Category Archives: Washington Court of Appeals

State v. Guevara: Stopping Schoolboys and Searching Them for Marijuana is Unlawful Without Probabale Cause.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, law enforcement, marijuana, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

With Police in Schools, More Children in Court - The New York Times

In State v. Guevara, the WA Court of Appeals held that a Interesting search involving a “school resource officer” who stopped the defendant and his friends for suspected drug use was NOT a social contact and NOT a community caretaking function.

Guevara and his friends were walking near school one morning before class. A uniformed school resource officer stopped the group and inquired what they were doing. He told them he suspected they were skipping class to smoke marijuana. The officer found drugs on Mr. Guevara. At trial, the judge denied Guevara’s motion to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the stop was a social contact within the scope of the officer’s authority.

In suppressing the evidence, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the stop became a seizure when the officer told the boys he believed they were using drugs and sought their consent to search them. This, ruled the court, was neither a social contact nor a community caretaking function.

My opinion? Good decision. Although they may have skipped school, the boys were otherwise behaving in a lawful manner. They were not under the influence of marijuana, alcohol or any other illegal drugs. They weren’t operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs or marijuana. Consequently, the officer appeared to lack probable cause to search them for possessing marijuana or any other drugs.  At worst, the officer should have merely escorted them back to school. Good decision.

Please review my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Irby: Jury Selection Gone Wrong

Constitutional Rights, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

How to weed out bad jurors during jury selection

Very interesting case. In State v. Irby, the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection was violated when the trial judge emailed the attorneys and said he was inclined to release ten prospective jurors for hardship.

The defendant, Terrance Irby, was charged with first degree murder.  During jury selection, several members of the jury were disqualified by the judge and attorneys through email exchanges.  The communications occurred without the defendant being present.  Consequently, the Court of Appeals overturned Irby’s conviction.

The WA Supremes reasoned,  “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend person, or by counsel”   under the due process clause of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the WA Constitution.  Here, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the removal of several potential jurors in Irby’s absence had no effect on the verdict.

My opinion?  Good decision.  The rule is clear as day.  Perhaps one of the jurors who was struck via email would have found Irby not guilty.  We’ll never know.  At any rate, Mr. Irby’s rights were clearly violated.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

In re. Personal Restraint of Swenson

Jury Trial, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

What is Judicial Recusal? Is it ethical for judges to recuse themselves? Current Affairs 2019 - YouTube

Interesting case.  In In re. Personal Restraint of Swenson, WA Court of Appeals decided a judge should disqualify themselves from sentencing a defendant’s case if the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned, but absent evidence of actual or potential bias, an appearance of fairness claim is without merit.

Mr. Swenson was sentenced for several sex offenses by a judge who prosecuted him 20 years earlier on an unrelated juvenile case.  Swenson did not ask the judge to recuse herself at the sentencing hearing on the sex offenses.  Nothing in the record indicated the judge remembered Swenson.  The judge imposed the agreed recommended sentence.  Swenson did not appeal the conviction, but he later filed a Personal Restraint Petition asking for a new sentencing hearing.  he cited the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a judge should be disqualified if their impartiality is called into question.  However, in this case there is no showing of actual or potential bias.  The mere fact that a judge prosecuted a defendant in the past does not disqualify the judge from hearing the case today.

Moreover, the Court argued there is no basis to reasonably question whether Swenson received a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.  The record shows the judge followed the parties’ agreed sentencing recommendation and the sentencing hearing was fair and impartial.  And nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing judge was aware of her involvement as a prosecutor 20 years earlier in an unrelated juvenile case against Swenson.

My opinion?  Seems fair.  In practice, judges typically recuse themselves upon realizing they defended or prosecuted the defendant months/years ago.  However, if the judge can’t remember, and has not been reminded by the defendant of their previous involvement, then the judge has no duty to recuse themselves.  And as far as disqualifying a judge is concerned, there must be some showing that the judge was biased for or against the defendant.  It’s common sense.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Werner: Who Let The Dogs Out?

