Category Archives: Washington Court of Appeals

State v. Mitchell: Bus Fare Officers

Sound Transit, King County Metro suspending fare enforcement to improve  safety during novel coronavirus response | Mass Transit

In State v. Mitchell the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided that a fare enforcement officer (FEO) may detain a passenger for a period of time necessary to identify a bus rider and may also issue a notice of civil infraction when a passenger fails to pay the required fare or produce proof of payment when asked, if the infraction occurs in the officer’s presence. Finally, a “passenger” includes a person that the FEO observes stepping off the bus.

Here, Mitchell was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree. The firearms were discovered when a fare enforcement officer stopped him to check proof of fare payment after he exited a Metro bus. Mitchell argues he was unlawfully detained and the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence of the firearms.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that RCW 35.58.585(1) allows metropolitan municipal corporations to designate individuals to monitor fare payment. These persons have all the powers granted to enforcement officers under RCW 7.80.050 and 7.80.060. This means an FEO can issue a notice of civil infraction when the infraction occurs in the officer’s presence, request identification, and detain a person for a period of time reasonably necessary to identify the person. Also, under RCW 35.58.585(2)(b) the law specifically grants FEOs the additional authority for the following:

(i) Request proof of payment from passengers; (ii) Request personal identification from a passenger who does not produce proof of payment when requested; (iii) Issue a citation and (iv) Request that a passenger leave the bus or other mode of public transportation when the passenger has not produced proof of payment after being asked to do so by a person designated to monitor fare payment.

Here, the defendant challenged the legality of the stop. He argued that the word “passenger” includes only those persons physically present on a mode of public transportation. Under this theory, an FEO may request proof of payment from someone currently traveling on a bus, because that traveler’s freedom of movement is already restricted by his or her presence on a moving vehicle. However, once the person disembarks the bus, additional authority is needed to request proof of payment, because to do so an FEO must first stop the person.

Unfortunately for Mitchell, the WA Court of Appeals disagreed. They said that here, there is no question Mitchell was a passenger. The FEO witnessed Mitchell disembarking the bus. He asked Mitchell and the other departing passengers for their proof of payment as they stepped off the bus. By using the bus, as a passenger, Mitchell had already incurred the obligation to display proof of payment when asked. Under these facts, the FEO acted within the scope of his statutory authority by requesting proof of payment from Mitchell. Additional authority to detain was unnecessary.

Also, because Michell did not have ID on himself, the FEO had the authority to detain Mitchell for the time reasonably necessary to identify him. Accordingly, the FEO radioed for assistance and, within minutes, police arrived and confirmed Mitchell’s identity. At each step of this encounter, the FEO acted within the scope of his statutory authority.

The Court of Appeals upheld Mitchell’s conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm First Degree.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Thierry: Prosecutor’s Improper Closing Argument Reverses Conviction.

Ethics class ordered for tired attorney who made improper closing argument  | The Law for Lawyers Today

In State v. Thierry, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a Prosecutor’s statements during the closing argument of a child sex abuse case was an improper appeal to passion and prejudice.

The State charged Alfred James Thierry Jr. with four counts of Rape of a Child First Degree and two counts of Child Molestation First Degree, based on conduct against his son, JT.

At trial, the Prosecutor’s closing argument discussed direct versus circumstantial evidence. This explanation included the following:

“None of you were present when these acts occurred. No one testified for you that they watched any of these acts happen. That would be direct evidence of the acts themselves, but that is not required and, if it were, the State could never prosecute any of these types of cases.”

She made a similar argument shortly thereafter, in a discussion of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence:

“Did Thierry rape and molest his son? Yes, he did. The evidence tells you that he did. What’s the evidence? JT is the evidence, and he is all that is required for you to find him guilty of these crimes. If the law required more, if the law required anything, something, anything beyond the testimony of a child, the child’s words, JT’s words, those instructions would tell you that, and there is no instruction that says you need something else. And, again, if that was required, the State could rarely, if ever, prosecute these types of crimes because people don’t rape children in front of other people and often because children wait to tell.”

