Category Archives: Jail

State v. Walker: Shackled Defendants

Judges now deciding daily if inmates should wear shackles in court -  oregonlive.com

Interesting case on shackled defendants appearing at non-jury hearings . . .

In State v. Walker, the Court of Appeals decided a trial judge can decide whether and how a prisoner should be restrained by shackles in the courtroom.

Here, the defendant Vernon Walker pleaded guilty to one count of Murder in the Second Degree and one count of Assault in the Second Degree arising from a 2003 shooting. At his sentencing hearing, jail security officers transported him to court wearing handcuffs and leg restraints. The trial court denied Walker’s motion for an order removing the handcuffs for the hearing. On appeal, Walker argues that the denial of his motion violated his constitutional right to appear before the court free of physical restraint. He also argued for a new sentencing hearing.

On appeal, Walker argued he had a constitutional right to appear in court free from restraints, regardless of whether a jury was present, and that there was no factual basis to support his shackling. He contended that because he had no history of disrupting court proceedings or attempting to escape from the courtroom, there was no reason to believe that he would do so at his sentencing hearing. He argued that the State’s claims otherwise were speculation. Walker also asserted that restraints would dehumanize him and prejudice the sentencing judge.

 Despite Walker’s arguments, the Court of Appeals disagreed. They reasoned a trial judge has sole authority over whether and how a prisoner should be restrained in the courtroom. Furthermore, even though the law strictly forbids defendants from appearing before juries wearing shackles, a court may shackle a defendant at non-jury hearings on a “lesser showing” than is required to shackle a defendant during a jury proceeding. Finally, the court reasoned that restraints are permissible in non-jury hearings to prevent injury to people in the courtroom, disorderly conduct at trial, or escape.

My opinion? This is a tough case. It is well settled that in a proceeding before a jury a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to appear free from restraints or shackles of any kind. In State v. Williams, the defendant’s conviction for burglary was reversed because the trial court, without justification, denied the defendant’s motion that he and his witnesses be unshackled before the jury during the trial. The Williams court cited article 1, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution which provides “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person,” and stated:

The right here declared is to appear with the use of not only his mental but his physical faculties unfettered, and unless some impelling necessity demands the restraint of a prisoner to secure the safety of others and his own custody, the binding of the prisoner in irons is a plain violation of the constitutional guaranty.

Here, in the Walker case, the Court of Appeals distinguished its reasoning from Williams to the extent that Williams only applied to times when the defendant was before the jury. Otherwise, for non-jury hearings, judges have full authority to decide whether defendants must appear in restraints and shackles.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Button: Public Shaming Sentence Struck

VERY interesting opinion. In State v. Button, the WA Court of Appeals says that a “shaming” sentence for a defendant convicted of is unlawful. More specifically, the Sentencing Reform Act does NOT support a sentencing court’s requirement that a defendant convicted of Theft First Degree must stand on a street corner holding a sign that states, “I stole from kids. Charlotte Button.” 

          

The defendant Charlotte Button was convicted for First Degree Theft for embezzling funds from a high school club. The trial court sentenced her to two months in jail and imposed an additional condition which intended to “send a message to the community.” The court explained the sentencing condition: “Before you begin your jail time, you are going to spend 40 hours standing at the corner of Wishkah and Broadway with a sign that says, ‘I Stole Money From Kida. Charlotte Burton.’ You’re going to do it two hours at a time twice a day from 7:00 to 9:00 in the morning and 4:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon.” Along with the “public shaming condition, the judge also imposed 60 days jail.

Ms. Button appealed the “public shaming” portion of her sentence on the grounds that it violated her Constitutional Rights under the First Amendment and 8th Amendment of the Constitution. In other words, her Free Speech rights were violated and the judge’s sentence was arguably Cruel & Unusual Punishment.

