Category Archives: Due Process

State v. Brock: WA Supreme Court Reverses Search of Backpack Case

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In State v. Brock, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision to reverse the Defendant’s convictions for 10 counts of Identity Theft in the Second Degree, 3 counts of Forgery, and violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

Last year, in State v. Brock: The “Time for Arrest” Doctrine, I blogged about how the Court of Appeals reversed Brock’s conviction, agreeing with Brock that it was not a valid search of his person under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that under the “Time for Arrest” doctrine, Brock did not have actual, exclusive possession of the backpack “immediately preceding” arrest and reversed Brock’s conviction on that basis.

Well, the WA Supreme Court decided different.

The Court reasoned that the “Time for Arrest” doctrine didn’t apply because the Defendant’s backpack was a part of his person at the time of arrest:

“Under these circumstances, the lapse of time had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack. Brock wore the backpack at the very moment he was stopped by Officer Olson. The arrest process began the moment Officer Olson told Brock that although he was not under arrest, he was also not free to leave. The officer himself removed the backpack from Brock as a part of his investigation. And, having no other place to safely stow it, Brock would have to bring the backpack along with him into custody. Once the arrest process had begun, the passage of time prior to the arrest did not render it any less a part of Brock’s arrested person.”

Based on that the WA Supremes reversed the Court of Appeals and decided the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

My opinion? Obviously, I agree with Justice McCloud’s dissenting opinion. He stated that the majority opinion ignores the strict limitations imposed on law enforcement during a Terry stop, confuses the justifications for a Terry frisk with the justifications for a search incident to arrest, and “conflicts with our precedent holding that a full custodial arrest is a prerequisite to any search incident to arrest.”

Justice McCloud couldn’t have said it better in the tongue-in-cheek retort in the last sentence of his dissent:

“I fear the majority’s new rule will only invite further expansions of our ‘narrow’ and ‘jealously guarded’ exception to the warrant requirement.”

Exactly.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Gauthier: The “Washout” Rule for Felony Convictions

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Washout" Rule for Priors | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Many clients approach me on the question of when prior felony convictions “Washout” from a Defendant’s offender scores. The recent case of State v. Gauthier is a good place to answer that question.

In Gauthier, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided (1) the prosecutor’s closing arguments were fair,  (2) Gauthier received effective assistance of counsel, and (3) trial court properly calculated Gauthier’s offender score.

At trial, Mr. Gauthier was found guilty of Rape in the Second Degree. On appeal, he argued that the trial court improperly calculated his offender score by failing to recognize that his prior convictions “washed out” pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c).

Some background is necessary. Under the “washout” provision, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c), prior “Class C” felony convictions are excluded in a defendant’s offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement pursuant to a felony conviction or entry of the judgment and sentence, the offender spent five consecutive years “in the community” without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction.

In Gauthier’s case, he had five prior class C felony convictions. His last release date happened in June 2007. However, he did not remain crime free for five years. He was charged with the Rape Second Degree on March 13, 2009, and taken into custody to the King County Correctional Facility on July 23, 2010. There, he remained through his first trial on May 2011 which resulted in a conviction. He was subsequently sentenced on July 8, 2011. Consequently, the sentencing court properly calculated his offender score as a five (5) based on his five prior class C felony convictions.

Furthermore, at his sentencing on February 14, 2014, Gauthier argued that his five prior class C felonies should not be included in his offender score because he spent 43 months in custody before he was convicted again on the present offense. He claimed that under the “washout” statute, the “in the community” phrase includes the 43 months he spent in custody on this offense, thus his offender score is zero not five. The sentencing court rejected this argument, calculated his offender score as five, and sentenced him to 120 months with credit for all time served back to July 2010, the date he was first arrested.

Here, and similar to the trial court, the WA Court of Appeals rejected Gauthier’s arguments and also rejected Gauthier’s reliance on State v. Ervin, a somewhat recent case where the WA Supreme Court decided in favor of the defendant James Erwin’s arguments  that his 17 days of custody did not interrupt the requisite  5-year washout period:

“We have found no case, and Gauthier cites to none, where Ervin’s limited holding was applied to time spent in confinement while awaiting resolution of a felony charge. That is the precise circumstance present here. As the State correctly points out, Gauthier’s interpretation creates an absurd scenario—a defendant’s offender score will actually go down while he is in custody pending trial or pending sentencing. Indeed, that is an absurd result and a result we are confident the legislature did not intend.”