She again returned to this argument near the end of her initial closing remarks, in discussing the burden of proof:

“Now I want to talk just briefly about the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. You don’t need to know all of the pieces. You don’t need to have all of the information or have all of the answers. If that were necessary, first of all, the standard would be beyond all doubt possible, but if that were necessary, once again, the State would not be able to prosecute any of these crimes or really any crime, actually, because how can you all as jurors who are selected from the community know nothing about any of the people involved, and certainly yourselves were not present for any act or crime that was committed, how can you know with 100 percent certainty?”

The prosecutor continued in this vein during rebuttal, returning to her public policy theme:

Defense counsel wants you to basically disregard everything that JT has said between what he told Sayfullah, between what he told Ms. Arnold-Harms, between when he told his primary care provider Ms. Lin and what he told Amber Bradford. ‘Just disregard all of that because he’s a child, because he was 8 when he said these things and because he was 9 when he was on the stand. Nothing he said is credible so just disregard it all.’ If that argument has any merit, then the State may as well just give up prosecuting these cases, and the law might as well say that “The word of a child is not enough.

At that point Thierry’s defense attorney objected that the prosecutor was “fueling the passion and prejudice of the jury.” The court overruled the objection and permitted the prosecutor to continue.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.

Thierry appealed that several of the remarks the Prosecutor made in closing argument merit reversal. He also argued that the cumulative effect of the improper statements denied him a fair trial.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals agreed with Thierry and decided that the Prosecutor’s arguments were improper and that it had a substantial likelihood of affecting the verdict.

The court reasoned that as a general matter, to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim a defendant must show that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial in the context of the record and all of the circumstances of the trial. To establish prejudice sufficient to require reversal, a defendant who timely objected to the challenged conduct in the trial court must show a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury verdict.

The Court further reasoned that it’s improper for prosecutors to use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.  Arguments that compel the jury to send a message to society about the general problem of child sexual abuse qualifies as such an improper emotional appeal.

Here, the Prosecutor’s statement that, “If Defense Counsel’s argument concerning JT’s credibility has any merit, . . . the State may as well just give up prosecuting child sex abuse cases, and the law might as well say that ‘the word of a child is not enough’” also qualified as an improper appeal to passion and prejudice.

The Court further reasoned that even if the Prosecutor’s argument was deemed purely a response to the defendant’s argument, Defense Counsel never suggested that the jury should not believe JT because of his age. Furthermore, nothing in Defense Counsel’s closing argument, therefore, warranted the prosecutor’s message that the State may as well give up prosecuting child sex abuse cases if JT were not believed and Thierry acquitted.

Finally, the court reasoned that the Prosecutor’s arguments had a substantial likelihood of affecting the verdict. The outcome of the case depended entirely on whether the jury chose to believe JT’s accusations or Thierry’s denial. Consequently, the Prosecutor’s remarks created a substantial risk that the jury decided to credit JT’s testimony for improper reasons. The prosecutor’s remarks exacerbated that risk by misrepresenting Defense Counsel’s argument so as to unfairly undermine Thierry’s defense.

The Court of Appeals reversed Thierry’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

My opinion? Good decision. Generally, it’s a professional courtesy to not object during opposing counsel’s closing arguments. It’s considered rude. Nevertheless, defense attorneys must object at all times when appropriate, even if doing so is frowned upon by judges and juries. Prosecutorial misconduct happens all of the time, and ESPECIALLY during closing arguments. Those statements, made again and again, definitely affected the outcome of the case. Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Linder: Unwitnessed Search is Unlawful

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In State v. Linder, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided that evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant was properly suppressed because the officer’s inventory of the search was not conducted with at least one witness.

Here, Defendant Aaron Linder was arrested by Kalama Police Chief Grant Gibson in March 2013 for driving with a suspended license. During the search incident to arrest, Chief Gibson found a small tin box inside the pocket of Mr. Linder’s hoodie. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Mr. Linder admitted being a daily user of hard drugs and that the tin box contained drug paraphernalia. But he refused to give his consent for Chief Gibson to open the box initially, and refused a second time at the police station.

The police obtained a search warrant. Sergeant Parker, without anyone else present, executed the warrant by opening the metal box and photographing and inventorying its contents. It was typical for the department’s night shift officer to work alone. The Kalama police department has a total of only five sworn officers.

