Category Archives: Whatcom County Criminal Defense

State v. Wisdom: Unlawful Search of Zipped Shaving Kit Bag

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Miranda, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

Interesting opinion. In State v. Wisdom, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided the removal and warrantless inspection of a zipped shut shaving kit bag found in the front seat of a stolen vehicle the defendant was driving was not a lawful search incident to arrest because  the defendant sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. The methamphetamine found in the zipped shut shaving kit is not lawful pursuant to the impound inventory doctrine, as unzipping the kit exceeded the lawful scope of an impound.

Defendant Heath Wisdom drove a Chevrolet pickup truck with an ATV in its back. Someone earlier reported both vehicles as stolen. Yakima County Sheriff Deputy Nate Boyer, while on patrol, passed the pickup, and Boyer’s automated license plate reader identified the pickup as stolen. Officer Boyer pulled Wisdom over and arrested him for possession of a stolen vehicle. Boyer handcuffed Wisdom, searched his body, and escorted him to the patrol vehicle. Officer Boyer found on Wisdom’s body a pipe that Wisdom admitted he used for smoking methamphetamine.

Deputy Nate Boyer advised Heath Wisdom of his Miranda rights. Officer Boyer asked if there were drugs in the truck, and Wisdom replied that methamphetamine lay on the front seat. Officer Boyer looked inside the cab of the truck and saw filters, some cleaner, and a black “shaving kit type” bag. Officer Boyer concluded that the bag contained the methamphetamine. The toiletry bag was closed, but Boyer spied money through the mesh side of the bag.

After photographing the truck, Deputy Boyer removed the bag from the vehicle, opened it, and found methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, drug paraphernalia, and two thousand seven hundred dollars in cash. Heath Wisdom told Deputy Boyer that he owned the black bag. Deputy Boyer had not asked Wisdom if he owned the black bag before searching inside the bag.

Deputy Boyer never obtained a warrant for his search, nor did he request Heath Wisdom’s consent before opening the black bag. Law enforcement impounded the truck and ATV, since the legal owner could not be located.

The State of Washington charged Heath Wisdom with three counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of RCW 69.50.4013(1) (cocaine, ecstasy, and heroin) and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) (methamphetamine). Wisdom moved under CrR 3.6 to suppress all evidence found in the black toiletry bag. However, the trial court denied Heath Wisdom’s motion to suppress. The WA Court of Appeals accepted review of this case.

First, the Court reasoned that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did NOT excuse police from obtaining a search warrant before unzipping and perusing the inside of the shaving kit bag. The court’s opinion was quite lengthy in explaining the need for society to trust police, and that doing so required officers to obtain search warrants in cases like this, and that failure to do so violates a defendants rights under article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Court emphasized how the caselaw treats “luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers” as unique for purposes of police searches. Washington courts recognize an individual’s privacy interest in his closed luggage, whether locked or unlocked. Indeed, the Court gave a very colorful analyses on this subject:

A person does not rummage through a woman’s purse, because ofsecrets obtained therein. A man’s shaving kit bag can be likened to a woman’s purse. The kit bag could obtain prescription drugs, condoms or other items the owner wishes shielded from the public. The bag is intended to safeguard the privacy of personal effects. Literature, medicines, and other things found inside a bag may reveal much about a person’s activities, associations and beliefs.

The Court further reasoned that Washington allows a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include exigent circumstances, searches incident to an arrest, inventory searches, plain view searches, and Terry stops. Furthermore, under Arizona v. Gant, a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest is authorized when the arrestee would be able to obtain a weapon from the vehicle or reach evidence ofthe crime of arrest to conceal or destroy it. Here, Heath Wisdom sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. He lacked access to the bag.

Furthermore, under State v. Snapp, the Court reasoned the WA Constitution disapproves expansive application of the search-incident-to arrest exception to the period of time after the arrestee is secured and attendant risks to officers have passed. When a search can be delayed without running afoul of concerns for officer safety or to preserve evidence of the crime of arrest from concealment or destruction by the arrestee, and does not fall within another applicable exception, the warrant must be obtained. The police officer can prevent destruction of evidence by holding the bag as a sealed unit until obtaining a warrant.

