Category Archives: Washington Court of Appeals

State v. Brock: The “Time for Arrest” Doctrine

Constitutional Rights, felony, Jail, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Should school officials be allowed to search students? | Debate.org

In State v. Brock, the WA Court of Appeals held that police officers cannot search someone’s backpack and arrest them for Drug Offenses 10 minutes after contacting a suspect on a Terry stop.

“NO,” said the Court of Appeals in a recent decision.  the facts were such that during a Terry stop, an officer separated Mr. Brock from his backpack. The officer subsequently arrested Brock and searched his backpack, but not until nearly 10 minutes after separating Brock from the bag. Officer Olson told Brock that he was not under arrest. Officer Olson asked Brock to put down his backpack, and Brock complied.

Officer Olson did not find any weapons or any other items during his pat down of Brock. He did not pat down or search the backpack at that time. At trial, the trial court denied Brock’s motion to suppress, finding that this was a valid search incident to arrest under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Some explanation is necessary. A “Terry stop” is a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from a famous United States Supreme Court decision titled, Terry v. Ohio.

Also, under the “time of arrest” rule, an officer may search personal articles in an arrestee’s actual and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.

Here, the search of the defendant’s bag did not happen immediately after he was arrested. Officer Olson searched the bag roughly 10 minutes after seizing it from Brock. The bag was secured in Officer Olson’s truck from the time of seizure through the time of the search. Brock was 12 to 15 feet away from the vehicle and the backpack at the time of arrest and during the search of the backpack.

Brock had actual possession of the backpack when Officer Olson initiated the Terry stop and when he seized it. However, Brock did not have actual possession of the backpack at the time of his arrest. Brock’s backpack was neither on his person nor within his area of control at the time of his arrest. While Officer Olson had probable cause to arrest Brock when he seized the backpack, it is the arrest itself—not probable cause—that constitutes the necessary authority of law to search under article I, section 7.

Therefore, to find that this was a valid search incident to arrest, the Court said it must be convinced that, for the purposes of what is in an arrestee’s possession, “immediately prior to arrest” includes either the time between a valid Terry stop and the actual resulting arrest or the time between seizure of the backpack during the Terry stop and the resulting arrest. The Court concluded in saying that Washington Supreme Court’s opinions have not gone this far, and “We decline to do so here.”

My opinion? Good decision. It’s pleasing to know our courts are upholding the WA Constitution and following the stringent search and seizure caselaw. Kudos.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Saggers: When Officers Exceed the Scope of Searches Under Terry v. Ohio

911 Call, Assault, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, , ,

Terry V. Ohio (@ohio_terry) | Twitter

In State v. Saggers, the WQA Court of Appeals held that police officers exceed the scope of a Terry Stop when  an informant’s tip is questionably (un)reliable and the exigency of the alleged serious offense has dissipated.

Police arrived at the home of defendant Andrew Saggers because a 911 call indicated an altercation occurred outside his home involving a shotgun. The 911 call was placed from a payphone. Although the caller provided his name, he was unknown to the police. When police went to the payphone, the caller was gone and the phone was hanging from the cord. The police contacted Mr. Saggers.

Although the present situation was neither dangerous nor life-threatening, the police inquired whether Mr. Saggers had a shotgun in the house. He admitted, “Yes.” The police searched his home and found the gun. Mr. Saggers was subsequently charged with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm. At trial, he was found guilty of the charges. The case went up on appeal.

The Court of Appeals held the police officers exceeded the scope of a search under Terry v. Ohio because the informant tip was unreliable and the emergency of any life-threatening situation was already passed. For those who don’t know, Terry v. Ohio is a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court which held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous.

Here, however, the Court of Appeals ruled that although it is understandable that officers faced with a 911 call like this one would rightfully pursue an investigation, the 911 Call itself was unreliable. Additionally, the danger had already passed by the time officers arrived at Sagger’s house. Consequently, the officer exceeded the scope of a valid search under Terry v. Ohio. Based on these findings, the Court of Appeals reversed Saggers’ conviction.

Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Martines: More Good Caselaw on Blood Tests Taken After DUI Arrests

Blood Test, Constitutional Rights, Department of Licensing, Drug Offenses, DUI, Ignition Interlock Device, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, , ,

Both cops, drivers have rights at checkpoints | Local News | scnow.com

In State v. Martines, the WA Court of Appeals held that after police investigate and arrest a suspect for suspicion of DUI, the State may not conduct tests on lawfully procured blood samples without first obtaining a warrant that authorizes testing and specifying the types of evidence for which the sample may be tested.

The defendant was seen driving his SUV erratically. He veered into another car, careened across the highway, bounced off the barrier, and rolled over. A Washington State Trooper arrived and took Mr. Martines into custody. Martines smelled of intoxicants, had bloodshot watery eyes, and stumbled while walking.

Trooper Tardiff sought a warrant to extract blood samples from Martines. His affidavit of probable cause stated that a blood sample “may be tested to determine his/her current blood alcohol level and to detect the presence of any drugs that may have impaired his/her ability to drive.” He obtained a warrant that authorized a competent health care authority to extract a blood sample and ensure its safekeeping. The warrant did not say anything about testing the blood sample.

Martines’ blood was taken at a local hospital. Then it was tested for the presence of drugs and alcohol. The test results indicated that Martines had a blood alcohol level of .121 within an hour after the accident, and that the drug diazepam (Valium) was also present. Martines had a prior conviction for vehicular assault while driving under the influence. The State charged him with Felony DUI.

The trial court denied Martines’ motion to suppress. He was found guilty at trial. The case went up on appeal. The primary issue on appeal was that testing a blood sample for any purpose is a search for which a search warrant is required. Because the warrant authorizing the extraction of blood did not specifically authorize blood testing of any kind, Martines argued that the results should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search.

The court held that (1) the extraction of the blood was one search while (2) the testing of the blood constituted another:

“The extraction of blood from a drunk driving suspect is a search.  Testing the blood sample is a second search.  It is distinct from the initial extraction because its purpose is to examine the personal information blood contains.  We hold that the State may not conduct tests on a lawfully procured blood sample without first obtaining a warrant that authorizes testing and specifies the types of evidence for which the sample may be tested.”

In short, the court held that extracting someone’s blood is a first search, and testing the blood is a second search. The first search – the initial extraction – is totally different than the second search, which is analyzing the blood. Because the second search is so intrusive (blood contains someone’s personal DNA code, pregnancy results, information on diseases, etc.), a second warrant is needed. Consequently, the State may NOT test blood samples without first obtaining a warrant that authorizes testing. The warrant must specifically state the types of evidence they’re looking for.

My opinion? State v. Martines is an interesting decision. I admire the Court of Appeals for making a decision which is consistent with Missouri v. McNeely (discussed in another blog) and going one step further favoring a defendant’s constitutional rights under the 4th Amendment.

The opinion prevents police officers from getting a boilerplate search warrant and going on fishing expeditions when they pull people over on suspicion of DUI. The officers must be trained to determine what exactly they’re looking for; be it drugs, alcohol or both. Saying someone has bloodshot/watery eyes, slurred speech and smells of intoxicants does not, by itself, cut it anymore.

Good job, Court of Appeals. I’m impressed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Barry: Whether a Defendant’s Demeanor Spells Trouble During Trial

Constitutional Rights, felony, Self-Incrimination, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Demeanor, Demeanor, Demeanor - Trial Practice Tips

In State v. Barry, the WA Court of Appeals decided it does NOT violate a defendant’s Constitutional rights to allow a jury to consider the defendant’s in-court demeanor during trial.

The State charged Barry with first degree child molestation (DV). The case proceeded to trial. Important to note, Barry chose not to testify. During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking the court, “Can we use as ‘evidence for deliberation,’ our observations of the defendants actions and demeanor during the court case?” The trial court instructed the jury, “Evidence is what you witness in the courtroom.” Barry objected to the jury instruction. The jury found Barry guilty as charged. Barry appealed.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial judge misstated the law in giving that instruction because the defendant did not testify; and therefore, his demeanor was not evidence presented during trial.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals rejected arguments that Barry’s 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated. It stated, “Here, neither the State nor the trial court forced Barry to do anything with regards to his demeanor. He had full control over how he acted in the courtroom. Other than citing the Fifth Amendment, Barry does not explain how he was compelled to give evidence against himself. We hold that allowing the jury to consider the defendant’s demeanor as evidence does not violate the Fifth Amendment.”

