Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

State v. Allen: Prosecutor Commits Misconduct With Phrase, “Should Have Known.”

Prosecutorial Misconduct in Texas: Right Now, it's an Appellate Fight -  Dallas Justice Blog

In State v. Allen, the WA Supremes ruled that the Prosecuting Attorney committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the standard upon which the jury may convict an accomplice.

This case involves the Lakewood police officer shootings.

The defendant Mr. Allen was friend and co-worker of Maurice Clemmons, who fatally shot four police officers in a coffee shop on November 29, 2009. Mr. Allen’s involvement transpired on the days leading up to the shooting.

This tragic story began in May 2009 when officers responded to reports that Clemmons was throwing rocks through his neighbors’ windows. Clemmons responded violently when officers arrived at the scene, and he was arrested for punching officers. He posted bail in November 2009, the month of the shootings.

Shortly after his release, Clemmons attended Thanksgiving dinner at his aunt’s house, where he expressed animosity toward the police. Specifically, he announced that if the police arrived to look for him, he would kill them and then go across the street to the elementary school and commit further acts of violence. Clemmons brandished a handgun while he described these acts. Allen, who was a friend and employee of Clemmons, was present at that dinner.

Three days later, Clemmons contacted Allen and told him they were going to wash the company truck. With Allen driving, Clemmons directed him to a car wash near a coffee shop in Lakewood. Upon arriving at the car wash, Allen parked the truck, got out, and walked across the street to a minimart.

During that time, Clemmons also left the car wash and entered the coffee shop, where the shootings occurred. When Allen returned to the truck, Clemmons appeared and told Allen that they had to leave. Allen claimed he drove only a few blocks until he left the truck upon discovering Clemmons was wounded. Allen also claimed that he did not know Clemmons was going to commit the murders.

Clemmons eventually ended up at his aunt’s house, and the truck was abandoned in a nearby parking lot. A few days later, Clemmons was killed by a Seattle police officer. Allen was arrested shortly afterward.

Allen was charged with four counts of Aggravated Murder in the first Degree. During trial, several spectators wore T -shirts that said, “‘You will not be forgotten, Lakewood Police,”‘ followed by the names of the four murdered officers. Allen objected to these T-shirts and asked that the shirts be covered. The trial court denied Allen’s motion.

At closing argument, the State was required to prove that Allen had actual knowledge that Clemmons would commit the murders. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney initially stated the correct definition of “knowledge” as it was used in the jury instruction. However, immediately afterward, the prosecuting attorney stated that “for shorthand we’re going to call that ‘should have known.'” Also, the prosecuting attorney went on to repeatedly and improperly use the phrase “should have known” when describing the definition of “knowledge.”

The prosecuting attorney also presented a slide show simultaneously with his closing argument. This slide show repeatedly referred to the incorrect “should have known” standard. One slide even stated, “You are an accomplice if: … you know or should have known,” with the words “should have known” in bold. The prosecuting attorney made several more “should have known” comments in rebuttal argument.

The jury received instructions that correctly stated the law regarding “knowledge.” Particularly, instruction 9 said the following:

A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a fact or circumstance when he or she is aware of that fact or circumstance. If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact.

 Allen was convicted of four counts of Murder in the First Degree. Based on the aggravating circumstance, the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 400 years.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Court granted review on three issues: (1) Did the prosecuting attorney commit prejudicial misconduct by misstating the standard upon which the jury could convict Allen? (2) Does the “aggravator” found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) apply to a defendant charged as an accomplice? (3) Was Allen prejudiced when spectators at trial wore T -shirts bearing the names of the murdered officers?

1. DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT?

The court ruled the Prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the standard upon which the jury could find Allen guilty. Here, the prosecuting attorney repeatedly misstated that the jury could convict Allen if it found that he should have known Clemmons was going to murder the four police officers.

The Court reasoned that, for example, the prosecuting attorney stated that “under the law, even if he doesn’t actually know, if a reasonable person would have known, he’s guilty.” As noted above, the “should have known” standard is incorrect; the jury must find that Allen actually knew Clemmons was going to murder the four police officers. Consequently, the Court concluded that the remarks were improper.