Finally, the Court ruled that the police officer’s inventorying of the pickup’s contents did NOT excuse the need to obtain a search warrant. Inventory searches, unlike other searches, are not conducted to discover evidence of crime. Although a routine inventory search does not require a warrant, a police department policy should not, however, justify an unconstitutional search. The permitted extent of an inventory search pursuant to police department policy must be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify the exception warrant clause.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held the warrantless search inside of Mr. Wisdom’s black bag was not justified by either a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Wisdom’s motion to suppress evidence, reversed his four convictions, and dismissed all charges filed against him.

Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Fuentes & Sandoz: Are Terry Stops Legal in High-Crime Areas?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, marijuana, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

The WA Supreme Court consolidated two search & seizure cases with very similar facts. Both cases involve Terry stops of a defendants who entered a high-crime areas and visited homes occupied by suspected drug dealers.

TERRY STOPS

 Generally, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of Washington’s constitution, an officer may not seize a person without a warrant. However, exceptions exist. A Terry investigative stop is one of the exceptions.

For those who don’t know, a “Terry stop” is a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. Picture an officer walking up to you and asking for your I.D. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that police may briefly detain a person who they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity. Also, police may conduct a limited search of the suspect’s outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be “armed and dangerous”. When a search for weapons is authorized, the procedure is known as a “stop and frisk.”

To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” that would indicate to a reasonable person that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Reasonable suspicion depends on the “totality of the circumstances”, and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous.

State v. Fuentes

In this case, police officers were conducting a stakeout of a known drug house. They saw Marisa Fuentes park her car across the street from the apartment. She walked up to the apartment, entered, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car. She opened the trunk of her car and removed a small plastic bag. The bag contained something about the size of a small football. Then Fuentes reentered the apartment, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car with a bag that had noticeably less content than when she entered the apartment.

Based on what officers observed, police stopped Fuentes’ car on suspicion of narcotics activity. An officer advised Fuentes that he needed to talk with her. For safety reasons, the officer requested that Fuentes come to the police vehicle, which she did. The officer read Fuentes her Miranda rights. Fuentas waived those rights and admitted she delivered marijuana to Fenton’s apartment.

The State charged Fuentes with Delivery of Marijuana. Fuentes moved to suppress evidence uncovered from the investigative stop of her car, including her statement about delivering marijuana, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop of her vehicle. The trial court concluded that officers had reasonable   suspicion to stop the vehicle and therefore denied the motion to suppress. Fuentes was subsequently convicted of delivery of marijuana at a stipulated facts trial. She appealed.

The WA Supreme Court decided the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to Fuentes before the stop occurred.

The officers in this case. They knew about past drug activity at Fenton’s apartment. Police made controlled buys from Fenton and conducted a search of the apartment 11 months before and found drugs. The officers also testified they had recent information from individuals arrested on drug-related charges that Fenton was still dealing drugs. Additionally, officers observed foot traffic that morning (10 visits between 10 p.m. and midnight) that suggested ongoing drug transactions.

Additionally, officers could reasonably infer that Fuentes participated in the ongoing drug transactions: Fuentes entered the apartment briefly, then returned to her car. She then carried a plastic bag into the apartment, and she left with a bag that had noticeably less content. Her stay lasted approximately five minutes. From these observations, officers could form a reasonable suspicion that Fuentes made a delivery at the apartment.

The WA Supremes affirmed the Court of Appeals in Fuentes because, under the totality of circumstances, the officers had individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Sandoz

In this case, around 11:30 p.m., Officer Chris Pryzgocld drove his patrol car past a six-unit apartment building in SeaTac. A high number of documented criminal incidents occurred in the area of this apartment building, including drug-related activity.

He saw a white vehicle parked illegally. The driver of the Jeep slumped down, as if to hide from the officer’s view, as the officer drove by. The officer parked his marked patrol car about 20 yards away. After waiting, he made contact with the slumped-over driver.

The officer observed Steven Sandoz leaving the apartment. The officer asked Sandoz what was going on. Sandoz replied that his friend gave him a ride to collect $20 from a friend. After more conversation, Sandoz admitted that he had a drug problem and said that he had a crack pipe in his pocket. Sandoz took out the pipe, and the officer arrested Sandoz for possession of drug paraphernalia. During a search incident to arrest, the officer felt something in Sandoz’s groin area. The officer read Sandoz his Miranda rights, and Sandoz admitted that he had two small envelopes of cocaine in his underwear.

