Category Archives: Jury Trial

State v. Paumier: Court Upholds the Right to Public Trial & Self-Representation

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Self-Representation for Artists - RedDotBlog

In State v. Paumier, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions because the trial court improperly (1) excluded public citizens from a portion of his trial, and (2) denied his right to represent himself.

Mr. Paumier was charged with Burglary and Theft.  Jury selection involved questioning jurors in chambers and recording their responses.  The public was not allowed to watch jury selection.  The trial court stated at the outset that potential jurors who preferred to answer questions privately to avoid possible embarrassment would be taken into the judge’s chambers.

Several jurors indicated during the course of voir dire that they preferred to answer certain questions in chambers.  The judge and the parties questioned five jurors in chambers, recording the jurors’ responses. Jury selection was completed that same day.

The following day, the trial court permitted the State to amend the information.  Paumier then pleaded not guilty and asked to represent himself, stating:

“I just don’t feel like a — I feel like there’s [sic] things about the trial getting this far that it shouldn’t have.  And I feel that my attorney should have spoke [sic] up for me instead of getting pissed off at me in court.  And I just don’t feel like he’s doing his job like he should.  I don’t feel it should have gotten this far, and I’d just rather present my, you know, case myself.”

His request was denied because the lower court decided that it came too late.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned, however, that Paumier’s right to a public trial was violated when the court allowed the jurors to be questioned privately in chambers.  The guaranty of open criminal proceedings extends to voir dire.  Additionally, the recent U.S. Supreme Court’s Presley v. Georgia makes it clear that court room closures should be rare and the court must consider alternatives prior to closing the court room.

The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied the defendant his request to represent himself at trial.  Here, there was no request for continuance, and the defendant’s request was clear.  There was no evidence that trial would have been delayed, or that granting his request would have impaired the administration of justice.

 My opinion?  Good decision.  Kudos to the defendant for stating, on the record, his preference to represent himself after the judge and attorneys conducted voir dire in chambers, and away from the public eye.  Mr. Paumier correctly followed his instincts.  I hope Mason County learns a lesson.

 

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Jones: Rape Shield Statute vs. Defendant’s Right to Testify

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What Is A Rape Shield Law? | The Defence Group

In State v. Jones, the WA Supreme Court held that the Rape Shield Statute does not stop a defendant from offering evidence or cross-examining a victim about the events on the night of the alleged sexual encounter, including the victim’s sexual conduct with other individuals during a wild sex party.

Defendant Mr. Jones was charged with first and second degree rape after his niece, K.D., claimed that Jones put his hands around her neck and forcibly raped her.  At trial, the jury acquitted Jones of first degree rape but could not reach a decision on second degree rape.  Jones was tried again for second degree rape along with the aggravating factor of being an individual in a position of trust to the victim.

Jones wanted to present evidence that K.D. consented to sex during an all-night sex party.  The party included one additional woman and two additional men, cocaine and alcohol.  During this party, K.D. consented to sex with all three men (which included Jones).  The judge, citing the Rape Shield Law, would not allow Jones to introduce such evidence because it was only being introduced to attack K.D.’s credibility.

Furthermore, during the trial, the prosecutor noted that Jones was compelled to give a DNA sample (did not do so voluntarily) and that he refused to clear up matters with the police.  At the end of trial, the judge backtracked a little and claimed that it allowed Jones to present evidence that the sex was consensual (but without mentioning the sex party).   Jones was convicted and appealed.  Jones claimed that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence of the sex party and for the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments with respect to speaking with police and giving a DNA sample.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed.

First, the court reasoned that the trial court violated Jones’ 6th Amendment rights by refusing to allow Jones testify about the sex party.  “Jones’s evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape.”  Furthermore, since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to stop the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated Jones’ Sixth Amendment rights when it barred his testimony.

Second, the Court held the Rape Shield Statute did not apply.  Washington’s rape shield law provides:

Evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim’s marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim’s consent except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense.

