Category Archives: Search and Seizure

“Community Caretaking” Search Upheld as Lawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, felony, Firearm, law enforcement, Plain View, police, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for community caretaking search

In State v. Duncan, the WA Supreme Court decided police officers may make a limited sweep of a vehicle under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement when (1) there is reasonable suspicion that an unsecured weapon is in the vehicle and (2) the vehicle has or shortly will be impounded and will be towed from the scene. However, this exception may not be used as a pre-text for an investigative search.

A little after midnight in Yakima one summer night in 2009, someone in a car shot into a home, grazing Kyle Mullins’ head. Other people in the home called 911 for medical assistance and to report the shooting. Callers described the car as white and possibly a Subaru or Impala. Officers were dispatched and stopped Duncan’s white Ford Taurus. Officers removed Duncan and his two passengers from the car at gunpoint, ordered them to the ground, handcuffed them, and put them in separate police cars. Without a warrant, officers opened the doors and found shell casings on the floor and a gun between the front passenger seat and the door. One officer removed the gun and placed it into an evidence bag in his own patrol car. The passengers told the police that Duncan had fired from the car and tossed the gun on the front floorboards. After the car was towed to a police annex, police obtained a warrant and made a more thorough search.

Duncan was charged with six counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Duncan moved to suppress the evidence under CrR 3.6 and confessions under CrR 3.5 that flowed from the traffic stop on several grounds, including that the police had insufficient grounds to stop him and that their initial warrantless search of his car was improper. At the pretrial suppression hearing, held a year and a half after the events of that summer night, the judge found that the stop was justified and that the search was reasonable, and denied the motions.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges and found by special verdicts that Duncan was armed with a firearm. The judge sentenced Duncan to 1,159 months of incarceration, the top of the standard range. Duncan’s projected release date is March 26, 2099.

The case was appealed to the WA Supreme Court to decide the issue of whether the warrantless search of Duncan’s vehicle was lawful. The Court decided it was.

The Court reasoned that generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. Nonetheless, there are a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement which provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers of the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. The State bears the burden of showing that the search and seizure was supported by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. The fruits of an unconstitutional search and seizure must be suppressed.

The Court reasoned that the search was not lawful under Arizona v. Gant for “officer safety” reasons  because the vehicles’ occupants are detained in police cars. Also the search was not lawful under the Plain View Doctrine because the officers could see the gun from outside the vehicle. Finally, the search was also not a valid inventory search because the car was not impounded.

However, the court found the search was lawful under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Under that exception, officers may make a limited sweep of a vehicle when (1) there is reasonable suspicion that an unsecured weapon is in the vehicle and (2) the vehicle has or shortly will be impounded and will be towed from the scene.

We caution, however, that the community caretaking exception is a strictly limited exception to the warrant requirement. It may not, however, be used as a pretext for an investigatory search:

“It will only rarely justify intrusion into a private place or vehicle after an arrest. However, given the facts of this case and the fact that the sweep of the vehicle occurred before our opinion in Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, was announced, we are confident that the desire to remove an unsecured gun from the vehicle was not here used as a pretext for an otherwise unlawful search.”

With that, the Court concluded that the limited search of the vehicle was lawful and affirmed Duncan’s conviction.

My opinion? For those who don’t know, pretextual searches are unlawful. They usually describes false reasons that hide the true intentions or motivations for a legal action. If a party trying to admit the evidence can establish good reasons, the opposing party – usually, the defense – must prove that the these reasons were “pretextual,” or false, and move to suppress the “fruits” of the search.

Here, I understand the Court’s logic. I’m glad the Court appreciates the unlawfulness of pretextual searches and makes distinctions in the case at hand. Unfortunately, until now, unlawful pretext searches have been mitigated and/or simply ignored by our courts for many years.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The “Textalyzer” Battles Distracted Driving & Works Like A Breathalyzer

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, Distracted Driving, law enforcement, Legislation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, police, Privacy, Reckless Driving, Reckless Endangerment, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Technology, Text Messages, Traffic Infractions, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

A police officer uses a prototype of a Textalyzer to check for texting activity on a phone. A proposed law in New York would allow police to use the technology in much the same way they use a Breathalyzer.