Sandoz was arrested and charged with Possession of Cocaine. Although he tried suppressing the evidence at pretrial, the Judge denied the motion for the following reasons: (1) the officer knew the area had extremely high drug activity based on 911 calls and drug dealing investigations, (2) the officer knew that the apartment Sandoz exited belonged to Ms. Meadows, who had numerous drug-related convictions, including possession with intent to deliver, (3) the officer had express authority from the complex owner to trespass nonoccupants for “loitering” at the complex, (4) the Jeep did not belong to any of the tenants at the complex, (5) the driver of the Jeep slouched down when the officer drove past, (6) the driver and Sandoz had conflicting stories for why they were in the area, (7) Sandoz looked surprised when he saw the officer, and (8) Sandoz visibly shook and looked pale when the officer talked to him.

Sandoz was found guilty at a bench trial he appealed. The WA Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the WA Supreme Court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity individualized to Sandoz to justify his Terry stop. First, Sandoz’s surprise at seeing the officer did not suggest criminal behavior. Next, the driver’s story did not conflict with Sandoz’s story. The driver said that his friend called him for a ride, and Sandoz said his friend gave him a ride to the apartment to collect $20. Rather than conflict, the stories confirmed one another.

Furthermore, as to Sandoz’s physical appearance, the officer did not attribute Sandoz’s pallor or shaking to drugs or to any illicit conduct. Thus, this fact does not add to circumstances that suggest criminal activity. The fact that the officer did not recognize the Jeep might justify the officer’s contact with the driver, but the oflicer did not connect this fact with anything the officer observed about Sandoz.

Additionally, Sandoz did not loiter or trespass. “Loiter” means “to remain in or near a place in an idle or apparently idle manner.” Sandoz did not remain idle: he left the apartment and walked immediately to the Jeep without stopping. Although the individuals in the Jeep may have loitered, that issue is not before the court. Similarly, Sandoz did not appear to trespass: he entered a tenant’s apartment, stayed inside at least 15 minutes without any known discord, and left directly to the Jeep. The facts suggest that Sandoz was an invited guest of Ms. Meadows, and as the officer stated, simply going into an apartment does not equal wrongdoing.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although Sandoz was visiting the apartment of a suspected drug dealer late at night in a high-crime area, this fact by itself does not justify a Terry stop. Other facts must exist to suggest criminal behavior. An officer’s hunch does not justify a stop. The totality of the circumstances in this case do not justify a Terry stop.

The WA Supremes concluded officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Sandoz engaged in criminal activity and reversed the Court of Appeals decision affirming his guilt.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. I.B.: Shaking Your Head Means “No” Under Miranda

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Due Process, felony, Interrogation, Juvenile, law enforcement, Miranda, police, Property Crimes, Self-Incrimination, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. I.B., the WA Court of Appeals decided a juvenile suspect’s shaking of his head in the negative after police asked him, post Miranda, if he was willing to talk was an unequivocal assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights.

Here, 15-year-old defendant I.B. was taken into custody as a suspect in a Residential Burglary crime. While being interrogated, I.B. shook his head in the negative after police asked him if he was willing to talk. Nevertheless, police continued their questioning and I.B. made inculpatory statements against his best interests. The trial court suppressed I.B.’s statements at his 3.5 Hearing and concluded that I.B’s shake of the head signaled an assertion of his right to remain silent. Later, I’B’s case was dismissed. The State appealed the trial court’s suppression.

The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether I.B.’s shaking his head in the negative after being asked if he was willing to talk was an unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent. The court decided it was.

The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” To counteract the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, police must administer Miranda warnings. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Miranda requires that the defendant “be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, police may not continue the interrogation or make repeated efforts to wear down the suspect.

Furthermore, the court reasoned a suspect need not verbally invoke his right to remain silent. In fact, Miranda sets a low bar for invocation of the right: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added). However, suspects must “unambiguously” express their desire to be silent. The test as to whether a suspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent was unequivocal is an objective one, asking whether'” a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement'” to be an invocation of Miranda rights. Once a suspect has clearly invoked the right to remain silent, police questioning must immediately cease.

Here, I.B. unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. Nothing in the circumstances leading up to I.B.’s invocation rendered his head movement ambiguous. The police officers read I.B. his Miranda rights and I.B. understood his rights. Both officers testified they understand shaking the head side to side to communicate the word ‘No.’ This affirmative conduct unambiguously signaled LB.’s desire for the questioning to cease. Consequently, the trial court properly suppressed LB.’s custodial statements.