Here, the Court decided the Rape Shield Statute protects victims from testifying about past sexual behavior.  In this case, however, Jones was attempting to introduce evidence of present sexual behavior.  Thus, to deny such evidence under the rape shield law would be to read out the term past.   Furthermore, since the evidence that Jones sought to be introduced involved Jones’s defense and version of what occurred the night of the crime, the denial of such evidence was NOT harmless error.  Jones is entitled to a new trial.

My opinion?  Under the circumstances, the court made a well-reasoned decision.  Their interpretation of the Rape Shield Statute appears correct: although one cannot admit evidence of the victim’s past sexual history, the statute does not prevent present sexual history from being admitted into evidence.  This evidence seems especially relevant when the victim is engaged in exploits in the manner described in this case.  Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Sex Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Berghuis v. Smith: Defining the Hardship of Obtaining an Impartial “Cross Section” of the Jury Community

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Race & Law, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Jury Selection: How Social Media is Changing the Game | Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

In Berghuis v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Michigan state court did not create an unfair bias in jury selection for a murder trial. case.

The defendant was an African-American man charged with Second Degree Murder and Felony Firearm Possession.  He goes to trial.  At voir dire, the jury panel was composed of 60 and 100 individuals, only 3 of whom, at most, were African American.  At that time, African-Americans constituted 7.28% of the County’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of the pool from which potential jurors were drawn.  An all-white jury was selected.  The trial court rejected Smith’s objection to the panel’s racial composition.  The all-white jury convicted Smith of the crimes.  He was sentenced to life in prison.

For those who don’t know, the 6th Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.  The issue was whether, under the circumstances, the defendant’s right was violated by the all-white jury’s conviction.

The Court reasoned that a defendant raising a violation of the “fair-cross-section” requirement of the Sixth Amendment must establish that any existing underrepresentation was due to “systematic exclusion” of the group in the jury-selection process. Practices, such as excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to show up for jury service, reliance on mail notices, a failure to follow up on nonresponses, the use of old addresses, and the refusal of police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors, are insufficient to establish “systematic exclusion.”  Consequently, the U.S. Supremes upheld Smith’s conviction.

My opinion?  Pollyannaish as it sounds, this opinion shows why it’s SO IMPORTANT for citizens to show up for jury duty.  Juries are the last bastion of objective, impartial justice.  We all experience moments when we are wrongfully accused; not because we intentionally did something wrong, but merely because we look/think/act outside the norms of the majority.

That’s exactly why juries MUST reflect a fair cross section of the community.  That “cross section,’ however, can only happen if YOU – the citizen – do your part and answer the call to serve on a jury.  Your lone perspective adds depth.  Your life experience – which, amazingly, might be similar to the defendant’s/petitioner’s/plaintiff’s – adds insight to their arguments.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

 

State v. Hammock: Home-Made Guns Are Still Firearms

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Pin on Small homemade wepons + gun stuff

In State v. Hammock, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a hollowed-out bolt, in which a bullet is inserted, and when used with a hammer to strike the bullet,  IS a firearm.

After an extended period of using drugs and arguing with Mr. Ford, defendant Hammock handed his girlfriend, Ms. McKee, a .22-caliber bullet, a hollowed-out bolt with a hexagonal head, and a ball peen hammer, and told her to shoot Ford.  Hammock had previously used the device to discharge a bullet.

Hammock inserted the shell into the head end of the bolt.  McKee placed the  non-head end of the  bolt against Ford’s head, struck the bullet with the ball peen hammer, discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford did not die immediately.

The following details are gruesome.  About 20 minutes later, Hammock jumped over the bed without warning  and repeatedly hit Ford  in the head  with a hammer.  Ford remained conscious for several more hours.  Later Hammock exited the room and returned with a metal object similar to a meat cleaver and struck Ford in the head two or three times.

