Category Archives: Drug Offenses

Is Texting While Driving the New DUI?

ACLU, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Technology, Text Messages, Traffic Infractions, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

Police Officer Posing As Construction Worker

Recently, Marietta Police dressed up as a construction workers at a busy intersection to catch distracted drivers who were text messaging while driving. The police go as far as busting drivers who are texting while stopped at red lights. It appears that going undercover is an effective way to bust drivers texting, tweeting or checking emails behind the wheel.

“What we’ve done here is we’re able to put officers in the roads so we’re able to get close enough almost inside their cars so we can look down and see exactly what they’re doing on their phones,” said Marietta police Officer Nick Serkedakis. “I really think this is the DUI of the future. Impairment is still a problem, but this distracted driving is killing as many people as drunk drivers.”

The tickets are $150 and one point on your license.

Can a program like this – one where WA police officers pose as construction workers at certain locations to observe texting drivers – be implemented in Washington State?

Probably not.

This program is very similar to DUI checkpoints, which were basically outlawed in 2008. For those who don’t know, sobriety checkpoints (also called DUI checkpoints) are locations where law enforcment officers are stationed to check drivers for signs of intoxication and impairment. Many jurisdictions utilize sobriety checkpoints as part of their larger drunk driving deterrance program. Due to legal issues surrounding their use, not all states conduct sobriety checkpoints. Some states have laws authorizing their use. Others forbid them or are silent on the issue.

According to the Government’s Highway Safety Association (GHSA), Washington State is one of only 12 states which do not conduct DUI checkpoints. The story is interesting. In 2008, then-Governor Christine Gregoire wanted the state Legislature to authorize police to set up sobriety spot checks, a practice unseen in Washington since the state Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1988 under City of Seattle v. Messiani.

Some background is necessary. In Messiani, the Washington State Supreme Court decided that the Seattle Police Department’s sobriety checkpoint program was constitutional. In short, police officers set up roadblocks where all oncoming motorists were stopped. The police lacked warrants and any particular suspicion of criminal activity. The City of Seattle argued that the State’s interest in the legal operation of vehicles outweighs any privacy interest under Article I, Section 7 of the WA Constitution. Ultimately, the Washington State Supreme Court concluded that the City of Seattle’s position was unlawful, and held that sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional.

At any rate, Governor Gregoire’s proposed DUI Checkpoint legislation failed. The ACLU even got involved. In the end, Legislators simply lacked the political will overturn the WA Supreme Court’s City of Seattle v. Messiani. 

Unlike Washington, however, Georgia has  actively legalized DUI checkpoints. They are conducted weekly and aggressively; and upheld under the State of Georgia’s Constitution.

Due to the differences, I can’t see WA police officers successfully pulling off an anti-text messaging campaign like the Georgia police officers can. This campaign is too similar to DUI checkpoints, which are illegal in Washington State.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

New Smartphone App Warns You When You’re Too Stoned To Drive

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, Evidence, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Race & Law, Search and Seizure, Technology, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

Detects Marijuana Impairment

Technology. Gotta love it.

Canary has created a smartphone app which checks your mental and physical performance levels after ingesting marijuana and before driving. The app has gained widespread popularity and is sanctioned by NORML, an organization whose mission is to move public opinion to legalize the responsible use of marijuana by adults.

The app is straightforward: after logging in, it quickly subjects users to four basic tests: (1) a memory challenge where you have to recall six numbers that briefly appear on screen, (2) a reaction-time game where you have to quickly identify a particular icon from a series of images that pop up, (3) a time-perception assessment where you have to count off 20 seconds in your head as accurately as possible, and (4) a balance test that uses your phone’s accelerometer to gauge your ability to stand motionless on one foot.

After taking the tests, the app compares your results to a personalized performance baseline based on your past attempts at the app or norms built into the program.

Canary then determines whether your performance is impaired. At the end of the three-minute session, a green light means you’re not impaired, a yellow light means you should reconsider driving, and a blinking red light means you are impaired.