Furthermore, the improper comments prejudiced the defendant. First, the Prosecutor misstated a key issue of the case – knowledge. Second, the misstatement of law was repeated multiple times. Repetitive misconduct can have a “cumulative effect.” Third, the trial court twice overruled Allen’s timely objections in the jury’s presence, potentially leading the jury to believe that the “should have known” standard was a proper interpretation of law.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, the record reveals that the jury was influenced by the improper statement of law during deliberations. Finally, the misconduct by the State was particularly egregious. Based on the foregoing factors, the Court found that there was a substantial likelihood that the Prosecutor’s misconduct affected the jury verdict and thus prejudiced Allen.

 2. DOES THE “AGGRAVATOR” SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT APPLY TO AN ACCOMPLICE?

The Court answered “Yes” to this question. Here, the court sentenced Allen to an exceptional sentence based on the sentencing aggravator found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v). That statute contains no express triggering language automatically authorizing an exceptional sentence for accomplices. Therefore, Allen’s own misconduct must form the basis upon which the exceptional sentence applies.

The operative language of the statute here allows the court to sentence Allen above the standard range if the offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the offense, the offender knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer, and the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is not an element of the offense.” Consequently, an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) may be imposed on remand if the jury finds the required elements based on Allen’s own misconduct.

3. DID THE SPECTATORS WEARING T-SHIRTS IN THE COURTROOM PREJUDICE ALLEN’S CASE?

The court decided that, based on the limited information in the record, it was unlikely that the t-shirts were inherently prejudicial. The T-shirts bore a message that said, “‘You will not be forgotten, Lakewood Police”‘ followed by a list of the victims’ names. The court said this message does not advocate for a message of guilt or innocence. Rather, the shirts were merely a silent showing of sympathy for the victims. Contrary to Allen’s arguments, the mere presence of words does not make a spectator display inherently prejudicial.

In conclusion, the prosecuting attorney committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the proper standard upon which the jury could find Allen acted with knowledge. Based on that, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion?

The shootings were exceptionally tragic. These officers left friends and family in the wake of their senseless death. That said, the Prosecutor in this case clearly committed misconduct. I’ve been in jury trials where Prosecutors will bend and stretch the the law when it comes to whether a defendant had knowledge they were committing a crime. Similar to the Prosecutor in this case, they’ll say “Well, the defendant should have known they were committing a crime.”

This is an ABSOLUTE misstatement of the law. “Knowing” and “Should Have Known” are two very, very different levels of understanding. Here, saying Mr. Allen “Should Have Known” that Clemmons would commit murder implies that Mr. Allen had a legal duty to know what Clemmons was thinking about before committing the heinous murders he committed. That’s wrong, and an improper statement of the law.

 Again, I extend my deepest condolences to the families and friends of the police officers who lost their lives. 

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Davis: Unlawful Possession of Firearms, Rendering Criminal Assistance and Exceptional Sentences.

Sherrard man to serve 7 years in prison for possession of stolen guns | wqad.com

WA Supremes gave an interesting opinion touching upon the defendants who were allegedly involved in the Lakewood police officer shootings from last year. In short, the Supreme Court could not reach a 5-4 majority opinion on the issue of whether the State lacked evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for Possession of a Stolen Firearm. However, the State reached a majority “No” decision on the issue of whether Exceptional Sentence applied to this case. 

The underlying facts of State v. Davis are notorious and undisputed. On Sunday, November 29, 2009, Clemmons entered a coffee shop just before 8:00 a.m. with two handguns and began shooting at four Lakewood police officers, fatally wounding three. The fourth officer struggled with Clemmons and shot Clemmons once in the side, but Clemmons wrested the fourth officer’s gun from him, fatally shot him, and left with the stolen gun.

While on the run, Clemmons contacted defendants Eddie Lee Davis and Letrecia Nelson shortly after the murders. Clemmons went to Davis’ home, requested a ride to a house in Auburn, and said he had been shot while killing four police officers. Davis drove Clemmons to Nelson’s home. Nelson let Clemmons and Davis inside. Clemmons told Nelson he had killed four police officers, been shot in the process, and stolen one officer’s gun.

