Category Archives: felony

State v. Eaton: A Defendant’s Sentence Cannot Be Enhanced For Involunatry Acts

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, felony, Jail, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Search and Seizure, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

sentence enhancements Archives - Oklahoma Justice Reform

In State v. Eaton, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant must act volitionally – with intent – to put himself within a zone that requires an upward sentencing enhancement.  An enhancement should not apply for drugs the defendant possessed when arrested and brought to jail.

Mr. Eaton was arrested for DUI and taken by police to the Clark County Jail.  At the jail, Eaton was searched by staff who discovered a small bag of methamphetamine taped to his sock.  The State charged Eaton with DUI and Possession of Methamphetamine and sought a sentencing enhancement for possessing a controlled substance in a jail or prison.  A jury convicted Eaton on both charges and found by special verdict that Eaton possessed methamphetamine while in a jail.  The trial court imposed an enhanced sentence.

The WA Supremes overturned the sentencing enhancement.  They reasoned that once Eaton was arrested, he no longer had control over his location.  From the time of arrest, his movement from street to jail became involuntary: involuntary not because he did not wish to enter the jail, but because he was forcibly taken there by State authority. He no longer had the ability to choose his own course of action.  Nor did he have the ability through some other course of action to avoid entering the area that would increase the penalty for the underlying crime.

My opinion?  Again, excellent decision.  It’d be different if Eaton knew he was going to jail and tried sneaking meth within the facility. However, those circumstances did not exist.  He was arrested for DUI  – a different matter altogether – and immediately booked into jail.  He never voluntarily brought the drugs into the jail itself.  He merely happened to possess them when arrested for DUI.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Dow: Corpus Delicti vs. RCW 10.58.03

Constitutional Rights, Corpus Delicti, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Uncategorized, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Important Facts about Corpus Delicti

In State v. Dow, the WA Supreme Court held that RCW 10.58.035 does NOT change the corpus delicti rule that the State must prove every element of an alleged crime by evidence independent of the defendant’s statement.

 Defendant Mr. Dow was charged with with first degree child molestation.  The victim was a three year old female, and too young to testify.  Consequently, her statements to others about the alleged offense were inadmissible.  No persons other than Dow and the child were present at the time of the alleged offense.  During a recorded police interview, Dow made statements regarding the events surrounding the alleged molestation.

The trial court found these statements to be exculpatory and not an admission.  The State sought to introduce Dow’s statements as substantive evidence that he committed the crime charged.  Dow moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were inadmissible for lack of  corpus delicti.  The trial court agreed.  Dow’s case was dismissed.  The State appealed.  The case found its way to the Supreme Court.

Some background is necessary: the corpus delicti doctrine generally is a principle that tests the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence, other than a defendant’s confession, to corroborate the confession.  The purpose of the rule is to ensure that other evidence supports the defendant’s statement and satisfies the elements of the crime.  Where no other evidence exists to support the confession, a conviction cannot be supported solely by a confession.  The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to prevent defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.  Historically, courts have grounded the rule in judicial mistrust of confessions.

Along comes RCW 10.58.035. It allows a statement to be admitted into evidence if there is substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the statement.   The following factors determine whether the statement is trustworthy:

(a)  Whether there is any evidence corroborating or contradicting the facts set out in the statement, including the elements of the offense;

(b)  The character of the witness reporting the statement and the number of witnesses to the statement;

(c)  Whether a record of the statement was made and the timing of the making of the record in relation to the making of the statement; and/or

(d)  The relationship between the witness and the defendant.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that even if the statements are admissible, no other evidence exists to establish the corpus delicti independent of Dow’s statement. Further, corpus delicti cases have always required sufficient evidence independent of a defendant’s confession to support a conviction.  RCW 10.58.035 does nothing to change this requirement. The State concedes it lacked evidence.  Indeed, the only evidence the State purported to have is Dow’s statement, which is insufficient under any standard.

Consequently, the WA Supremes upheld Dow’s dismissal.

My opinion?  I like the decision.  The WA Supremes dutifully followed corpus delicti and held people shouldn’t be charged with crimes unless evidence exists.  I fear, however, that even though the Court did not allow RCW 10.58.035 to swallow the corpus delicti rule, such decisions may come few and farther in between.  The statute was MADE to chip away at corpus delicti.  Period.  Perhaps it didn’t apply to Dow’s case because his statement was the ONLY evidence the State had.  Future defendants in future cases, however, might not be so lucky.