“This tool ideally allows cannabis consumers to take control and identify when they present a traffic-safety risk or when they may be under the influence,” says Paul Armentano, deputy director of NORML. “I believe this is information that all responsible marijuana users will want to know.”

The secret to Canary is that it doesn’t focus on potential markers of impaired performance, like levels of THC in your breath, but instead on performance itself. And since it launched weeks ago, Canary has been downloaded more than 10,000 times and is attracting attention from major marijuana players.

My opinion? Canary moves in the right direction. When it comes to marijuana use, drug tests such as urinalyses or blood tests are highly retrospective. The best those tests can do is assess lifestyle and acknowledge that the perpetrator consumed pot at some time recently.  However, these tests have absolutely no impact on whether you can perform. It’s unfair to prosecute someone who might have smoked a joint on Thursday and tested positive on Monday. So yes, testing someone’s performance before driving is absolutely critical to discovering if they’re too stoned to drive.

There’s a social justice incentive behind accurate marijuana impairment tests as well: Since African-Americans are far more likely to be pulled over and arrested for marijuana offenses than whites, an objective way to determine who’s high and who’s not could help level the playing field.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Z.U.E.: Terry Stop Based on Unreliable Informant Tip Was Unlawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Firearm, Informant, Juvenile, law enforcement, marijuana, Obstructing, police, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Good decision.

In State v. Z.U.E., the Washington Supreme Court decided that when police stop an individual based on an informant’s tip, there must be some “indicia of reliability” based on the totality of the circumstances. Here, there wasn’t.

The facts show that Z.U.E. was a juvenile passenger in a car stopped by police after several 911 callers reported a bald shirtless man seen carrying a gun. Another caller reported a 17 year old female gave the gun to the shirtless man. Based on these tips, police stopped a car believing that the female was in the car. They ordered Z.U.E out of the vehicle, searched him, and found marijuana on his person. The officers did not find any guns, nor did they find the bald, shirtless subject.

The state prosecuted Z.U.E for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance and Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer. At his trial, Z.U.E. argued a CrR 3.6 Motion to Suppress and essentially challenged the Terry stop and subsequent search incident to arrest. The police who stopped ZUE did not know how many 911 callers there were or the identities of the callers and did not corroborate the report regarding the female with a gun.  The trial court denied the motion. Z.U.E. was found guilty of the drug charge and acquitted on the Obstructing charge. Z.U.E. appealed. The WA Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 911 calls lacked sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify the stop. Again, the case went up on appeal – this time, by the State –  to the WA Supreme Court.

The WA Supremes affirmed the WA Court of Appeals and suppressed the evidence. In reaching their decision, the Court discussed Terry stops. In challenging the validity of a Terry stop, article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution generally tracks the U.S. Constitution’s  Fourth Amendment analysis. That said, warrantless seizures are presumed unreasonable, and the State bears the burden of establishing that the seizure falls within one of the carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception is a brief investigatory detention of a person, known as a Terry stop. For a Terry stop to be permissible, the State must show that the officer had a “reasonable suspicion” that the detained person was, or was about to be, involved in a crime.

They court further reasoned that when police stop an individual based on an informant’s tip, there must be some “indicia of reliability” based on the totality of the circumstances. There must be either (1) circumstances establishing the informant’s reliability or (2) some corroborative observation by the officers that shows the presence of criminal activity or the informer’s information was obtained in a reliable fashion. Here, the police did not have any articulable reason to suspect any of the passengers in the car of criminal activity. The seizure of Z.U.E was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure should have been suppressed.

My opinion? Good decision. This was a straightforward application of the law. The informant tips were unreliable. Also, Z.U.E.’s involvement on the 911 calls and firearms was so attenuated that it was virtually irrelevant. Well done, WA Supremes!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

NY Politician Wants Ignition Interlock Devices in All New Vehicles

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, DUI, Ignition Interlock Device, Legislation, marijuana, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Today, U.S. Representative Kathleen Rice announced that she will introduce legislation requiring all American automakers to equip new cars with ignition interlock device (IID) technology which detects a driver’s blood alcohol content (BAC) and prevents the engine from starting if the driver’s BAC is above the legal limit.