At Clemmons’ request, he was given fresh clothing and help treating his gunshot wound. Nelson put some clothes and the stolen gun in a shopping bag that was left on a counter. Just before leaving, Clemmons asked where the gun was. Davis replied that it was in the bag on the counter and gave the bag to Clemmons. He left the home with the gun, and remained a fugitive from justice. On December 1, 2009, 2-3 days after the incident, Clemmons was gunned down by a Seattle Police Officer who pulled his car over.

Based on their actions following that contact, Davis and Nelson were charged by the Prosecutor and convicted at jury trial of Rendering Criminal Assistance and Possession of a Stolen Firearm. Davis was also convicted of Unlawful Possession of that self-same firearm. The conviction was appealed, and found its way to the WA Supreme Court.

The Court addressed the issues of whether (1) sufficient evidence supported Davis’ and Nelson’s convictions relating to possession of a firearm, and (2) whether the exceptional sentences for rendering criminal assistance factually were legally justified.

1. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

The 4-person “majority” Court answered “Yes” to the question of whether sufficient evidence existed to support the convictions. The court reasoned there are two types of control: actual and constructive. A person actually possesses something that is in his or her physical custody, and constructively possesses something that is not in his or her physical custody but is still within his or her “dominion and control.”

For either type, to establish possession the prosecution must prove more than a passing control; it must prove actual control. The length of time in itself does not determine whether control is actual or passing, and whether one has actual control over the item at issue depends on the totality of the circumstances presented.

In light of the totality of the circumstances, the Court was convinced that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Clemmons temporarily relinquished control over the stolen gun to Davis and Nelson while his wound was treated and he changed clothes. There was no testimony that Clemmons made any specific requests or orders as to what should be done with the stolen gun while he was at Nelson’s home, and he did not even know where the gun was until he was ready to leave about 15 minutes later.

t is reasonable to infer that someone else decided what to do with the gun and that the decision-makers were Nelson and Davis because Nelson retrieved the shopping bag and put the gun inside it and Davis immediately responded when Clemmons asked where the gun was. Furthermore, both Nelson and Davis retained the ability to take further actions as to the gun until the time Davis gave it back to Clemmons because they knew where it was and Clemmons did not. Therefore, the court believed there was actual control sufficient to establish constructive possession.

2. EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES

The Court answered “No” to the issue of whether the defendants should receive an exceptional upward sentence for their convictions. The Court said Exceptional Sentences are intended to impose additional punishment where the particular offense at issue causes more damage than that contemplated by the statute defining the offense. In that situation, the standard penalty for the offense is insufficient and an exceptional sentence based on an “aggravating factor” found by the jury remedies that insufficiency.

Here, the Court reasoned that, as a matter of law, the “aggravating factor” at issue cannot apply to Rendering Criminal Assistance charges.  Here, the “victim” was the public at large. However, Exceptional Sentences apply where there is “a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim.” Because Rendering Criminal Assistance victimizes the general public, every member of the public is part of the victim class. There is no “other.” Therefore, the exceptional sentences imposed on Davis and Nelson were not legally justified.

The WA Supreme Court was highly divided on this issue. Justice Wiggins appeared to be the swaying vote. He concurred with the dissenting opinion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Davis’s and Nelson’s firearm possession convictions. However, Justice Wiggins concurred with the majority opinion as far as the decision that the Exceptional Sentences imposed for Eddie Davis’s and Letricia Nelson’s convictions for Rendering Criminal Assistance were not legally justified.

Ultimately, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Goggin: Implied Consent Warnings for Blood Test & Crawford Issues

DUI Blood Test (A Former DA Explains How To Beat It In Court)

In State v. Goggin, Division II of the Court of Appeals held that when a blood test is collected pursuant to a search warrant, the officer is not required to advise the defendant that the defendant has a right to additional tests. Also, proof of the defendant’s prior DUI conviction from Idaho was admissible; and the admission did not violate the confrontation clause. 

Mr. Goggin was arrested for DUI. After taking Mr. Goggin in for a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test, Officer Marcus read Mr. Goggin his implied consent warnings, including his right to have additional tests performed by a person of his own choosing. Mr. Goggin indicated he understood his rights and signed the implied consent form. Officer Marcus obtained a search warrant to draw a sample of Mr. Goggin’s blood. It was taken about three hours after his arrest and without any further independent-testing advisement. 

Mr. Goggin was charged with Felony DUI because he allegedly had four prior DUI convictions.

