Category Archives: Firearm

WA Supreme Court Rules Against Edmonds Gun Storage Law

Gun Laws - FindLaw

In Bass v. City of Edmonds, the Washington Supreme Court struck down an Edmonds gun storage ordinance in a court order reaffirming state law that local governments can’t impose their own firearms regulations.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After robust debate following a mass shooting at the nearby Marysville Pilchuck High School, the Edmonds City Council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to safely store their firearms when not in use. Ordinance 4120, codified as Edmonds City Code (ECC) chapter 5.26. The ordinance contains two operative provisions. Under the “storage provision,”

“It shall be a civil infraction for any person to store or keep any firearm in any premises unless such weapon is secured by a locking device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inaccessible or unusable to any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user.”

“Notwithstanding the foregoing, for purposes of this section, such weapon shall be deemed lawfully stored or lawfully kept if carried by or under the control of tthe owner or other lawfully authorized user.”

ECC 5.26.020. Under the “unauthorized access” provision,

“It shall be a civil infraction if any person knows or reasonably should know that a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person is likely to gain access to a firearm belonging to or under the control of that person, and a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person obtains the firearm.”

Violation of either provision carries a civil fine of as much as $10,000 if an at-risk person or child gained access to an unsecured gun.

At around the same time, Washington voters enacted Initiative 1639. This initiative, among many other things, criminalizes unsafe storage of firearms but in more limited circumstances than Edmonds’ ordinance. Unlike the City of Edmonds ordinance, the voter  initiative – later codified as RCW 9.41.360 – specifically did not mandate how or where a firearm must be stored.

The legality of the Edmonds’ ordinance was challenged and eventually made its way to the WA Supreme Court.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court found that the plaintiffs had legal standing to challenge the ordinance.

Next, the Court turned to the issue of whether existing statute under RCW 9.41.290 preempts this ordinance. The statute reads the following, in part:

“The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge, and transportation of firearms, or any other element relating to firearms or parts thereof, including ammunition and reloader components. Cities, towns, and counties or other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law, as in RCW 9.41.300, and are consistent with this chapter.”  ~RCW 9.41.290

Ultimately, the court ruled that Washington state law RCW 9.41.290  “fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state.”

Thursday’s ruling was a victory for gun rights organizations, such as the National Rifle Association and the Bellevue-based Second Amendment Foundation, both of which participated in the legal challenge.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a firearm offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pandemic Gun Sales

Coronavirus: US gun sales soar amid Covid-19 pandemic fears - YouTube

Great article in the thetrace.org by reporter Champe Barton discusses new data suggesting a connection between Pandemic gun sales and increased violence.

In March 2020, as the first COVID-19 outbreaks rippled across the U.S., Americans flocked to gun stores. In total, civilians purchased some 19 million firearms over the next nine months — shattering every annual sales record. At the same time, shootings across the country soared, with dozens of cities setting grim records for homicides.

Fresh data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) provides some of the first evidence that a relationship exists.

ATF data shows that in 2020, police recovered almost twice as many guns with a short “time-to-crime” — in this case, guns recovered within a year of their purchase — than in 2019. Law enforcement officials generally view a short time-to-crime as an indicator that a firearm was purchased with criminal intent. This is because a gun with a narrow window between sale and recovery is less likely to have changed hands. Altogether, more than 87,000 such guns were recovered in 2020, almost double the previous high. And almost 68,000 guns were recovered in 2020 with a time-to-crime of less than seven months. This means they were less likely to have been purchased the previous year.

Put more plainly, thousands of guns purchased in 2020 were almost immediately used in crimes — some as soon as a day after their sale. That was the case of the 9mm Beretta pistol purchased by an Arlington man from Uncle Dan’s Pawn Shop and Jewelry in Dallas, according to police records. Officers seized the gun from its owner during a drug arrest 24 hours later. In another example, a Laredo, Texas, man assaulted his mother, then opened fire on police with his Smith & Wesson M&P 15-22 rifle in July 2020. The gun had been purchased at a Cabela’s in Ammon, Idaho, just three months earlier.