While laws vary across the states, ignition interlock devices are widely required for individuals who are convicted of DUI. A recent study conducted by researchers at the University of Michigan found that requiring interlock technology in all new vehicles would, over a 15 year implementation period, prevent an estimated 85 percent of drunk driving-related deaths and 84-89 percent of drunk driving-related nonfatal injuries.

The study says that preventing deaths and injuries resulting from DUI and other alcohol/drug related accidents would save an estimated $343 billion over 15 years. Additionally, the cost of installing the IID technology would be recovered in first 3 years of implementing the devices into cars. Finally, the study found that young drivers would benefit the most.

Representative Rice said the following about her legislation:

“Advancing the progress we’ve made combating drunk driving demands bold action. It demands that we take a stand and say we refuse to keep letting drunk drivers take 10,000 lives each year. We refuse to keep seeing families torn apart when we know we can do more to prevent it. Strict enforcement is important, holding drunk drivers accountable is important, but we can and must do more to stop drunk drivers from ever hitting the road in the first place. That’s why I’m working on legislation to require ignition interlock devices in all new cars. This technology saves lives, it saves money, and I’m going to fight to make it standard equipment in American cars.”

Representative Rice previously served as a Prosecutor of Nassau County, NY, where she received national acclaim for her efforts to combat drunk driving, securing Long Island’s first DWI-related murder convictions and helping to lead a statewide overhaul of New York’s DWI laws. Rice was dubbed by the New York Daily News as “the state’s toughest DWI prosecutor,” and recently received a Lifetime Achievement Award from Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Abitia: Sexual Assault Advocate’s Testimony Was Improper

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, Jury Trial, Perpetrator Profile Testimony, Rape, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Court Says Eyewitness Testimony in Crash Case Was Improper but Harmless | The Legal Intelligencer

In State v. Abitia, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided that it was improper testimony and reversible error that an expert witness for the State – a Sexual Assault Advocate, no less – testified that people who molest children often do not tell the truth and when subjected to polygraph testing and often admit to committing more sexual abuse than the child victim reported.

The facts were such that defendant Raymond Abitia went to trial on one count of Rape of a Child in the Second Degree and one count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance to a Minor. The alleged victim was Abitia’s daughter, KM. At trial, KM disclosed the abuse after an incident in Skagit County that occurred shortly after she turned 14 years old.

One of the State’s witnesses was Joan Gaasland-Smith, the sexual assault case specialist – also called a Sexual Assault Victim Advocate – for the Whatcom County Prosecutor’s Office. Gaasland-Smith was qualified as an expert to discuss child sex abuse in general. For those who don’t know, “Sexual Assault Victim Advocates” are professionals trained to support victims of sex crimes. Advocates offer victims information, emotional support, and help finding resources. Sometimes, advocates attend court and pretrial interviews with victims. Advocates may also contact organizations, such as criminal justice or social service agencies, to get help or information for victims. Some advocates staff crisis hotlines, run support groups, or provide in-person counseling.

Gaasland- Smith testified that it is not unusual for children to delay disclosure. She said while there is no single reason that applies in every case, there are many reasons a child may not immediately disclose. A perpetrator may have offered the child rewards, money, or special attention in exchange for silence. The child may value the relationship with the perpetrator, fear being seen as abnormal, or think that the sexual contact feels good.

Up to this point, there was nothing particularly objectionable about Gaasland-Smith’s testimony. KM did not disclose abuse until the Skagit County incident and even then she resisted disclosing it to the police. Abitia’s defense strategy was to challenge KM’s credibility. It is generally permissible for a jury to hear expert testimony explaining why delayed disclosure does not necessarily mean the victim lacks credibility.

But in response to the prosecutor’s next question, Gaasland-Smith began to veer toward generalities about perpetrators. She said, “Kids can be told by perpetrators that, urn, that other adults believe adults, they won’t necessarily believe a child.” Abitia objected to “this whole line of questioning as to what do other sexual predators do. Abitia’s attorney objected to the testimony.