911 Call, Animal Abuse, Assault, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, Self-Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

HOA Senior Communities Should Ban Vicious Dogs | YourHub

In State v. Werner, the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense in the prosecution for first degree assault after accidentally discharging a firearm when confronted by a neighbor’s pack of dangerous dogs.

“Victim” Daniel Barnes moved to the property next door to to defendant Gary Werner. Almost immediately, Werner and Barnes  began an ongoing property dispute concerning a shared easement.  Barnes kept seven dogs on Barnes’s property, including a Rottweiler and pit bulls. At least  three times before the incident giving rise to criminal charges, the dogs came onto Werner’s property and acted menacingly, barking and circling Werner. Werner started carrying a handgun with him on the property because he was afraid of the dogs.

The property dispute  intensified.  On the day of the incident, Werner was on his property in the easement area when one of Barnes’s pit bulls approached him, baring its teeth. Werner noticed six other dogs with the pit bull, including the Rottweiler and other pit bulls.  The dogs started circling Werner.  He pulled out his pistol, thinking he could scare the dogs, and started yelling for Barnes to call off the dogs.  Werner panicked and called 911 on his cell phone, but due to his arthritis, the gun went off, discharging into the ground.  The police were contacted.

The State charged Werner with Assault First Degree and Malicious Harassment. The jury acquitted him of the Malicious Harassment charge but found him guilty of Assault First Degree.  He appealed.  The case ended up before the WA Supremes.

The Court reviewed the law on self-defense.  “To prove self-defense, there must be evidence that (1) the defendant subjectively feared that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (2) this belief was objectively reasonable; [and] (3) the defendant exercised no greater force than was reasonably necessary.” Callahan, 87 Wn. App. at 929 (citation omitted).

The Court reasoned that here, Werner stated that he was afraid. That fear was arguably reasonable, given that he was facing seven snarling dogs, including several pit bulls and a Rottweiler.  Pursuant to State v. Hoeldt, 139 Wn. App. 225, 160 P.3d 55 (2007), a pit bull can be a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.04.110(6). There is evidence that Barnes’s friend refused requests to call off the dogs. By that conduct, Werner could reasonably have believed that Barnes’s friend personally posed a threat through the agency of a formidable group of canines that were under his control.

As to the firing of the weapon, the WA Supremes believed Werner’s accounting that it was an accident.  They found sufficient evidence of both accident and self-defense to warrant instructing the jury on self-defense.  “Since the outcome turns on which version of events the jury believed, the failure to give a self-defense instruction prejudiced Werner.” Accordingly, the WA Supremes reversed Werner’s conviction.

My opinion?  Good decision.  A pack of wild dogs surrounding and growling at you definitely warrants self-defense.  That’s a no-brainer!  The “victim” is lucky none of his dogs were killed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Paumier: Court Upholds the Right to Public Trial & Self-Representation

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Self-Representation for Artists - RedDotBlog

In State v. Paumier, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions because the trial court improperly (1) excluded public citizens from a portion of his trial, and (2) denied his right to represent himself.

Mr. Paumier was charged with Burglary and Theft.  Jury selection involved questioning jurors in chambers and recording their responses.  The public was not allowed to watch jury selection.  The trial court stated at the outset that potential jurors who preferred to answer questions privately to avoid possible embarrassment would be taken into the judge’s chambers.

Several jurors indicated during the course of voir dire that they preferred to answer certain questions in chambers.  The judge and the parties questioned five jurors in chambers, recording the jurors’ responses. Jury selection was completed that same day.

The following day, the trial court permitted the State to amend the information.  Paumier then pleaded not guilty and asked to represent himself, stating:

“I just don’t feel like a — I feel like there’s [sic] things about the trial getting this far that it shouldn’t have.  And I feel that my attorney should have spoke [sic] up for me instead of getting pissed off at me in court.  And I just don’t feel like he’s doing his job like he should.  I don’t feel it should have gotten this far, and I’d just rather present my, you know, case myself.”

His request was denied because the lower court decided that it came too late.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned, however, that Paumier’s right to a public trial was violated when the court allowed the jurors to be questioned privately in chambers.  The guaranty of open criminal proceedings extends to voir dire.  Additionally, the recent U.S. Supreme Court’s Presley v. Georgia makes it clear that court room closures should be rare and the court must consider alternatives prior to closing the court room.