Sergeant Parker inventoried the tin box as containing two pieces of aluminum foil, an empty plastic box, two plastic tubes, a hair pin, a safety pin, and a piece of plastic from a cigarette package. The cigarette wrapper contained a crystalline substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. After he finished the inventory and completed the return of service form, Sergeant Parker placed the items, a copy of his report, and a note for Chief Gibson in a temporary evidence locker.

The next morning, Chief Gibson, also acting alone, verified that the contents in the box matched Sergeant Parker’s inventory and field tested a small quantity of the cellophane wrapper and its contents, which tested positive for methamphetamine. He packaged the remainder of the crystalline substance for submission to the crime laboratory. Mr. Linder was thereafter charged with one count of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 69.50 RCW, for possession of methamphetamine.

Before trial, Mr. Linder moved to suppress the evidence found in the tin box on the grounds that it was searched in violation of CrR 2.3( d). The rule provides that a return of the search warrant shall be made promptly, shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken, and-relevant here-that “the inventory shall be made in the presence of the person from whose possession or premises the property is taken, or in the presence of at least one person other than the officer.” In the suppression hearing that followed, both Sergeant Parker and Chief Gibson testified that they were unaware of the rule’s requirement that the inventory be made in the presence of another person.

The trial court granted Mr. Linder’s motion to suppress. The State appealed.

In reaching its decision, the WA Court of Appeals looked to the Exclusionary Rule In considering whether the contraband should be suppressed.

For those who don’t know, the Exclusionary Rule is a legal principle in the United States, under constitutional law, which holds that evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is sometimes inadmissible for a criminal prosecution in a court of law. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment‘s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” and that no person “shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”.

The Exclusionary Rule is grounded in the Fourth Amendment and it is intended to protect citizens from illegal searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule is also designed to provide a legal remedy and disincentive, which is short of criminal prosecution in response to prosecutors and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights compelled to self-incrimination. The exclusionary rule also applies to violations of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to counsel.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned that Washington’s version of the Exclusionary Rule had three objectives:

First, and most important, to protect privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and third, to preserve the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence which has been obtained through illegal means.

Here, reasoned the Court, excluding the evidence served the third objective of preserving the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence obtained through illegal means.  Here, a police officer’s unwitnessed late night execution of a search warrant in this case clearly violated CrR 2.3(d), called the reliability of his inventory into question, and could not be remedied other than by suppression.

My opinion? Great decision. Kudos to Division III for following the law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rooney: Unlawful Search of Bedroom, Yet Valid Frisk of Pants.

What to Know About Unlawful Search and Seizure

In State v. Rooney, the WA Court of Appeals Division II gave interesting results on a multi-layered search & seizure case. First, an officer who lawfully entered a parolee’s room in order to arrest him, properly conducted a Terry frisk of a roommate’s pair of pants before giving them to the roommate. The frisk was justified by the presence of several swords, an axe and multiple knives in the room. However, the officer’s search of a room over the objection of the roommate, who was not on community custody, violated the roommate’s Constitutional rights.

Alexandria White, who was serving a term of community custody, began living with the defendant, Norman Rooney, in his home in December 2013 shortly after her release from prison. Her parole officer Chris Napolitano supervised White’s community custody. Napolitano knew that Rooney and White had lived together like a married couple and they had always lived in the same room together.

After White moved in with Rooney again that December, Napolitano discovered White had changed her address without notifying him, which violated her community custody conditions.

Napolitano obtained an arrest warrant for White and, with a team of law enforcement officers, went to Rooney’s house to arrest her on December 30, 2013. As Napolitano walked into the bedroom, White was standing in the bedroom with Rooney, who appeared to be asleep in bed. Napolitano observed swords and axes hanging on the bedroom wall and a couple of knives laying on the shelves. He observed additional weapons on Rooney’s nightstand. Napolitano advised White that by failing to report her new address and not being available for contact she had violated her community custody. White acknowledged that Napolitano would arrest her for the violation.