The court overruled the objection, stating that “what kids can be told by perpetrators … is appropriate testimony for an expert witness.” The court warned the prosecutor to “be very cautious so that generalization does not directly or indirectly suggest to the jury that that is what has happened” in this case.

Gaasland-Smith went on to discuss reasons why children may be afraid to disclose. She testified that most of the time, children do not disclose everything all at once. When asked about the basis of her knowledge, she answered that sexual deviancy evaluations show it is common to discover that “more happened than the child ever told.” In the course of this answer, Gaasland-Smith testified that a sexual deviancy evaluation includes a lie detector test because “oftentimes people who do this kind of thing don’t tell the truth.”

The jury convicted Abitia as charged. The case was appealed on the issue of whether the expert witness’s testimony was improper.

The Court of Appeals reasoned “Perpetrator Profile Testimony” is improper because it “clearly carries with it the implied opinion that the defendant is the sort of person who would engage in the alleged act, and therefore did it in this case too.” Gaasland-Smith’s line of testimony about what perpetrators do should have been cut off when the objection was first raised. Her opinion that sex offenders lie about their conduct implied that Abitia was lying when he denied having sexual contact with KM. No witness may testify as to an opinion on the veracity of the defendant, either directly or inferentially.

The Court also reasoned that Gaasland-Smith’s testimony that offenders can be trusted to tell the truth only when they are subject to lie detector tests was also unduly prejudicial. Ordinarily, polygraph evidence is inadmissible absent stipulation by both parties because the polygraph has not attained general scientific acceptability. Therefore, Gaasland-Smith’s improper reference to lie detectors bolstered her opinion that sexual offenders, as a class, are liars.

The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

My opinion? Excellent decision. It indeed invades the providence of the jury for experts to discuss “Perpetrator Profile Testimony” in the context of jury trials. It sways jurors far too much, and leads to unfair jury trials like the one above.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

States With the Highest DUI Arrests

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, police, Search and Seizure, Studies, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

States With the Most Drunk Driving Problems (2021)

Today, a national study on DUI arrests was released by Project Know, a drug addiction resource center that combats substance addiction and the societal issues that stem from it. In it, they sifted through data from federal agencies to figure out where you are most likely to get arrested for a DUI, per capita.

For example, Seattle had 2,861 DUI incidents in 2013, which puts its DUI arrest rate at 43.8 per 10,000 residents—slightly lower than Washington’s 2013 rate of 49.8. There were more DUIs in Seattle in 2013 than in 2012 or 2011 and, so far this year (up to November 16th), there have been 2,588, which should put the end-of-year total at about the same level as 2013’s.

My opinion? Interesting projections. Let’s see data showing the lobbying efforts and financial contributions of different anti-drinking-&-driving groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) . I wonder if their efforts have anything to do with the projections and proactive enforcement of DUI laws in Washington? Just a thought.

State v. Wisdom: Unlawful Search of Zipped Shaving Kit Bag

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Miranda, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Interesting opinion. In State v. Wisdom, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided the removal and warrantless inspection of a zipped shut shaving kit bag found in the front seat of a stolen vehicle the defendant was driving was not a lawful search incident to arrest because  the defendant sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. The methamphetamine found in the zipped shut shaving kit is not lawful pursuant to the impound inventory doctrine, as unzipping the kit exceeded the lawful scope of an impound.

Defendant Heath Wisdom drove a Chevrolet pickup truck with an ATV in its back. Someone earlier reported both vehicles as stolen. Yakima County Sheriff Deputy Nate Boyer, while on patrol, passed the pickup, and Boyer’s automated license plate reader identified the pickup as stolen. Officer Boyer pulled Wisdom over and arrested him for possession of a stolen vehicle. Boyer handcuffed Wisdom, searched his body, and escorted him to the patrol vehicle. Officer Boyer found on Wisdom’s body a pipe that Wisdom admitted he used for smoking methamphetamine.

Deputy Nate Boyer advised Heath Wisdom of his Miranda rights. Officer Boyer asked if there were drugs in the truck, and Wisdom replied that methamphetamine lay on the front seat. Officer Boyer looked inside the cab of the truck and saw filters, some cleaner, and a black “shaving kit type” bag. Officer Boyer concluded that the bag contained the methamphetamine. The toiletry bag was closed, but Boyer spied money through the mesh side of the bag.

