Tag Archives: Bellingham Criminal Defense Attorney

State v. Jones: Slight Lane Travel = Unlawful Search

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, DUI, felony, Firearm, law enforcement, police, Search and Seizure, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

On the Road: Changing lanes in an intersection may be legal — but it's not necessarily safe – Press Enterprise

Good case. In State v. Jones, The WA Court of Appeals decided a police officer does not have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle that crosses the fog line three times in a mile for violating the safe lane travel statute, RCW 46.61.140(1).

Anacortes Police Officer Jacqueline Richter saw Donald Jones driving within the city limits of Anacortes, Washington. As she followed Jones in her patrol car for about a mile, she observed Jones’s vehicle “pass over the fog line approximately an inch” three times, each time “correcting its position with a slow drift.” She stopped Jones and told him that she had stopped his vehicle “due to erratic lane travel.” There were no other vehicles on the roadway at the time. Jones agreed to perform field sobriety tests. There was no indication of intoxication.

Officer Sam King arrived to assist Richter. King saw a rifle in the backseat of Jones’s truck. Jones consented to a vehicle search “for the sole purpose of recovering the rifle.” A records check revealed that Jones did not have a valid driver’s license. In the course of their conversation, Jones told King that he had a felony conviction in Idaho for possession of a controlled substance. The State charged Jones with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the Second Degree.

Jones moved to suppress the fruits of the vehicle search. Citing State v. Prado, Jones challenged the lawfulness of the stop. The trial court denied Jones’s motion. At trial he was found guilty. He appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that stopping Jones’s vehicle was unlawful under RCW 46.61.040(1) and State v. Prado. the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence of the firearm. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court.

The Court reasoned that a traffic stop is a seizure. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires either a warrant or proof that the seizure qualifies under one of the few “‘jealously and carefully drawn'” exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Here, said the Court, there was no evidence of “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” to support a stop and search of Jones’s vehicle. The State presented no evidence about Officer Richter’s training and experience in identifying impaired drivers. Officer Richter did not testify that she suspected Jones was impaired or that she stopped him for this reason. The State presented no evidence of dangerous driving or any other traffic infraction. Finally, the trial court did not find that Officer Richter stopped Jones because of a reasonable suspicion that he was DUI.

Because the State failed to justify its warrantless seizure of Jones, the trial court should have suppressed the evidence discovered because of that seizure.

My opinion? Good decision. I’m happy that the Court of Appeals is finally supporting its decision in State v. Prado. In that case, a police officer stopped a car that had crossed a lane divider line in an exit lane by approximately two tire widths for one second. The State charged the driver with driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The district court denied Prado’s motion to suppress, and Prado was convicted.  He appealed.

Ultimately, in deciding Prado the Court of Appeals held that “minor incursions over a lane line” do not, by themselves, constitute a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop. Also, “a vehicle crossing over a lane once for one second by two tire widths does not, without more, constitute a traffic violation justifying a stop by a police officer.”

Prado was an excellent decision in 2008. Unfortunately, Prado hasn’t been well-supported by other court decisions. Indeed, in my own practice, judges deciding suppression issues seem to have turned a blind eye to Prado decision. Hopefully, State v. Jones shall reinforce Prado and give it the respect it deserves.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Rodriguez v. United States: Nonconsensual Dog Sniff of Car Held Unconstitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that absent reasonable suspicion, police extending a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) the 4th Amendment does Fourth Amendment does not tolerate a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop, (2) a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violated the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures, (3) a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the issuing of a ticket for the violation, and (4) a stop may, however, be prolonged for a dog sniff when there is independent information giving rise to an individualized suspicion that the occupants of the car are involved in a drug offense.

The 6-3 ruling is indeed a big win for the 4th Amendment.

In this case, Officer Struble, a K-9 officer, stopped the defendant Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder. After issuing a warning for the traffic offense Officer Strubble asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. Struble detained him until another police officer arrived. Struble’s dog performed a search and alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The dog found methamphetamine.