My prediction?  Future courts may find that if a scintilla of evidence beyond the defendant’s statement exists, then the statute kicks into effect and does away with corpus delicti.  Keep your eyes peeled . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Whatcom County Jail Gets Record Number of Inmates

Animal Abuse, Assault, Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Domestic Violence, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, felony, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jail, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Pretrial Investigations, Probable Cause, Property Crimes, Retail Theft, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sentencing, Sex Crimes, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Terry Stop, Theft, Washington State Patrol, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

COVID-19 infections hit record high in California prisons | CalMatters

Whatcom County Jail’s population hit a record high over Presidents Day weekend and since then, law enforcement agencies have been booking fewer people, to ease the crowding.
The jail’s population reached 323 inmates – its operational capacity should be 212 inmates -the weekend of Feb. 13-15, causing the jail to run out of temporary beds and come close to running out of clothes, sheets and other resources. From Feb. 1 to Feb. 16, an average of 26 people were booked into the jail each day.

Bellingham police have been citing and releasing some people arrested on misdemeanor, and booking and then immediately releasing others.  An officer might take some people to jail to have their photos and fingerprints taken, then have the jail release them.

My opinion?  I’ll state the obvious: the criminal justice system in Whatcom County has reached peaked capacity.  Jails are overcrowded.  Trial calendars are filled.   Trust me, I know.

The easy solution?  Hire an additional judge, build additional courts, and build another jail.  Unfortunately, that’s not going to happen any time soon.   Put simply, The County lacks resources to build jails and/or hire more court staff.  This is not due to sloppy spending on the part of the County.  The Whatcom Superior Court has already eliminated numerous services due to the decrease in revenues.  That said, the likelihood of obtaining more revenue to hire another judge and/or construct another jail is slim to none.

The harder solution – and probably the more criticized; yet WORKABLE solution – is for the Prosecutor’s Office to negotiate more cases to a favorable resolution.  They’re a trial-happy bunch, and unnecessarily so.  Not every case must be brought to trial.  Justice happens when all parties leave the courtroom satisfied with the result.

At any rate, overcrowded jails are symptomatic of larger problems.  The County judiciary is burning the candlestick at both ends.  We’re seeing a decrease in judicial revenues and an increase in inmates.  The state of affairs certainly is alarming.  Why now, and why all of the sudden?

A tough nut to crack.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harris: A Defendant May Argue Gant On Appeal Even Though It Was Not Argued At Trial.

Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Courts and the Constitution Arizona v Gant

In State v. Harris, the  WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant who did not bring a suppression motion prior to trial, may assert a claim under Arizona v. Gant  for the first time on appeal.

Defendant Stuart J. Harris, Jr. appealed his conviction for First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.  He argued  sufficiency of the evidence,  additional evidentiary error, and prosecutorial misconduct.   While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which deals with the scope of a car search pursuant to the arrest of its driver.  The Court of Appeals Division II allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the Gant issue.

For those who don’t know, Gant rejected the reading of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d (1981), that predominated in the lower courts, namely, that the Fourth Amendment allows a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.

In departing from Belton, the Gant Court held instead that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723.3

Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned the facts in Gant were similar to those here.  Harris was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the car at the time of its search, and there was no reason to believe that the car contained evidence related to the offense for which he was arrested (driving with a suspended license). Therefore, absent other legal support for the search, the officer’s search of  the car was unlawful.

Furthermore, Gant applies retroactively because “A party should be allowed to take advantage of a decision rendered during the pendency of his case, even if he had not reserved the point decided, if the decision could not have reasonably been anticipated.”  State v. Harris at 6-7, quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit.

My opinion?  I’m a HUGE fan of the Arizona v. Gant opinion (please see my Dec. 24, 2009 blog), and by extension, I’m a HUGE fan of this opinion. Generally, United States Supreme Court decisions that announce new constitutional rules governing criminal prosecutions apply retroactively to all criminal cases not yet final on appeal.  I’m happy the Court of Appeals stuck to the law; and supported Gant, to boot.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Drum: Good Decision Regarding Stipulated Evidence At Drug Court Trials

Burglary, Drug Court, Evidence, felony, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What's good 'evidence-based' practice for classrooms? We asked the teachers, here's what they said | EduResearch Matters

In State v. Drum, the WA Supreme Court held a trial court may find a defendant NOT GUILTY if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all of the elements of a crime beyond all reasonable doubt.

Patrick Drum entered into a contract to participate in drug court, which provided for the eventual dismissal of a Residential Burglary charge if  Drum  successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program.  The contract required Drum to stipulate that the facts set forth in the investigation reports, witness statements, and laboratory tests were true and sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

After waiting in custody for 42 days for a bed to open up at a treatment facility, Drum requested to leave the drug court program.  He had a bench trial.  The judge found him guilty based on the evidence that was stipulated when Mr. Drum entered the contract.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that by entering a drug court contract, a defendant is NOT giving up his right to an independent finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  A trial court still has the authority to find the defendant not guilty if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, if a trial court independently reviews the evidence and makes findings, a stipulated drug court agreement is NOT the equivalent of a guilty plea.