The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied the defendant his request to represent himself at trial.  Here, there was no request for continuance, and the defendant’s request was clear.  There was no evidence that trial would have been delayed, or that granting his request would have impaired the administration of justice.

 My opinion?  Good decision.  Kudos to the defendant for stating, on the record, his preference to represent himself after the judge and attorneys conducted voir dire in chambers, and away from the public eye.  Mr. Paumier correctly followed his instincts.  I hope Mason County learns a lesson.

 

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Jones: Rape Shield Statute vs. Defendant’s Right to Testify

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What Is A Rape Shield Law? | The Defence Group

In State v. Jones, the WA Supreme Court held that the Rape Shield Statute does not stop a defendant from offering evidence or cross-examining a victim about the events on the night of the alleged sexual encounter, including the victim’s sexual conduct with other individuals during a wild sex party.

Defendant Mr. Jones was charged with first and second degree rape after his niece, K.D., claimed that Jones put his hands around her neck and forcibly raped her.  At trial, the jury acquitted Jones of first degree rape but could not reach a decision on second degree rape.  Jones was tried again for second degree rape along with the aggravating factor of being an individual in a position of trust to the victim.

Jones wanted to present evidence that K.D. consented to sex during an all-night sex party.  The party included one additional woman and two additional men, cocaine and alcohol.  During this party, K.D. consented to sex with all three men (which included Jones).  The judge, citing the Rape Shield Law, would not allow Jones to introduce such evidence because it was only being introduced to attack K.D.’s credibility.

Furthermore, during the trial, the prosecutor noted that Jones was compelled to give a DNA sample (did not do so voluntarily) and that he refused to clear up matters with the police.  At the end of trial, the judge backtracked a little and claimed that it allowed Jones to present evidence that the sex was consensual (but without mentioning the sex party).   Jones was convicted and appealed.  Jones claimed that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence of the sex party and for the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments with respect to speaking with police and giving a DNA sample.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed.

First, the court reasoned that the trial court violated Jones’ 6th Amendment rights by refusing to allow Jones testify about the sex party.  “Jones’s evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape.”  Furthermore, since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to stop the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated Jones’ Sixth Amendment rights when it barred his testimony.

Second, the Court held the Rape Shield Statute did not apply.  Washington’s rape shield law provides:

Evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim’s marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim’s consent except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense.

Here, the Court decided the Rape Shield Statute protects victims from testifying about past sexual behavior.  In this case, however, Jones was attempting to introduce evidence of present sexual behavior.  Thus, to deny such evidence under the rape shield law would be to read out the term past.   Furthermore, since the evidence that Jones sought to be introduced involved Jones’s defense and version of what occurred the night of the crime, the denial of such evidence was NOT harmless error.  Jones is entitled to a new trial.

My opinion?  Under the circumstances, the court made a well-reasoned decision.  Their interpretation of the Rape Shield Statute appears correct: although one cannot admit evidence of the victim’s past sexual history, the statute does not prevent present sexual history from being admitted into evidence.  This evidence seems especially relevant when the victim is engaged in exploits in the manner described in this case.  Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Sex Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Hammock: Home-Made Guns Are Still Firearms

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Pin on Small homemade wepons + gun stuff

In State v. Hammock, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a hollowed-out bolt, in which a bullet is inserted, and when used with a hammer to strike the bullet,  IS a firearm.

After an extended period of using drugs and arguing with Mr. Ford, defendant Hammock handed his girlfriend, Ms. McKee, a .22-caliber bullet, a hollowed-out bolt with a hexagonal head, and a ball peen hammer, and told her to shoot Ford.  Hammock had previously used the device to discharge a bullet.

Hammock inserted the shell into the head end of the bolt.  McKee placed the  non-head end of the  bolt against Ford’s head, struck the bullet with the ball peen hammer, discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford did not die immediately.

The following details are gruesome.  About 20 minutes later, Hammock jumped over the bed without warning  and repeatedly hit Ford  in the head  with a hammer.  Ford remained conscious for several more hours.  Later Hammock exited the room and returned with a metal object similar to a meat cleaver and struck Ford in the head two or three times.