Finally, the Court of Appeals discussed the absence of any discussion on the record regarding Barry’s demeanor. In other words, there was a lack of record on how Barry behaved. The Court said the following:

“Without any information identifying what demeanor the jury may have considered, it is impossible to know whether that consideration was favorable or unfavorable to Barry. In the abstract, a defendant’s behavior is neutral. Depending on the demeanor, a jury could draw a negative inference or a positive inference from how the defendant acts during trial. As a result, merely stating that a jury may have considered a defendant’s demeanor without any information about that demeanor cannot establish prejudice because that consideration may have favored the defendant.”

My opinion? This case is tough. I’ll agree with the Court of Appeals in saying that what we don’t know is the pink elephant in this room. I’ve had many jury trials. During preparations, I thoroughly inform defendants how to properly behave in court. And yes, it’s extremely difficult for many defendants to stay calm and stoic during trial. Most defendants are very emotional about the case, especially if they believe the State’s witnesses are lying and/or exaggerating  during testimony.

Consequently, the decision on whether to testify is a strategic one. And this decision – whatever it may be – can backfire for many reasons. Typically, jurors want to hear defendants testify. However, if a defendant does not testify, then human nature dictates that juries perceive how the defendants acts during trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Green: When Inventory Searches Become Overbroad

Constitutional Rights, DUI, felony, law enforcement, police, Pretrial Investigations, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, , ,

Vehicle Inventory Search - Daigle Law Group

In State v. Green, the WA Court of Appeals decided that evidence of Identity Theft  was not admissible when the officer obtained the evidence after searching the defendant’s car during a DUI and Hit & Run investigation.

Mr. Green was arrested for DUI after his vehicle struck a pedestrian who later died. After arrest, police searched Mr. Green’s car. They found a paper bag containing numerous receipts. After more investigating,  it was later determined the receipts were evidence of purchases using stolen credit cards. The car was later towed to a police impound lot. The officer began investigating the defendant for theft/fraud charges in addition to the Vehicular Homicide charge. However, the officer’s search warrant was only specific to the Vehicular Homicide charge.

A few days later, the officer obtained a second search warrant to search the car for evidence of fraud and identity theft. Mr. Green moved to suppress the receipts. The state argued the receipts were properly seized pursuant to an inventory search and were admissible pursuant to the independent source doctrine.

Some background is necessary. Under the 4th Amendment to the U.S Constitution and article I section 7 of the Washington Constitution, warrantless searches and seizures are unconstitutional. However one exception to the warrant requirement are Inventory Searches accompanying a lawful vehicle impound. The purpose of an inventory search is to (1) protect the vehicle owner’s property; (2) protect the police against false claims of theft by the owner, and (3) protect the police from potential danger.

The direction and scope of an inventory search must be limited to the purpose of justifying the exception. Under the Independent Source Exception, evidence obtained by unlawful governmental action is not suppressed under the exclusionary rule if the evidence was obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant or other lawful means independent of the unlawful action.

In this case, the officer did not find the receipts as part of an inventory search. Stated different, the officer looked in the paper bag but did not consider the receipts to be relevant to the inventory search. Therefore, there was no evidence that he inventoried them. The officer seized the receipts for investigatory purposes on a different matter altogether, namely, the soon-to-be-pending Identity Theft charges.

 

The Court further reasoned the receipts were not admissible under the Independent Source doctrine because the officer neither found the receipts nor had knowledge of them through an independent source.

My opinion? This was a reasonable, practical approach. In this case, it makes no sense to allow the police to conduct investigations of different crimes other than the one they are already working on, especially if they lack independent evidence to begin with.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Quaale: Mistrials Happen When Police Officers Offer Opinion Testimony

Constitutional Rights, DUI, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Pushback on Capitol Police chief testimony continues - Roll Call

In State v. Quaale, the WA Court of Appeals wrote an excellent opinion on the issue of whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial was violated when the Prosecutor invited objectionable testimony from the officer.