A very interesting and well-written news article by reporter Matt Richtel of the New York Times discussed how lawmakers from New York want to treat distracted driving like drunken driving. The newest idea is to give police officers a new device that is the digital equivalent of the Breathalyzer — a roadside test called the Textalyzer.

The idea certainly carries momentum. Richtel wrote that over the last seven years, most states have banned texting by drivers, and public service campaigns have tried many tactics — “It can wait,” among them — to persuade people to ignore their phones when driving their cars.

Nevertheless, the problem appears to be getting worse. Americans confess in surveys that they are still texting while driving, as well as using Facebook and Snapchat and taking selfies. Richtel’s article emphasized that road fatalities, which had fallen for years, are now rising sharply, up roughly 8 percent in 2015 over the previous year, according to preliminary estimates. That is partly because people are driving more, but Mark Rosekind, the chief of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, said distracted driving was “only increasing, unfortunately.”

In response, legislators and public health experts want to treat distracted driving like drunken driving. The most provocative idea is to give police officers a new device that is the digital equivalent of the Breathalyzer — a roadside test called the Textalyzer.

Richtel explained it would work like this: an officer arriving at the scene of a crash could ask for the phones of any drivers involved and use the Textalyzer to tap into the operating system to check for recent activity.

The technology could determine whether a driver had used the phone to text, email or do anything else that is forbidden under New York’s hands-free driving laws, which prohibit drivers from holding phones to their ear. Failure to hand over a phone could lead to the suspension of a driver’s license, similar to the consequences for refusing a Breathalyzer.

Richtel described how the proposed legislation faces hurdles to becoming a law, including privacy concerns. But Félix W. Ortiz, a Democratic assemblyman who was a sponsor of the bipartisan Textalyzer bill, said it would not give the police access to the contents of any emails or texts. It would simply give them a way to catch multitasking drivers, he said.

If the legislation passed in New York, it could be adopted by other states in the same way that the hands-free rules did after New York adopted them.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Bellingham Police Department Body Cameras Now Mandatory

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Body camera, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Miranda, misdemeanor, Obstructing, police, Police Dogs, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Qualified Immunity, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Technology, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for bellingham police body cameras

A news article by Samantha Wohlfiel from of the Bellingham Herald reports that starting this July, Bellingham Police Department (BPD) will require all uniformed patrol officers to wear and use body cameras.

In 2014, the BPD started a voluntary program, allowing officers to use a body camera if they were willing. Now, Police Chief Cliff Cook has decided all uniformed patrol officers will need to wear the cameras while on duty:

“I think the original pilot and then the past year and a half … has shown us that having the videos is not only beneficial in cases of prosecution of individuals for crimes, as evidence of the actions of our officers, especially when they’re appropriate . . .  It also generally helps us resolve disputes or disagreements about what may have transpired between an officer and a citizen much more quickly and in a more definitive way.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Initially, 18 officers volunteered for Bellingham’s program, and currently 34 officers are using the cameras, Cook said. He also mentioned that his police officers have noted that people often change their behavior for the better when they’re told they’re being filmed.

One of the main concerns for officers and community members has been privacy, Cook said:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

Basically, the “policy” requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

The department has a mix of cameras, some that are clipped on a lapel, others that are worn on glasses, but both have easily been knocked off in situations where officers were restraining someone, Cook said, so the department may shift toward other models.

Between 2014 and 2016, the total program cost has been $315,250, which includes things such as all hardware (the cameras, clips, glasses they sit on, etc.), software and docking stations, Cook told the council.

According to the article, the projected costs moving forward are about $35,000 to $56,000 per year each of the next two years for renewed data storage management.

Another concern was, of course, privacy:

“One of the concerns we talked about was the overriding concern about creating video of individuals in pretty personally trying situations that involve personal privacy, such as mental illness, or a domestic violence call in a private residence, or interviewing the victim of a crime. So there are provisions within the policy where officers are given discretion on whether they want to turn that camera on or not.”

~Police Chief Cliff Cook

The current policy requires that officers turn on the cameras for any enforcement activity, an arrest, use of force or where they believe there will be the need to use force.