After Napolitano arrested White and placed her in the living room, Napolitano told White that he was going to search the bedroom. White responded that she lived in the living room, not the bedroom, but Napolitano did not see any sleeping arrangements or anything that appeared to be White’s belongings in the living room. Napolitano ordered Rooney to leave the bedroom so the officers could search it. Rooney objected to the search because he was not currently on community custody, but he began to physically comply.

Rooney, who was dressed in what appeared to be boxer shorts, asked to put on pants. Napolitano replied that he would have to search the pants “for safety reasons” before Rooney could put them on and leave the room. Given the other weapons in the room, Napolitano was concerned that Rooney might have a weapon in the pants. Rooney grabbed a pair of pants, and when Napolitano took hold of the pants, he immediately felt a firearm.

After Rooney was arrested and placed in the living room, Napolitano and Harvey searched the bedroom and found methamphetamine, heroin, and clonazepam. The State charged Rooney with three counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance (methamphetamine, heroin, and clonazepam) and one count of First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm. Rooney moved to suppress evidence of the controlled substances and the firearm. The trial court denied Rooney’s motion and found him guilty as charged at a bench trial. On appeal, Rooney argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. However, consent is one well-recognized exception to this rule. The State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a warrantless search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The Court further reasoned that, in searches involving a cohabitant who consents to a warrantless search, Washington has adopted the Common Authority Rule; which says that a cohabitant may grant consent to search a residential area that each cohabitant has equal authority to control. This rule is based on the Washington Constitution’s guarantee of each individual’s expectation of privacy and the theory that a person assumes risk that his or her cohabitant may allow “outsiders” into a shared space.

Finally, the Court reasoned that the consent of only one person with common authority over the place to be searched when multiple cohabitants are present is NOT sufficient to conduct a lawful search of shared space.  “We have never held that a cohabitant with common authority can give consent that is binding upon another cohabitant with equal or greater control over the premises when the non-consenting cohabitant is actually present on the premises,” said the Court. “When a cohabitant who has equal or greater authority to control the premises is present, his consent must be obtained and the consent of another of equal or lesser authority is ineffective against the non-consenting cohabitant.”

With that, the court held that under application of the common authority rule, because Rooney was present and objected, the officers’ search of Rooney’s room was unlawful. The fact that White was serving a community custody term does not undermine Rooney’s right to object to a warrantless search of his bedroom. Therefore, the officers’ warrantless search of Rooney’s bedroom was unlawful as to Rooney, and the trial court erred in denying Rooney’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine, heroin, and clonazepam evidence found during the unlawful search.

Regarding the frisk of Rooney’s pants, the Court of Appeals reached an entirely different decision. They decided the trial court did not error in denying Rooney’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm found in Rooney’s pants. The Court reasoned that an officer may conduct a non-consensual protective Terry frisk for weapons if the officer can articulate specific facts that create an objectively reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous. The officer need not be certain that the person is armed before he or she conducts a protective frisk.

Here, Napolitano and other law enforcement officers saw “several swords, an axe, and multiple knives” in Rooney’s bedroom. Because he was aware of the number of weapons, Napolitano was concerned for his safety. Also, Rooney’s behavior following Napolitano’s warning that the pants would be searched, together with Napolitano’s observation of the weapons in plain view in his bedroom, gave Napolitano articulable suspicion that the pants Rooney wanted to wear might have contained a weapon.

The court concluded that the officers’ warrantless search of Rooney’s bedroom over his objection was unlawful, and therefore, the evidence of the controlled substances must be suppressed. But Napolitano’s frisk of Rooney’s pants was lawful and based on reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the court reversed Rooney’s three convictions for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance (methamphetamine, heroin, and clonazepam), and affirmed his conviction for First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Cayetano-James: Prohibiting Phone Call Testimony

Notaries Earn Extra Income Serving As A Remote Testimony Witness | NNA

In State v. Cayetano-James, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided the trial court mistakenly denied the defendant’s motion to have a witness testify telephonically from Mexico.

The defendant was charged with Rape of a Child in the First Degree. While the case was pending, he filed a notice of the defense of alibi. The Prosecutor changed the trial dates and amended the charges. In response, Defense Counsel filed and argued a motion to dismiss under CR 8.3(b). Because of this, Defense Counsel argued a potential witness in Mexico will most likely need to be contacted to refute the amendment to the charges.