Seven or eight minutes elapsed between the time Struble issued the warning and the dog alerting to the presence of contraband.

Rodriguez faced several federal drug charges. Although he moved to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle on the basis that Officer Struble prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff search, the lower court denied Rodriguez’s motion. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the search and seizure issues.

The Court reasoned that a routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio than an arrest. Its duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission,” which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

The court further reasoned that a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission. Also, the Court was concerned that seizing citizens for traffic stops and holding them to conduct a more intrusive search with no evidence of criminal activity beyond the mere traffic stop is unlawful: “The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop.

My opinion? Great ruling! It’s rare that the Supreme Court upholds the 4th Amendment these days. Fortunately, this favorable outcome happened because the suspect asserted his rights by refusing the dog sniff. Past rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court limit 4th Amendment protections where suspects DID NOT assert their rights. See Florida v. Bostick.

Yet here’s a case where the suspect did flex their rights. Look at the outcome! It’s a testament – a reminder, if you will – that asserting your rights makes a difference. Great case.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Study: Marijuana and Alcohol Doubles Odds for DUI

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, marijuana, Race & Law, Reckless Driving, Studies, Traffic Infractions, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

A Marijuana DUI is Tough to Prove | DUI Lawyer

Marijuana is becoming increasingly legalized in the US for medical and recreational use. A new study analyzes the simultaneous use of alcohol and marijuana. In short, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving, social consequences, and harm to self and others.

The researchers analyzed data from the 2005 and 2010 National Alcohol Survey (n=8,626; 4,522 females, 4,104 males). This was a Random Digit Dial, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview survey of individuals aged 18 and older from all 50 states and DC. Blacks and Hispanics were over-sampled. The study authors assessed differences in demographics, alcohol-related social consequences, harms to self, and drunk driving across simultaneous, concurrent, and alcohol-only using groups.

“We looked at three groups of adults,” explained Meenakshi S. Subbaraman, a corresponding author for the study and associate scientist at the Alcohol Research Group, a program of the Public Health Institute. “One, those who used only alcohol in the previous 12 months; two, those who used both alcohol and cannabis but always separately, or concurrently; and three, those who used both alcohol and cannabis and usually together, or simultaneously.

According to the study, simultaneous users did not necessarily always use cannabis while they drank; the groups were based on how often they drank when using cannabis, and not vice versa.

The study authors found that, compared to adults who solely used alcohol, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving, social consequences, and harms to self. Compared to concurrent users, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving. Simultaneous users also had the heaviest drinking patterns in terms of quantity and frequency.

The research brought interesting conclusions. “If cannabis use becomes more prevalent as U.S. states and other countries continue to legalize it, then we need to be prepared to advise people appropriately,” cautioned Subbaraman. “If you use both substances together, your risk of drunk driving, and possibly other consequences, may be higher than if you stick to using one at a time.”

The study appears in the May 2015 online issue of the journal Alcoholism: Clinical & Experimental Research.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Dehydrated Drivers As Bad On The Road As Drunk Drivers, Study Suggests

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Dehydrated Driving Is Just as Dangerous as Drunk Driving | Shape

New research suggests that driving while dehydrated is equally as destructive as driving while drunk. Drivers who had consumed alcohol over the legal limit as well as drivers who were dehydrated made twice as many driving mistakes as those who were hydrated.

The Telegraph reports that not drinking enough water can cause drivers to make more mistakes, increasing their chances of a collision. The study revealed that drivers who had only had 25ml of water an hour made more than double the number of mistakes on the road than those who were hydrated – the same amount as those who have been drink driving.

Professor Ron Maughan, Emeritus Professor of Sport and Exercise Nutrition, who led the study at Loughborough University, said: “We all deplore drink driving, but we don’t usually think about the effects of other things that affect our driving skills, and one of those is not drinking and dehydration.

“There is no question that driving while incapable through drink or drugs increases the risk of accidents, but our findings highlight an unrecognised danger and suggest that drivers should be encouraged to make sure they are properly hydrated.