Simply put, if Gauthier had remained in the community for five years after June 2007 and remained crime free for those five years, his prior class C felony convictions would not count in his offender score after June 2012. It would have “washed out” under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c). However, Gauthier’s 43 months in custody rendered hopeless any arguments that his priors would wash out.

The Court of Appeals upheld affirmed the trial court’s Judgment & Sentence and sentenced him to 120 months of prison.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Afeworki: “Band It” Restraint Is Constitutional

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In State v. Afeworki, the WA Court of Appeals Division I held, among other rulings, that a “Band It” prisoner restraint system worn by the Defendant during trial does not violate the Constitutional right to a fair trial or the presumption of innocence.

The Defendant Tomas Afeworki was charged with Murder in the First Degree. During pretrial proceedings, he experienced significant and ongoing conflict with each of his several attorneys. On the eve of trial, Afeworki repeatedly threatened his attorney, who was permitted to withdraw as a result. Afeworki was, thereafter, required to represent himself. He was found guilty.

On appeal, Afeworki contends that this deprived him of his right to counsel. After threatening his attorney, Afeworki was also required to wear a “Band It” physical security restraint, not visible to observers, while in the courtroom. Afeworki argues that wearing the “Band It” violated his right to a fair trial.

The court reasoned that under State v. Finch, a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances. This is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution.”

In short, restraining a defendant during trial infringes upon this right to a fair trial for several reasons: (1)it violates a defendant’s presumption of innocence, (2) it restricts the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel during trial, (3) it interferes with the right to testify in one’s own behalf, and (4) it offends the dignity of the judicial process.

Washington case law also says that, given the constitutional implications of using restraints in a criminal trial, shackles or other restraining devices should only be used when necessary to prevent injury to those in the courtroom, to prevent disorderly conduct at trial, or to prevent an escape. That said, a trial court has broad discretion to determine which security measures are necessary to maintain decorum in the courtroom and to protect the safety of its occupants.

A trial court may consider the following factors in determining whether the use of restraints is justified: the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, their temperament and character, age, physical attributes, past record, past escapes or attempted escapes, evidence of a present plan to escape, threats to harm others or cause a disturbance, self-destructive tendencies, the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large, the size and the mood of the audience, the nature and physical security of the courtroom and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.

The court described the “Band-It” restraint system as a device that essentially as a 50,000-volt taser contained in a band that is worn under a sleeve or pant leg. Unlike most restraints, which are either visible to jurors or readily perceived by jurors, the Band-It is not visible when the wearer is clothed. Also, unlike other restraints, the Band-It does not in any way directly constrain the wearer’s movements. In fact, the Band-It can cause a wearer’s movements to be constrained only when it is activated.

Here, reasoned the court, the Band-It restraint system does not implicate the presumption of innocence because it is not visible to observers. Moreover, it does not implicate the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel because it does not physically constrain a defendant’s movements. Finally, the defendant’s antics, aggressive behavior and threats to his defense counsel justified the trail judge’s reasons for making the defendant wear the device:

“The court thereby fashioned a comprehensive order that protected both Afeworki’s constitutional rights and the safety of the people present in the courtroom for his trial. The trial court’s decision was reasonable. There was no error.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rhoden: Illegal 2-Step Confession Violates Miranda

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Police Engage in Illegal Interrogation Tactics and Conviction Gets Reversed — Jacksonville Criminal Lawyer Blog — April 13, 2018

In State v. Rhoden, the WA Court of Appeals Division II held that the trial court failed to suppress Mr. Rhoden’s statements made to police during an improper two- step interrogation procedure.

The facts were such that on February 26, 2013, the Pierce County Sheriff’ s Department served a search warrant on a residence in Puyallup. Five occupants of the residence, including Rhoden, were handcuffed.

