Category Archives: Constitutional Rights

State v. Buelna Valdez: Search Incident to Arrest is Invalid (Tip of the Hat To Arizona V. Gant)

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Requirement - FindLaw

In State v. Buelna Valdez, the WA Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest was invalid under the 4th Amendment.

Here, a police officer pulled over a vehicle because it had only one working headlight.  The officer ran a records search on the driver, Mr. Buelna-Valdez, and discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  The officer handcuffed and secured the defendant in his patrol car.  Officer searched the vehicle.  He noticed loose dashboard panels.  He calls a K-9 unit.  The K-9 uncovered methamphetamine located under a moldy cup holder.  The passenger was then also arrested. Both men were charged with drug offenses.

The WA  Supremes held that the automobile search incident to arrest was unlawful.  They reasoned that because the arrestee was handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, he no longer had access to any portion of his vehicle.  The officer’s search of the vehicle was therefore unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the WA Constitution.  The Court also embraced the U.S. Supreme Court’s Arizona v. Gant in finding factual similarities between the cases:

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the arrestee was secured and not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, so neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest warranted the search.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.  Furthermore, the arrestee was arrested based upon an outstanding warrant; the State has not shown that it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the underlying crime might be found in the vehicle.  See Gant, citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).”

The Court also reasoned the search was conducted without a warrant, even though the circumstances did not prevent officers from obtaining one prior to the search:  “There was no showing that a delay to obtain a warrant would have endangered officers or resulted in evidence related to the crime of arrest being concealed or destroyed.  As such . . . the evidence collected from that search should be suppressed, and the resulting convictions reversed.”

My opinion?  Obviously, I’m happy.  The case is great law for defense attorneys.  Indeed, it goes even further than Gant. Although good, Gant was slightly problematic because it allowed police to search for evidence of the crime of arrest.   In this decision, however, the WA Supremes only allow a search if there is evidence of destruction.  Therefore, in WA, if the defendant is in the squad car, the police cannot search the defendant’s vehicle.  Beautiful.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harrington: “Progressive Intrusion” = Unlawful Search

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

4 Charts That Show Stop-and-Frisk Is a Terrible Crime-Fighting Tool

In State v. Harrington, the WA Supreme Court held that the “Progressive Intrusion” of the officer during the investigations was an unlawful search.

Issue was whether the police unlawfully searched/seized the defendant prior to arrest, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, requiring suppression of drugs found on his person.

In short (yes, I’m getting to the good part), the WA Supremes decided the search WAS unlawful, and amounted to a “progressive intrusion.”  Evidence suppressed, case thrown out of court.

The facts: On August 13, 2005, 11:00PM, Officer Reiber of the Richland Police was driving his police car on duty.  He noticed soon-to-be defendant, Dustin Harrington, walking down the sidewalk.  Officer Reiber made a U-turn, drove past Harrington, and pulled into a driveway.  He did not activate his lights or siren.  Officer exited his car and made contact with Harrington (this is called a “social contact”).

Officer Reiber asked questions.  Harrington answered them awkwardly and non-sensically.  Officer became nervous because Harrington kept putting his hands in his pockets.  The conversation lasted about five minutes.

State patrol Trooper William Bryan drove by the scene.  He initiated a U-turn, got out of his car, and approached the two men.  Similar to Officer Reiber, Trooper Bryan did not activate his emergency lights.  Upon contact, Trooper Bryan did not speak to either gentleman.  He stood about eight feet away.

Officer Reiber asked Mr. Harrington if he could pat down Harrington “for officer safety reasons.”  Mr. Harrington said “No.”  Officer patted Harrington down anyway, against Harrington’s consent.  During the pat-down, Officer Reiber found a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine.  Reiber arrested Harrington.  During the search, officers discovered a pipe and baggie containing methamphetamine on Harrington’s person. Harrigton was charged with Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine.

The WA Supremes articulated why the search/arrest was illegal, and consequently, why the evidence should be suppressed.  They discussed what “social contact” between an officer and citizen means:

“The phrase’s plain meaning seems somewhat misplaced.  ‘Social contact’ suggests idle conversation about, presumably, the weather or last night’s ball game — trivial niceties that have no likelihood of triggering an officer’s suspicion of criminality.  The term ‘social contact’ does not suggest an investigative component.”