My opinion? Good decision. In the context of interrogations, shaking one’s head side to side means no. There’s no other reasonable interpretation.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. A.A.: Unlawful Search of Juvenile

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Juvenile, Methamphetamine, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. AA, the Washington Court of Appeals decided an officer who detained a runaway juvenile under RCW 13.32A, the Family Reconciliation Act, unlawfully removed methamphetamine and marijuana from the youth’s pocket. The court reversed his conviction.

In State v. AA, the juvenile defendant A.A. was reported as a runaway. Officer Escamilla found A.A. walking down an alley a few blocks north of his mother’s house. The Officer detains AA and conducts a search before taking AA to the Crisis Residential Center (CRC), a detention center for minors.

Officer Escamilla searched A.A. near his patrol car. During the search, the officer found methamphetamine in a coin pocket of A.A.’s pants and marijuana in another pocket. The officer then transported A.A. to a juvenile detention center, rather than the CRC. The State charged A.A. with two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.

The trial court denied AA’s motion to suppress the evidence. At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Officer Escamilla testified that A.A. was “just walking down an alley” and appeared “upset,” but that he was not engaged in criminal activity and did not appear dangerous to himself or others. At a bench trial, A.A .was found guilty on both drug charges. He appealed. The Court of Appeals took the case.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court mistakenly concluded Officer Escamilla’s search of  A.A. was reasonable under the Family Reconciliation Act (the Act) because A.A. was going to be transported to the CRC, a secure facility for juveniles, which requires a search of juveniles before admission.

The Court of Appeals decided that while an officer may lawfully conduct a pat-down search for weapons prior to transporting the youth, the officer may not conduct a full search.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution  prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Under these provisions, warrantless searches are “per se” unreasonable. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The exception allows an officer to search an arrestee for weapons as a measure to protect the officer or to search for evidence that may be destroyed. The community caretaking function, which allows for limited searches when it is necessary for police officers to render emergency aid or assistance, is also a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. These types of searches are “divorced” from a criminal investigation. Finally, the State has the burden of proving the search was lawful.

The Court reasoned that here, the particular circumstances did not justify the search of A.A.’s pockets. Once the officer conducted the pat-down search and determined that A.A. did not have a weapon, the search should have stopped. A.A. had not committed a crime and, therefore, there was no need to preserve evidence of a crime. A.A. did not exhibit signs of dangerousness to himself or others. The only concern was for officer safety.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although A.A. would be transported to a detention facility with other minors, this facility “was a noncriminal protective custody situation, which requires us to accord maximum weight to A.A.’s privacy interest in evaluating the reasonableness of the search.”

The Court of Appeals reversed A.A.’s conviction.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The law was simple, and simply applied. The State failed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. Period. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Irby: A Juror’s Bias Reverses Conviction

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Selection, Jury Trial, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Irby, The WA Court of Appeals reversed the murder conviction of a defendant because a juror’s remarks during jury selection indicated her express bias against the defendant.

In reaching their decision, the court reasoned that when a juror makes an unqualified statement expressing actual bias, seating the juror is a manifest constitutional error that may be raised on appeal. Also, a juror’s statement during voir dire that she “would like to say he’s guilty” requires a new trial because no inquiry was made from the Prosecution that would have neutralized the statement.

In 2005, James Rock was murdered at his home in rural Skagit County. The investigations led to Terrance Irby, a known associate of Rock. Rock’s neighbors had seen Irby in the neighborhood on March 8. Irby was soon located in custody in Marysville. He had been arrested there on March 8, after running a red light and attempting to elude police. In Irby’s truck, officers found Rock’s weapons and boots splashed with Rock’s blood.

Irby was arrested and charged with Aggravated Murder in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, and Felony Murder.

Oddly enough, in 2011, the WA Supreme Court had already reversed Irby’s convictions because of a violation of his right to a public trial. The violation occurred when the court and the attorneys agreed by e-mail, without Irby’s participation, to dismiss some of the potential jurors before voir dire began.

The State recharged the case. He awaited trial.  Irby had three different standby counselors while his case was pending. Irby fired all of them before the second trial began. As a consequence, the trial court granted Irby’s request to proceed pro se; or in other words, by himself without defense counsel.