The research shows that immediate booms in access to firearms almost always lead to corresponding spikes in violence.

Dr. Garen Wintemute directs the Violence Prevention Research Program at UC Davis. He wasn’t surprised that the largest increase in access to firearms in history happened alongside a parallel surge in violence.

“It can be difficult or impossible statistically to sort out the contributions that any one of these [phenomena] made” to the rise in violence . . . But the bottom line is, if the prior research holds up and increases in access are associated with increases in violence, we’re in for a very rough time ahead.” ~Dr. Garen Wintemute

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face firearm offenses or any other crimes. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Not a Toy, Still a Gun

Kessler Arms 12Ga. Bolt Action Shotgun

In State v. Gouley, the WA Court of Appeals held that an antique shotgun that was missing a bolt action was still a “firearm.”  The State merely has to establish that the shotgun was a real gun, not a toy gun.  The State was not required to prove that the firearm could be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable period of time.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Gouley was convicted of a felony and was under community supervision when he missed an appointment with his community corrections officer. Because of Gouley’s failure to report, the Department of Corrections issued a warrant for Gouley’s arrest.

Several officers attempted to locate Gouley at his listed residence to execute the warrant. The officers found Gouley asleep in his bedroom. In searching the bedroom, the officers discovered a shotgun under Gouley’s bed. Gouley was previously convicted of a serious offense and was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

After Gouley was placed in the squad car, he said the shotgun was given to him by his great uncle. The shotgun was a 20-gauge bolt action shotgun made by Kessler Arms. Although the company was out of business, the shotgun is not rare and is relatively inexpensive. When the shotgun was discovered under Gouley’s bed, it was missing a bolt action assembly and was not operable in that condition.

The State charged Gouley with one count of First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm
and one count of Escape from community custody.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the definition of “inoperable firearms.” The instruction said that a “temporarily inoperable firearm that can be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable time.” Also, a “disassembled firearm that can be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable time” met the definition of a firearm. Gouley consented to the use of this instruction. The jury convicted Gouley as charged. Gouley appealed on arguments that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals defined the term “firearm” under the statute. A “firearm” is a “weapon or device from which a projectile or projectiles may be fired by an explosive such as gunpowder.” Furthermore, a firearm need not be operable in order to qualify as a firearm under the statute. Instead, the inquiry is whether the firearm is a “gun in fact” rather than a “toy gun.”

The Court reasoned the evidence sufficient to show that the device at issue was a firearm  because it was a gun in fact and not a toy. “Although the shotgun was missing a bolt action, Schoeman testified that the gun could be made operable and could fire if a bolt or bolt assembly is inserted into the receiver.”

The Court raised and dismissed Gouley’s argument the firearm was inoperable. Gouley pointed to the fact that there was something wrong with the firing pin of that firearm or maybe the trigger spring, or the firing pin spring.

“However, the fact that the shotgun was defective or inoperable when it was discovered does not mean that the shotgun was a toy, or anything other than a “gun in fact.” And whether the device was a gun in fact is the only relevant determination that the jury had to make.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Ultimately, the Court reasoned the evidence established that the firearm possessed by Gouley met the definition of firearm. With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Gouley’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Tackle or Terry Stop?

Man escapes NYPD car before being tackled Video - ABC News

In State v. Pines, the WA Court of Appeals held that police officers exceeded the scope of a Terry Stop when, with no observations or information from which to believe the suspect was carrying a weapon, they followed the suspect into a restaurant, tackled him to the ground, held him down by the neck and head, and handcuffed him.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On March 23, 2018, Officer Sausman was in his vehicle when he identified the defendant Mr. Pines driving a black BMW. Sausman recognized Pines and was aware that Pines had a warrant for Residential Burglary and Domestic Violence charges. Sausman also knew that Pines was previously convicted of a felony.