Two interrogations happened. The first interview happened when Deputy Olesen questioned the handcuffed occupants in the living room of the home. Importantly, he failed to advise the suspects of their constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966).

For those who don’t know Miranda warnings (often abbreviated to “Miranda“, or “Mirandizing” a suspect) is the name of the formal warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the Miranda ruling. Its purpose is to ensure the accused are aware of, and reminded of, various rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that they know they can invoke them at any time during the interview.

At any rate, Mr. Rhoden told Deputy Olesen there were drugs and a gun in the bedroom.  At that point, Deputy Olesen then escorted Rhoden to the kitchen and questioned him a second time and after finally advising Rhoden of his Miranda rights.

During the post –Miranda second interview, Deputy Olesen asked Rhoden the same questions that he had asked Rhoden in the living room before giving the Miranda warnings.

Mr. Rhoden said there was about a gram of methamphetamine located in the dresser on the left side of his bed and that he had been smoking methamphetamine for approximately the last two to three months. During a search, officers found several items in a dresser, including ( 1) small baggies containing a substance later tested and confirmed to contain methamphetamine, (2) an electronic scale, ( 3) glass smoking devices, and (4) documents containing Rhoden’ s name and the address of the residence being searched.

Rhoden was charged with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) under RCW 69.50.401. Before trial, the trial court conducted a CrR 3. 5 hearing to determine the admissibility of Rhoden’ s statements to police.

The trial court held that Rhoden’ s pre-Miranda statements to police were not admissible at trial and that his post -Miranda statements to police were admissible at trial. At trial, the jury found Rhoden guilty of the charges. Mr. Rhoden appealed his conviction.

The Legal Issue

On appeal, the legal issue was whether the Miranda warnings given to Rhoden during the second interrogation were effective to inform Mr. Rhoden of his Fifth Amendment right to keep silent when he had just provided the same incriminating information in the first interrogation for which he was not given Miranda warnings.

The Rule: Missouri v. Seibert

The court looked to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604- 06, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 ( 2004) for guidance. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were ineffective to inform the defendant of their right against self-incrimination in circumstances similar to these. As here, the warnings in Seibert were given only after the suspect had confessed during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.

The Seibert Test

After reviewing Missouri v. Seibert, the court discussed the Seibert est. First, if a court determines that the use of the two- step interrogation procedure was deliberate, it then must ” determine, based on objective evidence, whether the midstream warning adequately and effectively apprised the suspect that he had a “genuine choice whether to follow up on his earlier admission.”

In making this determination, courts may consider whether any curative measures were taken to insure the suspect’ s understanding of his or her Miranda rights. Such curative measures may include a significant break in time and place between the pre- and post –Miranda questioning or an additional warning that the suspect’ s pre –Miranda statements could not be used against the suspect in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

The court compared the Missouri v. Seibert case to Mr. Rhoden’s facts. It reasoned that similar to Rhoden’s situation, the interrogating officers in Seibert questioned the defendant without Miranda warnings yet later gave Miranda warnings in a second interview before obtaining the suspect’ s confession without a significant break in time or place and without measures to assure the suspect that her non-Mirandized statements could not be used against her in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Applying Seibert to the Facts

The Court then applied the two-part Seibert test the facts at hand. It reasoned that here, the police deliberately used the two- step interrogation procedure. During the initial interrogation in the living room before giving Miranda rights, Olesen asked the five handcuffed suspects whether there were any drugs in the home, and Rhoden admitted that he had a small quantity of methamphetamine in his bedroom. After completing his questioning of the group in the living room, Olesen escorted Rhoden to the kitchen, read Rhoden his Miranda rights, and repeated the same questions he had asked in the living room, to which Rhoden answered consistently with his responses given before receiving the Miranda warnings.

Thus, reasoned the court, the objective evidence of “the timing, setting and completeness of the pre-warning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the overlapping content of the pre and post-warning statements” all support the conclusion that the two- step interrogation procedure used here was deliberate.