Dehydration can also result in impaired mental functioning, changes in mood, and reductions in concentration, alertness and short-term memory, say the researchers who carried out the first study into dehydration, driving errors and accident risk.

My opinion? Although I don’t want to minimize the impact that DUI has on its victims and society, let’s keep our information in perspective. Along with the above study, numerous other studies performed by the the National Highway Traffic Safety Institute suggest that eating, talking on a cellphone and/or texting while driving is just as distracting – if not more distracting – than driving while under the influence of intoxicants.

Now, research suggests that dehydration – being thirsty – creates the same physiological symptoms among drivers that intoxicants do.

Interesting.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. MacDonald: Police Cannot Testify for Victims at Sentencing

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DNA, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, law enforcement, Sentencing, Violent Crime, Washington Supreme Court, , ,
In a close opinion, the WA Supreme Court ruled in State v. MacDonald that an investigating officer may not request the judge for a sentence greater than that in the State’s plea agreement. Even when the investigating officer claims to be speaking on the victim’s behalf, statements that are contrary to the plea agreement will constitute a breach of the agreement.
 In 1978, Arlene Roberts was found dead in her home. The police collected several latent fingerprints from bank statements and traveler’s checks within her trailer but never identified a suspect. The case went inactive.
 In 2010, detective Scott Tompkins reviewed the case files and matched the fingerprints to MacDonald.
The Prosecutor charged MacDonald with Murder in the First Degree.
 After the trial began, the parties entered into plea negotiations. The State agreed that the prosecutor would change the charge from first degree felony murder to second degree manslaughter and recommend a five-year suspended sentence in exchange for an Alford plea. MacDonald accepted the plea agreement.
 At sentencing, Deputy Prosecutor Kristin Richardson informed the court that detective Tompkins wished to speak on behalf of the victim pursuant to RCW 9.94A.500. Though detective Tompkins was involved throughout the plea negotiations and Richardson intended for Tompkins to sit at counsel’s table pursuant to Evidence Rule 615 in order to assist her, Prosecutor Richardson asserted that she did not know what Tompkins wanted to say. MacDonald objected, but the trial court permitted Tompkins to testify as a victim advocate over MacDonald’s objection.
Tompkins immediately asked the court to impose the maximum sentence. He described what happened to the victim and gave the court marked photographs of the victim’s body as police found her. Tompkins informed the court that the medical examiner’s report contained 18 paragraphs detailing her injuries and then asserted that Roberts “died a horrific death.”
The trial court imposed the maximum sentence, giving MacDonald 60 months in prison with a minimum sentence of 55 months and credit for time served. Macdonald moved to withdraw his plea. The Court of Appeals denied MacDonald’s motion.

The WA Supremes decided to reverse the Court of Appeals and permit MacDonald to decide whether to withdraw his guilty plea or to seek specific performance. The court agreed with the reasoning in State v.  Sanchez that investigating officers cannot make sentence recommendations contrary to a plea agreement. The Court also reasoned that the same due process concerns stopping an investigating officer from undermining a plea agreement also stop that officer from making unsolicited remarks on a victim’s behalf to the court at sentencing that are contrary to the plea agreement. Washington’s crime victims’ rights laws do not permit the State to breach a plea agreement.

My opinion? Although I offer my deepest condolences to the family of the victim, I must agree with the WA Supremes on this.

A plea agreement is a contract between the State and the defendant. The Prosecutor thus has a contractual duty of good faith. Prosecutor cannot undercut the terms of the agreement, either explicitly or implicitly, or by conduct showing intent to circumvent the terms of the plea agreement. In Washington, the statutory relationship between prosecutors and investigating officers binds investigating officers to plea agreements in a criminal case.