Sausman followed Pines to Columbia City, where Pines parked his vehicle and entered a Pagliacci Pizza restaurant. Sausman advised the uniformed arrest team that Pines was in the restaurant.

Detective Miller was one of three uniformed officers that entered the restaurant to contact Pines. As the officers entered, Pines began moving toward the other door. The officers tackled Pines to the ground, holding him down by the neck and head, and handcuffed him. The officers then frisked Pines and found a handgun in his jacket pocket. The State charged Pines with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree.

Pines moved to suppress the handgun during a pretrial CrR 3.6 hearing. The trial court denied Pines’s motion to suppress. Later, during a bench trial, the trial court found Pines guilty and imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison.

Pines appealed on arguments that that the trial court erred in finding that the search and discovery of his firearm was a lawful Terry Stop, and thus denying his motion to suppress. Pines contends that his seizure amounted to a custodial arrest and that the police lacked probable cause at the time of his arrest.

COURT’S RATIONALE & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals said that under the Washington Constitution, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant required applies. Furthermore, said the court, if the evidence was seized without authority of law, it is not admissible in court. Finally, it reasoned that a person is seized when an officer, by physical force or show of authority, restrains the person’s freedom of movement. The restraint must be such that a reasonable person would not believe they were free to leave.

“The State argues, and the trial court agreed, that Pines’s seizure and subsequent search was the result of a valid Terry Stop,” said the Court of Appeals. “We disagree.”

The Court of Appeals elaborated that under Terry v. Ohio, a police officer may temporarily detain a person based on a reasonable suspicion that the person is or has been involved in a crime.

“In evaluating the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion, we look to the totality of the circumstances known to the officer,” said the Court of Appeals. “We determine the reasonableness based on an objective view of the known facts, not the officer’s subjective belief or ability to correctly articulate his suspicion in reference to a particular crime. The detention must not exceed the duration and intensity necessary to dispel the officer’s suspicions.”

The Court relied on State v. Mitchell  – an important Washington case on Terry Stops – to determine whether the officer’s interactions with Mr. Pines was lawful:

“Here, in stark contrast with Mitchell, the arresting officers did not observe Pines carrying a weapon. Indeed, as Detective Miller testified, they had no reason to contact Pines except for their belief that he might have a warrant.

Further, unlike Mitchell, where the officer was alone at night, there were three uniformed police officers along with Detective Sausman at the scene. No officer testified that they feared for their safety prior to Pines’s seizure or that they had seen a weapon prior to their search. And finally, unlike Mitchell where the defendant was told to lie down without contact from the officer, the three uniformed officers forcefully took Pines to the ground and handcuffed him, while Detective Sausman yelled that Pines was under arrest on a felony warrant.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals held that a reasonable person in Pines’s situation would consider themselves under custodial arrest. “Pines’s seizure exceeded the scope of a valid Terry Stop. The trial court erred in concluding the search was valid under Terry.”

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that although the officer’s knowledge of a month-old arrest warrant would support a properly limited Terry detention, it was insufficient to provide probable cause for arrest.  “The month gap between the officer learning of the arrest warrant and the arrest was too long – the suspect could have been arrested and posted bail during the 30-day interval,” said the Court.

The Court dismissed Pines’s conviction with prejudice.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Banning Armed Protests

Michigan Cancels Legislative Session to Avoid Armed Protesters - Bloomberg

The Washington State Capitol has long been the site of armed and unarmed protests. Until recently, armed protests at the Capitol have taken place without violence, bloodshed or gunfire.

In December, however, shots were fired at two clashes between demonstrators who were pro-former President Donald Trump and counterdemonstrators near the Capitol grounds, injuring one person. Consequently, lawmakers are considering a bill that would ban the open carry of firearms on Capitol grounds and at other public demonstrations.