Ford remained alive and conscious, so Hammock knotted an extension cord around Ford’s neck and placed a white plastic bag over Ford’s head.  Hammock also struck Ford again with the metal object once or twice.  Ford ultimately died from a gunshot wound to the head, blunt force impacts to the head, and ligature strangulation due to an extension cord knotted around his neck.

The State charged Hammock First Degree Murder, and numerous Drug Offenses.  A forensic scientist with the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory testified that the .22-caliber bullet is a “rimfire” cartridge, meaning that its primer, the explosive, is around the rim of the cartridge. The primer ignites the gunpowder that provides the gas that propels the bullet.  The scientist was able to discharge a bullet from the bolt by striking the rim of the cartridge with a ball peen hammer.  The jury found Hammock guilty of all charges, including possession of a deadly weapon.

Court of Appeals reasoned that the bolt, hammer, and bullet, when considered together, constitute an instrument of offensive combat.  Hammock inserted the bullet into the bolt, handed it back to McKee, and told her to shoot Ford.  McKee put the bolt up to Ford’s head, struck it with a hammer, and discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford died partly from this gunshot wound to the head.

This constitutes an “instrument” used to injure or kill someone, reasoned the Court.  Additionally, the Court held that the bolt system meets the definition of “device” as well under former RCW 9.41.010(1).  Under Webster’s Dictionary, a “device” is “something that is formed or formulated by design and usage.

Consequently, the Court upheld Hammocks guilty verdict.

My opinion?  As I said above, I’m dedicating this post to NRA members, gun enthusiasts, and 2nd Amendment buffs.  Although I’m clearly NOT providing legal advice – I cannot do that over the internet – this bit of public information should put gun enthusiasts on pause.  Home-made guns are still firearms; even if the moving parts are separated from each other.  Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Dow: Corpus Delicti vs. RCW 10.58.03

Constitutional Rights, Corpus Delicti, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Uncategorized, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Important Facts about Corpus Delicti

In State v. Dow, the WA Supreme Court held that RCW 10.58.035 does NOT change the corpus delicti rule that the State must prove every element of an alleged crime by evidence independent of the defendant’s statement.

 Defendant Mr. Dow was charged with with first degree child molestation.  The victim was a three year old female, and too young to testify.  Consequently, her statements to others about the alleged offense were inadmissible.  No persons other than Dow and the child were present at the time of the alleged offense.  During a recorded police interview, Dow made statements regarding the events surrounding the alleged molestation.

The trial court found these statements to be exculpatory and not an admission.  The State sought to introduce Dow’s statements as substantive evidence that he committed the crime charged.  Dow moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were inadmissible for lack of  corpus delicti.  The trial court agreed.  Dow’s case was dismissed.  The State appealed.  The case found its way to the Supreme Court.

Some background is necessary: the corpus delicti doctrine generally is a principle that tests the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence, other than a defendant’s confession, to corroborate the confession.  The purpose of the rule is to ensure that other evidence supports the defendant’s statement and satisfies the elements of the crime.  Where no other evidence exists to support the confession, a conviction cannot be supported solely by a confession.  The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to prevent defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.  Historically, courts have grounded the rule in judicial mistrust of confessions.

Along comes RCW 10.58.035. It allows a statement to be admitted into evidence if there is substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the statement.   The following factors determine whether the statement is trustworthy:

(a)  Whether there is any evidence corroborating or contradicting the facts set out in the statement, including the elements of the offense;

(b)  The character of the witness reporting the statement and the number of witnesses to the statement;

(c)  Whether a record of the statement was made and the timing of the making of the record in relation to the making of the statement; and/or

(d)  The relationship between the witness and the defendant.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that even if the statements are admissible, no other evidence exists to establish the corpus delicti independent of Dow’s statement. Further, corpus delicti cases have always required sufficient evidence independent of a defendant’s confession to support a conviction.  RCW 10.58.035 does nothing to change this requirement. The State concedes it lacked evidence.  Indeed, the only evidence the State purported to have is Dow’s statement, which is insufficient under any standard.