The court applied the second inquiry, which examined the effectiveness of the midstream Miranda warnings. In this inquiry, the question was whether any curative measures were present, such as a significant break in time and place between the pre- and post -Miranda questioning or an additional warning that the suspect’ s pre –Miranda statements could not be used against the suspect in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Here, the evidence at the CrR 3. 5 hearing showed that there was not a significant break in time or place between the pre- and post -Miranda interrogation. Perhaps more importantly, the evidence also showed that Olesen did not take any additional measures to insure that Rhoden understood his Miranda rights, such as advising him that his pre –Miranda statements could not be used against him. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Rhoden’ s post –Miranda statements.

Failure to Suppress Rhoden’s Statements Was Not Harmless Error

Finally, the Court of Appeals decided that the trial court’s decision to not suppress Rhoden’s statements was not harmless error. It reasoned that constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error. Here,  and under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same guilty finding absent evidence of Rhoden’ s challenged admissions.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the subtle – and unlawful – “2-Part Inquiry” of the arresting officer in this case. This technique is commonly used by law enforcement to unlawfully obtain statements from defendants and simultaneously circumvent Miranda. Good work, Court of Appeals!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Strange: Was the Jury “Tainted” or Impartial?

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In State v. Strange, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated by a prospective jurors’ statements concerning their own prior experiences with child molestation.

Here, defendant George Strange was accused of Child Molestation Second Degree and Voyeurism. from 2011 to 2013, Strange lived with his wife and his wife’ s children, who are juveniles. Here, juvenile J.M. was 12 years old when Strange allegedly fondled her breasts one night. He explained he was giving her a breast examination.

During jury selection, the court and attorneys asked the prospective jurors about their personal experiences with child molestation. Although most of the jurors had no personal experience with child molestation, almost one-third of the jurors knew someone who was either a victim or had been charged with child molestation. In response to the court’ s questioning, juror no. 54 stated,

JUROR: “Um — what I said before, like, I know people that I know. Like it’ s not an easy accusation to make. Like, it is hard for people (inaudible). It’ s like if accusations were made there’ s something behind that . . . I don’ t — like, I don’t have a ton of experience but it has just been my experience people don’ t make that accusation, you know, for no reason. Like, I feel like if an accusation was made there had to be something that had happened.”

Juror no. 54 was excused for unrelated hardship reasons.

During trial, other witnesses testified to Strange’s odd behavior around J.M. Additionally, the State played a recorded video of Strange being interviewed by a police detective who commented on Strange’s behavior during the interview. Finally, Strange did not call any witnesses nor did he testify. At the end of trial, Strange was found guilty on all counts.

On appeal, Strange argued that his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was violated because of prospective jurors’ statements concerning their own prior experiences with child molestation, either in their families or among friends or acquaintances, which tainted the entire jury venire.

The court rejected Strange’s arguments. It reasoned that article I, § 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair trial by unbiased jurors.” Also, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also guarantees the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors. Here, no prospective juror professed any expertise about sexual abuse cases. Therefore, there is no concern about a prospective juror with more credible, authoritative knowledge tainting the rest of the jury pool.

Second, most jurors were merely questioned about their experiences with child molestation and asked if they could remain impartial. Some jurors admitted to a potential bias, most said they could apply the court’ s instructions impartially, and two prospective jurors asked for individual voir dire, preferring not to talk about their experiences in front of the rest of the jury pool. Consequently, the Court of Appeals decided that Strange received a fair trial by an impartial jury.

Finally, the court rejected Strange’s argument that his defense attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to the admission of Strange’s recorded interview with police. The court reasoned that because defense counsel’s failure to object was a legitimate trial tactic, it cannot be said that Strange’ s trial counsel’ s performance was deficient. Therefore, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails. The decision of Strange’s attorney to not play the video was a legitimate trial tactic, and did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

My opinion? Oftentimes, during jury selection, prospective jurors say things out loud which may appear to discredit the defendant, especially when the charges are particularly galvanizing. A defense attorney must be cautious in proceeding with these jurors. A good technique is to ask the juror to extrapolate “what they mean” if the juror says they have difficulty being objective, and/or if the juror says the defendant “must be guilty of something.” The attorney can strike the juror for cause because the juror could be biased against the defendant.