After photographing the truck, Deputy Boyer removed the bag from the vehicle, opened it, and found methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, drug paraphernalia, and two thousand seven hundred dollars in cash. Heath Wisdom told Deputy Boyer that he owned the black bag. Deputy Boyer had not asked Wisdom if he owned the black bag before searching inside the bag.

Deputy Boyer never obtained a warrant for his search, nor did he request Heath Wisdom’s consent before opening the black bag. Law enforcement impounded the truck and ATV, since the legal owner could not be located.

The State of Washington charged Heath Wisdom with three counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of RCW 69.50.4013(1) (cocaine, ecstasy, and heroin) and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) (methamphetamine). Wisdom moved under CrR 3.6 to suppress all evidence found in the black toiletry bag. However, the trial court denied Heath Wisdom’s motion to suppress. The WA Court of Appeals accepted review of this case.

First, the Court reasoned that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did NOT excuse police from obtaining a search warrant before unzipping and perusing the inside of the shaving kit bag. The court’s opinion was quite lengthy in explaining the need for society to trust police, and that doing so required officers to obtain search warrants in cases like this, and that failure to do so violates a defendants rights under article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Court emphasized how the caselaw treats “luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers” as unique for purposes of police searches. Washington courts recognize an individual’s privacy interest in his closed luggage, whether locked or unlocked. Indeed, the Court gave a very colorful analyses on this subject:

A person does not rummage through a woman’s purse, because ofsecrets obtained therein. A man’s shaving kit bag can be likened to a woman’s purse. The kit bag could obtain prescription drugs, condoms or other items the owner wishes shielded from the public. The bag is intended to safeguard the privacy of personal effects. Literature, medicines, and other things found inside a bag may reveal much about a person’s activities, associations and beliefs.

The Court further reasoned that Washington allows a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include exigent circumstances, searches incident to an arrest, inventory searches, plain view searches, and Terry stops. Furthermore, under Arizona v. Gant, a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest is authorized when the arrestee would be able to obtain a weapon from the vehicle or reach evidence ofthe crime of arrest to conceal or destroy it. Here, Heath Wisdom sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. He lacked access to the bag.

Furthermore, under State v. Snapp, the Court reasoned the WA Constitution disapproves expansive application of the search-incident-to arrest exception to the period of time after the arrestee is secured and attendant risks to officers have passed. When a search can be delayed without running afoul of concerns for officer safety or to preserve evidence of the crime of arrest from concealment or destruction by the arrestee, and does not fall within another applicable exception, the warrant must be obtained. The police officer can prevent destruction of evidence by holding the bag as a sealed unit until obtaining a warrant.

Finally, the Court ruled that the police officer’s inventorying of the pickup’s contents did NOT excuse the need to obtain a search warrant. Inventory searches, unlike other searches, are not conducted to discover evidence of crime. Although a routine inventory search does not require a warrant, a police department policy should not, however, justify an unconstitutional search. The permitted extent of an inventory search pursuant to police department policy must be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify the exception warrant clause.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held the warrantless search inside of Mr. Wisdom’s black bag was not justified by either a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Wisdom’s motion to suppress evidence, reversed his four convictions, and dismissed all charges filed against him.

Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Reis: Search & Seizure in Medical Marijuana Case

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, felony, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, Plain View, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

In State v. Reis, the WA Supreme Court decided that although medical marijuana use is a defense, police officers can still obtain search warrants and search people’s homes if sufficient probable cause of criminal activity exists.

In 2012, Detective Thomas Calabrese received an anonymous tip from an individual living in the Shorewood area of Burien, informing him that a man named “William” was actively growing marijuana in a house in that neighborhood. The informant, who feared retaliation by Reis, declined to provide any additional information. Detective Calabrese began investigating.

He conducted stakeout surveillance of the home and watched the defendant William Reis tending to numerous marijuana plants growing in the backyard. The detective also heard a distinct humming sound coming from the northwest side of the target home and observed black plastic covering the daylight basement window. Detective Calabrese also noticed condensation on this window.