On March 5, 2013—the first day scheduled for jury selection —Irby voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings. Irby said he did not believe he could get a fair trial in Skagit County. Trial became somewhat of a circus. By Irby’s choice, the trial proceeded before a jury that had been picked without any participation by Irby. Every day before trial resumed, the trial court had Irby brought from the jail into the courtroom so that the court could verify that he still wanted to remain absent.

The jury convicted Irby as charged on March 12, 2013.

The primary issue on appeal was whether juror bias – specifically, the bias of the juror who said she “would like to say he’s guilty” – violated Irby’s right to a fair and impartial jury.

In reaching its decision the Court of Appeals reasoned that under RAP 2.5(a)(3), a party may raise for the first time on appeal a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” Here, criminal defendants have a federal and state constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Criminal defendants have a federal and state constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. The error alleged here, seating a biased juror, violates this right.

Furthermore, the court reasoned that seating that particular juror manifested actual bias. Under RCW 4.44.170(2) actual bias is “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.” The Court of Appeals said both thetrial judge and the Prosecutor failed to elicit any assurances from that juror that she had an open mind on the issue of guilt. This was wrong.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the juror at question demonstrated actual bias and that seating her was manifest constitutional error requiring reversal of all convictions and remand for a new trial.

My opinion? It’s awful and tragic that Mr. Rock died a violent and painful death. My condolences go to his family and everyone who cared for him. Anyone in their circumstance would want the murderer brought to justice and convicted for these horrible crimes.

However, gaining convictions is meaningless if the courts and prosecutors violate a defendant’s rights in the process. It devalues the entire criminal justice system. It loses credibility and coherence.

Perhaps the Judge and Prosecutor failed to make a record of “rehabilitating” that particular juror of her biases – a process which happens at EVERY jury trial I’ve conducted – because neither Mr. Irby nor a criminal defense attorney was at jury selection to attempt to strike that particular juror for cause. Neverthless, all of us now have a greater understanding of why it’s necessary for attorneys to engage the colloquy of ensuring that jurors are NOT biased – even when they most certainly are.

Eliminating biased jurors from trial not only ensures a fair trial for the defendant. It also creates a court record for ensuring that jury verdicts are not overturned on appeal. As this one was.

Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Rodriguez v. United States: Nonconsensual Dog Sniff of Car Held Unconstitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that absent reasonable suspicion, police extending a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) the 4th Amendment does Fourth Amendment does not tolerate a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop, (2) a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violated the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures, (3) a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the issuing of a ticket for the violation, and (4) a stop may, however, be prolonged for a dog sniff when there is independent information giving rise to an individualized suspicion that the occupants of the car are involved in a drug offense.

The 6-3 ruling is indeed a big win for the 4th Amendment.

In this case, Officer Struble, a K-9 officer, stopped the defendant Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder. After issuing a warning for the traffic offense Officer Strubble asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. Struble detained him until another police officer arrived. Struble’s dog performed a search and alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The dog found methamphetamine.

Seven or eight minutes elapsed between the time Struble issued the warning and the dog alerting to the presence of contraband.

Rodriguez faced several federal drug charges. Although he moved to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle on the basis that Officer Struble prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff search, the lower court denied Rodriguez’s motion. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the search and seizure issues.

The Court reasoned that a routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio than an arrest. Its duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission,” which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

The court further reasoned that a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission. Also, the Court was concerned that seizing citizens for traffic stops and holding them to conduct a more intrusive search with no evidence of criminal activity beyond the mere traffic stop is unlawful: “The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop.

My opinion? Great ruling! It’s rare that the Supreme Court upholds the 4th Amendment these days. Fortunately, this favorable outcome happened because the suspect asserted his rights by refusing the dog sniff. Past rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court limit 4th Amendment protections where suspects DID NOT assert their rights. See Florida v. Bostick.

Yet here’s a case where the suspect did flex their rights. Look at the outcome! It’s a testament – a reminder, if you will – that asserting your rights makes a difference. Great case.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Study: Marijuana and Alcohol Doubles Odds for DUI

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, marijuana, Race & Law, Reckless Driving, Studies, Traffic Infractions, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Marijuana is becoming increasingly legalized in the US for medical and recreational use. A new study analyzes the simultaneous use of alcohol and marijuana. In short, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving, social consequences, and harm to self and others.

The researchers analyzed data from the 2005 and 2010 National Alcohol Survey (n=8,626; 4,522 females, 4,104 males). This was a Random Digit Dial, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview survey of individuals aged 18 and older from all 50 states and DC. Blacks and Hispanics were over-sampled. The study authors assessed differences in demographics, alcohol-related social consequences, harms to self, and drunk driving across simultaneous, concurrent, and alcohol-only using groups.