The Court further reasoned that subsequent events quickly dispelled the social contact and escalated the encounter to an unlawful seizure. First, Trooper Bryan’s arrival at the scene escalated the situation away from a mere “social contact” because a reasonable person would think twice about the turn of events.  As a result, Trooper Bryan’s presence contributed to the eventual seizure of Harrington.

Second, Officer Reiber’s request for Mr. Harrington  to remove hands from pockets added to the officer’s unlawfully progressive intrusion.  Third, Mr. Harrington did not consent to the search.  Officers MUST have a well-founded suspicion to search when they lack a defendant’s consent.

Here, these circumstances lacked the foundational basis for a search.  Finally, and before Officer Reiber’s request to search, he did not ask for Harrington’s name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs.

The court concluded Harrington was unconstitutionally seized because, like him, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when officers asked to frisk.  Consequently, the seizure violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My Opinion?  Excellent.  Beautiful.  On point.  The WA Supremes got it right.  The cumulative effect of these violations — all three of them — amounted to an unlawful search.  I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes addressed the fine line between a lawful “social contact” and unlawful “progressive intrusion.”  I’ve had numerous clients face criminal charges as a result of an officer’s apparently innocent “social contact,” which was, in reality, a progressive intrusion into their privacy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Saunders: A Court Should Not Grant Continuances Without Valid Reasons

Constitutional Rights, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

In State v. Saunders, the WA Court of Appeals held that courts should not grant continuances without valid reasons.

The defendant’s trial was continued several times.  He objected at every hearing before the court (yes, defense counsel asked for some of them).  One continuance was for further negotiations.  Another was because the case was pending in the prosecutor’s negotiating unit, even though the court noted there was no good explanation.  A third continuance happened because the case was not yet assigned to a trial prosecutor.

The Court reasoned that all three continuances were without adequate basis.  Since there were no convincing/valid reasons for the continuances, the charges were dismissed for violation of CrR 3.3; which is Washington’s speedy trial rule:

“Absent convincing and valid reasons for the continuances granted on January 8, February 20, or March 18, the trial court’s order granting the three continuances were “manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds and for untenable reasons.” Downing, 151 Wn.2d at 272 (quoting Junker, 79 Wn.2d at 26.  The trial court abused its discretion in granting further delays in commencing Saunders’s trial.  Under these circumstances, we reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charge against Saunders under CrR 3.3(h).”  ~WA Court of Appeals

My opinion?  Excellent, excellent, excellent!  First, I admire defendants who exercise their rights to speedy trial.  Whatever outcome that’s going to happen will inevitably happen faster because both sides are forced to work the case up.  True, there are times when rushing to battle is not always the best strategy.

Some cases get better with age.  Memories fade.  Witnesses recant and/or move away.  Prosecutors want to dump old cases when their caseloads get too heavy.  Nevertheless, what I deeply despise — and I’ve seen it happen — is when courts lack any good reason to grant the prosecutor’s wishes for continuances.  It’s incredibly frustrating.  State v. Saunders is a great step in the right direction.

This case is vastly similar to State v. Kenyon, which I discussed in my October 7 blog (Indeed, the Saunders court expressly based much of its reasoning from the Kenyon decision).  Clearly, our courts are giving teeth back to the  Speedy Trial Rule.  Good!  I believe the larger reason why this is happening is because shrinking state/judiciary budgets are, consequently, taking away the luxury to continue criminal cases.  I, for one, enjoy the change.  I’d rather go to trial than make up reasons to keep continuing cases.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Winterstein: Parole Officers Cannot Search A Home If Facts Do Not Support the Officer’s Belief That Probationer Lives There.

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Parole and probation have grown far beyond resources allocated to support them

In State v. Winterstein, the WA Supreme Court held that parole officers cannot search a home if the facts do not support the officer’s belief that that defendant on probation lives there.

Terry Lee Winterstein was convicted of Unlawful Manufacture of Methamphetamine after his probation officer conducted a warrantless search of his residence. After trial, Winterstein’s counsel discovered that Winterstein had reported a change of address with the Department of Corrections at least three weeks prior to the search.