At trial, Goggin moved to suppress the results of the blood test based on the officer’s failure to advise him of his right to an additional test after obtaining the warrant. The trial court said, “This was a blood draw authorized by a search warrant. The trooper did not have to advise the defendant of the right to additional tests.” Later, Goggin was found guilty. He appealed.

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Trooper Marcus whether he re-read the implied consent warnings to Mr. Goggin after obtaining the search warrant:

Defense counsel: Did you at any time advise him as part of any warnings related to the blood test that he could get an additional blood test?

Trooper Marcus: That was in part of the implied consent warnings for breath. It states in there that you have the right to additional tests administered by a qualified person of your own choosing.

Defense counsel: You have separate warnings for blood; do you not?

Trooper Marcus: We do, but implied consent warnings for blood weren’t read in this case.

Later in trial, the Prosecutor admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior DUI from Idaho. Although no witnesses actually testified that Mr. Goggin actually had a prior DUI from Idaho, the prosecutor successfully admitted into evidence the Judgment and Sentence conviction data from the Idaho court. Mr. Goggin tried dismissing the case based on the State’s failure to produce a witness from Idaho who could provide evidence that he had been arrested in Idaho. The court denied the motion, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to go to the jury. The jury found Mr. Goggin guilty of felony OUI. He appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the arresting officer was not required to advise Mr. Goggin of the right to additional tests because the blood draw was authorized by a search warrant, not the implied consent statute. The Court reasoned that City of Seattle v. Robert St. Johnand  RCW 46:20.308(1) allows officers to “obtain a search warrant for blood alcohol tests regardless of the implied consent statute.”

In St. John, the motorcyclist refused to take the voluntary test; but, the evidence that the motorcyclist was driving under the influence constituted sufficient probable cause to justify a warrant. Similarly here, the search warrant and subsequent blood alcohol test were the result of evidence showing Mr. Goggin was driving under the influence. Thus, the State was not required to re-advise Mr. Goggin of his right to additional tests after issuance of the search warrant.

The Court also held that Goggin’s constitutional right to confront a witness under Crawford v. Washington were not violated when the State failed to produce a witness who could testify about Goggin’s prior DUI from Idaho. Here, the State met its burden of proving Mr. Goggin was the same Joseph Goggin convicted of the 2009 DUI in Idaho by submitting Mr. Goggin’s 2007 to 2011 Washington State Identification card.

his photographic identification card included Mr. Goggin’s height and weight, hair and eye color, and his address. This information matched the identifying information in the 2009 Idaho judgment and sentence. The identification card was issued in 2007 and was valid until 2011; thus, it corresponded with the date of the Idaho conviction. Accordingly, the State provided sufficient evidence of this fourth DUI to support the conviction for felony DUI.

Also, Mr. Goggin’s Idaho judgment and sentence was inherently trustworthy. It was not created in anticipation of litigation or to prove a fact at trial; therefore, it was not necessary to cross-examine the clerk who certified the document. A certified record not prepared for use in a criminal proceeding but created for the administration of an entity’s affairs is not testimonial evidence under Crawford v. Washington. Accordingly, the admission of the Idaho judgment and sentence did not violate Mr. Goggin’s confrontation rights.

The Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Goggin’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Quaale: WA Supreme Court Upholds WA Court of Appeals & Grants Mistrial Due To Trooper’s Opinion Testimony

Lay Witnesses and Opinion Testimony: Admissible?

Excellent opinion from the WA Supreme Court. In State v. Quaale, the WA Supreme Court decided that a Washington State Trooper’s opinion testimony regarding the defendant’s sobriety violated the defendant’s rights at trial.

Trooper Stone pulled the defendant Ryan Quaale over for Eluding and DUI. Trooper Stone then performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test (HGN test) on Quaale.

Some explanation of the HGN test is necessary. The HGN test is a routinely used field sobriety test in which the administrator tells the subject to follow a pen or fingertip with his or her eyes as the administrator moves the stimulus from side to side. After consuming alcohol, a person will have difficulty smoothly following the stimulus; the person’s eyes will jerk or bounce as they move from side to side.

For those who don’t know, “Nystagmus” is this very involuntary oscillation of the eyeballs – the jerking – which results from the body’s attempt to maintain orientation and balance. HGN is the inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they turn from side to side or move from center focus to the point of maximum deviation at the side.