Consequently, the WA Supremes upheld Dow’s dismissal.

My opinion?  I like the decision.  The WA Supremes dutifully followed corpus delicti and held people shouldn’t be charged with crimes unless evidence exists.  I fear, however, that even though the Court did not allow RCW 10.58.035 to swallow the corpus delicti rule, such decisions may come few and farther in between.  The statute was MADE to chip away at corpus delicti.  Period.  Perhaps it didn’t apply to Dow’s case because his statement was the ONLY evidence the State had.  Future defendants in future cases, however, might not be so lucky.

My prediction?  Future courts may find that if a scintilla of evidence beyond the defendant’s statement exists, then the statute kicks into effect and does away with corpus delicti.  Keep your eyes peeled . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harris: A Defendant May Argue Gant On Appeal Even Though It Was Not Argued At Trial.

Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Courts and the Constitution Arizona v Gant

In State v. Harris, the  WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant who did not bring a suppression motion prior to trial, may assert a claim under Arizona v. Gant  for the first time on appeal.

Defendant Stuart J. Harris, Jr. appealed his conviction for First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.  He argued  sufficiency of the evidence,  additional evidentiary error, and prosecutorial misconduct.   While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which deals with the scope of a car search pursuant to the arrest of its driver.  The Court of Appeals Division II allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the Gant issue.

For those who don’t know, Gant rejected the reading of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d (1981), that predominated in the lower courts, namely, that the Fourth Amendment allows a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.

In departing from Belton, the Gant Court held instead that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723.3

Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned the facts in Gant were similar to those here.  Harris was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the car at the time of its search, and there was no reason to believe that the car contained evidence related to the offense for which he was arrested (driving with a suspended license). Therefore, absent other legal support for the search, the officer’s search of  the car was unlawful.

Furthermore, Gant applies retroactively because “A party should be allowed to take advantage of a decision rendered during the pendency of his case, even if he had not reserved the point decided, if the decision could not have reasonably been anticipated.”  State v. Harris at 6-7, quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit.

My opinion?  I’m a HUGE fan of the Arizona v. Gant opinion (please see my Dec. 24, 2009 blog), and by extension, I’m a HUGE fan of this opinion. Generally, United States Supreme Court decisions that announce new constitutional rules governing criminal prosecutions apply retroactively to all criminal cases not yet final on appeal.  I’m happy the Court of Appeals stuck to the law; and supported Gant, to boot.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pugh: WA Supremes Admit “Excited Utterance” Hearsay Evidence of 911 Call; Disregard State v. Crawford

911 Call, Assault, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Evidence, felony, Jury Trial, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What is EXCITED UTTERANCE? What does EXCITED UTTERANCE mean? EXCITED UTTERANCE meaning & explanation - YouTube

In State v. Pugh, the WA Supreme Court admitted “Excited Utterance” hearsay evidence of a 911 call, thus disregarding State v. Crawford.

Defendant Timothy Pugh and his wife Bridgette are married.  They had problems.  In November 2004, she obtains a no-contact order (NCO) against him.  On March 21, 2005, and in violation of the NCO, the Pughs were together at a friend’s apartment.  At 3:13 a.m., she calls 911 and states, “My husband was beating me up really bad.”

She provided his description.  When the operator asked her whether he was still there, Mrs. Pugh said, “He’s just outside.” She again reported being beaten, but this time stated it in the present sense.  She also said she needed an ambulance.  The call terminated when police officers arrived.  Mrs. Pugh had a bruised face and a chipped tooth.  The officers soon arrested Mr. Pugh in the parking lot outside the apartment where Bridgette was.

Before trial, the State delivered a subpoena to Mrs. Pugh.  However she refused to arrive and/or testify at trial.  Despite her decision, and in clear violation of State v. Crawford (2004 case where WA Supremes upheld the Confrontation Clause and dismissed a case where the State’s victim/witness refused to testify) , the trial court admitted her 911 call as evidence.  Pugh was convicted of felony violation of the court order, domestic violence.