That said, detective Tompkins was acting in the role of substantially assisting the prosecution. This is unlawful. It violates procedural due process. Apparently, the WA Supremes agreed. Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ellison: No Right to Allocution

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Sex Crimes, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

In State v. Ellison, the WA Court of Appeals decided a defendant lost his right to give a statement at his sentencing because his lengthy presentation changed from religious songs and unrelated topics to protests of his innocence and an accusation that his attorney was lying to the court.

At a bench trial, Mr Ellison was convicted of Rape in the Second Degree and Child Molestation in the Second Degree. At his sentencing, the court invited Ellison to allocute.

For those who don’t know, “Allocution” is defined as the right of a criminal defendant to make a personal argument or statement to the court before the pronouncement of sentence. It is the defendant’ s opportunity to plead for mercy and present any information to try mitigating the sentence.

Here, Ellison sang a short religious song and spoke about various topics not clearly related to the sentencing proceeding. After making extensive remarks, Ellison began to protest his innocence and accuse his trial attorney of lying to the court. At that point, the court cut Ellison off, explained that the matters he related were irrelevant to the issues at hand, and pronounced the sentence. Ellison asked for permission to finish his remarks, but the court declined. The court imposed life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Ellison appealed.

The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and denied Ellison’s appeal. it reasoned that the sentencing court allowed Ellison to speak for some time, cutting him off only when he began using the opportunity to testify about the facts of the case and complain about the conduct of his trial attorney. Unfortunately, those were not legitimate purposes for allocution. Because the court let Ellison speak without interruption until it was clear he was using the allocution for improper purposes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in cutting short Ellison’ s allocution.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Didlake v. DOL: Fees for DOL Hearings Held Constitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Constitutional Rights, Court Fines, Department of Licensing, Due Process, DUI, Ignition Interlock Device, law enforcement, misdemeanor, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Cost of a DUI

Here’s an interesting opinion on the ever-increasing financial costs of fighting DUI crimes and the Department of Licencing’s (DOL) automatic suspension of a DUI defendant’s driver’s license.

In Didlake v. Department of Licensing, the Court of Appeals held that Washington’s Implied Consent Statute, RCW 46.20.308, which requires drivers arrested for DUI to pay a $200-$375 statutory fee in order to have an administrative hearing on license suspension, does NOT violate due process because of the driving privilege is not a fundamental right and DOL waives the fee for indigent drivers.

In 2010 – 2011 police arrested James Didlake and other defendants for DUI. Washington’s Implied Consent Statute, RCW 46.20.308, requires that a driver arrested for Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (DUI) pay a filing fee to obtain an administrative review hearing to prevent a driver’s license suspension or revocation. And as required by Washington’s implied consent law, the Department initiated license suspension proceedings against them. Each defendant paid a $200 fee for an administrative review hearing. After they prevailed at their hearings, the Department rescinded their license suspensions.

Didlake filed a class action lawsuit against the DOL, asking for injunctive and declaratory relief, plus a refund and damages. He alleged that the $200 statutory fee for an administrative hearing violates due process. Didlake filed a motion for class certification under CR 23. After filing its answer, the DOL filed a motion to dismiss Didlake’s lawsuit under CR 12(b)(6).

On April 5, 2013, the trial court granted the DOL’s motion to dismiss. Didlake asked the Washington Supreme Court for direct review. On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.

In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals gave lots of background on the procedural aspects of challeging DOL license suspensions. The court reasoned that the implied consent law provides certain procedural protections to drivers. The DOL must give the driver written notice that it intends to suspend or revoke the driver’s license. The DOL must also notify the driver of the right to a hearing and specify the steps to obtain one. Within 20 days of this notice, the driver may request in writing a formal hearing before the DOL. As part of the request, the driver must pay a mandatory fee. The DOL may waive the fee, however, for drivers who are indigent.

At the hearing, the driver may have assistance of counsel, question witnesses, present evidence, and testify. The hearing officer determines if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence and if the driver refused to take a test or took a test that revealed a BAC of 0.08 or higher. After the hearing, the DOL “shall order that the suspension, revocation, or denial either be rescinded or sustained.”