Still, it’s difficult to “unring the bell,” so to speak, when a prospective juror says controversial things which may hurt the defendant’s chances at trial if the rest of the jury pool believes that juror’s statements. This is the essence of “tainting the jury,” which is reversible error and should be avoided at all costs. In response, another good tactic is to inquire if other potential jurors feel the same as the juror who aired their grievances. Find someone shaking their head “No.” Ask them why.

Chances are, they’ll say something about giving the defendant a fair trial, or presumption of innocence, or something like that. Test the waters. Guide the jurors back toward their oath that they MUST presume the defendant not guilty throughout trial. Remind them that if they serve as jurors, they’re under oath to withhold their personal biases and reserve judgment until after hearing all of the evidence.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Is Texting While Driving the New DUI?

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Police Officer Posing As Construction Worker

Recently, Marietta Police dressed up as a construction workers at a busy intersection to catch distracted drivers who were text messaging while driving. The police go as far as busting drivers who are texting while stopped at red lights. It appears that going undercover is an effective way to bust drivers texting, tweeting or checking emails behind the wheel.

“What we’ve done here is we’re able to put officers in the roads so we’re able to get close enough almost inside their cars so we can look down and see exactly what they’re doing on their phones,” said Marietta police Officer Nick Serkedakis. “I really think this is the DUI of the future. Impairment is still a problem, but this distracted driving is killing as many people as drunk drivers.”

The tickets are $150 and one point on your license.

Can a program like this – one where WA police officers pose as construction workers at certain locations to observe texting drivers – be implemented in Washington State?

Probably not.

This program is very similar to DUI checkpoints, which were basically outlawed in 2008. For those who don’t know, sobriety checkpoints (also called DUI checkpoints) are locations where law enforcment officers are stationed to check drivers for signs of intoxication and impairment. Many jurisdictions utilize sobriety checkpoints as part of their larger drunk driving deterrance program. Due to legal issues surrounding their use, not all states conduct sobriety checkpoints. Some states have laws authorizing their use. Others forbid them or are silent on the issue.

According to the Government’s Highway Safety Association (GHSA), Washington State is one of only 12 states which do not conduct DUI checkpoints. The story is interesting. In 2008, then-Governor Christine Gregoire wanted the state Legislature to authorize police to set up sobriety spot checks, a practice unseen in Washington since the state Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1988 under City of Seattle v. Messiani.

Some background is necessary. In Messiani, the Washington State Supreme Court decided that the Seattle Police Department’s sobriety checkpoint program was constitutional. In short, police officers set up roadblocks where all oncoming motorists were stopped. The police lacked warrants and any particular suspicion of criminal activity. The City of Seattle argued that the State’s interest in the legal operation of vehicles outweighs any privacy interest under Article I, Section 7 of the WA Constitution. Ultimately, the Washington State Supreme Court concluded that the City of Seattle’s position was unlawful, and held that sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional.

At any rate, Governor Gregoire’s proposed DUI Checkpoint legislation failed. The ACLU even got involved. In the end, Legislators simply lacked the political will overturn the WA Supreme Court’s City of Seattle v. Messiani. 

Unlike Washington, however, Georgia has  actively legalized DUI checkpoints. They are conducted weekly and aggressively; and upheld under the State of Georgia’s Constitution.

Due to the differences, I can’t see WA police officers successfully pulling off an anti-text messaging campaign like the Georgia police officers can. This campaign is too similar to DUI checkpoints, which are illegal in Washington State.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Z.U.E.: Terry Stop Based on Unreliable Informant Tip Was Unlawful

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Good decision.

In State v. Z.U.E., the Washington Supreme Court decided that when police stop an individual based on an informant’s tip, there must be some “indicia of reliability” based on the totality of the circumstances. Here, there wasn’t.

The facts show that Z.U.E. was a juvenile passenger in a car stopped by police after several 911 callers reported a bald shirtless man seen carrying a gun. Another caller reported a 17 year old female gave the gun to the shirtless man. Based on these tips, police stopped a car believing that the female was in the car. They ordered Z.U.E out of the vehicle, searched him, and found marijuana on his person. The officers did not find any guns, nor did they find the bald, shirtless subject.