The Court of Appeals decided that although Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act allows a number of sentencing alternatives – including drug treatment for drug offenders and sexual deviance treatment for sex offenders – “public shaming” is not a designated sentencing alternative. “Nor does any other Sentencing Reform Act provision independently authorize the sign-holding condition, which clearly requires Button to affirmatively engage in some conduct. Thus, there is no statutory authority allowing the imposition of a sign-holding condition in the first instance.”

The Court did not address Ms. Button’s Constitutional arguments.

My opinion? Good decision. It’s well-grounded in statutory authority (and lack thereof). Sure, the defendant’s actions leading to the conviction were bad. Nevertheless, she paid her debt to society by serving a significant amount of jail (60 days). And I’m sure the court imposed restitution and court fines, as well. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pinson: When Prosecutors Violate a Defendant’s 5th Amendment Right

Forcing iPhone unlock violates Fifth Amendment, says Court of Appeals –  Naked Security

In State v. Pinson, the WA Court of Appeals held that a Prosecutor violated a defendant’s 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination by arguing that the defendant was guilty because he chose to not talk to police when arrested.

Mason County Sheriff Deputy Nault responded to a reported domestic violence call. He contacted Stacey Campbell, who was in a parking lot across the street from her home. She said the defendant Jarad Pinson, her boyfriend, violently assaulted her. Deputy Nault saw red marks on her neck. Deputy Nault went into the home and arrested Mr. Pinson. During the arrest, Mr. Pinson was cooperative. He said he was drinking with his friends. When asked by officers if the situation became violent with Ms. Campbell, however, Mr. Pinson did not respond. he was arrested for Assault Second Degree Domestic Violence.

At trial, the judge granted the defense attorney’s motion in limine to suppress the Prosecutor from asking whether the fight was physical. However, defense counsel asked that question during cross-examination. Because of this, the judge ruled that Pinson’s defense attorney “opened the door” and gave the Prosecutor opportunity to cross examine the defendant on whether the fight was physical.

In closing argument, the Prosecutor said Mr. Pinson’s silence during arrest was substantive evidence of guilt. Although Ms. Campbell recanted her earlier accusations of assault while testifying on the witness stand, the jury nevertheless returned a guilty verdict on the Assault Second Degree charges. The case went up on appeal.

The law on prosecutorial misconduct is straightforward. To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that “in the context of the records and the circumstances of trial, the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. However, when the defendant fails to object to the challenged portions of the prosecutor’s argument, he is deemed to have waived any error unless the prosecutor’s conduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not “cure” the resulting prejudice to the defendant.

The 5th Amendment in the U.S Constitution states, “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Similarly, Article I, section 9 of the WA State Constitution follows this language. Both Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to be free from self-incrimination, including the right silence. A defendant has the right to remain silent both prearrest and post-arrest; i.e., both before and after a defendant is given Miranda warnings.

 Here, the Court of Appeals held that the Prosecutor’s statement was improper because in violated Mr. Pinson’s 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. More specifically, it was improper for the State to make closing arguments that infer guilt from the defendant’s silence. Even though defense counsel did not object, his failure to object did not waive the claim of prosecutorial misconduct because the conduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice.

The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? Great decision. It’s a long-standing, basic principle that Prosecutors cannot infer a defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. I’m pleased the Court acknowledged this basic principle.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. McDonald: Prior Misdemeanor DV Convictions Count Toward Pointable “Offender Score” in Present Felony DV Charges & Convictions.

Co-Parenting with a No-Contact Order | Blog | Talking Parents

In State v. McDonald The Court ruled that violations of a Domestic Violence No-Contact Order are included in an offender score for felony DV convictions.

In this case, the defendant Christopher McDonald was charged with Assault of his girlfriend Julianne Vanas  during a car ride. The court entered No-contact Orders prohibiting contact between the defendant and his girlfriend. The defendant contacted Vanas via phone numerous times while he was in custody. The jail recorded the phone calls. At one point, the defendant told Vanas she needed to be persistent about calling the Prosecutor and saying she would not follow through with the charges.