Detective Calabrese also discovered Mr. Reis had a prior DV conviction and, during that arrest, officers discovered significant evidence of a marijuana grow operation, as well as a rifle and $18,000 cash hidden in the attic. Additional searches of Reis’s financial records in 2005 connected him to a large marijuana grow operation in California. Detective Calabrese also learned that Reis had been arrested in 2011 for possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana.

Based on this information, Detective Calabrese put all of this information in an affidavit of probable cause to support a search warrant of Reis’s home. Judge Eide granted a search warrant, finding probable cause to believe that Reis was violating Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50. A search of Reis’s home pursuant to the search warrant revealed plants, scales, ledgers, sales receipts, and tools indicative of a marijuana grow operation. The search also revealed 37 plants and 210.72 ounces of cannabis.

Reis moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that officers lacked probable cause to search his home. The trial court denied his motion. The WA Court of Appeals granted review. They decided the authorized use of medical marijuana under RCW 69.51A.040 does not stop an officer from searching a home for criminal activity. Although compliant use of medical marijuana under the statute is an affirmative defense, it does not negate probable cause required for a search warrant. State v. Reis, 180 Wn.App. 438, 322 P.3d 1238 (2014). The WA Supreme Court  granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

The WA Supremes reasoned that RCW 69.51A.040, as passed, does not decriminalize the medical use of marijuana. Instead, the plain language of the statute establishes a limited exception to the general prohibition against marijuana that existed at the time that the search warrant in this case issued. The Court summarized it best here:

The legislature may have intended to create heightened protections for qualifying patients who registered. However, because registration is currently impossible, the statute provides qualifying patients with only an affirmative defense until the legislature is able to establish a registry. Therefore, we reject Reis’s argument and affirm the Court of Appeals.

The Court describes how the “Medical Marijuana Defense” works under RCW 69.51A.040.

There are six required “terms and conditions” contained within RCW 69.51A.040. Subsection (1) places limits on the quantity of cannabis that a qualifying patient or designated provider may possess. Subsections (2) and (3) require registration with the Department of Health-now impossible in light of the governor’s veto-and require that the patient keep their registration within their home and present it to inquiring investigating officers. Subsections (4 ), (5), and (6) require that the investigating officer not possess evidence that the qualifying patient or designated provider is converting marijuana for their own use or benefit, or otherwise violating distribution requirements or registration requirements. If a qualifying patient or designated provider complies with all of these requirements, including registration, the use of marijuana does not constitute a crime.

Here, the search was valid because the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent lead to the conclusion that a user or possessor of cannabis may raise only an affirmative defense.

My opinion? Hate to say, but the reasoning makes sense. After all, assaulting people in the street is still a crime. One must prove a defense – hypothetically speaking, self-defense – by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be found not guilty of the crime of assault. The same reasoning applies here. The medical use of marijuana does not decriminalize marijuana use – it only provides a defense if one is charged with marihuana-related crimes. Police officers can still investigate citizens and apply for search warrants if probable cause exists that a crime is being committed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Fuentes & Sandoz: Are Terry Stops Legal in High-Crime Areas?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, marijuana, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Joyce Carol Oates revisits past in 'High Crime' tales

The WA Supreme Court consolidated two search & seizure cases with very similar facts. Both cases involve Terry stops of a defendants who entered a high-crime areas and visited homes occupied by suspected drug dealers.

TERRY STOPS

 Generally, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of Washington’s constitution, an officer may not seize a person without a warrant. However, exceptions exist. A Terry investigative stop is one of the exceptions.

For those who don’t know, a “Terry stop” is a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. Picture an officer walking up to you and asking for your I.D. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that police may briefly detain a person who they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity. Also, police may conduct a limited search of the suspect’s outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be “armed and dangerous”. When a search for weapons is authorized, the procedure is known as a “stop and frisk.”

To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” that would indicate to a reasonable person that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Reasonable suspicion depends on the “totality of the circumstances”, and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous.