Here, Trooper Stone testified that in his opinion, the HGN test is very important to determining impairment because, unlike the walk the line test, which a person can practice, the HGN test measures an involuntary reflex. Trooper Stone did not perform any other sobriety tests on Quaale in the field.

During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale’s eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, Reckless Driving, and Attempting to Elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was charged with Attempting to Elude a police vehicle and with Felony DUI. The DUI was charged as a felony because Quaale had been previously convicted of Vehicular Homicide While Under the Influence. RCW 46.61.502(6)(b)(i).

Quaale was tried twice. At the first trial, the jury convicted him of attempting to elude but could not agree on a verdict for the DUI charge. During a second trial on the DUI charge, the State concluded its direct examination of Trooper Stone with the following questions:

Q. In this case, based on the HGN test alone, did you form an opinion based on your training and experience as to whether or not Mr. Quaale’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired? [Defendant’s objection that the question goes to the ultimate issue is overruled]
Q …. Did you form an opinion?
A. Absolutely. There was no doubt he was impaired.

The WA Supremes reasoned that Trooper Stone’s testimony that he had “no doubt” the defendant was impaired was an improper opinion on the defendant’s guilt and therefore inadmissible. Trooper Stone based his opinion solely on a HGN test, which can indicate physical signs consistent with alcohol consumption. The test, however, cannot establish impairment by itself, and testimony to the contrary violates the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Baity.

An explanation of State v. Baity is necessary. In Baity, the WA Supreme Court considered whether drug recognition protocol employed by police officers to detect behavior associated with certain drugs constituted novel scientific evidence generally accepted in the scientific community, satisfying the Frye test for admissibility of expert testimony.  Police officers trained to use this protocol are often referred to as Drug Recognition Experts (DREs).

DREs use a 12-step procedure to classify behavioral patterns associated with seven categories of drugs. Officers employ the HGN test as one ofthe 12 steps. In Baity, the Court analyzed whether the HGN test satisfied Frye when used for drug detection. The Court held that it did. It reasoned that the underlying scientific basis of the test-an intoxicated person will exhibit nystagmus was undisputed. T

he Court also noted that officers perform the test in the same way whether the officer tests for alcohol or drug impairment and that the officer also looks for the same result: involuntary jerking in the driver’s eyes. Thus, the Court’s analysis of the HGN test in the DUI drug detection context, as discussed in Baity, applies equally to the DUI alcohol detection context in this case.

Although the Baity Court heard testimony on the HGN test admissible as evidence that a person was intoxicated on drugs, the Court also placed limits on that testimony because the HGN test merely shows physical signs consistent with ingestion of intoxicants. The Court said that an officer may not testify in a manner that casts an “aura of scientific certainty to the testimony.”

The officer also cannot predict the specific level of  drugs present in a suspect.  Furthermore, the Baity court held that a DRE officer, properly qualified, could express an opinion that a suspect’s behavior and physical attributes are consistent or inconsistent with those behaviors and physical signs associated with certain categories of drugs.

With that background, the Quaale Court reasoned that the Trooper’s testimony that Quaale was “impaired” parroted the legal standard contained in the jury instruction definition for “under the influence.” The word “impair” means to “diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (2002).

Thus, the trooper concluded that alcohol diminished Quaale in such an appreciable degree that the HGN test could detect Quaale’s impairment. Because the Trooper’s inadmissible testimony went to the ultimate factual issue-the core issue of Quaale’s impairment to drive-the testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt.

With that, the WA Supremes affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment and sentence, and remanded Mr. Quaale’s case for a new trial.

Great decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. W.R.: Defendants Do NOT Need to Prove Consent in Rape Cases

9th Circuit Affirms TCPA Consent Defense

In State v. W.R, J.R., the WA Supreme Court held that it violates due process to make the defendant prove the alleged sexual act in question was consensual when the crime charged is Rape in the Second Degree by Forcible Compulsion.

The defendant, a minor named W.R., was found guilty at his bench trial of Rape in the Second Degree by Forcible Compulsion. The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.P. that occurred on January 2, 2011, while J.P. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. J.P. was also a minor at the time.

Throughout trial, the juvenile court judge found W.R. lacked credibility. Consequently, the court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence.