“We looked at three groups of adults,” explained Meenakshi S. Subbaraman, a corresponding author for the study and associate scientist at the Alcohol Research Group, a program of the Public Health Institute. “One, those who used only alcohol in the previous 12 months; two, those who used both alcohol and cannabis but always separately, or concurrently; and three, those who used both alcohol and cannabis and usually together, or simultaneously.

According to the study, simultaneous users did not necessarily always use cannabis while they drank; the groups were based on how often they drank when using cannabis, and not vice versa.

The study authors found that, compared to adults who solely used alcohol, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving, social consequences, and harms to self. Compared to concurrent users, simultaneous users had double the odds of drunk driving. Simultaneous users also had the heaviest drinking patterns in terms of quantity and frequency.

The research brought interesting conclusions. “If cannabis use becomes more prevalent as U.S. states and other countries continue to legalize it, then we need to be prepared to advise people appropriately,” cautioned Subbaraman. “If you use both substances together, your risk of drunk driving, and possibly other consequences, may be higher than if you stick to using one at a time.”

The study appears in the May 2015 online issue of the journal Alcoholism: Clinical & Experimental Research.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rich: No Reckless Endangerment Found in DUI Case

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, DUI, Jury Trial, law enforcement, police, Reckless Endangerment, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Rich, the WA Court of Appeals ruled there is no ‘per se’ liability for Reckless Endangerment based on proof of DUI.

Here the defendant was pulled over for driving a stolen vehicle. She was arrested for DUI because she exhibited the effects of having consumed alcohol and her BAC test was over .15. She also had a 9-year-old child in the front seat. The Prosecutor charged the defendant with Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, DUI and Reckless Endangerment.

During trial, the Prosecutor argued that because Rich operated a vehicle while legally intoxicated in violation of the DUI statute, her conduct also satisfies the elements of reckless endangerment. The State also points to the following pieces of “additional evidence” that would support a finding that Rich’s conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury: (1) Rich endangered a passenger and motorists on a “major public roadway,” (2) she was heavily intoxicated, and (3) she exceeded the speed limit. The jury found Rich guilty of both Reckless Endangerment and DUI.

The case went up on appeal on the issue of whether a jury can find rich guilty on both crimes when the overwhelming evidence suggested she was only guilty of DUI.

Some background is necessary. The Reckless Endangerment statute, RCW 9A.36.050, provides as follows:

A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.

Another provision in the criminal code, RCW 9A.08.010, defines levels of culpability, including recklessness. RCW 9A.08.010 provides, in relevant part:

RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.

Here, the Court reasoned that the Prosecutor offered no evidence whatsoever about the presence of other vehicles, motorists, or pedestrians, nor any evidence about the type of road or traffic conditions. Additionally, the police officer who observed Rich drive did not indicate that Rich’s manner of driving posed any danger or caused him to suspect that Rich was impaired.

And even if the jury could infer from an officer’s testimony that Rich was speeding 15 miles per hour faster than the speed limit, the deputy followed Rich because he believed the car was stolen, not because of speeding or for any reason related to the manner in which the car was being operated. This evidence would not, therefore, allow a trier of fact to conclude that Rich’s speed created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury.

Because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rich recklessly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious injury to another person, the Reckless Endangerment conviction must be vacated.

My opinion? Good decision. there is no “per se” liability for Reckless Endangerment based on proof of violation of the DUI statute. If the penalties for DUI are thought of as too lenient then the legislature can increase them. If there should be additional offenses tied to DUI, say DUI with a passenger, then they likewise can be implemented by the legislature through the democratic process.

However, courts should remain unwilling to impose such value judgments upon the citizens by shoehorning conduct into the somewhat broad definitions of certain criminal offenses.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Whatcom County Jail: An Inmate’s Perspective

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The Bellingham Herald discussed Whatcom County Jail’s deplorable and dangerous conditions. In the article Staff & Inmates Say It’s Time For A New Whatcom County Jail, Sheriff Bill Elfo is reported as saying the current Whatcom County Jail is consistently packed beyond its designed capacity, with conditions that pose safety issues for guards and inmates.

On March 18, Elfo sat down with Bellingham City Council during a special meeting to discuss the need for a new county jail and request the city’s financial support.