Here, the Court reasoned that Washington courts have almost always have upheld the constitutionality of filing fees. Courts have consistently distinguished between fundamental interests and interests that are “solely monetary,” involving “economics and social welfare,” or even “important” or “substantial.” If the interest involved is fundamental, due process requires access for all. Here, the court reasoned, a fee waiver for indigent litigants accomplishes this mandate. If the interest is not fundamental, “a monetary prerequisite to an appeal is thus permissible, even for indigent appellants.

Additionally, Courts have identified the driving privilege as an “important” and “substantial” but not fundamental right. Consequently, the court reasoned, this contradicts Didlake’s assertion that the filing fee has a “chilling effect” on drivers’ exercise of their due process rights. Thus, he fails to establish a facial challenge on due process grounds. And because he paid the fee and received a hearing that complied with due process, he does not show that the fee requirement is unconstitutional as applied to him. “Whether facial or as-applied, Didlake’s due process challenges fail.”

 The Court concluded that because Didlake failed to establish that the implied consent statute’s fee requirement violates procedural due process, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing Didlake’s class action claim.

My opinion? Speaking as a DUI attorney, DOL hearings and license suspensions are just another way for the State to profit from defendants charged with DUI. These days, a DOL hearing costs $375. Additionally, a defendant’s window of time to apply for these hearings is small – only 20 days after the DUI incident happened. Finally, DOL hearings are very difficult to win. There must be some glaring legal weakness in the case regarding (1) the pullover of the defendant’s vehicle, (2) the evidence of DUI, (3) whether the officer read the Implied Consent Warnings, and/or (4) whether the defendant tested over .08 BAC or refused the BAC machine.

Unfortunately, given the Court’s analysis above, it appears the wheels of justice shall continue to financially grind upon defendants facing license suspensions from DUI charges.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

WA Legislature Considers Banning “Palcohol”

Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, Legislation, Uncategorized, , ,
Palcohol

According to the Bellingham Herald, Washington is one of a growing number of states to try banning a new powdered alcohol product before it reaches liquor-store shelves.

Palcohol is a new powdered version of alcohol. Palcohol will be made in two different formulations, a Beverage Formulation and an Industrial Formulation. Like other powdered beverages, it must be first dissolved in water prior to consumption. One package weighs about an ounce. Powdered alcohol, it claims, could lighten the loads of hikers and airlines, as well as other consumers and sellers for whom the bulk and weight of booze are burdensome, such as refreshment-sellers who operate on islands.

Several Washington legislators, however, say Palcohol is a dangerously sneaky mechanism for getting drunk and have proposed legislation to ban it before it arrives. The House Committee on Commerce and Gaming unanimously endorsed amendments to turn SB 5292, a regulatory measure that passed the Senate unopposed, into a ban on powdered alcohol for all purposes except research.

“This is not a crafted bourbon, or a scotch, or a tequila or something that’s special,” said Rep. Jeff Holy, R-Cheney, at a public hearing this week. “Powdered alcohol is simply for the purpose of intoxication, period. You’re not crafting the finer liquors.”

If the bill becomes law, Washington would join at least six other states that have prohibited powdered alcohol, including the announcement this week by Maryland officials that alcohol distributors there have agreed to a voluntary ban on the substance. More than two dozen other states have introduced bills this year to ban powdered alcohol, which was first patented in 1972 by General Foods but has not seen widespread retail sales in the U.S.

My opinion? It seems inappropriate to speculate that snorting alcohol is going to become a raging epidemic. There’s no evidence. It also seems hypocritical to ban powdered alcohol without banning alcohol itself. Remember how Prohibition worked? Was that a great success?

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rich: No Reckless Endangerment Found in DUI Case

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DUI, Jury Trial, law enforcement, police, Reckless Endangerment, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Reckless Endangerment for the Lord | JD Espinoza

In State v. Rich, the WA Court of Appeals ruled there is no ‘per se’ liability for Reckless Endangerment based on proof of DUI.