The state prosecuted Z.U.E for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance and Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer. At his trial, Z.U.E. argued a CrR 3.6 Motion to Suppress and essentially challenged the Terry stop and subsequent search incident to arrest. The police who stopped ZUE did not know how many 911 callers there were or the identities of the callers and did not corroborate the report regarding the female with a gun.  The trial court denied the motion. Z.U.E. was found guilty of the drug charge and acquitted on the Obstructing charge. Z.U.E. appealed. The WA Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 911 calls lacked sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify the stop. Again, the case went up on appeal – this time, by the State –  to the WA Supreme Court.

The WA Supremes affirmed the WA Court of Appeals and suppressed the evidence. In reaching their decision, the Court discussed Terry stops. In challenging the validity of a Terry stop, article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution generally tracks the U.S. Constitution’s  Fourth Amendment analysis. That said, warrantless seizures are presumed unreasonable, and the State bears the burden of establishing that the seizure falls within one of the carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception is a brief investigatory detention of a person, known as a Terry stop. For a Terry stop to be permissible, the State must show that the officer had a “reasonable suspicion” that the detained person was, or was about to be, involved in a crime.

They court further reasoned that when police stop an individual based on an informant’s tip, there must be some “indicia of reliability” based on the totality of the circumstances. There must be either (1) circumstances establishing the informant’s reliability or (2) some corroborative observation by the officers that shows the presence of criminal activity or the informer’s information was obtained in a reliable fashion. Here, the police did not have any articulable reason to suspect any of the passengers in the car of criminal activity. The seizure of Z.U.E was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure should have been suppressed.

My opinion? Good decision. This was a straightforward application of the law. The informant tips were unreliable. Also, Z.U.E.’s involvement on the 911 calls and firearms was so attenuated that it was virtually irrelevant. Well done, WA Supremes!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

In re Detention of H.N.: Screenshots of Text Messages Are Admissible Evidence

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In In re Detention of H.N., Division I of the WA Court of Appeals decided that E-mailed screenshots of text messages that a medical expert used as part of her testimony were properly admitted as substantive evidence at trial.

H.N. is a college student who was less than 21 years of age at the time of the events leading to this case. She worked at part time jobs, and she had two roommates who worked with her at one of her jobs. After midnight on a night in May 2014, H.N.’s two roommates returned home to discover her unconscious on the floor and lying in a pool of her own vomit. Nearby there was an empty bottle of wine, an empty bottle of Nyquil, and a partially empty bottle of vodka. H.N. briefly awoke but then passed out again. One roommate called 911, and medics responded to the scene.

Afterward, H.N. was involuntarily detained for mental health treatment.

Thereafter, the State petitioned for up to 14 days of additional inpatient treatment, pursuant to the involuntary treatment act, RCW 71.05. For those who don’t know, detainees like H.N. may petition their local superior courts to be released from detention and observation. However, courts won’t release detainees if the detainee is likely to gravely injure themselves or someone else upon release.

On May 7, 2014, the court conducted a hearing on H.N.’s petition for release. At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of a psychologist who evaluated H.N. at the hospital. The psychologist testified as an expert. Part of her testimony was based on what purported to be e-mailed screenshots of text messages between H.N. and her boyfriend, “A.” These messages were exchanged on the night her roommates found her unconscious on the floor, lying in a pool of her vomit. The psychologist read several of these text messages into the record. Over H.N.’s objection on the basis of lack of foundation, the court admitted this evidence.

For those who don’t know, the “lack of foundation” objection most often applies to exhibits or pieces of evidence other than testimony that are brought into court without an explanation of where they came from or what they represent.  Foundation is usually laid by having a witness testify as to what the object is.

At any rate, and after the hearing, the trial court found that H.N. suffered from a mental disorder and presented a likelihood of serious harm to herself. The court entered an order committing H.N. for involuntary treatment for a period of 14 days. H.N. appealed the court’s decision to detain her.

The WA Court of Appeals took the case and decided the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted as substantive evidence e-mailed screenshots of text messages that the State’s expert witness used during her testimony.