Senate Bill 5038 would make it a gross misdemeanor to open carry firearms and other weapons at the state Capitol campus, legislative meetings and within 1,000 feet of a public demonstration. The bill’s prime sponsor, Sen. Patty Kuderer, D-Bellevue, said that an increase in armed vigilantism is becoming an alarming trend.

Kuderer argues that her bill would ensure that weapons are not used to intimidate peaceful demonstrators, and would decrease the potential for lethal violence.

“The purpose of open carrying a weapon at a protest is to intimidate people . . . It only serves to increase the risk of violence or death. And we’ve seen over the past several years armed groups engage with peaceful protestors, and sometimes with deadly consequences.” ~Sen. Patty Kuderer

According to Washington State Patrol spokesperson Chris Loftis, there have been 149 unpermitted demonstrations or events at the Capitol since COVID-19 restrictions went into effect in the spring.

Washington is an open-carry state, but the Capitol would be added to a list of places where firearms are already banned, including jails, courtrooms, airports, schools and mental health facilities.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving firearms. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Right to Present a Defense

1538.5 Motions To Suppress Evidence In California

In State v. Jennings, the WA Court of Appeals held the trial court’s exclusion of a shooting victim’s toxicology report indicating the victim had methamphetamine in his body at the time of his death did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On the date of the incident, the defendant Mr. Jennings accompanied his friend Mr. Redman to get Redman’s car from a mobile home in Puyallup, Washington. Redman had been living there, but had recently been kicked out. Drug activity occurred there. Jennings was there to defuse any hostilities between Redman and others at the house. Jennings armed himself with bear spray and a gun.

When they arrived, Jennings was on high alert. He knew violent events had recently occurred there. His friend Mr. Redman got into an argument with Mr. Burton, an individual at the house. Redman had his gun out. Jennings was familiar with the behavior of people who consumed methamphetamine. He realized that both Redman and Burton were high on methamphetamine and acting aggressively.

Burton and Redman argued about Redman’s car and then began to scuffle, wrestling in the foyer of the house. Jennings sprayed his bear spray at them to break up the fight. Burton then turned around and started walking toward Jennings, who backed up. Jennings believed Burton had Redman’s gun.

Jennings feared for his life. He was afraid Burton was reacting violently because he was high on methamphetamine. Jennings fired his gun and hit Burton twice. Burton died at the scene shortly after the shooting and before the ambulance arrived.

Jennings was arrested the next day. He was charged with second degree intentional murder (RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a)), second degree felony murder predicated on second degree assault (RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b)), and unlawful possession of a firearm.

At trial, Jennings claimed at trial that he shot Burton in self-defense. However, the judge excluded the toxicology report showing that Burton had methamphetamine in his body at the time of his death.  A jury found Jennings guilty of second degree felony murder.

Jennings appealed on numerous issues, including arguments that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding a toxicology report showing that Burton had methamphetamine in his body at the time of his death.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by emphasizing that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, evidence of self-defense must be assessed from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person standing in the shoes of the defendant, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the defendant sees. Finally, the court reasoned that evidence that might impact a defendant’s assessment of the danger presented, like the victim’s prior specific violent acts, is admissible only if known to the defendant when the incident occurred.

“In analyzing the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, we balance the State’s interest in excluding the toxicology report against Jennings’s need for evidence showing that his subjective fear was reasonable,” said the Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that in this case, the toxicology report did not have extremely high probative value and it did not constitute Jennings’s entire defense. “At trial, Jennings testified that what he observed on the day of the shooting gave rise to his subjective fear . . . his belief that Burton was high on methamphetamine,” said the Court.

“Jennings has not shown that there was a reasonable probability that any additional corroboration from the toxicology report would have materially changed the result at trial,” said the Court. “We hold that even if the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the toxicology report under ER 401 and 402, this ruling was harmless error.”

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Jennings’ conviction.

My opinion? Evidentiary and legal issues aside, these facts are terribly tragic. My heart goes out to the friends and families of all who were impacted by this. From a legal standpoint, however, It appears the WA Court of Appeals conducted a basic balancing test under Washington’s Rules of Evidence and determined that the toxicology report of the victim’s meth/blood levels was neither probative nor relevant at trial.