Neverthless, the probation officer searched Winterstein’s prior residence. Winterstein argued that the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed because his probation officer did not have the authority of law to search a house that was not Winterstein’s documented residence.

The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals also held that regardless of the illegal search, the evidence could be admissible under the “inevitable discovery doctrine”—that is, evidence that police would have ultimately or inevitably discovered through other (lawful) means.

The case wound its way up to the WA Supreme Court.

First, the Court addressed whether the probation officer’s search of the Winterstein’s former residence was proper.  They reasoned that, generally speaking, individuals under Department of Corrections supervision have a lesser expectation of privacy, and can be searched on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.  However, the Court also said that probation officers must have probable cause—a higher standard—to believe that their probationers live at the residences they search:

“In this context, probable cause exists when an officer has information that would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the probationer lives at the place to be searched. The information known to the officer must be reasonably trustworthy. Only facts and knowledge available to the officer at the time of the search should be considered.”

Second, the Supremes addressed the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine.  They reasoned it is well-established that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Section 7 says: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

While federal cases have allowed for inevitable discovery, and the state Court of Appeals has applied the doctrine, the Supreme Court said the doctrine is “speculative and does not disregard illegally obtained evidence”—and is therefore incompatible with the state constitution’s expansive protection of privacy.

My opinion?  Extremely well-articulated and correct decision.  The WA Supremes’ handling/dispatching of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine acknowledges the expanded freedoms under the WA Constitution in comparison to the U.S. Constitution.  Admitting evidence under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine leaves no incentive for the State to comply with the constitution’s requirement that arrests precede searches.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Magee: Police Officers MUST Witness Traffic Infractions

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Red Light Cameras, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

In State v. Magee, the WA Supreme Court held police officers lack authority to issue traffic citations if the officer fails to witness the infraction take place.

Mr. Magee was cited for second degree negligent driving after the state patrol received reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong direction on the highway.  The dispatched trooper found Magee parked nose-to-nose with a friend’s car, facing the wrong direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp.

The trooper assumed Magee had driven against traffic in order to get in this position.  Magee was cited for negligent driving.  He challenged the infraction, arguing the officer lacked authority to issue a citation when she had not witnessed an infraction.  Unfortunately, his traffic court ruled against him.

Magee’s case found its way to the WA Supreme Court.  They reasoned that RCW 46.63.030 lists the instances where a law enforcement officer has the authority to issue a notice of traffic infraction:

(a) When the infraction is committed in the officer’s presence;

(b) When the officer is acting upon the request of a law enforcement officer in whose presence the traffic infraction was committed;

(c) If an officer investigating at the scene of a motor vehicle accident has reasonable cause to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident has committed a traffic infraction;

(d) When the infraction is detected through the use of a photo enforcement system under RCW 46.63.160; or

(e) When the infraction is detected through the use of an automated traffic safety camera under RCW 46.63.170.

The Supremes overturned Magee’s conviction after analyzing the statute: “RCW 46.63.030 plainly requires us to conclude that an officer must either be present when the infraction occurs or meet one of the other statutory circumstances before issuing a ticket. There is no contention subsections (b) through (e) apply in this case.

Instead, the State argues that the trooper actually witnessed the citable offense because the negligent behavior was “ongoing.” But negligent driving in the second degree is a moving violation. For the infraction to be valid, the movement must have been made in the officer’s presence.”

My opinion?  Again, excellent!  Officers shouldn’t hand out traffic infractions if they don’t witness the infraction happen.  PERIOD.  This violates due process.  This new opinion is (thankfully) consistent with State v. Campbell, 31 Wn.App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982).  I use Campbell in my pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence.

In Campbell, a motorist drove by a Washington State Trooper and yelled to the trooper that there was a drunk driver going southbound.  The unknown witness described the vehicle.  The Trooper caught up to the vehicle but did not observe the driver violate any traffic laws.  Nevertheless, the trooper stopped the vehicle, conducted a DUI investigation, and arrested the driver for DUI.

The Campbell court concluded that although a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop for suspected drunk driving, but before doing so, s/he must first possess a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that such a violation of law was or is presently being committed.

Good job, WA Supremes!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Patton: WA Supreme Court Acknowledges Search and Seizure Protections Afforded by Arizona v. Gant.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police Search Your Car Without a Warrant?