At trial, the defendant was convicted of Felony Tampering With a Witness and six gross misdemeanor violations of a No-Contact Order. Regarding the charge of Assault in the Second Degree, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser offense of Assault in the Fourth Degree, also a gross misdemeanor. By special verdicts, the jury found each count was domestic violence. The jury returned not guilty verdicts on Unlawful Imprisonment and Assault Fourth Degree.

At sentencing, the court calculated McDonald’s offender score as “7” based on prior convictions. Because McDonald’s current conviction was a domestic violence offense, the court added 1 additional point for each of the current domestic violence gross misdemeanors, yielding a total offender score of 14 points (this is HIGH). The court sentenced McDonald to 51 months prison for Tampering With a Witness and imposed consecutive sentences for the Assault Fourth Degree and No-Contact Order convictions. The defendant appealed, saying the trial court miscalculated.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s calculations of the defendant’s felony score pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(21).

For those who don’t know, RCW 9.94A.525 provides: “If the present conviction is for a felony domestic violence offense where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 was plead and proven . . . count points as follows: (c) Count one point for each prior conviction for a repetitive domestic violence offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, was plead and proven after August 1, 2011.”

Here, the defendant argued (1) the statute does not apply, (2) the court gave erroneous jury instructions, (3) he was given ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the trial court improperly included his six current convictions for violating a domestic violence No-Contact order in calculating his offender score for Tampering With a Witness – a domestic violence conviction.

The court rejected the defendant’s arguments. It reviewed the legislative intent of the statute from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. The Court also stated, “We must avoid constructions that yield unlikely, strange or absurd consequences.” And here, apparently the defendant’s interpretation of the law was unpersuasive.

My opinion?  . . . it doesn’t seem fair. Yes, domestic violence is an awful situation. It has horrible effects on people’s lives, including the families and children of those involved. Still, it doesn’t seem fair or equitable that a person with minor domestic violence convictions have those convictions count toward a felony score.

Let’s assume these “minor convictions” for domestic violence included a Malicious Mischief Third Degree conviction for breaking a vase while arguing with a girlfriend, or a minor Assault Fourth Degree domestic violence conviction involving a “push & shove” with no injuries,  mutual combat and drugs/alcohol ingested by the defendant and victim prior to the argument.

It seems over-the-top that these types of domestic violence convictions can count toward a felony offender score and expose a defendant to substantially more months, if not years, in prison should they face a pending felony domestic violence charge.  This type of math inevitably kills negotiations between defendants and prosecutors. It forces defendants to go to trial. Is that justice?

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Brock: The “Time for Arrest” Doctrine

Should school officials be allowed to search students? | Debate.org

In State v. Brock, the WA Court of Appeals held that police officers cannot search someone’s backpack and arrest them for Drug Offenses 10 minutes after contacting a suspect on a Terry stop.

“NO,” said the Court of Appeals in a recent decision.  the facts were such that during a Terry stop, an officer separated Mr. Brock from his backpack. The officer subsequently arrested Brock and searched his backpack, but not until nearly 10 minutes after separating Brock from the bag. Officer Olson told Brock that he was not under arrest. Officer Olson asked Brock to put down his backpack, and Brock complied.

Officer Olson did not find any weapons or any other items during his pat down of Brock. He did not pat down or search the backpack at that time. At trial, the trial court denied Brock’s motion to suppress, finding that this was a valid search incident to arrest under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Some explanation is necessary. A “Terry stop” is a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from a famous United States Supreme Court decision titled, Terry v. Ohio.

Also, under the “time of arrest” rule, an officer may search personal articles in an arrestee’s actual and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.

Here, the search of the defendant’s bag did not happen immediately after he was arrested. Officer Olson searched the bag roughly 10 minutes after seizing it from Brock. The bag was secured in Officer Olson’s truck from the time of seizure through the time of the search. Brock was 12 to 15 feet away from the vehicle and the backpack at the time of arrest and during the search of the backpack.

