited any legal authority for freezing Meza’s accounts.

In January 2015, Meza filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s order. Meza argued that there was no legal authority for the order. The trial court denied Meza’s motion to vacate the order, saying there was probable cause to believe that Meza’s account was related to the charged crime. The court concluded that it had the authority to freeze Meza’s funds under CrR 2.3. In addition, the trial court ruled that Meza’s account qualified as both evidence of a crime and the proceeds of a crime. Meza filed a motion for discretionary review. The WA Court of Appeals accepted the case.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned that The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” These provisions generally prohibit warrantless searches and seizures unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.

Consequently, reasoned the court, a person’s banking records fall within the constitutional protection of private affairs. Although no Washington case has addressed whether funds in a bank account can be seized without a warrant it defies reason to extend constitutional protection to bank account records but not to the funds reflected in those records. The Court emphasized that the seizure of funds is as much a threat to security in a person’s effects and a disturbance of a person’s private affairs as the seizure of the records regarding those funds:

“Here, the State cites no statute, court rule, or other authority allowing the seizure of a defendant’s bank account in these circumstances. Therefore, the seizure was not authorized by law.”

Finally, the Court rejected the State’s argument that under State v. Garcia-Salgado the trial court’s order is the functional equivalent of a search warrant.

“We hold that the Garcia-Salgado holding is limited to cases where the trial court’s order is authorized by law. Allowing a court order to function as a warrant when there is no independent authority for a seizure would render CrR 2.3 meaningless. Limiting the scope of Garcia-Salgado preserves the integrity of CrR 2.3. We hold that Garcia-Salgado is inapplicable and that the trial court’s order cannot be treated as the functional equivalent of a warrant.”

Based on these decision the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ordering the seizure of Meza’s credit union account.

My opinion? GOOD opinion. Very sensible and reasonable. It’s refreshing that the Court of Appeals followed the law and made the right decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

U.S. Supreme Court to Update DUI Procedures

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The US Supreme Court plans to update the rules for prosecuting individuals accused of drunk driving by reviewing a trio of cases dealing with “Refusal” statutes.

In North Dakota, a state law makes it a crime for a motorist to refuse to take “any” type of test — blood, alcohol or urine — used to prosecute driving under the influence (DUI) cases. The court will decide the constitutionality of this provision in the context of two cases, Birchfield v. North Dakota and Beylund v. North Dakota, each of which presents the same question from a slightly different angle.

In Beylund, motorist Steve Michael Beylund agreed to take a blood test after being threatened with criminal penalties if he refused. In Birchfield, motorist Danny Birchfield refused to take a breath test. The highest court in North Dakota reviewed the existing legal precedent and found no reason to overturn the refusal law.

The drunk-driving cases provide the Court with something of a sequel to its ruling in 2013 in Missouri v. McNeely, which left the clear impression that, if police have enough time, they should get a warrant before taking a test of a suspected drunk driver.  The Court ruled that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not always amount to an emergency situation that permits a DUI test without a warrant.

The North Dakota justices wrote, “Birchfield has not drawn our attention to any appellate court decisions striking down criminal refusal statutes, and we have found that since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in McNeely, criminal refusal statutes have continued to withstand Fourth Amendment challenges, particularly in Minnesota.”

Last month, however, in Hawaii v. Won, the Hawaii Supreme Court cited the US Supreme Court’s reasoning in finding refusal statutes as unconstitutional. In light of McNeely, Hawaii’s justices decided the US Supreme Court had clearly ordered law enforcement to obtain a warrant before compelling a “search” of a person’s blood, as the Fourth Amendment requires.

The US Supreme Court will tackle the different rulings from these States in the context of a third case, Bernard v. Minnesota, which deals with that state’s law treating a breath test as a “search incident to arrest.” Here, William Robert Bernard Jr used his truck to pull a boat out of the water. Officers believed he was DUI. After Bernard was arrested, he refused a breath test.

At any rate, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide whether criminalized refusal statutes represent a DUI exception to the Constitution.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Besola: Overbroad Search Warrant

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In State v. Besola, the Washington Supreme Court held that a search warrant was overbroad. Because the warrant failed to meet the Constitution’s “particularity” requirement, the court reversed the Defendant’s convictions for Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct and Dealing in such depictions.

Mark Besola and Jeffrey Swenson lived together in Besola’s house. After a friend of Swenson’s, Kellie Westfall, was arrested, she told police that she had seen drugs and child pornography at Besola’ s house. Based on the information provided by Westfall, a judge issued a search warrant for illegal drugs but declined to issue a search warrant related to child pornography at that time.

At the scene, police saw CDs and DVDs with handwritten titles that implied that they contained child pornography. On the basis of this observation, police requested and obtained an addendum to the search warrant.

The language of that amended warrant (and whether it was sufficiently particular) is at the heart of the legal issue in this case.

The warrant indicated that the crime under investigation was “Possession of Child Pornography R.C.W. 9.68A.070.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 312 (boldface omitted). The warrant indicated that “the following evidence is material to the investigation or prosecution of the above described felony”:

1. Any and all video tapes, CDs, DVDs, or any other visual and or audio recordings; 2. Any and all printed pornographic materials; 3. Any photographs, but particularly of minors; 4. Any and all computer hard drives or laptop computers and any memory storage devices; 5. Any and all documents demonstrating purchase, sale or transfer of pornographic material.