The defendant was charged with Eluding Police and DUI. At trial, the Trooper  was asked to describe the extent of his experience, explain the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and the procedure for testing it, and tell the jury about his administration of the test to the defendant. The prosecutor also asked, “In this case, based on the HGN test alone, did you form an opinion based on your training and experience as to whether or not the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired?”

Rightfully, the defendant’s lawyer immediately objected that the Trooper was being asked to provide an opinion on the ultimate issue determining guilt. The objection was overruled. The Trooper answered, “Absolutely. There was no doubt he was impaired.”

The Court of Appeals reasoned that impermissible testimony regarding the defendant’s guilt may be reversible error because such evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial, which includes independent determination of the facts by the jury. Here, and even where expert testimony is helpful to the jury, it is unnecessary for a witness to express belief that certain facts or findings lead to a conclusion of guilt. Opinion testimony should be avoided if the information can be presented in such a way that the jury can draw its own conclusions.

 My opinion? The defense attorney was very smart to object to the Officer’s opinion testimony and preserve the issue for appeal. Opinion testimony should NEVER be allowed at trial. The State’s witnesses – including officers – may only testify to their observations. They are not expert witnesses who can offer opinions.

Before trial, I routinely draft and argue motions in limine expressly requesting the judge to instruct the Prosecutor to not ask questions instructing witnesses/officers to provide opinion testimony. These motions strengthen a standing objection and help preserve legal issues for appeal when they are violated. Great opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Guevara: Stopping Schoolboys and Searching Them for Marijuana is Unlawful Without Probabale Cause.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, law enforcement, marijuana, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

With Police in Schools, More Children in Court - The New York Times

In State v. Guevara, the WA Court of Appeals held that a Interesting search involving a “school resource officer” who stopped the defendant and his friends for suspected drug use was NOT a social contact and NOT a community caretaking function.

Guevara and his friends were walking near school one morning before class. A uniformed school resource officer stopped the group and inquired what they were doing. He told them he suspected they were skipping class to smoke marijuana. The officer found drugs on Mr. Guevara. At trial, the judge denied Guevara’s motion to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the stop was a social contact within the scope of the officer’s authority.

In suppressing the evidence, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the stop became a seizure when the officer told the boys he believed they were using drugs and sought their consent to search them. This, ruled the court, was neither a social contact nor a community caretaking function.

My opinion? Good decision. Although they may have skipped school, the boys were otherwise behaving in a lawful manner. They were not under the influence of marijuana, alcohol or any other illegal drugs. They weren’t operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs or marijuana. Consequently, the officer appeared to lack probable cause to search them for possessing marijuana or any other drugs.  At worst, the officer should have merely escorted them back to school. Good decision.

Please review my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Irby: Jury Selection Gone Wrong

Constitutional Rights, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

How to weed out bad jurors during jury selection

Very interesting case. In State v. Irby, the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection was violated when the trial judge emailed the attorneys and said he was inclined to release ten prospective jurors for hardship.

The defendant, Terrance Irby, was charged with first degree murder.  During jury selection, several members of the jury were disqualified by the judge and attorneys through email exchanges.  The communications occurred without the defendant being present.  Consequently, the Court of Appeals overturned Irby’s conviction.

The WA Supremes reasoned,  “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend person, or by counsel”   under the due process clause of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the WA Constitution.  Here, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the removal of several potential jurors in Irby’s absence had no effect on the verdict.

My opinion?  Good decision.  The rule is clear as day.  Perhaps one of the jurors who was struck via email would have found Irby not guilty.  We’ll never know.  At any rate, Mr. Irby’s rights were clearly violated.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

In re. Personal Restraint of Swenson

Jury Trial, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

What is Judicial Recusal? Is it ethical for judges to recuse themselves? Current Affairs 2019 - YouTube

Interesting case.  In In re. Personal Restraint of Swenson, WA Court of Appeals decided a judge should disqualify themselves from sentencing a defendant’s case if the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned, but absent evidence of actual or potential bias, an appearance of fairness claim is without merit.