Ford remained alive and conscious, so Hammock knotted an extension cord around Ford’s neck and placed a white plastic bag over Ford’s head.  Hammock also struck Ford again with the metal object once or twice.  Ford ultimately died from a gunshot wound to the head, blunt force impacts to the head, and ligature strangulation due to an extension cord knotted around his neck.

The State charged Hammock First Degree Murder, and numerous Drug Offenses.  A forensic scientist with the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory testified that the .22-caliber bullet is a “rimfire” cartridge, meaning that its primer, the explosive, is around the rim of the cartridge. The primer ignites the gunpowder that provides the gas that propels the bullet.  The scientist was able to discharge a bullet from the bolt by striking the rim of the cartridge with a ball peen hammer.  The jury found Hammock guilty of all charges, including possession of a deadly weapon.

Court of Appeals reasoned that the bolt, hammer, and bullet, when considered together, constitute an instrument of offensive combat.  Hammock inserted the bullet into the bolt, handed it back to McKee, and told her to shoot Ford.  McKee put the bolt up to Ford’s head, struck it with a hammer, and discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford died partly from this gunshot wound to the head.

This constitutes an “instrument” used to injure or kill someone, reasoned the Court.  Additionally, the Court held that the bolt system meets the definition of “device” as well under former RCW 9.41.010(1).  Under Webster’s Dictionary, a “device” is “something that is formed or formulated by design and usage.

Consequently, the Court upheld Hammocks guilty verdict.

My opinion?  As I said above, I’m dedicating this post to NRA members, gun enthusiasts, and 2nd Amendment buffs.  Although I’m clearly NOT providing legal advice – I cannot do that over the internet – this bit of public information should put gun enthusiasts on pause.  Home-made guns are still firearms; even if the moving parts are separated from each other.  Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harris: A Defendant May Argue Gant On Appeal Even Though It Was Not Argued At Trial.

Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, United States Supreme Court, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Courts and the Constitution Arizona v Gant

In State v. Harris, the  WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant who did not bring a suppression motion prior to trial, may assert a claim under Arizona v. Gant  for the first time on appeal.

Defendant Stuart J. Harris, Jr. appealed his conviction for First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.  He argued  sufficiency of the evidence,  additional evidentiary error, and prosecutorial misconduct.   While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which deals with the scope of a car search pursuant to the arrest of its driver.  The Court of Appeals Division II allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the Gant issue.

For those who don’t know, Gant rejected the reading of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d (1981), that predominated in the lower courts, namely, that the Fourth Amendment allows a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.

In departing from Belton, the Gant Court held instead that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723.3

Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned the facts in Gant were similar to those here.  Harris was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the car at the time of its search, and there was no reason to believe that the car contained evidence related to the offense for which he was arrested (driving with a suspended license). Therefore, absent other legal support for the search, the officer’s search of  the car was unlawful.

Furthermore, Gant applies retroactively because “A party should be allowed to take advantage of a decision rendered during the pendency of his case, even if he had not reserved the point decided, if the decision could not have reasonably been anticipated.”  State v. Harris at 6-7, quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit.

My opinion?  I’m a HUGE fan of the Arizona v. Gant opinion (please see my Dec. 24, 2009 blog), and by extension, I’m a HUGE fan of this opinion. Generally, United States Supreme Court decisions that announce new constitutional rules governing criminal prosecutions apply retroactively to all criminal cases not yet final on appeal.  I’m happy the Court of Appeals stuck to the law; and supported Gant, to boot.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Saunders: A Court Should Not Grant Continuances Without Valid Reasons

Constitutional Rights, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

In State v. Saunders, the WA Court of Appeals held that courts should not grant continuances without valid reasons.

The defendant’s trial was continued several times.  He objected at every hearing before the court (yes, defense counsel asked for some of them).  One continuance was for further negotiations.  Another was because the case was pending in the prosecutor’s negotiating unit, even though the court noted there was no good explanation.  A third continuance happened because the case was not yet assigned to a trial prosecutor.