Under Washington’s Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is defined in ER 401 as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ER 402 provides that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Finally, ER 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice.

Here, the Court of Appeals was convinced that Mr. Jennings’ self-defense theory was properly supported by his testimony that he responded in self-defense to the victim’s meth-induced attack. Therefore, no other evidence was necessary to admit more evidence that the victim was high on meth. Jennings’ testimony, by itself, was enough. Any additional evidence on that issue was therefore cumulative, repetitive, unnecessary and potentially prejudicial to the State’s case under ER 403.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges and self-defense is a possible defense. It’s important to hire an experienced criminal defense trial attorney who understands the law, the rules of evidence and how both contribute to trial defenses.

Reasonable Suspicion & 911 Calls

Concealed Carry and Alcohol - What's the Bottom Line? - Alien Gear ...

In United States v. Vandergroen, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the police’s search of a suspicious person was reasonable under the circumstances when bar patrons called 911 minutes before to report the man had a pistol on him.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Late on a Saturday evening of February 17, 2018, a worker at a bar in California called 911 to report that three patrons had seen a man in the area with a pistol on him. In response to this call, the police stopped the man as he drove away, discovered a pistol in his car, and placed him under arrest. The man, Mr.  Vandergroen, argued a Rule 12 motion to suppress the evidence. The lower federal court denied the motion. Vandergroen was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which is a federal criminal conviction.

On appeal, Vandergroen now argues that the 911 call should never have led to his stop in the first place because it did not generate reasonable suspicion, and that the evidence of the pistol should therefore have been excluded.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Mr. Vandergroen. It affirmed the lower court’s denial of Vandergroen’s motion to suppress and upheld his conviction.

The Court began by saying that under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop only where s/he has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity, commonly referred to as “reasonable suspicion.”

The Court further elaborated that while a 911 call may generate reasonable suspicion, it can only do so when, under the totality-of-the circumstances, it possesses two features. First, the tip must exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability, and second, it must provide information on potential illegal activity serious enough to justify a stop.

Finally, the Court identified a number of factors that demonstrate the reliability of a tip. These facts include (1) whether the tipper is known, rather than anonymous; (2) whether the tipper reveals the basis of his knowledge; (3) whether the tipper provides detailed predictive information indicating insider knowledge, id.; whether the caller uses a 911 number rather than a non-emergency tip line; and (4) whether the tipster relays fresh, eyewitness knowledge, rather than stale, second-hand knowledge.

With the above in mind, the Court of Appeals delved into its analysis.

“The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion,” said the Court. It reasoned that first, the statements by an independent witness were undoubtedly reliable. “Witness #2 provided his name and employment position, making him a known, and therefore more reliable, witness,” said the Court.

Second, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the statements by the bar’s patrons were also reliable. “Although the patrons remained anonymous during the call, which generally cuts against reliability, their statements exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome this shortcoming,” said the Court. Finally, the Court reasoned that the reported activity — possessing a concealed weapon  was presumptively unlawful in California and was ongoing at the time of the stop.

In conclusion the Court of Appeals held that the 911 call generated reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and the lower court was correct to deny Vandergroen’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. His criminal conviction was upheld.

My opinion? Mind you, this is a federal opinion. Under Washington law, however,  a bare report that someone is in possession of a firearm does not provide reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. This is because Washington is both an open carry state and liberally grants concealed weapons permits. United States v. Brown.

In Washington, under RCW 9.41.300(1)(d), a stop may have been permissible in this case if the individual with the pistol had been in that portion of the lounge classified by the state liquor and cannabis board as off-limits to persons under twenty-one years of age. That’s because it is unlawful for any person to enter a bar with a firearm.

Please read my Legal Guide on Search and Seizure and contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving a questionable search or seizure of evidence. Hiring a competent and experienced defense attorney is the first and best step towards justice.