In State v. Patton, the WA Supreme Court held that an automobile search which happens after arrest is not justified unless the defendant is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest.

Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant.  A Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was on his property and leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat.  The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest.  Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer.

Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court found that Patton was arrested when the officer “manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody” while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, “the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence.”  The court elaborated their reasoning with the following:

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Congratulations to Justice Jim Johnson, who found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.   In Gant, the U.S. Supremes held that a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Drug Offense or any other crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. King: Out-Of-Jurisdiction Police Cannot Arrest Unless Emergency Exists

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Reckless Driving, Terry Stop, Washington State Traffic Commission, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police make traffic stops outside Jurisdiction - YouTube

Excellent opinion.

In State v. King, the WA Supreme Court held that out-of-jurisdiction police cannot arrest unless an emergency exists.

Tyler King was riding his motorcycle southbound on Interstate 5 north of Vancouver city limits when he was stopped and issued a criminal citation for Reckless Driving by Vancouver police officer Jeff Starks. King had stood up on the pegs of his motorcycle, looked at the vehicle he was approaching, and  accelerated to pass the vehicle.

King and Starks both testified at the trial, offering different interpretations of the facts. Starks offered opinion testimony that King’s driving had been reckless, which King’s attorney did not object to at trial but then raised on appeal. King also challenged that the officer was outside of his jurisdiction without an interlocal agreement and without satisfying the statutory emergency exception.

The Supreme Court held that Officer Starks did not have jurisdiction to issue the criminal citation. They reasoned that Stark’s  interpretation of King’s actions would not have constituted “an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property.”

King did not nearly hit another car, nor run a light, nor weave across traffic lanes. He did not pop a wheelie, cut off another car, nor, for that matter, drive in reverse along the shoulder. At most, King glared at the driver of the large truck, stood on his foot pegs for three to five seconds, and accelerated at high speed past the truck.

As aforementioned, Starks could not verify that King accelerated away at what he thought was 100 m.p.h. Even so, the officer testified King slowed down as he approached other traffic and pulled over immediately when Starks signaled him to do so.

The majority concludes that the trial court was wrong to simply take the definition of reckless driving and assume that it “automatically fit within the emergency exception.” The majority also suggests that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the opinion testimony issue was foreclosed by the lack of an objection at trial.

My opinion?  Again, good decision.  Reckless Driving does not always involve racing, road rage, emergency situations or life-threatening behavior.  Let’s be frank: some people simply enjoy horsing around while driving!

The Supremes rightfully disagreed with the trial court and saw the situation for what it was: people slightly agitated with each other’s driving, a brief increase in speed, and it’s over.  Nobody goes crazy, and/or gets mad, violent or injured.  Period.  It’d be a miscarriage of justice to allow out-of-jurisdiction officers to arrest people based on those circumstances.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Iniguez: How Were the Defendant’s Speedy Trial Rights NOT Violated?

Constitutional Rights, Discovery, Due Process, felony, Jail, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Can’t agree with the Supremes on this one . . .

In State v. Iniguez, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated even though a defendant waited in jail 8 months and objected to all continuances.

Following his arrest on First Degree Robbery, Mr. Iniguez remained in custody pending a joint trial with his codefendant.  An 8-month delay between arraignment and trial took place.  During this time, the State moved for a total of four trial continuances, the last of which the State sought because it learned — belatedly — that a key witness was out of town.  Iniguez objected to all continuances.  The trial court denied his objections and pretrial motions.  At trial, the jury found Iniguez guilty.  He appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez’s conviction.  The court held the eight-month delay between arrest and trial was prejudicial and violated Iniguez’s constitutional right to speedy trial.

However, the WA Supremes decided the delay did not violate the time-for-trial court rule, CrR 3.2, and did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or Const. art. I, § 22 constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 22 of the state constitution does not offer greater protections than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Using the six-part Gunwall test, the Court determined there was no clear reason to find greater protections in the state constitution, so the two provisions should be applied similarly.

Also, under the four-factor Blakely analysis, the Court also reasoned that although the circumstances of the delay were substantial enough to presume harm to Iniguez, the level of violation of Iniguez’ speedy trial rights wasn’t enough to justify dismissing his case.