Mr. Swenson was sentenced for several sex offenses by a judge who prosecuted him 20 years earlier on an unrelated juvenile case.  Swenson did not ask the judge to recuse herself at the sentencing hearing on the sex offenses.  Nothing in the record indicated the judge remembered Swenson.  The judge imposed the agreed recommended sentence.  Swenson did not appeal the conviction, but he later filed a Personal Restraint Petition asking for a new sentencing hearing.  he cited the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a judge should be disqualified if their impartiality is called into question.  However, in this case there is no showing of actual or potential bias.  The mere fact that a judge prosecuted a defendant in the past does not disqualify the judge from hearing the case today.

Moreover, the Court argued there is no basis to reasonably question whether Swenson received a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.  The record shows the judge followed the parties’ agreed sentencing recommendation and the sentencing hearing was fair and impartial.  And nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing judge was aware of her involvement as a prosecutor 20 years earlier in an unrelated juvenile case against Swenson.

My opinion?  Seems fair.  In practice, judges typically recuse themselves upon realizing they defended or prosecuted the defendant months/years ago.  However, if the judge can’t remember, and has not been reminded by the defendant of their previous involvement, then the judge has no duty to recuse themselves.  And as far as disqualifying a judge is concerned, there must be some showing that the judge was biased for or against the defendant.  It’s common sense.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Werner: Who Let The Dogs Out?

911 Call, Animal Abuse, Assault, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, Self-Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

HOA Senior Communities Should Ban Vicious Dogs | YourHub

In State v. Werner, the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense in the prosecution for first degree assault after accidentally discharging a firearm when confronted by a neighbor’s pack of dangerous dogs.

“Victim” Daniel Barnes moved to the property next door to to defendant Gary Werner. Almost immediately, Werner and Barnes  began an ongoing property dispute concerning a shared easement.  Barnes kept seven dogs on Barnes’s property, including a Rottweiler and pit bulls. At least  three times before the incident giving rise to criminal charges, the dogs came onto Werner’s property and acted menacingly, barking and circling Werner. Werner started carrying a handgun with him on the property because he was afraid of the dogs.

The property dispute  intensified.  On the day of the incident, Werner was on his property in the easement area when one of Barnes’s pit bulls approached him, baring its teeth. Werner noticed six other dogs with the pit bull, including the Rottweiler and other pit bulls.  The dogs started circling Werner.  He pulled out his pistol, thinking he could scare the dogs, and started yelling for Barnes to call off the dogs.  Werner panicked and called 911 on his cell phone, but due to his arthritis, the gun went off, discharging into the ground.  The police were contacted.

The State charged Werner with Assault First Degree and Malicious Harassment. The jury acquitted him of the Malicious Harassment charge but found him guilty of Assault First Degree.  He appealed.  The case ended up before the WA Supremes.

The Court reviewed the law on self-defense.  “To prove self-defense, there must be evidence that (1) the defendant subjectively feared that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (2) this belief was objectively reasonable; [and] (3) the defendant exercised no greater force than was reasonably necessary.” Callahan, 87 Wn. App. at 929 (citation omitted).

The Court reasoned that here, Werner stated that he was afraid. That fear was arguably reasonable, given that he was facing seven snarling dogs, including several pit bulls and a Rottweiler.  Pursuant to State v. Hoeldt, 139 Wn. App. 225, 160 P.3d 55 (2007), a pit bull can be a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.04.110(6). There is evidence that Barnes’s friend refused requests to call off the dogs. By that conduct, Werner could reasonably have believed that Barnes’s friend personally posed a threat through the agency of a formidable group of canines that were under his control.

As to the firing of the weapon, the WA Supremes believed Werner’s accounting that it was an accident.  They found sufficient evidence of both accident and self-defense to warrant instructing the jury on self-defense.  “Since the outcome turns on which version of events the jury believed, the failure to give a self-defense instruction prejudiced Werner.” Accordingly, the WA Supremes reversed Werner’s conviction.

My opinion?  Good decision.  A pack of wild dogs surrounding and growling at you definitely warrants self-defense.  That’s a no-brainer!  The “victim” is lucky none of his dogs were killed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.