W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual.

The WA Supreme Court granted review of the case on this one issue: When the State charges the defendant under a rape statute that includes “forcible compulsion” as a necessary element of the crime, does due process forbid requiring a criminal defendant to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence?

The court reasoned that once a defendant asserts a consent defense and provides sufficient evidence to support the defense, the State bears the burden of proving lack of consent as part of its proof of the element of forcible compulsion. It analyzed the decision in State v. Camara and other cases which applied a “negates” analysis. In short, the Court held that when a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant. It stated, “The key to whether a defense necessarily negates an element is whether the completed crime and the defense can coexist.”

Furthermore, the court said other courts have recognized that when a person consents to sexual intercourse, such consent negates forcible compulsion. In addition, the defendant cannot be burdened with proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence, as the burden must remain on the State to prove forcible compulsion beyond reasonable doubt.

We hold that consent necessarily negates forcible compulsion. For this reason, due process prohibits shifting the burden to the defendant to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence. While the defendant may be tasked with producing evidence to put consent in issue, such evidence need only create reasonable doubt as to the victim’s consent. Our prior decisions in Camara and Gregory are inconsistent with this holding; we thus must explain why these cases must be overruled.

My opinion? Good decision, on many levels. It’s satisfying that the WA Supremes overruled bad caselaw and reasoned their way back to the one of the oldest standards in American jury trial jurisprudence: it is the State, and not the defendant, who carries the burden. Making the defendant carry this burden violates due process.

Although it appears Camara and Gregory tried to carve out an exception to this general rule in much the same way a defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence if charged with Assault, making a defendant prove consent in rape and sex cases is far too difficult to prove. This is especially true when the Rape-Shield statute suppresses information about a victim’s past sexual history. Good decision, WA Supremes.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Unlawful Frisking Violates Constitutional Rights

Austin PD defends officer who stopped and frisked woman in video

Good case. In State v. Russell, the WA Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of a small container found on the defendant’s body exceeded the proper scope of a pat-down search under the guise of a “protective frisk for weapons” during a Terry Stop.

The defendant Mr. Russell was stopped for violating several minor traffic laws. The officer recognized Russell from a prior stop. Although the Mr. Russell told officers he was not armed, he did, in fact, have a small pistol in his pocket. The officer frisked Mr. Russell for weapons. The officer felt a small box in Russell’s pants. The box was did not weigh any significant amount, and the officer had no idea whether the box contained a weapon. The officer opened the box. It contained a syringe filled with methamphetamine. The defendant was arrested for Possession of Meth.

The trial court granted Mr. Russell’s motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the case. However, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on appeal. Eventually, the case found its way to the WA Supreme Court.

The WA Supreme Court ruled that although the initial protective frisk was permissible, the officer violated Russell’s constitutional rights when he removed a small container from his pocket and searched it without a warrant. The officer admitted that the container’s contents weighed only a fraction of what a pistol weighs. Because the officer did not have a reasonable belief that the container housed a gun, the warrantless search was not justified.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that any threat to the officer’s safety ended when he took control of the container. He did not have authority to search it while investigating traffic infractions. Finally, the WA Supreme Court  held that the search was not justified on the basis of consent because the State did not show that Russell consented to the search. For these reasons, the WA Supremes reversed the Court of Appeals.

My opinion? Great decision. Under the law, officers can only search for “hard and sharp” objects which might be used as weapons. Anything else they find is “fruit of the poisonous tree” under an unlawful search. Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Finch: Can Defendants Force Victims to Get Polygraph Tests?

Can A Pregnant Woman Take A Polygraph Test?

In State v. Finch, the WA Supreme Court ruled that a rape victim’s polygraph test is inadmissible at trial.

The defendant was accused of raping a juvenile. Defense counsel obtained a court order commanding the alleged victim to obtain a polygraph test. The polygraph questions centered around what exactly happened on the day of the alleged rape incident.

The WA Supreme Court held that the trial court wrongfully granted the Defendant’s request to order the victim to take a polygraph test. The court reasoned there is no factual basis under CrR 4.7 – basically, the discovery rule – making it reasonably likely that the disputed polygraph test results would provide information material to the defense.