 The WA Supremes held Mrs. Pugh’s statements to the 911 operator were nontestimonial, and therefore admission of a recording of the 911 call at Mr. Pugh’s trial did not violate his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  They reasoned that her statements qualify as res gestae under the res gestae doctrine as it applied at the time the state constitution was adopted.

They further argued that statements of this type do not implicate the state confrontation clause.  Because the statements are nontestimonial and do not implicate article I, section 22, admission of the 911 recording violated neither the federal nor the state confrontation clause.

My opinion?  I hold the same disdain as Justice Sanders’ dissenting opinion.  Article I, Section 22 of the WA Constitution states, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . .”  This is the essence of the Confrontation Clause.

And, to quote Justice Sanders, “What is there about face to face that the majority opinion does not understand?”  Crawford applies – and cases get dismissed – if a victim refuses to testify.  Period.  Here, the victim refused to testify.  Nevertheless, and in total violation of Crawford, the majority pulls out some archaic res gestae analysis, breathes life into it, and totally stomps the heck out of Crawford.

 Unbelievable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harrington: “Progressive Intrusion” = Unlawful Search

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

4 Charts That Show Stop-and-Frisk Is a Terrible Crime-Fighting Tool

In State v. Harrington, the WA Supreme Court held that the “Progressive Intrusion” of the officer during the investigations was an unlawful search.

Issue was whether the police unlawfully searched/seized the defendant prior to arrest, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, requiring suppression of drugs found on his person.

In short (yes, I’m getting to the good part), the WA Supremes decided the search WAS unlawful, and amounted to a “progressive intrusion.”  Evidence suppressed, case thrown out of court.

The facts: On August 13, 2005, 11:00PM, Officer Reiber of the Richland Police was driving his police car on duty.  He noticed soon-to-be defendant, Dustin Harrington, walking down the sidewalk.  Officer Reiber made a U-turn, drove past Harrington, and pulled into a driveway.  He did not activate his lights or siren.  Officer exited his car and made contact with Harrington (this is called a “social contact”).

Officer Reiber asked questions.  Harrington answered them awkwardly and non-sensically.  Officer became nervous because Harrington kept putting his hands in his pockets.  The conversation lasted about five minutes.

State patrol Trooper William Bryan drove by the scene.  He initiated a U-turn, got out of his car, and approached the two men.  Similar to Officer Reiber, Trooper Bryan did not activate his emergency lights.  Upon contact, Trooper Bryan did not speak to either gentleman.  He stood about eight feet away.

Officer Reiber asked Mr. Harrington if he could pat down Harrington “for officer safety reasons.”  Mr. Harrington said “No.”  Officer patted Harrington down anyway, against Harrington’s consent.  During the pat-down, Officer Reiber found a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine.  Reiber arrested Harrington.  During the search, officers discovered a pipe and baggie containing methamphetamine on Harrington’s person. Harrigton was charged with Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine.

The WA Supremes articulated why the search/arrest was illegal, and consequently, why the evidence should be suppressed.  They discussed what “social contact” between an officer and citizen means:

“The phrase’s plain meaning seems somewhat misplaced.  ‘Social contact’ suggests idle conversation about, presumably, the weather or last night’s ball game — trivial niceties that have no likelihood of triggering an officer’s suspicion of criminality.  The term ‘social contact’ does not suggest an investigative component.”

The Court further reasoned that subsequent events quickly dispelled the social contact and escalated the encounter to an unlawful seizure. First, Trooper Bryan’s arrival at the scene escalated the situation away from a mere “social contact” because a reasonable person would think twice about the turn of events.  As a result, Trooper Bryan’s presence contributed to the eventual seizure of Harrington.