My opinion? This is a step in the right direction. Body cameras make everyone behave better. They also catch evidence of what really transpired. Good move, BPD.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Frisks & DV Investigations

42 U.S.C. § 1983, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, law enforcement, Obstructing, police, Police Misconduct, Qualified Immunity, Race & Law, Search and Seizure, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for police frisk

In Thomas v. Dillard, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the domestic violence (DV) nature of a police investigation is relevant in assessing whether a suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to search.

Palomar College Police Officer Christopher Dillard responded to a call to investigate a man pushing a woman in a public area on the college’s campus. There he found Correll Thomas, a student at the college who had been hanging out with and kissing his girlfriend, Amy Husky. Although Thomas was unarmed and in fact had committed no act of domestic violence, Dillard demanded Thomas submit to a search for weapons, believing police officers are free to conduct a Terry frisk whenever they are investigating a potential “domestic violence” incident, regardless of the specific circumstances of the call or the facts encountered at the scene. When Thomas refused to be searched, Dillard tased him. Thomas sued Dillard under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting unlawful seizure and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

The 9th Circuit held that although the domestic violence nature of a police investigation is a relevant consideration in assessing whether there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion:

“Because domestic violence encompasses too many criminal acts of varying degrees of seriousness for an officer to form reasonable suspicion a suspect is armed from that label alone, we hold domestic violence is not a crime such as bank robbery or trafficking in large quantities of drugs that is, as a general matter, likely to involve the use of weapons.”

Therefore, officer Dillard violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure by detaining him for the purpose of performing a Terry frisk.

However, the 9th Circuit held that Dillard was entitled to protection from the lawsuit under qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that the initial demand for a frisk was unlawful. The court further held that it was not clearly established at the time that continuing to detain a noncompliant domestic violence suspect for the purpose of executing a frisk and tasing him when he refused to comply were unlawful.

My opinion? On the one hand, it’s refreshing that the Court understood the 4th Amendment issues presented in this case. Forcing a Terry search is unlawful under these circumstances. However, I disagree with the court that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Second Amendment Protects Stun Guns

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Search and Seizure, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

In Cadtano v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment presumably extends to stun guns.

After a “bad altercation” with an abusive boyfriend put her in the hospital, Jaime Caetano found herself homeless and in fear for her life. She obtained multiple restraining orders against her abuser, but they proved futile. So when a friend offered her a stun gun “for self-defense against her former boy friend, Caetano accepted the weapon.

It is a good thing she did. One night after leaving work, Caetano found her ex-boyfriend waiting for her outside. He “started screaming” that she was “not gonna [expletive deleted] work at this place” any more because she “should be home with the kids” they had together. Caetano’s abuser towered over her by nearly a foot and outweighed her by close to 100 pounds. But she didn’t need physical strength to protect herself. She stood her ground, displayed the stun gun, and announced: “I’m not gonna take this anymore. . . . I don’t wanna have to use the stun gun on you, but if you don’t leave me alone, I’m gonna have to.” The gambit worked. The ex-boyfriend “got scared and he left her alone.”

Under Massachusetts law, however, stun guns are illegal.

When police later discovered the weapon, Ms. Caetano was arrested, tried, and convicted for violating the law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a stun gun “is not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection” because it was “not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.”

Her case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s conclusion that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use. It reasoned that law enforcement and correctional officers carry stun guns and Tasers, presumably for such purposes as nonlethal crowd control. Also, subduing members of a mob is little different from suppressing insurrections, a traditional role of the militia.  Finally, several branches of the U. S. armed services equip troops with electrical stun weapons to “incapacitate a target without permanent injury or known side effects.”

The Court also reasoned that “hundreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens,” who may lawfully possess them in 45 States. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded with powerful language stated below:

A State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people safe. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either unable or unwilling to do what was necessary to protect Jaime Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself. To make matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy its prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of a criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal weapon that may well have saved her life. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsiest of grounds. This Court’s grudging per curiam now sends the case back to that same court. And the consequences for Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her conviction likely bars her from ever bearing arms for self-defense. If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than about keeping them safe.