My opinion?  EXCELLENT DECISION.

For those who don’t know, Drug Courts are programs that divert nonviolent, drug-related offenders into intensive treatment programs with the  goal of encouraging offenders  into a productive, drug-free lifestyle.  In general, offenders participate in required drug treatment and counseling, find work, meet with corrections officers, attend regular visits with a judge, and meet any other conditions set by the court.  Personal involvement by the drug court judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and treatment providers is cited as the key to the success of drug courts.

Drug Court is a privilege.  It’s difficult to get into.  A defendant must be evaluated and found a good candidate by the evaluator, prosecutor and judge.  To gain entry, defendant must also stipulate – essentially, agree – to the truth of the evidence alleged against them in the police reports.  Worst-case scenario; if defendants either quit or are kicked out of Drug Court, then they have already waived their right to a jury trial, waived their right to challenge the evidence through direct/cross examination of witnesses, and essentially waived their presumption of innocence.  Ouch.

State v. Drum gives judges broad discretion to review the truth and veracity of the “stipulated evidence.”  In other words, judges may consider whether the State can prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Best-case scenario for a defendant, it appears they have a chance to get a case acquitted by a judge upon leaving Drug Court.

Practically speaking, the likelihood of an acquittal is slim.  Drug Courts are highly political venues.   Indeed, look at how the WA Supreme Justices voted, it was a SLIM 5-4 majority.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Washington State Felons Should Have Voting Rights, Federal Court Rules

Constitutional Rights, felony, Race & Law, Theft, , ,

Opinion | Restoring Voting Rights for Felons - The New York Times

Here’s some good news.  On Martin Luther King Jr. day, no less.

A federal appeals court tossed out Washington’s law banning incarcerated felons from voting, finding the state’s criminal-justice system is “infected” with racial discrimination.

Muhammad Shabazz Farrakhan was serving a three-year sentence at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla for a series of felony-theft convictions. Ultimately, five other inmates, all members of racial minority groups, joined as plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs’ brought studies and social-science data which showed that minorities in Washington are stopped, arrested and convicted in such disproportionate rates that the ban on voting by incarcerated felons is inherently discriminatory.

The federal court agreed.  The decision, written by Judge A. Wallace Tashima, said the studies “speak to a durable, sustained indifference in treatment faced by minorities in Washington’s criminal justice system — systemic disparities which cannot be explained by ‘factors independent of race.’ ”

Blacks are 70 percent more likely — and Latinos and Native Americans 50 percent more likely — than whites to be searched in traffic stops.  The research also showed that blacks are nine times more likely to be incarcerated than whites, despite the fact that the ratio of arrests for violent crime among blacks and whites is less than four-to-one. One result of that: 25 percent of black men in Washington are disenfranchised from voting.

My opinion?  I’m overjoyed with the decision.  Granted, convicted felons should face appropriate consequences if found guilty of committing crimes.  However, the Washington law stripping them of voting rights was simply Draconian.

Eventually, the convicts will serve their sentence and return to society.  Studies show that voting by incarcerated felons is the best tool to re-integrate them into society.  Why deny them the right to vote?  What good does that do?

The decision is a step in the right direction.  Let them vote.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pugh: WA Supremes Admit “Excited Utterance” Hearsay Evidence of 911 Call; Disregard State v. Crawford

911 Call, Assault, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Evidence, felony, Jury Trial, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What is EXCITED UTTERANCE? What does EXCITED UTTERANCE mean? EXCITED UTTERANCE meaning & explanation - YouTube

In State v. Pugh, the WA Supreme Court admitted “Excited Utterance” hearsay evidence of a 911 call, thus disregarding State v. Crawford.

Defendant Timothy Pugh and his wife Bridgette are married.  They had problems.  In November 2004, she obtains a no-contact order (NCO) against him.  On March 21, 2005, and in violation of the NCO, the Pughs were together at a friend’s apartment.  At 3:13 a.m., she calls 911 and states, “My husband was beating me up really bad.”

She provided his description.  When the operator asked her whether he was still there, Mrs. Pugh said, “He’s just outside.” She again reported being beaten, but this time stated it in the present sense.  She also said she needed an ambulance.  The call terminated when police officers arrived.  Mrs. Pugh had a bruised face and a chipped tooth.  The officers soon arrested Mr. Pugh in the parking lot outside the apartment where Bridgette was.