The Court decided that the text message evidence was properly authenticated pursuant to ER 901(b). For those who don’t know ER 901(b) is an evidence rule which allows or disallows evidence depending on whether the evidence is properly “authenticated” (or not).

Here, the Court of Appeals gave many reasons why H.N.’s text messages were, in fact, authentic. She gave out-of-court acknowledgments that she sent the messages, the identifying information at the top of the text messages showed that she was the sender of the messages, her phone number matched the contact information in her medical chart, the messages consistently reference names of people in her life, the messages were consistent with certain events in H.N.’s life, and the timing of the text messages were consistent with her hospitalization on the night of the incident.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s detention of H.N. and concluded that text message evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that H.N. posed a likelihood of serious harm to herself.

My opinion? The Court’s logic appears sound. Although the text messages are inadmissible Hearsay under Evidence Rule  (ER) 801, hearsay is, in fact, admissible under certain circumstances.  Also, courts may consider evidence that might otherwise be objectionable under other rules of evidence. They can rely upon such information as lay opinions, hearsay, or the proffered evidence itself in making its determination. Such information must be reliable. Here, ER 901 allowed the State to authenticate the text message evidence. It was reliable. Therefore, it was admissible.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Elkins: Officers Need Not Re-Advise Miranda in All Cases

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How Long Do Miranda Rights Last? | Wallin & Klarich

In State v. Elkins, the WA Court of Appeals decided that whether the officers have scrupulously honored the defendant’ s right to silence and right to counsel under Miranda must be determined on a case -by -case basis, and that there is no bright-line rule requiring police officers to fully re-advise previously Mirandized suspects when reinitiating interrogation.

Yakima County deputies received a tip that defendant Eugene Elkins had killed his girlfriend Kornelia Engelmann. Yakima County deputies arrived and arrested him. He was advised of his Miranda rights. For those who don’t know, police officers must inform defendants of their Miranda rights once police place a defendant in custody and/or conduct investigations via questioning the defendant. The Miranda rights are stated as follows:

“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?”

Miranda protects a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination, and may incline defendants to stop talking and/or immediately seek the advice of an attorney. Once a defendant asserts their Miranda rights, the police MUST stop questioning the defendant. And, generally speaking, police must repeat and re-inform defendants of their Miranda rights if questioning continues at a later time; and/or defendants change their minds and want to speak to the police.

Here, at around 3;30 p.m., Yakima County deputies advised Elkins of his Miranda rights before arresting him. Elkins declined to make a statement, and the Yakima County deputies did not question him further. They took him into custody.

Later, the police again attempted to interview Elkins at about 8: 30 PM. Although they did not re-advise Elkins of his Miranda rights, police asked Elkins if he had been advised of these rights, if he remembered them, and if he understood those rights were still in effect. After Elkins confirmed that he recalled being advised of his Miranda rights and that he understood those rights were still in effect, Elkins agreed to talk to the deputies. In short, he informed the police that he and Ms. Engelmann had a verbal argument which led to a physical altercation.

When the deputies commented on the extensive bruising on Engelmann’ s body and asked Elkins if he had kicked her, hit her with something, or hit her with a closed fist, Elkins said that he did not want to talk to the deputies any longer and requested an attorney. The deputies ended the interview.

On June 7, the very next day, Elkins gave a full written statement to police after they re-advised him of his Miranda rights. In the statement, he admitted to killing Engelmann. Elkins was subsequently charged with Murder in the Second Degree.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before trial, Elkins moved under CrR 3.5 to suppress the statements he made to the police on June 6 and June 7. However, the trial court admitted all of Elkins’ statements. At trial, Elkins was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree. He appealed his conviction to the WA Court of Appeals Division II.