The Court ruled 5-4 against Iniguez, holding there was no constitutional violation of his right to a speedy trial.

My opinion?  My thoughts are similar to dissenting Judge Sanders.  I agree with the majority opinion that the length of delay in this case — coupled with the fact that Iniguez spent all of it in custody — gave rise to a presumption of prejudice.  The defendant’s trial delay was nearly nine months.  The delays arose because of the State’s need to interview witnesses, joinder with the co-defendant, scheduling conflicts, and the late discovery of the unavailability of a key witness one week prior to trial.

None of the delays were caused by Iniguez himself.  Indeed, he objected to continuing his case at every opportunity!  Finally, Iniguez was prejudiced because he was in jail during this entire process.  This is very substantial.  Incarceration carries detrimental effects: loss of job, disruption of family life, idleness, etc.  Time spent in jail is simply dead time.

How were Iniguez’s Speedy Trial rights NOT violated?

Again, bad decision . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Kenyon: Courtroom Congestion Is No Reason For Delay

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A PACKED COURTROOM. This photo relates to the story because it is a packed courtroom like the Maycomb courtroom in Tom Rob… | Photo, Historical photos, Picture show

In State v. Kenyon, the WA Supreme Court held that courtroom congestion is no reason for delaying a trial.

On February 15, 2006, Mr. Kenyon was charged with six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was incarcerated while awaiting. After multiple delays his case eventually went to trial in August—well beyond the time limits provided by the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3).

For those who don’t know, under the speedy trial rule, a defendant who is detained in jail must have a trial set within 60 days of arraignment. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the rule’s time limits, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice so long as the defendant objects within 10 days after notice of trial date is mailed.

Some periods of time are excluded when computing the date for trial. For example, continuances granted by the court are excluded, as well as “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances” that are beyond the control of the court or of the parties.

Kenyon argued his right to a speedy trial was violated as no court was available to hear his case. The State argues the trial court properly followed the scheduled and that his attorney asked for many continuances. The trial court held the delay was “unavoidable” as the judge was presiding over another case and the other judge was on vacation.

The Supreme Court however, has said that courtroom congestion—as opposed to scheduling conflicts or trial preparation—is not a valid reason for delay.

The Court determined that despite the allowance for “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances,” the speedy trial rule still requires trial courts to document the details of unavailable judges and courtrooms. The failure to do so in this case violated Kenyon’s right to a speedy trial and the Court dismissed the charges with prejudice.

My opinion?  Clearly — and rightfully —  the Supremes gave teeth back to the  Speedy Trial Rule.  In short, trials must happen within a certain period of time; and if they don’t, and/or if the case is not continued correctly, then the case should be dismissed.  It’s that simple.

However, for the last few years (decades?) our Appeals courts have taken exception to the general rule; often to the degree where where the exceptions have swallowed the rule.  Needless to say, I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes decided Kenyon in this manner.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Seattle v. St. John: Police May Obtain a Search Warrant For a Blood Sample When Motorists Refuse to Give Breath Test.

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can I Refuse A Blood Test? - Welch and Avery

In Seattle v. St. John, the WA Supreme Court held that police may obtain a search warrant for a blood sample when motorists refuse to give a breath test.

After crashing his motorcycle in Seattle, Robert St. John was investigated for DUI. A police officer asked St. John to consent to a blood alcohol test.  St. John refused.   The officer obtained a warrant for the test.  The results were suppressed in municipal court based on a broad interpretation of a provision of the Implied Consent Law that prohibits performing the test once consent has been refused. The superior court reversed and the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Supreme Court:

1. Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

2. Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines the voluntary blood alcohol test?

3. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

The WA Supreme Court upheld the superior court and allowed the blood test evidence.  They reasoned that the Implied Consent law restricts performing a blood test pursuant to that law, but does not prohibit performing a blood test pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant (RCW 46.20.308). Similarly, the officer’s statements about the Implied Consent law did not foreclose his obtaining the warrant.

I echo the dissenting opinion of Justice Charles Sanders.  Simply put, an officer cannot force a driver to submit to a blood test if the driver refuses consent.  However, under the majority opinion’s reasoning, a driver’s refusal to consent to a Breath test is essentially meaningless.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.