Before trial, the State delivered a subpoena to Mrs. Pugh.  However she refused to arrive and/or testify at trial.  Despite her decision, and in clear violation of State v. Crawford (2004 case where WA Supremes upheld the Confrontation Clause and dismissed a case where the State’s victim/witness refused to testify) , the trial court admitted her 911 call as evidence.  Pugh was convicted of felony violation of the court order, domestic violence.

 The WA Supremes held Mrs. Pugh’s statements to the 911 operator were nontestimonial, and therefore admission of a recording of the 911 call at Mr. Pugh’s trial did not violate his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  They reasoned that her statements qualify as res gestae under the res gestae doctrine as it applied at the time the state constitution was adopted.

They further argued that statements of this type do not implicate the state confrontation clause.  Because the statements are nontestimonial and do not implicate article I, section 22, admission of the 911 recording violated neither the federal nor the state confrontation clause.

My opinion?  I hold the same disdain as Justice Sanders’ dissenting opinion.  Article I, Section 22 of the WA Constitution states, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . .”  This is the essence of the Confrontation Clause.

And, to quote Justice Sanders, “What is there about face to face that the majority opinion does not understand?”  Crawford applies – and cases get dismissed – if a victim refuses to testify.  Period.  Here, the victim refused to testify.  Nevertheless, and in total violation of Crawford, the majority pulls out some archaic res gestae analysis, breathes life into it, and totally stomps the heck out of Crawford.

 Unbelievable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Proposed Law Changes To Prevent Future Police Murders

Accomplice, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, law enforcement, Legislation, police, Violent Crime, Washington State Patrol, , ,

2009 Lakewood shooting - Wikipedia

In the wake of the Lakewood police officer shooting tragedy, Representative Mike Hope (R-Lake Stevens) is drafting legislation to prevent serial offenders like Maurice Clemmons from having an opportunity to harm others. Hope, a Seattle police officer who works patrol when not in session, said this was at the top of his legislative agenda.

The three-part legislation will include two proposed changes to the Washington State Constitution and a sentencing enhancement, proposals he says would have prevented the murders of four Lakewood police officers Nov. 29.

The first bill would remove bail opportunities for dangerous individuals who have committed two felonies and are charged with a possible “third strike” felony offense.   The second bill would prevent defendants from receiving bail if they commit another violent crime in Washington and are proven dangerous to the public.  The third bill would require a sentencing enhancement against those who aid and abet criminals who are not bailable.

A change to the state constitution requires a two-thirds approval in both the House and the Senate and simple majority approval from voters.

My opinion?  Like everyone, I’m deeply saddened with the deaths of the four Lakewood Officers.  Their murders were completely meaningless and senseless.  I’m also disturbed the defendant’s friends/relatives assisted him.

That said, I question whether altering the WA Constitution and chipping away at a defendant’s rights is the answer to preventing similar murders from happening in the future.  I’m a staunch defender of constitutional rights.  Indeed, if I were to wrap an American flag around myself and proclaim my patriotism out loud, then THAT is the platform I stand upon: vigilant, aggressive protection of individual rights against a tyrannical government.

The proposed legislation is strong medicine.  Too strong.  At worst, defendants can be held without bail.  This is disturbing.  Under court rules, judges may hold defendants without bail only if the charge they face is a capital charge; like murder.  Additionally, judges must impose the least restrictive release alternatives to defendants.

Disallowing bail and indefinitely holding defendants in jail laughs in the face of “least restrictive alternative.” Finally, holding defendants without bail leads to “plea tenderization” by cutting defendants off from work and family.  As a result, defendants may plead guilty not because they committed a crime; but simply to get out of jail and move on with their lives.  That’s an utterly inhumane result if the defendant is innocent of the charges.

We’ll see what happens.  The bill needs extremely strong support.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Buelna Valdez: Search Incident to Arrest is Invalid (Tip of the Hat To Arizona V. Gant)

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Requirement - FindLaw

In State v. Buelna Valdez, the WA Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest was invalid under the 4th Amendment.

Here, a police officer pulled over a vehicle because it had only one working headlight.  The officer ran a records search on the driver, Mr. Buelna-Valdez, and discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  The officer handcuffed and secured the defendant in his patrol car.  Officer searched the vehicle.  He noticed loose dashboard panels.  He calls a K-9 unit.  The K-9 uncovered methamphetamine located under a moldy cup holder.  The passenger was then also arrested. Both men were charged with drug offenses.