Here the defendant was pulled over for driving a stolen vehicle. She was arrested for DUI because she exhibited the effects of having consumed alcohol and her BAC test was over .15. She also had a 9-year-old child in the front seat. The Prosecutor charged the defendant with Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, DUI and Reckless Endangerment.

During trial, the Prosecutor argued that because Rich operated a vehicle while legally intoxicated in violation of the DUI statute, her conduct also satisfies the elements of reckless endangerment. The State also points to the following pieces of “additional evidence” that would support a finding that Rich’s conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury: (1) Rich endangered a passenger and motorists on a “major public roadway,” (2) she was heavily intoxicated, and (3) she exceeded the speed limit. The jury found Rich guilty of both Reckless Endangerment and DUI.

The case went up on appeal on the issue of whether a jury can find rich guilty on both crimes when the overwhelming evidence suggested she was only guilty of DUI.

Some background is necessary. The Reckless Endangerment statute, RCW 9A.36.050, provides as follows:

A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.

Another provision in the criminal code, RCW 9A.08.010, defines levels of culpability, including recklessness. RCW 9A.08.010 provides, in relevant part:

RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.

Here, the Court reasoned that the Prosecutor offered no evidence whatsoever about the presence of other vehicles, motorists, or pedestrians, nor any evidence about the type of road or traffic conditions. Additionally, the police officer who observed Rich drive did not indicate that Rich’s manner of driving posed any danger or caused him to suspect that Rich was impaired.

And even if the jury could infer from an officer’s testimony that Rich was speeding 15 miles per hour faster than the speed limit, the deputy followed Rich because he believed the car was stolen, not because of speeding or for any reason related to the manner in which the car was being operated. This evidence would not, therefore, allow a trier of fact to conclude that Rich’s speed created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury.

Because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rich recklessly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious injury to another person, the Reckless Endangerment conviction must be vacated.

My opinion? Good decision. there is no “per se” liability for Reckless Endangerment based on proof of violation of the DUI statute. If the penalties for DUI are thought of as too lenient then the legislature can increase them. If there should be additional offenses tied to DUI, say DUI with a passenger, then they likewise can be implemented by the legislature through the democratic process.

However, courts should remain unwilling to impose such value judgments upon the citizens by shoehorning conduct into the somewhat broad definitions of certain criminal offenses.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Whatcom County Jail: An Inmate’s Perspective

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The Bellingham Herald discussed Whatcom County Jail’s deplorable and dangerous conditions.

In the article Staff & Inmates Say It’s Time For A New Whatcom County Jail, Sheriff Bill Elfo is reported as saying the current Whatcom County Jail is consistently packed beyond its designed capacity, with conditions that pose safety issues for guards and inmates.

On March 18, Elfo sat down with Bellingham City Council during a special meeting to discuss the need for a new county jail and request the city’s financial support.

The jail’s current legal capacity is somewhere between 298 and 362 inmates, but the average daily population in 2014 was 403 people.

Inmates have broken out the windows in their cells onto the street below and picked away at the grout in their cinder block walls, creating small pass-throughs from cell to cell; sewer lines have backed up into the sheriff’s office; nearly every space – shower rooms, indoor recreation areas – has been used to house inmates at one time or another as the population has fluctuated well beyond capacity.

The video above captures commentary from jail staff, inmates and administration weighing in on the issue.

My opinion? Sure, certain aspects of the criminal justice system are punitive. They’re made to have inmates consider their surroundings and force them to take accountability for the crimes they’re committed.

Nevertheless, the old and overcrowded jail creates significant Human Rights issues and potentially extraordinary liability costs if a worst-case-scenario tragedy happened. According to the National Institute of Corrections recent evaluation of the jail, it was determined that if a fire or other emergency were to happen, such as an earthquake, the loss of life at the jail would be “catastrophic.’ Though the building is largely cinder block, mortar and concrete, if mattresses, clothing and/or other items were set on fire, smoke could easily fill a room or floor of the building and suffocate those inside.

It’s time for a new jail with better living conditions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.