The jail’s current legal capacity is somewhere between 298 and 362 inmates, but the average daily population in 2014 was 403 people.

Inmates have broken out the windows in their cells onto the street below and picked away at the grout in their cinder block walls, creating small pass-throughs from cell to cell; sewer lines have backed up into the sheriff’s office; nearly every space – shower rooms, indoor recreation areas – has been used to house inmates at one time or another as the population has fluctuated well beyond capacity.

The video above captures commentary from jail staff, inmates and administration weighing in on the issue.

My opinion? Sure, certain aspects of the criminal justice system are punitive. They’re made to have inmates consider their surroundings and force them to take accountability for the crimes they’re committed.

Nevertheless, the old and overcrowded jail creates significant Human Rights issues and potentially extraordinary liability costs if a worst-case-scenario tragedy happened. According to the National Institute of Corrections recent evaluation of the jail, it was determined that if a fire or other emergency were to happen, such as an earthquake, the loss of life at the jail would be “catastrophic.’ Though the building is largely cinder block, mortar and concrete, if mattresses, clothing and/or other items were set on fire, smoke could easily fill a room or floor of the building and suffocate those inside.

It’s time for a new jail with better living conditions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Manlove: “Deliberate Cruelty” Enhancements Apply to Property Crimes.

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In State v. Manlove, the Division III Court of Appeals held that a upward sentencing enhancement applies to Residential Burglary and other property crimes if a jury finds the defendant’s conduct during the commission of crime manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.

In 2005, Paula Parker and her then-husband purchased a remote cabin on forty acres in Stevens County, Washington. The couple became acquainted with their neighbor, David Manlove, whose home lay a half mile from Parker’s cabin.

Paula Parker divorced in 2011, and she retained sole custody of the cabin. Parker and Manlove occasionally joined one another at each other’s homes for dinner. The two enjoyed a pastoral, idyllic, and platonic relationship, until . . .

Paula Parker went on vacation from June 19 to July 2, 2013 and returned to her cabin the morning of July 3. Once inside her home, Parker discovered her cabin was ransacked. Property was destroyed. The intruder left a hand-rolled cigarette. Paula realized her neighbor, David Manlove, smoked similar cigarettes.

Parker contacted police and informed them she believed the culprit was Manlove. She avoided her home for a few days.

On July 7, she returned home. Again, her house was ransacked. The damage was even more extensive this time. The intruder shredded Paula Parker’s medical records, high school diploma, and college degree. Parker kept her mother’s ashes in an urn, and the prowler dumped the ashes onto the floor.

After surveying the damage at Paula Parker’s cabin on July 8, 2013, Stevens County sheriff deputies traveled to David Manlove’s home. When asked why he damaged Paula Parker’s home, Manlove responded, “It’s my mountain.” When arrested, Manlove repeated several times: “It’s my mountain so there’s no crime.”

Law enforcement obtained two search warrants for David Manlove’s home. Officers seized many items that belonged to Paula Parker, including a hatchet, a chainsaw, a veil for a belly dancing costume, a mortar and pestle, journals, and jewelry. Officers also found marijuana plants and a rifle.

David Manlove was charged with Residential Burglary, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the Second Degree, Possession of more than Forty Grams of Marijuana, Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree, and Malicious Mischief in the First Degree. The State further alleged that Manlove committed Residential Burglary with deliberate cruelty in violation of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a).

The trial court found Manlove competent to stand trial after an evaluation by Eastern State Hospital. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that: “Deliberate cruelty” means gratuitous violence ,or other conduct which inflicts physical, psychological, or emotional pain as an end in itself, and which goes beyond what is inherent in the elements of the crime or is normally associated with the commission of the crime. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 177. The jury found David Manlove guilty as charged.

On appeal, the issue was whether the aggravating factor of deliberate cruelty under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a) applies to Residential Burglary.

The Court of Appeals decided, “Yes.” They gave two reasons why, under appropriate circumstances, the deliberate cruelty aggravating factor may apply to a property crimes. First, when the legislature desired to limit the application of an aggravating factor to certain offenses, it expressly provided that limitation in the statute. Second, the statute allows a sentence enhancement when the current offense is a burglary and the victim ofthe burglary was present in the building or residence when the crime was committed.

The Court affirmed Manlove’s convictions and sentence, including the enhancement for deliberate cruelty.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.