On March 27, 2013, the trial court heard a defense motion to permit the telephonic testimony of witness Ms. Camacho. Defense counsel argued that because of Camacho’s immigration status, the court should allow her to testify by telephone or, alternatively, order her telephonic deposition. Although Defense Counsel argued that Camacho’s testimony was material, the court denied the motion for telephonic testimony. The court also denied Defense Counsel’s motion for a continuance. Finally, at trial, the court excluded Camacho’s Skype testimony and phone call testimony of other witnesses. Not surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

On appeal, the WA Court of Appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the telephonic testimony of this defense witness.

First, the court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution guarantee that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This right to due process includes the right to be heard and to offer testimony. The accused’s right to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.

Second, said the court, the right to call witnesses in one’s own behalf has long been recognized as essential to due process. “Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.” Additionally, Washington courts have broad authority under ER 611 to control trial proceedings and also have discretion to permit telephonic testimony under CR 43(a)(1).

Finally, the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded “essential facts of high probative value whose exclusion effectively barred [the defendant] from presenting his defense” without a showing by the State that allowing Camacho to testify by telephone would disrupt the fairness of the fact-finding process. This deprived the Defendant’s witness of the opportunity to present testimony that would have been relevant, material and vital to the defense; and violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? Good decision. Obstructing a defendant from presenting witnesses for their defense violates the 6th Amendment. Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Martines: WA Supreme Court Finds Defendant Guilty of DUI on Blood Test Case

Bad news.

In State v. Martines, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the WA Court of Appeals Division I. I blogged about this case last year in State v. Martines: More Good Caselaw on Blood tests Taken After DUI Arrests. There, the WA Court of Appeals version of State v. Martines held that the blood test performed on Martines was an unlawful warrantless search. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that drawing blood and testing blood constitute separate searches, each of which requires particular authorization, and that the warrant here authorized only a blood draw.

The original Martines opinion appeared strong. It was rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely; which requires police officers to obtain search warrants for blood draws in DUI cases when exigent circumstances do not otherwise exist. It also followed Washington State legalizing marijuana, thus necessitating stronger regulations and monitoring of blood tests performed during DUI investigations.

The WA Supreme Court decided differently in a short, scathing opinion signed by all justices.

First, the Court held that a warrant authorizing the testing of a blood sample for intoxicants does not require separate findings of probable cause to suspect drug and alcohol use so long as there is probable cause to suspect intoxication that may be caused by alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both.

Second, the Court  further held that the search warrant lawfully authorized testing Martines’s blood sample for intoxicants because it authorized a blood draw to obtain evidence of DUI. In other words, the search of Martines’s blood did not exceed the bounds of the search warrant when a sample of Martines’s blood was extracted and tested for intoxicants anyway.

My opinion?

Bad decision. I’m amazed the WA Supremes didn’t discuss Missouri v. McNeely at all. Not once. McNeely profoundly and significantly evolved search and seizure law concerning blood draws in DUI investigations. Indeed, McNeely was the underpinnings for Division One Court of Appeals case State v. Martinez. Yet the WA Supremes ignore McNeely as if it didn’t exist. Ignoring case precedents violates stare decisis, plain and simple.

Hopefully, this case gets appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for further review.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Brock: WA Supreme Court Reverses Search of Backpack Case

In State v. Brock, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision to reverse the Defendant’s convictions for 10 counts of Identity Theft in the Second Degree, 3 counts of Forgery, and violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

Last year, in State v. Brock: The “Time for Arrest” Doctrine, I blogged about how the Court of Appeals reversed Brock’s conviction, agreeing with Brock that it was not a valid search of his person under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that under the “Time for Arrest” doctrine, Brock did not have actual, exclusive possession of the backpack “immediately preceding” arrest and reversed Brock’s conviction on that basis.

Well, the WA Supreme Court decided different.