With that, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

My opinion? Good decision. Stun guns are non-lethal use of self-defense. They shouldn’t be outlawed or classified as a dangerous weapon.

FYI, stun guns are (mostly) legal in WA State. State law only prohibits the possession of a stun gun on school property under RCW 9.41.280.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Mugshot Shaming & Facebook

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Due Process, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Race & Law, Search and Seizure, Shaming, Social Media, Technology, Uncategorized, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for mugshot shaming

A news article from CBS 6 News reports that the Chesterfield County Sheriff’s Office in Virginia has decided to post weekly mugshots of people arrested on DUI charges on their Facebook page. Every Thursday they put the mugshots together into a video that gets thousands of views.

The sheriff told CBS 6 that while deputies aren’t making the arrests, they’re hoping the videos will make a difference.

“It’s a community issue,” he said, and pointed out that DUI infractions are on the rise.

Over the past seven days, 22 people in Chesterfield were charged with DUI.

“So we wanted to do our part, in conjunction with the police department, who do a good job making the arrests, and seeing if we couldn’t help deter somebody from getting in that car when they’ve had too much to drink,” said Sheriff Karl Leonard.

Additionally, the Chesterfield Sheriff’s Office wants to remind viewers that everyone you see here is innocent until proven guilty in court.

My opinion? Often, clients facing criminal charges ask me whether they can sue the Bellingham Herald – or anyone else, for that matter – on claims of slander and/or libel for posting their arrest on the Herald’s weekly jail reports.

Unfortunately, the typical answer is “No.” Under the common law, proving slander and libel require a finding that the information distributed to the public is untrue. Here, the fact that someone was arrested is, in fact, true. Therefore, that information can be reported. Additionally, news media outlets reporting this information provide the caveat to viewers that arrested individuals are innocent until proven guilty in court. Chesterfield County Sheriff’s Office has done this as well.

Still, social media is used by everyone. Who among us wants their arrest information posted on Facebook? The information is a scarlet letter. It’s embarrassing. Worst-case scenario,  people may lose employment opportunities and come under scrutiny from their peers, family and friends from the posting of this highly personal information on Facebook.

On a positive note, posting people’s mugshots on Facebook could reveal whether police are racially profiling DUI defendants. Watch the video. Notice how 99.9% of Chesterfield County’s DUI offenders are Hispanic or African American? This, in a county where census data information reveals that 70% of Chesterfield County’s population is 70% Caucasian?

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Keodara: Overbroad Search Warrant for Cell Phone

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Due Process, Eighth Amendment, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Ineffective Assistance, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sentencing, Technology, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for cell phone search

In State v. Keodara, the WA Court of Appeals ruled that a search warrant was overbroad in violation of the particularity requirement because it allowed police to search a cell phone “for items that had no association with any criminal activity and for which there was no probable cause whatsoever.”

In 2011, the defendant Say Keodara was involved in a shooting at a bus stop.  Several weeks later, police arrested him for an unrelated incident. They searched his backpack and found his cell phone. Outside the backpack police found drugs, drug packaging and drug paraphernalia.  An officer submitted an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone.

The affidavit made several generalizations about drug dealers and gang members in support of the officer’s conclusion that there was evidence of crime on the cell phone. The judge issue the warrant pursuant to the affidavit, which ultimately allowed police to search Keodara’s entire phone without any limitations.  Police searched the phone and found evidence that the State used when trying Mr. Keodara for the shooting at the bus stop.

Keodara was charged with Murder in the First Degree, three counts of Assault in the First Degree (each with a separate firearm enhancement), and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 831 months of prison (69.25 years).

On appeal, Keodara argued that the evidence from his phone should have been suppressed because the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, §7 of the Washington State Constitution. He also argued that his substantial prison sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

Ultimately, the court held that although the search of Keodara’s phone violated the federal
constitution, the failure to suppress the evidence was harmless. It also held that Keodara’s sentence violated the 8th Amendment because the court failed to Keodara’s youth and other age-related factors into account. Accordingly, the court affirmed Keodara’s conviction but remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that a warrant is overbroad if it fails to describe with particularity items for which probable cause exists to search. In this case, the affidavit for the warrant for Keodara’s phone contained blanket statements about what certain groups of offenders tend to do and what information they tend to store in particular places. Furthermore, the warrant’s language also allowed Keodara’s phone to be searched for items that had no association with any criminal activity and for which there was no probable cause whatsoever. The court also said the following:

Here, no evidence was seized that would have linked Keodara’s phone to the crimes listed in the warrant-unlawful possession of firearms, possession with intent to deliver or sell narcotics, or assault. Nothing in the record suggests that anyone saw Keodara use the phone to make calls or take photos. In addition, the phone was found in a backpack, separate from the drug paraphernalia or the pistol. There was no indication that evidence of firearms or drugs were found with the phone. We conclude that the warrant was overbroad and failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals also held that the trial court committed harmless error in admitting evidence police found on the phone:

Here, the untainted evidence of Keodara’s guilt was strong. Cellular phone tower records placed him near the location of the shooting, two eyewitnesses identified him, and another witness testified that Keodara contacted him and told him about the shooting. We find that the trial court’s denial of Keodara’s motion to suppress does not warrant reversal and, accordingly, we affirm his convictions.

The Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of whether Keodara’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. In short, the court said, “Yes.” It reasoned that the trial court did not take into account that Keodara was a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes or consider other age related factors that weigh on culpability or his capacity for rehabilitation. Based on that, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed in this case violated Keodar’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

My opinion? Good decision. It appears that, more and more, our courts are rightfully acknowledging a Defendant’s youth at sentencing.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Evans: A Knife is Not a Gun

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Due Process, Jury Trial, law enforcement, misdemeanor, Search and Seizure, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In City of Seattle v. Evans, the WA Supreme Court ruled that Article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution’s protection of the right to bear “arms” does not extend to a paring knife.

Seattle Police Officer Michael Conners stopped a vehicle driven by Wayne Anthony Evans for speeding in the Central District of Seattle. As Conners approached Evans’s vehicle, he observed furtive movements from Evans and his passenger, and he smelled marijuana. Conners directed Evans to exit the vehicle and asked him whether he had any weapons. Evans responded that there was a knife in his pocket. Conners instructed Evans not to reach for the knife; Conners then reached into Evans’s front right pocket, retrieved a fixed-blade knife with a black handle, and placed Evans under arrest for possession of a fixed-blade knife.

The City of Seattle (City) charged Evans with the unlawful use of weapons in violation of SMC 12A.14.080, which reads, “It is unlawful for a person knowingly to . . . carry concealed or unconcealed on his or her person any dangerous knife, or carry concealed on his or her person any deadly weapon other than a firearm.”

The case proceeded to trial. The City’s Prosecutor introduced the knife into evidence and presented testimony from Officer Conners. Conners identified the knife that he recovered from Evans at trial and the State entered that knife into evidence. When asked, Officer Conners described the knife as having a “black handle with a metal colored blade” that was “about-about this long,” apparently gesturing with his hands. Officer Conners admitted that he was concerned that the knife had a fixed blade-that is, it had a blade that would not fold into the handle-and alternately described the blade as resembling a “kitchen knife” or a “paring knife.”

The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Evans’s conviction was affirmed by the King County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals.

The WA Supreme Court reviewed the case on the specific issue of whether Mr. Evans’ fixed-blade knife is a protected arm under the Washington or federal constitution. Apparently, ruled the court, a knife is NOT protected as an “Arm” under the Constitution(s):

 . . . we hold that not all knives are constitutionally protected arms and that Evans does not demonstrate that his paring knife is an “arm” as defined under our state or federal constitution. Therefore, Evans cannot establish that SMC 12A.14.080(B) is unconstitutional as applied to him and we reject his as-applied challenge.

The court reasoned that although it is true that some weapons may be used for culinary purposes, as it is also true that many culinary utensils may be used when necessary for self-defense; but it does not follow that all weapons are culinary utensils or that all culinary utensils are weapons:

Were we to adopt Evans’s analysis and hold that a kitchen knife was a protected arm because it could be used for self-defense, there would be no end to the extent of utensils arguably constitutionally protected as arms. If a kitchen knife is a protected arm, what about a rolling pin, which might be effectively wielded for protection or attack? Or a frying pan? Or a heavy candlestick? “Admittedly, any hard object can be used as a weapon, but it would be absurd to give every knife, pitchfork, rake, brick or other object conceivably employable for personal defense constitutional protection as ‘arms.’