Consecutive v. Concurrent Sentencing

Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentencing in Kentucky - Baldani Law Group

Clients often ask, “What’s the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences?”

Quite a lot, actually!

The question applies to Clients facing criminal charges from numerous jurisdictions. For these clients, sometimes the best approach is to seek a global resolution. This can happen if the prosecutors of the different jurisdictions are willing to coordinate their efforts toward a plea bargain involving reductions and dismissals of some criminal charges in exchange for guilty pleas to other charges.

Naturally, a big question in these negotiations is whether the defendant shall serve their jail time under a consecutive sentence or a concurrent sentences. Here’s some definitions:

Concurrent sentences: When sentences run concurrently, defendants serve all the sentences at the same time. This outcome is favorable to the defendant.

Consecutive sentences: When sentences run consecutively, defendants have to finish serving the sentence for one offense before they start serving the sentence for any other offense. This sentence outcome is not favorable to the defendant.

To illustrate the point, in State v. Brown the WA Court of Appeals recently held that firearm enhancements must be served consecutively in cases in which the defendant was 18-years or older when s/he committed the crimes.

BACKGROUND FACTS

A jury convicted Mr. Brown of four counts of first degree robbery, one count of attempted first degree robbery, two counts of second degree assault, and one count of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. Five of the convictions included firearm enhancements, which are increased sentencing penalties.

At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of 381 months. The State recommended five firearm enhancements ran consecutively to each other and to Mr. Brown’s base sentence of 129 months. The trial court imposed the State’s recommended sentence. Brown appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Mr. Brown’s arguments on appeal. It reasoned that under the Sentencing Reform Act – and specifically, RCW 9.94A.533(3)(e) – all firearm enhancements require prison time and shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other firearm or deadly weapon enhancements.

“Brown’s sole claim is that he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court erroneously believed it lacked the discretion to depart from the required term of confinement for a firearm enhancement. We disagree.” ~WA Court of Appeals

To support its reasoning, the WA Court of Appeals relied on State v. Brown (no relation) a WA Supreme Court case which held that Washington law deprives sentencing courts of the discretion to impose an exceptional sentence with regard to firearm enhancements.

“In any event, a decision by the Washington Supreme Court is binding on all lower courts of the state,” reasoned the WA court of Appeals. “This court does not have the
authority to overrule Brown.”

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Brown’s lengthy prison sentence.

My opinion? Again, if a defendant is convicted of a number of crimes that carry lengthy prison terms, the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences can be tremendous. The same factors that judges tend to consider when deciding on the severity of a sentence (for example, a defendant’s past record) also affect their decisions on whether to give concurrent or consecutive sentences.

As you can see, however, some criminal statutes require that the sentence for the crime in question be served consecutively to any other crime committed in the same incident.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving the possibility of concurrent or consecutive sentencing. It’s crucial to hire an experienced criminal defense attorney who understands the law.

Passive Obstructing

Extinction Rebellion: Climate protesters dodge arrest after police ...

In State v. Canfield, the WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s feigning sleep when first contacted by police and his repeated refusals to obey commands was “Passive Obstructing, and supported an Obstructing a Public Servant conviction.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Law enforcement officers testified that Mr. Canfield feigned sleep when first contacted, disregarded several commands, and tried to start his vehicle as if to drive away from the scene. He also lied about his identity and tried to hide a gun while being arrested. Eventually, he was charged with numerous crimes to include Possession of Methamphetamine, Second Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, Possession of a Stolen Firearm, and Obstructing a Public Servant.

At trial, the court convicted Mr. Canfield of Obstructing in addition to some of the aforementioned charges. He appealed on numerous issues, including whether there was sufficient evidence to arrest to support a conviction for Obstructing.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals reasoned upheld the lower court’s finding that Mr. Canfield hindered a public servant in the performance of his duties.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Mr. Canfield’s argument that his case was similar to State v. D.E.D. That case, which was a favorable legal precedent, involved a defendant who passively resisted an investigatory detention. In that case, the Court of Appeals held the defendant’s passive resistance to being handcuffed did not constitute obstructing a public servant.