The Court reasoned that all three continuances were without adequate basis.  Since there were no convincing/valid reasons for the continuances, the charges were dismissed for violation of CrR 3.3; which is Washington’s speedy trial rule:

“Absent convincing and valid reasons for the continuances granted on January 8, February 20, or March 18, the trial court’s order granting the three continuances were “manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds and for untenable reasons.” Downing, 151 Wn.2d at 272 (quoting Junker, 79 Wn.2d at 26.  The trial court abused its discretion in granting further delays in commencing Saunders’s trial.  Under these circumstances, we reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charge against Saunders under CrR 3.3(h).”  ~WA Court of Appeals

My opinion?  Excellent, excellent, excellent!  First, I admire defendants who exercise their rights to speedy trial.  Whatever outcome that’s going to happen will inevitably happen faster because both sides are forced to work the case up.  True, there are times when rushing to battle is not always the best strategy.

Some cases get better with age.  Memories fade.  Witnesses recant and/or move away.  Prosecutors want to dump old cases when their caseloads get too heavy.  Nevertheless, what I deeply despise — and I’ve seen it happen — is when courts lack any good reason to grant the prosecutor’s wishes for continuances.  It’s incredibly frustrating.  State v. Saunders is a great step in the right direction.

This case is vastly similar to State v. Kenyon, which I discussed in my October 7 blog (Indeed, the Saunders court expressly based much of its reasoning from the Kenyon decision).  Clearly, our courts are giving teeth back to the  Speedy Trial Rule.  Good!  I believe the larger reason why this is happening is because shrinking state/judiciary budgets are, consequently, taking away the luxury to continue criminal cases.  I, for one, enjoy the change.  I’d rather go to trial than make up reasons to keep continuing cases.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Iniguez: How Were the Defendant’s Speedy Trial Rights NOT Violated?

Constitutional Rights, Discovery, Due Process, felony, Jail, Speedy Trial & Continuances, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Speedy Trial | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Can’t agree with the Supremes on this one . . .

In State v. Iniguez, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated even though a defendant waited in jail 8 months and objected to all continuances.

Following his arrest on First Degree Robbery, Mr. Iniguez remained in custody pending a joint trial with his codefendant.  An 8-month delay between arraignment and trial took place.  During this time, the State moved for a total of four trial continuances, the last of which the State sought because it learned — belatedly — that a key witness was out of town.  Iniguez objected to all continuances.  The trial court denied his objections and pretrial motions.  At trial, the jury found Iniguez guilty.  He appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez’s conviction.  The court held the eight-month delay between arrest and trial was prejudicial and violated Iniguez’s constitutional right to speedy trial.

However, the WA Supremes decided the delay did not violate the time-for-trial court rule, CrR 3.2, and did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or Const. art. I, § 22 constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 22 of the state constitution does not offer greater protections than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Using the six-part Gunwall test, the Court determined there was no clear reason to find greater protections in the state constitution, so the two provisions should be applied similarly.

Also, under the four-factor Blakely analysis, the Court also reasoned that although the circumstances of the delay were substantial enough to presume harm to Iniguez, the level of violation of Iniguez’ speedy trial rights wasn’t enough to justify dismissing his case.

The Court ruled 5-4 against Iniguez, holding there was no constitutional violation of his right to a speedy trial.

My opinion?  My thoughts are similar to dissenting Judge Sanders.  I agree with the majority opinion that the length of delay in this case — coupled with the fact that Iniguez spent all of it in custody — gave rise to a presumption of prejudice.  The defendant’s trial delay was nearly nine months.  The delays arose because of the State’s need to interview witnesses, joinder with the co-defendant, scheduling conflicts, and the late discovery of the unavailability of a key witness one week prior to trial.

None of the delays were caused by Iniguez himself.  Indeed, he objected to continuing his case at every opportunity!  Finally, Iniguez was prejudiced because he was in jail during this entire process.  This is very substantial.  Incarceration carries detrimental effects: loss of job, disruption of family life, idleness, etc.  Time spent in jail is simply dead time.

How were Iniguez’s Speedy Trial rights NOT violated?

Again, bad decision . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.