Brock had actual possession of the backpack when Officer Olson initiated the Terry stop and when he seized it. However, Brock did not have actual possession of the backpack at the time of his arrest. Brock’s backpack was neither on his person nor within his area of control at the time of his arrest. While Officer Olson had probable cause to arrest Brock when he seized the backpack, it is the arrest itself—not probable cause—that constitutes the necessary authority of law to search under article I, section 7.

Therefore, to find that this was a valid search incident to arrest, the Court said it must be convinced that, for the purposes of what is in an arrestee’s possession, “immediately prior to arrest” includes either the time between a valid Terry stop and the actual resulting arrest or the time between seizure of the backpack during the Terry stop and the resulting arrest. The Court concluded in saying that Washington Supreme Court’s opinions have not gone this far, and “We decline to do so here.”

My opinion? Good decision. It’s pleasing to know our courts are upholding the WA Constitution and following the stringent search and seizure caselaw. Kudos.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Toxicologist Says, “No Spike YET In Marijuana DUI Arrests”

A Marijuana DUI is Tough to Prove | DUI Lawyer

The state toxicologist hasn’t seen a spike in positive blood tests for marijuana since pot became legal under Washington law.

Voters last fall passed Initiative 502, allowing adults over 21 to possess up to an ounce of marijuana. The measure, which took effect Dec. 6, set a DUI limit designed to be similar to the .08 blood-alcohol content for drunken driving – 5 nanograms of active THC per milliliter of blood.

State toxicologist Fiona Couper told a legislative hearing in Olympia on Wednesday that the Washington State Patrol’s toxicology lab has completed tests on all blood samples taken from drivers in December, and has started on samples from last month. She says there’s no spike, but notes the law has only just taken effect.

Couper says that every year, about 6,000 blood samples from drivers are submitted to the lab. About 1,000 to 1,100 of those come back positive for active THC, with the average being about 6 nanograms.

My opinion? This could be the proverbial calm before the storm. Who knows, perhaps law enforcement officers are being trained and retrained on becoming Drug Recognition Experts on marijuana DUI detection. Progressive laws are slow to get enacted, and the government’s response to progressive legislation even slower; especially if it costs money to train/retrain officers. Yes, there’s no spike yet. But don’t get too comfy . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Mass Incarceration In America

Monthly Review | From Mass Incarceration to Mass Coercion

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Sentencing Project Releases New Publication on Prison Deterrence

How US prisons violate three principles of criminal justice | Aeon Ideas

Good reading!  The Sentencing Project’s report addresses a key concern for policy makers regarding whether deterrence is better achieved by increasing the (1) likelihood of apprehension, or (2) severity of sanctions.  The report, titled Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating certainty vs. the Severity of Criminal Punishment is written  is written by Valerie Wright, PhD.

Overall, the report concludes that:

•    Enhancing the certainty of punishment is far more likely to produce deterrent effects than increasing the severity of punishment.

•    There is no significant public safety benefit to increasing the severity of sentences by imposing longer prison terms, particularly at high levels of incarceration.

•    Policies such as “three strikes and you’re out” and mandatory minimum sentences only burden state budgets without increasing public safety.

•    Evidence-based approaches would require increasing the certainty of punishment by improving the likelihood of detection.

My opinion?  The report seems accurate.  I’ve blogged numerous times on this topic, particularly the need for the criminal justice system to seek rehabilitation instead of incarceration for many crimes, especially drug offenses.  At a time when fiscal concerns have propelled policymakers to consider means of controlling corrections budgets, the findings on deterrence suggest that a focus on examining harsh sentencing practices is long overdue.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Garcia-Salgado: DNA Swab is Unlawful if State Lacks Warrant Supported By Probable Cause

My Rights When Police Want my DNA in a Sex Assault Case | Berry Law

In State v. Garcia, the WA Supreme Court held that collecting a DNA swab from a defendant was unlawful search because it was made without a warrant and without probable cause based on oath or affirmation.