Police seized a number of computers, memory storage devices, CDs, and DVDs. They ultimately found child pornography on one computer and on 41 disks with handwritten titles. They also found a DVD duplicating device (also known as a DVD burner) attached to the computer. Some disks contained duplicated copies of the child pornography.

A handwriting expert testified that Besola’s handwriting was on at least one of the disks containing child pornography and that indications of both Besola’s and Swenson’s handwriting were on multiple other disks. Both defendants were charged with Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct and Dealing in such depictions.

Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, the WA Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether the search warrant meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires warrants to “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” That requirement is heightened if the warrant authorizes a search for materials protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

For guidance, the court reviewed a 1992 case, State v. Perrone, that involved similar circumstances. In Perrone, the Court decided that the warrant in that case failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in part because it provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography.

Here, the Court decided the decision in Perrone is binding in this case. Under Perrone, the court concluded that many provisions of this search warrant were similarly overbroad. As in Perrone, the descriptions of the items to be seized expressly included materials that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography and photographs that did not depict children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

Similar to Perrone, these descriptions could easily have been made more particular by adding the precise statutory language, “depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” As in Perrone, the police in this case failed to add that language to their search warrant. Therefore, under Perrone, these provisions were insufficiently particular and thus invalid.

The WA Supreme Court denied the State’s arguments that the warrant in this case is saved by a citation to the child pornography statute at the top of the warrant. The Court reasoned the State was incorrect because the statutory citation does not modify or limit the items listed in the warrant, so it does not save the warrant from being overbroad. More importantly, said the Court, the State’s position conflicts with Perrone and would hinder the goals of the warrant particularity requirement.

Because the warrant fails to meet the Constitution’s particularity requirement, the WA Supreme Court reversed these convictions.

My opinion? Good decision. Yes, possessing child porn is illegal. However, so are illegal searches. Warrants must particularly describe the items believed to found. Otherwise, they become a meaningless ticket allowing police to engage a fishing expedition of our bodies, property, vehicles and homes. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Linder: Unwitnessed Search is Unlawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exclusionary Rule, felony, Methamphetamine, Miranda, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sixth Amendment, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

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In State v. Linder, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided that evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant was properly suppressed because the officer’s inventory of the search was not conducted with at least one witness.

Here, Defendant Aaron Linder was arrested by Kalama Police Chief Grant Gibson in March 2013 for driving with a suspended license. During the search incident to arrest, Chief Gibson found a small tin box inside the pocket of Mr. Linder’s hoodie. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Mr. Linder admitted being a daily user of hard drugs and that the tin box contained drug paraphernalia. But he refused to give his consent for Chief Gibson to open the box initially, and refused a second time at the police station.

The police obtained a search warrant. Sergeant Parker, without anyone else present, executed the warrant by opening the metal box and photographing and inventorying its contents. It was typical for the department’s night shift officer to work alone. The Kalama police department has a total of only five sworn officers.

Sergeant Parker inventoried the tin box as containing two pieces of aluminum foil, an empty plastic box, two plastic tubes, a hair pin, a safety pin, and a piece of plastic from a cigarette package. The cigarette wrapper contained a crystalline substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. After he finished the inventory and completed the return of service form, Sergeant Parker placed the items, a copy of his report, and a note for Chief Gibson in a temporary evidence locker.

The next morning, Chief Gibson, also acting alone, verified that the contents in the box matched Sergeant Parker’s inventory and field tested a small quantity of the cellophane wrapper and its contents, which tested positive for methamphetamine. He packaged the remainder of the crystalline substance for submission to the crime laboratory. Mr. Linder was thereafter charged with one count of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 69.50 RCW, for possession of methamphetamine.

Before trial, Mr. Linder moved to suppress the evidence found in the tin box on the grounds that it was searched in violation of CrR 2.3( d). The rule provides that a return of the search warrant shall be made promptly, shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken, and-relevant here-that “the inventory shall be made in the presence of the person from whose possession or premises the property is taken, or in the presence of at least one person other than the officer.” In the suppression hearing that followed, both Sergeant Parker and Chief Gibson testified that they were unaware of the rule’s requirement that the inventory be made in the presence of another person.

The trial court granted Mr. Linder’s motion to suppress. The State appealed.

In reaching its decision, the WA Court of Appeals looked to the Exclusionary Rule In considering whether the contraband should be suppressed.

For those who don’t know, the Exclusionary Rule is a legal principle in the United States, under constitutional law, which holds that evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is sometimes inadmissible for a criminal prosecution in a court of law. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment‘s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” and that no person “shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”.

The Exclusionary Rule is grounded in the Fourth Amendment and it is intended to protect citizens from illegal searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule is also designed to provide a legal remedy and disincentive, which is short of criminal prosecution in response to prosecutors and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights compelled to self-incrimination. The exclusionary rule also applies to violations of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to counsel.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned that Washington’s version of the Exclusionary Rule had three objectives:

First, and most important, to protect privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and third, to preserve the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence which has been obtained through illegal means.

Here, reasoned the Court, excluding the evidence served the third objective of preserving the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence obtained through illegal means.  Here, a police officer’s unwitnessed late night execution of a search warrant in this case clearly violated CrR 2.3(d), called the reliability of his inventory into question, and could not be remedied other than by suppression.

My opinion? Great decision. Kudos to Division III for following the law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.