State v. Fuentes

In this case, police officers were conducting a stakeout of a known drug house. They saw Marisa Fuentes park her car across the street from the apartment. She walked up to the apartment, entered, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car. She opened the trunk of her car and removed a small plastic bag. The bag contained something about the size of a small football. Then Fuentes reentered the apartment, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car with a bag that had noticeably less content than when she entered the apartment.

Based on what officers observed, police stopped Fuentes’ car on suspicion of narcotics activity. An officer advised Fuentes that he needed to talk with her. For safety reasons, the officer requested that Fuentes come to the police vehicle, which she did. The officer read Fuentes her Miranda rights. Fuentas waived those rights and admitted she delivered marijuana to Fenton’s apartment.

The State charged Fuentes with Delivery of Marijuana. Fuentes moved to suppress evidence uncovered from the investigative stop of her car, including her statement about delivering marijuana, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop of her vehicle. The trial court concluded that officers had reasonable   suspicion to stop the vehicle and therefore denied the motion to suppress. Fuentes was subsequently convicted of delivery of marijuana at a stipulated facts trial. She appealed.

The WA Supreme Court decided the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to Fuentes before the stop occurred.

The officers in this case. They knew about past drug activity at Fenton’s apartment. Police made controlled buys from Fenton and conducted a search of the apartment 11 months before and found drugs. The officers also testified they had recent information from individuals arrested on drug-related charges that Fenton was still dealing drugs. Additionally, officers observed foot traffic that morning (10 visits between 10 p.m. and midnight) that suggested ongoing drug transactions.

Additionally, officers could reasonably infer that Fuentes participated in the ongoing drug transactions: Fuentes entered the apartment briefly, then returned to her car. She then carried a plastic bag into the apartment, and she left with a bag that had noticeably less content. Her stay lasted approximately five minutes. From these observations, officers could form a reasonable suspicion that Fuentes made a delivery at the apartment.

The WA Supremes affirmed the Court of Appeals in Fuentes because, under the totality of circumstances, the officers had individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Sandoz

In this case, around 11:30 p.m., Officer Chris Pryzgocld drove his patrol car past a six-unit apartment building in SeaTac. A high number of documented criminal incidents occurred in the area of this apartment building, including drug-related activity.

He saw a white vehicle parked illegally. The driver of the Jeep slumped down, as if to hide from the officer’s view, as the officer drove by. The officer parked his marked patrol car about 20 yards away. After waiting, he made contact with the slumped-over driver.

The officer observed Steven Sandoz leaving the apartment. The officer asked Sandoz what was going on. Sandoz replied that his friend gave him a ride to collect $20 from a friend. After more conversation, Sandoz admitted that he had a drug problem and said that he had a crack pipe in his pocket. Sandoz took out the pipe, and the officer arrested Sandoz for possession of drug paraphernalia. During a search incident to arrest, the officer felt something in Sandoz’s groin area. The officer read Sandoz his Miranda rights, and Sandoz admitted that he had two small envelopes of cocaine in his underwear.

Sandoz was arrested and charged with Possession of Cocaine. Although he tried suppressing the evidence at pretrial, the Judge denied the motion for the following reasons: (1) the officer knew the area had extremely high drug activity based on 911 calls and drug dealing investigations, (2) the officer knew that the apartment Sandoz exited belonged to Ms. Meadows, who had numerous drug-related convictions, including possession with intent to deliver, (3) the officer had express authority from the complex owner to trespass nonoccupants for “loitering” at the complex, (4) the Jeep did not belong to any of the tenants at the complex, (5) the driver of the Jeep slouched down when the officer drove past, (6) the driver and Sandoz had conflicting stories for why they were in the area, (7) Sandoz looked surprised when he saw the officer, and (8) Sandoz visibly shook and looked pale when the officer talked to him.

Sandoz was found guilty at a bench trial he appealed. The WA Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the WA Supreme Court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity individualized to Sandoz to justify his Terry stop. First, Sandoz’s surprise at seeing the officer did not suggest criminal behavior. Next, the driver’s story did not conflict with Sandoz’s story. The driver said that his friend called him for a ride, and Sandoz said his friend gave him a ride to the apartment to collect $20. Rather than conflict, the stories confirmed one another.