In rendering its decision, the Court acknowledged that fully re-advising a suspect of his Miranda rights is clearly the best practice when resuming questioning of a suspect who has asserted his right to silence. However, the Court also said there is no bright-line rule that law enforcement officers must always fully re-advise a defendant of his or her Miranda rights. In addition, they said that the issue of whether a defendant’ s rights have been scrupulously honored must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The Court further reasoned that under the totality of the circumstances, Elkins statements were not coercively obtained by police. The facts show that ( 1) the Yakima deputies ceased questioning Elkins immediately when he asserted his right to silence, (2) no law enforcement officer attempted to interrogate Elkins for a significant period of time, five hours, before his subsequent contact with the police, ( 3) no law enforcement officer engaged in any coercive tactics, and (4) the police did not interrogate Elkins until after they confirmed that he had been read his rights, that he recalled those rights, and that he understood those rights were still in effect. The court also said the following:

“[T]he subsequent interrogation is proper if the State has shown that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights given the totality of the circumstances, not whether the subsequent contact was preceded by law enforcement fully re-advising the defendant of his or her Miranda rights. When this and the other factors . . . are met, the officers have scrupulously honored the defendant’ s rights.”

Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Elkins’ June 6 waiver was knowing and voluntary under the circumstances. They also reasoned that his statements made during transport and June 7, 2014 statements were also admissible because Elkins initiated the relevant conversation following his assertion of his right to counsel and then knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals upheld his conviction.

My opinion? My heart goes out to the victim’s friends and family. I sincerely hope they find comfort in the Court of Appeals’ decision. However, I disagree with the decision. When it comes to protecting people’s constitutional rights, bright-line rules work best. And its always been a time-tested rule that police MUST re-advise suspects of their Miranda rights, especially under circumstances like this.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Ohio v. Clark: Child Victim Hearsay Statements Are Admissible

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In Ohio v. Clark, the United States Supreme Court ruled that statements made by the 3-year-old victim to his preschool teacher were properly admitted at trial, despite the fact that the 3-year-old did not testify.

Here, defendant Darius Clark sent his girlfriend away to engage in prostitution while he cared for her 3-year-old son L. P. and 18-month-old daughter A. T. When L. P.’s preschool teachers noticed marks on his body, he identified Clark as his abuser. Clark was subsequently tried on multiple counts related to the abuse of both children. At trial, the State introduced L. P.’s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark’s guilt, but L. P. did not testify. The trial court denied Clark’s motion to exclude the statements under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. A jury convicted Clark on all but one count. The state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the matter once and for all.

For those who don’t know, The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government. The right only applies to criminal prosecutions.

Here, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that L. P.’s statements at trial – which were introduced as hearsay evidence through the testimony of a school counselor – did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

In reaching its decision, the Court said it’s prior decision in Crawford v. Washington held that the Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the introduction of “testimonial” statements by a non-testifying witness, unless the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Additionally, a statement qualifies as testimonial if the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to “create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” The Court addressed why L.P.’s statements were not “testimonial:”

“L. P.’s statements were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution. They occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. L. P.’s teachers asked questions aimed at identifying and ending a threat. They did not inform the child that his answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L. P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the conversation was informal and spontaneous. L. P.’s age further confirms that the statements in question were not testimonial because statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause”

“Finally, although statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers are not categorically outside the Sixth Amendment’s reach, the fact that L. P. was speaking to his teachers is highly relevant. Statements to individuals who are not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonialthan those given to law enforcement officers.”

Furthermore, the Court found it irrelevant that the teachers’ questions and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution. “Mandatory reporting obligations do not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed at gathering evidence for prosecution.”

My opinion? I fear a slippery slope. Child victims are notoriously difficult. The first challenge is getting an interview. If defense counsel succeeds, they must be prepared to interview the child victim with a legion of DV advocates, investigating officers, parents, family friends and the Prosecutor attending the interview. And by this time, the matter has been discussed ad nauseum between the child and the aforementioned. Consequently, by the time the interview happens, the child has essentially been trained and coached to memorize a script and stick with it.

Now, with this opinion, it seems that school counselors can testify to statements made by the child victim., and that the child not even be made available to testify. Under the Washington Rules of Evidence – which strictly follow the Federal Rules of Evidence – ER 801 says, “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement made to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Statements made by another are hearsay. Also, Hearsay is generally inadmissible. But now, under these circumstances, hearsay is admissible; and made worse by the fact that the defendant cannot confront the child witness at trial. This violates the essence of the 6th Amendment’s Confrontation clause. Period. Bad decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.