With that, the WA Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Evans’s paring knife was not an arm entitled to constitutional protection. Therefore, Evans cannot establish that SMC 12A.14.080 is unconstitutional as applied to him.

My opinion? I hate to say, but I somewhat agree. There’s a huge difference between a gun and a knife. The right to bear arms was made to protect guns, not knives. Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Meza: Freezing Funds Without a Warrant Is Unlawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Freezing Bank Accounts, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for freezing bank funds

In State v. Meza, the WA Court of Appeals Division II held that a trial court’s order to freeze the defendant’s bank account was not a search warrant, and therefore did not satisfy the warrant requirement for the seizure of funds.

In June 2014, John Armstrong spoke with the Lewis County sheriff’s office and alleged that Rafael Meza had swindled money from him. Deputy Justin Rogers investigated Armstrong’s allegations. Rogers contacted the Twin Star Credit Union and verified that Meza held an account that had received large wire transfers recently. Rogers also learned from Mansfield that Meza recently had informed him that he was planning to go to Mexico.

Rogers served Twin Star Credit Union with a valid search warrant for Meza’s account information. Meza’s bank statements showed a check and four wire transfers from Mansfield totaling $105,000, with the last transfer on June 18. They also showed a single wire transfer from Armstrong in the amount of $15,000 on April 11. Meza’s checking account showed that between October 2013 and June 2014, he withdrew approximately $89,000 in cash in 41 transactions involving between $3,000 and $5,000 each.

On June 27, 2014, the State charged Meza with one count of Theft in the First Degree. On the same day, the State presented an ex parte “Motion for an Order Freezing and Holding Funds” to the judge. The State asserted that the funds in Meza’s credit union accounts were “evidence in a felony offense.” The State’s motion was based on the probable cause affidavit filed with the information and asserted that there was “a high likelihood, based on the affidavit regarding probable cause, that Meza will remove said funds and leave the country.”

Importantly, the State did not request a search warrant for the credit union funds or reference CrR 2.3 in its motion.

Nevertheless, the trial court signed an order directing Twin Star Credit Union to “freeze and hold all accounts in the name of . . . Meza . . . as evidence in a criminal proceeding, until further order of this Court.” Also, neither the motion nor the order cited any legal authority for freezing Meza’s accounts.

In January 2015, Meza filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s order. Meza argued that there was no legal authority for the order. The trial court denied Meza’s motion to vacate the order, saying there was probable cause to believe that Meza’s account was related to the charged crime. The court concluded that it had the authority to freeze Meza’s funds under CrR 2.3. In addition, the trial court ruled that Meza’s account qualified as both evidence of a crime and the proceeds of a crime. Meza filed a motion for discretionary review. The WA Court of Appeals accepted the case.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned that The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” These provisions generally prohibit warrantless searches and seizures unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.

Consequently, reasoned the court, a person’s banking records fall within the constitutional protection of private affairs. Although no Washington case has addressed whether funds in a bank account can be seized without a warrant it defies reason to extend constitutional protection to bank account records but not to the funds reflected in those records. The Court emphasized that the seizure of funds is as much a threat to security in a person’s effects and a disturbance of a person’s private affairs as the seizure of the records regarding those funds:

“Here, the State cites no statute, court rule, or other authority allowing the seizure of a defendant’s bank account in these circumstances. Therefore, the seizure was not authorized by law.”

Finally, the Court rejected the State’s argument that under State v. Garcia-Salgado the trial court’s order is the functional equivalent of a search warrant.

“We hold that the Garcia-Salgado holding is limited to cases where the trial court’s order is authorized by law. Allowing a court order to function as a warrant when there is no independent authority for a seizure would render CrR 2.3 meaningless. Limiting the scope of Garcia-Salgado preserves the integrity of CrR 2.3. We hold that Garcia-Salgado is inapplicable and that the trial court’s order cannot be treated as the functional equivalent of a warrant.”

Based on these decision the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ordering the seizure of Meza’s credit union account.