Furthermore, as to Sandoz’s physical appearance, the officer did not attribute Sandoz’s pallor or shaking to drugs or to any illicit conduct. Thus, this fact does not add to circumstances that suggest criminal activity. The fact that the officer did not recognize the Jeep might justify the officer’s contact with the driver, but the oflicer did not connect this fact with anything the officer observed about Sandoz.

Additionally, Sandoz did not loiter or trespass. “Loiter” means “to remain in or near a place in an idle or apparently idle manner.” Sandoz did not remain idle: he left the apartment and walked immediately to the Jeep without stopping. Although the individuals in the Jeep may have loitered, that issue is not before the court. Similarly, Sandoz did not appear to trespass: he entered a tenant’s apartment, stayed inside at least 15 minutes without any known discord, and left directly to the Jeep. The facts suggest that Sandoz was an invited guest of Ms. Meadows, and as the officer stated, simply going into an apartment does not equal wrongdoing.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although Sandoz was visiting the apartment of a suspected drug dealer late at night in a high-crime area, this fact by itself does not justify a Terry stop. Other facts must exist to suggest criminal behavior. An officer’s hunch does not justify a stop. The totality of the circumstances in this case do not justify a Terry stop.

The WA Supremes concluded officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Sandoz engaged in criminal activity and reversed the Court of Appeals decision affirming his guilt.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. A.A.: Unlawful Search of Juvenile

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Juvenile, Methamphetamine, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 In State v. AA, the Washington Court of Appeals decided an officer who detained a runaway juvenile under RCW 13.32A, the Family Reconciliation Act, unlawfully removed methamphetamine and marijuana from the youth’s pocket. The court reversed his conviction.

In State v. AA, the juvenile defendant A.A. was reported as a runaway. Officer Escamilla found A.A. walking down an alley a few blocks north of his mother’s house. The Officer detains AA and conducts a search before taking AA to the Crisis Residential Center (CRC), a detention center for minors.

Officer Escamilla searched A.A. near his patrol car. During the search, the officer found methamphetamine in a coin pocket of A.A.’s pants and marijuana in another pocket. The officer then transported A.A. to a juvenile detention center, rather than the CRC. The State charged A.A. with two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.

The trial court denied AA’s motion to suppress the evidence. At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Officer Escamilla testified that A.A. was “just walking down an alley” and appeared “upset,” but that he was not engaged in criminal activity and did not appear dangerous to himself or others. At a bench trial, A.A .was found guilty on both drug charges. He appealed. The Court of Appeals took the case.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court mistakenly concluded Officer Escamilla’s search of  A.A. was reasonable under the Family Reconciliation Act (the Act) because A.A. was going to be transported to the CRC, a secure facility for juveniles, which requires a search of juveniles before admission.

The Court of Appeals decided that while an officer may lawfully conduct a pat-down search for weapons prior to transporting the youth, the officer may not conduct a full search.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution  prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Under these provisions, warrantless searches are “per se” unreasonable. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The exception allows an officer to search an arrestee for weapons as a measure to protect the officer or to search for evidence that may be destroyed. The community caretaking function, which allows for limited searches when it is necessary for police officers to render emergency aid or assistance, is also a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. These types of searches are “divorced” from a criminal investigation. Finally, the State has the burden of proving the search was lawful.

The Court reasoned that here, the particular circumstances did not justify the search of A.A.’s pockets. Once the officer conducted the pat-down search and determined that A.A. did not have a weapon, the search should have stopped. A.A. had not committed a crime and, therefore, there was no need to preserve evidence of a crime. A.A. did not exhibit signs of dangerousness to himself or others. The only concern was for officer safety.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although A.A. would be transported to a detention facility with other minors, this facility “was a noncriminal protective custody situation, which requires us to accord maximum weight to A.A.’s privacy interest in evaluating the reasonableness of the search.”

The Court of Appeals reversed A.A.’s conviction.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The law was simple, and simply applied. The State failed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. Period. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.