The Court reasoned that the “Time for Arrest” doctrine didn’t apply because the Defendant’s backpack was a part of his person at the time of arrest:

“Under these circumstances, the lapse of time had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack. Brock wore the backpack at the very moment he was stopped by Officer Olson. The arrest process began the moment Officer Olson told Brock that although he was not under arrest, he was also not free to leave. The officer himself removed the backpack from Brock as a part of his investigation. And, having no other place to safely stow it, Brock would have to bring the backpack along with him into custody. Once the arrest process had begun, the passage of time prior to the arrest did not render it any less a part of Brock’s arrested person.”

Based on that the WA Supremes reversed the Court of Appeals and decided the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

My opinion? Obviously, I agree with Justice McCloud’s dissenting opinion. He stated that the majority opinion ignores the strict limitations imposed on law enforcement during a Terry stop, confuses the justifications for a Terry frisk with the justifications for a search incident to arrest, and “conflicts with our precedent holding that a full custodial arrest is a prerequisite to any search incident to arrest.”

Justice McCloud couldn’t have said it better in the tongue-in-cheek retort in the last sentence of his dissent:

“I fear the majority’s new rule will only invite further expansions of our ‘narrow’ and ‘jealously guarded’ exception to the warrant requirement.”

Exactly.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Gauthier: The “Washout” Rule for Felony Convictions

Washout" Rule for Priors | Law offices of Alexander Ransom

Many clients approach me on the question of when prior felony convictions “Washout” from a Defendant’s offender scores. The recent case of State v. Gauthier is a good place to answer that question.

In Gauthier, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided (1) the prosecutor’s closing arguments were fair,  (2) Gauthier received effective assistance of counsel, and (3) trial court properly calculated Gauthier’s offender score.

At trial, Mr. Gauthier was found guilty of Rape in the Second Degree. On appeal, he argued that the trial court improperly calculated his offender score by failing to recognize that his prior convictions “washed out” pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c).

Some background is necessary. Under the “washout” provision, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c), prior “Class C” felony convictions are excluded in a defendant’s offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement pursuant to a felony conviction or entry of the judgment and sentence, the offender spent five consecutive years “in the community” without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction.

In Gauthier’s case, he had five prior class C felony convictions. His last release date happened in June 2007. However, he did not remain crime free for five years. He was charged with the Rape Second Degree on March 13, 2009, and taken into custody to the King County Correctional Facility on July 23, 2010. There, he remained through his first trial on May 2011 which resulted in a conviction. He was subsequently sentenced on July 8, 2011. Consequently, the sentencing court properly calculated his offender score as a five (5) based on his five prior class C felony convictions.

Furthermore, at his sentencing on February 14, 2014, Gauthier argued that his five prior class C felonies should not be included in his offender score because he spent 43 months in custody before he was convicted again on the present offense. He claimed that under the “washout” statute, the “in the community” phrase includes the 43 months he spent in custody on this offense, thus his offender score is zero not five. The sentencing court rejected this argument, calculated his offender score as five, and sentenced him to 120 months with credit for all time served back to July 2010, the date he was first arrested.

Here, and similar to the trial court, the WA Court of Appeals rejected Gauthier’s arguments and also rejected Gauthier’s reliance on State v. Ervin, a somewhat recent case where the WA Supreme Court decided in favor of the defendant James Erwin’s arguments  that his 17 days of custody did not interrupt the requisite  5-year washout period:

“We have found no case, and Gauthier cites to none, where Ervin’s limited holding was applied to time spent in confinement while awaiting resolution of a felony charge. That is the precise circumstance present here. As the State correctly points out, Gauthier’s interpretation creates an absurd scenario—a defendant’s offender score will actually go down while he is in custody pending trial or pending sentencing. Indeed, that is an absurd result and a result we are confident the legislature did not intend.”

Simply put, if Gauthier had remained in the community for five years after June 2007 and remained crime free for those five years, his prior class C felony convictions would not count in his offender score after June 2012. It would have “washed out” under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c). However, Gauthier’s 43 months in custody rendered hopeless any arguments that his priors would wash out.

The Court of Appeals upheld affirmed the trial court’s Judgment & Sentence and sentenced him to 120 months of prison.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Afeworki: “Band It” Restraint Is Constitutional

In State v. Afeworki, the WA Court of Appeals Division I held, among other rulings, that a “Band It” prisoner restraint system worn by the Defendant during trial does not violate the Constitutional right to a fair trial or the presumption of innocence.