Petitioner Alejandro Garcia-Salgado was convicted of a Sex Offense in King County Superior Court after the results of his D.N.A. test linked him to the victim, and were were admitted into evidence during his trial.  He appealed his conviction, saying that the State lacked probable cause to test his D.N.A. and that conducting the test without his consent pursuant to a court order violated his constitutional rights.

The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Garcia-Salgado’s conviction, holding that sufficient evidence existed in the record to establish probable cause for a test of Garcia-Salgado’s D.N.A.  Garcia-Salgado appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Washington.

The WA Supreme Court reasoned that a cheek swab for DNA is indeed a search that intrudes into the body.  A search that intrudes into the body may be made  pursuant  to  an order entered under  CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) if (1) the order is supported by probable case based on oath or affirmation, (2) is entered by a neutral and detached magistrate, (3) describes the place to be searched and the thing to be seized, and (4) if there is a clear indication that the desired evidence will be found, the test is reasonable, and the test is performed in a  reasonable manner.

Here, the WA Supremes decided the trial court errored in procuring the DNA swab because the State lacked a warrant supported by probable cause.  “Consequently, this court cannot say that there was probable cause to search Garcia-Salgado’s DNA.  We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand.”

My opinion?  Heinous as the crime was, the WA Supremes decided correctly.  Defendants have rights, plain and simple.  The criminal justice system must conduct investigations in accordance with these rights.  If the process is short-cutted or made sloppy, then convictions cannot stand.  Here, the State failed to get a warrant for the DNA swab.  Consequently, they should not be allowed to present the DNA evidence at trial.  Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Doughty: WA Supremes Limit Scope of Terry Stops

terry stop | Nevada Public Radio

In State v. Doughty, the WA Supreme Court held that a person’s two-minute visit to a suspected drug house at 3:20 in the morning is insufficient grounds for an investigative seizure.

Late one night, defendant Walter Moses Doughty approached a suspected drug house, stayed for two minutes, then drove away.  A police officer who observed Doughty’s approach and departure stopped Doughty on suspicion of drug activity.  This is typically called a Terry stop under Terry v. Ohio.

During this investigative seizure the officer ran a records check and, based on the results, arrested Doughty for driving with a suspended license.  Police found methamphetamine during a vehicle search incident to arrest.  At trial, he was convicted of Possession of Methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals confirmed the conviction.  The case ended up with the WA Supremes.

Some explanation of a Terry stop is necessary.  In justifying the particular intrusion/investigation, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.  When reviewing the merits of an investigatory stop, a court must evaluate the totality of circumstances presented to the investigating officer.  The State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the stop was justified.

Under this analysis, the WA Supremes reasoned that a person’s presence in a high-crime area at a “late hour” does not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable suspicion to detain that person.  Similarly, a person’s “mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not justify the stop.”

Although the State argued the circumstances warranted the search, the court reasoned that Police may not seize a person who visits a location — even a suspected drug house — merely because the person was there at 3:20 a.m. for only two minutes.  “The Terry-stop threshold was created to stop police from this very brand of interference with people’s everyday lives.”  Additionally, the United States Supreme Court embraced the Terry rule to stop police from acting on mere hunches.

Finally, the Court reasoned that Officer Bishop relied only on his own incomplete observations.  There was no informant’s tip and no furtive movement.  Bishop merely saw Doughty approach and leave a suspected drug house at 3:20 a.m.  Bishop had no idea what, if anything, Doughty did at the house.  Accordingly, these circumstances does not warrant intrusion into Doughty’s private affairs.

The WA Supremes reversed the Court of Appeals, suppress the evidence against Doughty, and vacated his conviction.

My opinion?  GREAT decision.  It’s always nice when our esteemed judges follow the law in undramatic fashion.  Clearly, the stop was unlawful and the evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court and court of Appeals. 🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.