“The comparison fails,” said the Court. It further reasoned that the law imposes a duty to cooperate with an arrest and makes it a crime to resist arrest, and actions that hinder an arrest short of resisting can constitute obstructing a public servant.

“Passive resistance to a lawful arrest can constitute obstructing by itself. Here, there was additional evidence beyond the handcuffing incident, including the repeated refusals to obey commands and feigning sleep. Mr. Canfield did not merely refuse to cooperate with the police. He actively tried to hinder them.”

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court rightfully concluded that Mr. Canfield was guilty of obstructing a public servant.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges of Obstructing. Hiring an experienced and effective defense attorney is the best step towards justice.

Body Camera Evidence Admissible

Image result for body worn camera

In State v. Clayton, the WA Court of Appeals held that police body camera evidence is admissible at trial. It does not violate Washington’s Privacy Act because police interactions with a suspect and witnesses or victims of the crime are not private conversations.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The charges arose from a visit by law enforcement to a Spokane home. On the evening in question, multiple officers responded to the residence following a report of shots being fired. Mr. Clayton let officers in the residence and consented to a search. There were six people in the residence in addition to the officers who entered. Three officers had active body cameras recording the investigation, but none of the residents were advised of that fact.

An officer discovered two revolvers in a dresser and also observed bullet holes in a couch, wall, and the floor. Upon learning that Mr. Clayton was ineligible to possess the revolvers, officers arrested him for unlawful possession of the weapons. The prosecutor charged two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm based on the October arrest. Clayton’s girlfriend told officers that one month earlier, Clayton had fired a shot in the apartment that struck the couch on which she was sitting.

Ultimately, the prosecutor charged Clayton with one count of second degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm for the September incident, as well as two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm for the two weapons recovered in October.

After conducting a CrR 3.6 hearing on a defense motion to suppress the recordings, the court permitted the video evidence only to the point where the officer discovered the guns and arrested Clayton. Body camera footage from one of the officers was played for the jury at trial. The jury acquitted Clayton on the assault charge, but convicted him of all three
unlawful possession charges.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Clayton argues that the police body camera recording was made in violation of the “Privacy Act,” rendering the evidence inadmissible.

The Court of Appeals  ultimately ruled, however, that because the police interaction with Mr. Clayton and his family was not a private conversation, there was no error.

The Court described how the Privacy Act prohibits recording a private communication unless all parties to the communication consent. Consequently, any information obtained from unknown recordings is inadmissible in court.

More specifically, a communication is private under the act when (1) the parties have a subjective expectation that it is private, and (2) that expectation is objectively reasonable.  Among other things, the subject matter of the calls, the location of the participants, the potential presence of third parties, and the roles of the participants are relevant to whether the call is private.

When it comes to body-worn cameras, law enforcement may record people who have been arrested upon (i) informing the person that a recording is being made, (ii) stating the time of the beginning and ending of the recording in the recording, and (iii) advising the person at the commencement of the recording of his or her constitutional rights. In addition, (iv) the recording may be used only for valid police or court activities. Finally, the person must be told that he or she is being recorded. However, there is no requirement that the individual consent to the recording.

In short, the Court reasoned that conversations with uniformed, on-duty law enforcement officers are typically not private conversations.

“People understand that information they provide to officers conducting an investigation is going to turn up in written police reports and may be reported in court along with the observations made by the officers . . . The conversations took place in his apartment, a place where he had some subjective expectation of privacy, but they also occurred in the presence of five others. The subject matter of the visit—a report of a gun being fired and subsequent search for the weapon—was not a private one.”

Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and upheld his convictions.

Please read my Search & Seizure Legal Guide titled contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges and the evidence involves recordings from police body-worn cameras. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.