The Defendant Tomas Afeworki was charged with Murder in the First Degree. During pretrial proceedings, he experienced significant and ongoing conflict with each of his several attorneys. On the eve of trial, Afeworki repeatedly threatened his attorney, who was permitted to withdraw as a result. Afeworki was, thereafter, required to represent himself. He was found guilty.

On appeal, Afeworki contends that this deprived him of his right to counsel. After threatening his attorney, Afeworki was also required to wear a “Band It” physical security restraint, not visible to observers, while in the courtroom. Afeworki argues that wearing the “Band It” violated his right to a fair trial.

The court reasoned that under State v. Finch, a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances. This is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution.”

In short, restraining a defendant during trial infringes upon this right to a fair trial for several reasons: (1)it violates a defendant’s presumption of innocence, (2) it restricts the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel during trial, (3) it interferes with the right to testify in one’s own behalf, and (4) it offends the dignity of the judicial process.

Washington case law also says that, given the constitutional implications of using restraints in a criminal trial, shackles or other restraining devices should only be used when necessary to prevent injury to those in the courtroom, to prevent disorderly conduct at trial, or to prevent an escape. That said, a trial court has broad discretion to determine which security measures are necessary to maintain decorum in the courtroom and to protect the safety of its occupants.

A trial court may consider the following factors in determining whether the use of restraints is justified: the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, their temperament and character, age, physical attributes, past record, past escapes or attempted escapes, evidence of a present plan to escape, threats to harm others or cause a disturbance, self-destructive tendencies, the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large, the size and the mood of the audience, the nature and physical security of the courtroom and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.

The court described the “Band-It” restraint system as a device that essentially as a 50,000-volt taser contained in a band that is worn under a sleeve or pant leg. Unlike most restraints, which are either visible to jurors or readily perceived by jurors, the Band-It is not visible when the wearer is clothed. Also, unlike other restraints, the Band-It does not in any way directly constrain the wearer’s movements. In fact, the Band-It can cause a wearer’s movements to be constrained only when it is activated.

Here, reasoned the court, the Band-It restraint system does not implicate the presumption of innocence because it is not visible to observers. Moreover, it does not implicate the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel because it does not physically constrain a defendant’s movements. Finally, the defendant’s antics, aggressive behavior and threats to his defense counsel justified the trail judge’s reasons for making the defendant wear the device:

“The court thereby fashioned a comprehensive order that protected both Afeworki’s constitutional rights and the safety of the people present in the courtroom for his trial. The trial court’s decision was reasonable. There was no error.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rhoden: Illegal 2-Step Confession Violates Miranda

Police Engage in Illegal Interrogation Tactics and Conviction Gets Reversed  — Jacksonville Criminal Lawyer Blog — April 13, 2018

In State v. Rhoden, the WA Court of Appeals Division II held that the trial court failed to suppress Mr. Rhoden’s statements made to police during an improper two- step interrogation procedure.

The facts were such that on February 26, 2013, the Pierce County Sheriff’ s Department served a search warrant on a residence in Puyallup. Five occupants of the residence, including Rhoden, were handcuffed.

Two interrogations happened. The first interview happened when Deputy Olesen questioned the handcuffed occupants in the living room of the home. Importantly, he failed to advise the suspects of their constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966).

For those who don’t know Miranda warnings (often abbreviated to “Miranda“, or “Mirandizing” a suspect) is the name of the formal warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the Miranda ruling. Its purpose is to ensure the accused are aware of, and reminded of, various rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that they know they can invoke them at any time during the interview.

At any rate, Mr. Rhoden told Deputy Olesen there were drugs and a gun in the bedroom.  At that point, Deputy Olesen then escorted Rhoden to the kitchen and questioned him a second time and after finally advising Rhoden of his Miranda rights.

During the post –Miranda second interview, Deputy Olesen asked Rhoden the same questions that he had asked Rhoden in the living room before giving the Miranda warnings.