My opinion? GOOD opinion. Very sensible and reasonable. It’s refreshing that the Court of Appeals followed the law and made the right decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Cruel & Unusual Punishment?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Eighth Amendment, felony, Methamphetamine, Search and Seizure, Strict Liability, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Schmeling, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that Felony Possession of a Controlled Substance is constitutional as applied under the Eighth Amendment and under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause even though the statute makes possession of very small amounts of a controlled substance a felony without knowledge of possession or intent to possess.

Here, as part of a theft investigation, law enforcement officers searched Richard Schmeling’s car and uncovered two small baggies that contained white residue. The residue was tested and turned out to be methamphetamine. The State charged Schmeling with Felony Possession of a Controlled Substance. Schmeling’s first trial ended in a mistrial because of a hung jury. On retrial, the jury convicted Schmeling. He appealed his conviction on the argument that RCW 69.50.4013 violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process because it makes possession of drug residue a felony without requiring any culpable mental state.

The Court of appeals reasoned that Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The basic concept of the Eighth Amendment is that punishment for a crime must be proportionate to the offense. There are two types of Eighth Amendment analysis: (1) determining whether a sentence is disproportionate to the particular crime, and (2) using categorical rules to define constitutional standards for certain classes of crimes or offenders.

  1. WAS SCHMELING’S SENTENCE PROPORTIONATE TO HIS CRIME?

The Court gave historical background showing that many Eighth Amendment cases address whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the crime. The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence and forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime. Most courts have shown a reluctance to review legislatively mandated sentences. As a result, successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences are exceedingly rare.

Here, Schmeling argues that classifying possession of small amounts of a controlled substance as a felony without a knowledge or intent constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the WA Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Smith. In that case, Smith was convicted of possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana, which was punished as a felony. He argued that the seriousness of the offense did not warrant classifying his crime as a felony. The court rejected Smith’s argument, noting that it was unaware of any authority supporting the proposition that classification alone could constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court also held that Smith’s actual sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his offense. Consequently, under the traditional proportionality analysis, Smith controls. Therefore, classification of a crime as a felony despite the absence of a knowledge or intent requirement does not result in grossly disproportionate punishment.

2. WAS SCHMELING’S SENTENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENDER?

This analysis involves two steps. First, the reviewing court considers “objective indicia of society’s standards (categorical approach), as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Second, the reviewing court considers precedent and its own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment is unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged that Schmeling wanted them to apply a categorical approach. However, the Court of Appeals declined to apply the categorical approach to punishment of adult drug offenders like Schmeling. It held that under State v. Smith, RCW 69.50.4013 does not violate the Eighth Amendment even though it punishes the possession of small amounts of controlled substances as a felony without imposing a knowledge or intent element.

3. DID SCHMELING’S SENTENCE VIOLATE DUE PROCESS?

In short, the Court held that RCW 69.50.4013 does NOT violate due process even though it makes possession of drug residue a crime without requiring any culpable mental state.

The court reasoned that Strict Liability Crimes – crimes with no knowledge or intent  requirement – do not necessarily violate due process. “We do not go with Blackstone in saying that ‘a vicious will’ is necessary to constitute a crime, for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient. There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.”

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that WA’s Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the legislature has the authority to create strict liability crimes that do not include a culpable mental state. Also, our Supreme Court twice has directly addressed in two other cases whether the elements of possession of a controlled substance under prior versions of RCW 69.50.4013 contains a knowledge or intent element. Those cases were State v. Bradshaw and State v. Cleppe. In both cases, the court held that the legislature deliberately omitted knowledge and intent as elements of the crime and that it would not imply the existence of those elements.

Here, Schmeling cites two cases from other jurisdictions holding that a strict liability offense violated due process. However, given our Supreme Court’s repeated approval of the legislature’s authority to adopt strict liability crimes, the Court found Schmelling’s arguments unpersuasive.

In sum, the Court of Appeals held that RCW 69.50.4013 does NOT violate due process even though it does not require the State to prove intent or knowledge to convict an offender of possession of a small amount of a controlled substance. It affirmed Schmeling’s conviction and sentence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.