Second, Officer Reiber’s request for Mr. Harrington  to remove hands from pockets added to the officer’s unlawfully progressive intrusion.  Third, Mr. Harrington did not consent to the search.  Officers MUST have a well-founded suspicion to search when they lack a defendant’s consent.

Here, these circumstances lacked the foundational basis for a search.  Finally, and before Officer Reiber’s request to search, he did not ask for Harrington’s name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs.

The court concluded Harrington was unconstitutionally seized because, like him, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when officers asked to frisk.  Consequently, the seizure violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My Opinion?  Excellent.  Beautiful.  On point.  The WA Supremes got it right.  The cumulative effect of these violations — all three of them — amounted to an unlawful search.  I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes addressed the fine line between a lawful “social contact” and unlawful “progressive intrusion.”  I’ve had numerous clients face criminal charges as a result of an officer’s apparently innocent “social contact,” which was, in reality, a progressive intrusion into their privacy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Patton: WA Supreme Court Acknowledges Search and Seizure Protections Afforded by Arizona v. Gant.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police Search Your Car Without a Warrant?

In State v. Patton, the WA Supreme Court held that an automobile search which happens after arrest is not justified unless the defendant is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest.

Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant.  A Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was on his property and leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat.  The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest.  Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer.

Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court found that Patton was arrested when the officer “manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody” while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, “the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence.”  The court elaborated their reasoning with the following:

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Congratulations to Justice Jim Johnson, who found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.   In Gant, the U.S. Supremes held that a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Drug Offense or any other crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kyllo: When It Makes Sense, Argue Self Defense

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Ineffective Assistance, Jury Trial, Self-Defense, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Undercover inmate describes violence in jail

In State v. Kyllo the WA Supreme Court held that the  jury instruction misstated the law on Self-Defense. Moreover, the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured.

On June 12, 2004, while an inmate at the Cowlitz County jail on other charges, Mr. Kyllo was involved in a fist fight with another inmate during the course of which Kyllo bit the other inmate’s ear off. Kyllo was charged with second degree assault and he claimed he acted in self-defense.

At trial, Defense counsel proposed a self-defense jury instruction that stated:

A person is entitled to act on appearances in defending himself, if that person believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that he is in actual danger of great bodily harm, although it afterwards might develop that the person was mistaken as to the extent of the danger. Actual danger is not necessary for the use of force to be lawful.

Kyllo was convicted on the charge of second degree assault. On appeal, he asserted ineffectual assistance of counsel, arguing that the instruction above improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Barbara Madsen writing a unanimous opinion.

The Court held that the jury instruction misstated the law, and that the jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self-defense when he reasonably apprehends that he is about to be injured — “One is not required to believe he is about to be grievously harmed or killed.”

The Court held that Kyllo was denied effective assistance of counsel, and remanded the case for a new trial.

My opinion?  Excellent decision.  Reminds defense attorneys to stay cognizant of the jury instructions they provide.  For those who don’t know, a jury instruction is an instruction given by the court to a jury at the conclusion of presentation of all evidence in a trial, and after the lawyer’s closing arguments, to advise the jury of the law that applies to the facts of the case, and the manner in which they should conduct their deliberations.  The attorneys prepare the instructions.

Here, the defense attorney gave the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  The instruction presents a good starting point for the circumstances surrounding this particular case (Convict A is mad-dogging Convict B, Convict B attacks Convict A first  — and acting on Convict A’s appearances — because he believes Convict A will attack and get the advantage of surprise).  Unfortunately, the instruction, by itself wasn’t enough.

As a matter of practice, I believe both a self defense instruction AND and “Acting on Appearances” instruction work best in combination with each other.  Speaking from my own trial experience, everyone on the street embraces self defense.  It allows us to fight back when we’re attacked.  Simple.

However, the soft-spoken pacifists out there (who are INCREDIBLY hard to spot at jury selection) are downright offended by the “Acting on Appearances” instruction.  Many juries simply cannot promote violence beyond the context of self defense.  Yet even a pacifist will fight to save their own life.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.