Mr. Rhoden said there was about a gram of methamphetamine located in the dresser on the left side of his bed and that he had been smoking methamphetamine for approximately the last two to three months. During a search, officers found several items in a dresser, including ( 1) small baggies containing a substance later tested and confirmed to contain methamphetamine, (2) an electronic scale, ( 3) glass smoking devices, and (4) documents containing Rhoden’ s name and the address of the residence being searched.

Rhoden was charged with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) under RCW 69.50.401. Before trial, the trial court conducted a CrR 3. 5 hearing to determine the admissibility of Rhoden’ s statements to police.

The trial court held that Rhoden’ s pre-Miranda statements to police were not admissible at trial and that his post -Miranda statements to police were admissible at trial. At trial, the jury found Rhoden guilty of the charges. Mr. Rhoden appealed his conviction.

The Legal Issue

On appeal, the legal issue was whether the Miranda warnings given to Rhoden during the second interrogation were effective to inform Mr. Rhoden of his Fifth Amendment right to keep silent when he had just provided the same incriminating information in the first interrogation for which he was not given Miranda warnings.

The Rule: Missouri v. Seibert

The court looked to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604- 06, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 ( 2004) for guidance. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were ineffective to inform the defendant of their right against self-incrimination in circumstances similar to these. As here, the warnings in Seibert were given only after the suspect had confessed during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.

The Seibert Test

After reviewing Missouri v. Seibert, the court discussed the Seibert est. First, if a court determines that the use of the two- step interrogation procedure was deliberate, it then must ” determine, based on objective evidence, whether the midstream warning adequately and effectively apprised the suspect that he had a “genuine choice whether to follow up on his earlier admission.”

In making this determination, courts may consider whether any curative measures were taken to insure the suspect’ s understanding of his or her Miranda rights. Such curative measures may include a significant break in time and place between the pre- and post –Miranda questioning or an additional warning that the suspect’ s pre –Miranda statements could not be used against the suspect in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

The court compared the Missouri v. Seibert case to Mr. Rhoden’s facts. It reasoned that similar to Rhoden’s situation, the interrogating officers in Seibert questioned the defendant without Miranda warnings yet later gave Miranda warnings in a second interview before obtaining the suspect’ s confession without a significant break in time or place and without measures to assure the suspect that her non-Mirandized statements could not be used against her in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Applying Seibert to the Facts

The Court then applied the two-part Seibert test the facts at hand. It reasoned that here, the police deliberately used the two- step interrogation procedure. During the initial interrogation in the living room before giving Miranda rights, Olesen asked the five handcuffed suspects whether there were any drugs in the home, and Rhoden admitted that he had a small quantity of methamphetamine in his bedroom. After completing his questioning of the group in the living room, Olesen escorted Rhoden to the kitchen, read Rhoden his Miranda rights, and repeated the same questions he had asked in the living room, to which Rhoden answered consistently with his responses given before receiving the Miranda warnings.

Thus, reasoned the court, the objective evidence of “the timing, setting and completeness of the pre-warning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the overlapping content of the pre and post-warning statements” all support the conclusion that the two- step interrogation procedure used here was deliberate.

The court applied the second inquiry, which examined the effectiveness of the midstream Miranda warnings. In this inquiry, the question was whether any curative measures were present, such as a significant break in time and place between the pre- and post -Miranda questioning or an additional warning that the suspect’ s pre –Miranda statements could not be used against the suspect in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Here, the evidence at the CrR 3. 5 hearing showed that there was not a significant break in time or place between the pre- and post -Miranda interrogation. Perhaps more importantly, the evidence also showed that Olesen did not take any additional measures to insure that Rhoden understood his Miranda rights, such as advising him that his pre –Miranda statements could not be used against him. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Rhoden’ s post –Miranda statements.

Failure to Suppress Rhoden’s Statements Was Not Harmless Error

Finally, the Court of Appeals decided that the trial court’s decision to not suppress Rhoden’s statements was not harmless error. It reasoned that constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error. Here,  and under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same guilty finding absent evidence of Rhoden’ s challenged admissions.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the subtle – and unlawful – “2-Part Inquiry” of the arresting officer in this case. This technique is commonly used by law enforcement to unlawfully obtain statements from defendants and simultaneously circumvent Miranda. Good work, Court of Appeals!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.