The WA  Supremes held that the automobile search incident to arrest was unlawful.  They reasoned that because the arrestee was handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, he no longer had access to any portion of his vehicle.  The officer’s search of the vehicle was therefore unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the WA Constitution.  The Court also embraced the U.S. Supreme Court’s Arizona v. Gant in finding factual similarities between the cases:

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the arrestee was secured and not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, so neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest warranted the search.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.  Furthermore, the arrestee was arrested based upon an outstanding warrant; the State has not shown that it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the underlying crime might be found in the vehicle.  See Gant, citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).”

The Court also reasoned the search was conducted without a warrant, even though the circumstances did not prevent officers from obtaining one prior to the search:  “There was no showing that a delay to obtain a warrant would have endangered officers or resulted in evidence related to the crime of arrest being concealed or destroyed.  As such . . . the evidence collected from that search should be suppressed, and the resulting convictions reversed.”

My opinion?  Obviously, I’m happy.  The case is great law for defense attorneys.  Indeed, it goes even further than Gant. Although good, Gant was slightly problematic because it allowed police to search for evidence of the crime of arrest.   In this decision, however, the WA Supremes only allow a search if there is evidence of destruction.  Therefore, in WA, if the defendant is in the squad car, the police cannot search the defendant’s vehicle.  Beautiful.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harrington: “Progressive Intrusion” = Unlawful Search

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

4 Charts That Show Stop-and-Frisk Is a Terrible Crime-Fighting Tool

In State v. Harrington, the WA Supreme Court held that the “Progressive Intrusion” of the officer during the investigations was an unlawful search.

Issue was whether the police unlawfully searched/seized the defendant prior to arrest, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, requiring suppression of drugs found on his person.

In short (yes, I’m getting to the good part), the WA Supremes decided the search WAS unlawful, and amounted to a “progressive intrusion.”  Evidence suppressed, case thrown out of court.

The facts: On August 13, 2005, 11:00PM, Officer Reiber of the Richland Police was driving his police car on duty.  He noticed soon-to-be defendant, Dustin Harrington, walking down the sidewalk.  Officer Reiber made a U-turn, drove past Harrington, and pulled into a driveway.  He did not activate his lights or siren.  Officer exited his car and made contact with Harrington (this is called a “social contact”).

Officer Reiber asked questions.  Harrington answered them awkwardly and non-sensically.  Officer became nervous because Harrington kept putting his hands in his pockets.  The conversation lasted about five minutes.

State patrol Trooper William Bryan drove by the scene.  He initiated a U-turn, got out of his car, and approached the two men.  Similar to Officer Reiber, Trooper Bryan did not activate his emergency lights.  Upon contact, Trooper Bryan did not speak to either gentleman.  He stood about eight feet away.

Officer Reiber asked Mr. Harrington if he could pat down Harrington “for officer safety reasons.”  Mr. Harrington said “No.”  Officer patted Harrington down anyway, against Harrington’s consent.  During the pat-down, Officer Reiber found a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine.  Reiber arrested Harrington.  During the search, officers discovered a pipe and baggie containing methamphetamine on Harrington’s person. Harrigton was charged with Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine.

The WA Supremes articulated why the search/arrest was illegal, and consequently, why the evidence should be suppressed.  They discussed what “social contact” between an officer and citizen means:

“The phrase’s plain meaning seems somewhat misplaced.  ‘Social contact’ suggests idle conversation about, presumably, the weather or last night’s ball game — trivial niceties that have no likelihood of triggering an officer’s suspicion of criminality.  The term ‘social contact’ does not suggest an investigative component.”

The Court further reasoned that subsequent events quickly dispelled the social contact and escalated the encounter to an unlawful seizure. First, Trooper Bryan’s arrival at the scene escalated the situation away from a mere “social contact” because a reasonable person would think twice about the turn of events.  As a result, Trooper Bryan’s presence contributed to the eventual seizure of Harrington.

Second, Officer Reiber’s request for Mr. Harrington  to remove hands from pockets added to the officer’s unlawfully progressive intrusion.  Third, Mr. Harrington did not consent to the search.  Officers MUST have a well-founded suspicion to search when they lack a defendant’s consent.

Here, these circumstances lacked the foundational basis for a search.  Finally, and before Officer Reiber’s request to search, he did not ask for Harrington’s name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs.

The court concluded Harrington was unconstitutionally seized because, like him, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when officers asked to frisk.  Consequently, the seizure violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My Opinion?  Excellent.  Beautiful.  On point.  The WA Supremes got it right.  The cumulative effect of these violations — all three of them — amounted to an unlawful search.  I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes addressed the fine line between a lawful “social contact” and unlawful “progressive intrusion.”  I’ve had numerous clients face criminal charges as a result of an officer’s apparently innocent “social contact,” which was, in reality, a progressive intrusion into their privacy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.