The Court based its decision on three grounds. First, polygraph tests are inadmissible at trial unless all parties agree. Here, the State did not want to stipulate to admitting the victim’s polygraph. Second, the State would not dismiss the charges against the defendant even if the victim failed the polygraph because there would be a “disputed issue of material fact” regarding the polygraph’s reliability (CrR 8.3). Third, the polygraph test results would only provide the defendant with highly unreliable information.

The Court concluded that the negative emotions that accompany being a sex crime victim, such as stress, anxiety, and fear, can further compromise the reliability of an already unreliable polygraph test by distorting the results and creating false positives.

My opinion? Good decision. The biggest problem with polygraph tests is that there are no known physiological responses that directly correspond with deception. An examinees physiological responses is often governed by whether the examinee believes the test is accurate, and from the atmosphere created by the examiner.

Furthermore, external stimuli may cause a change in physiological responses, such as a surprising question or a noise outside the room. Likewise, stress, anxiety and fear – all controlled by the autonomic nervous system – cause changes in the physiological responses of an examinee.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Lindsay: When Attorneys Act Unprofessionally

I'll Have Your Rear End Sanctioned': Insurance Defense Lawyer Spars With  Plaintiff, Opposing Counsel | Daily Business Review

In State v. Lindsay, the WA Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s conviction because the lawyers engaged in unprofessional behavior, trading verbal jabs and snide remarks throughout the proceedings in this case.

The defendants were charged with Robbery, Burglary, Kidnapping, Assault and Theft of a Firearm. The jury convicted them of some, but not all counts. The WA Supreme Court reasoned that although the trial court attempted to maintain civility, the magnitude of the problem, which spilled into the prosecutor’s closing argument, requires reversal. In short, a prosecutorial misconduct involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper, and (2) whether tjhe improper comments caused prejudice.

The court noted that although the conflict from both the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel seemed mutual and both attorneys were at fault, Prosecutors are held to a higher standard of conduct. Additionally, some of the Prosecutor’s hijinks at Closing Argument required reversal of the conviction. For example, the Court noted that Prosecutors may not refer to defense counsel’s closing argument as a “crock.” These comments impugn Defense Counsel, and imply deception and dishonesty. The Prosecutor also said that the defendant Holmes’s testimony was “funny,” “disgusting,” “comical,” and “the most ridiculous thing I’ve ever heard.”

Additionally, the Prosecutor’s attempts at coupling the jigsaw puzzle analogy with a percentage of missing pieces in the defense attorney’s case was also reversible error. Moreover, comparing the reasonable doubt standard to the decision made at a cross-walk is error. In addition, telling the jury that its job is to ‘speak the truth,’ or some variation thereof, misstates the burden of proof and is also improper.

A prosecutor’s stating that a witnesses’ testimony is “the most ridiculous thing I’ve ever heard” is an improper expression of personal opinion as to credibility. Finally, a prosecutor’s behavior in whispering to the jury is improper, highly unprofessional and potentially damaging to the fairness of the proceedings.

My opinion? The WA Supremes made a good decision. Practicing law is hard. Conducting jury trials is very hard. Now imagine dealing with another attorney’s unprofessional conduct during trial. Unbelievable! Yes, these instances of misconduct happen. I speak from experience when I say it’s easy to get sucked into malicious and negative behavior, especially when attorney’s advocate in the heat of battle.

Nevertheless, Section 3.4 of Washington’s Rules of Professional Conduct require that attorneys be civil toward one another and the tribunal. It’s incredibly difficult for judges to analyze the legal issues over the furor of shouting attorneys. And it hurts the credibility of the entire legal institution when our citizens see us behaving badly. My heart goes out to the lawyers involved in the case. Hopefully, they worked out their differences.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Roden: Text Messages Are Protected by Washington’s Privacy Act

Washington Privacy Act: Amendments jeopardize protections for consumers | The Seattle Times

Good opinion.

In State v. Roden, the WA Supreme Court ruled that Washington’s Privacy Act is violated by an officer’s warrantless opening, reviewing, and responding to text messages sent to a suspect’s phone, before the suspect viewed the message.

In State v. Roden, Daniel Lee was arrested for possession of heroin. After the arrest, a police detective spent 5 to 10 minutes browsing through Lee’s cell phone. The detective noticed several text messages from Jonathan Roden. The detective arranged a drug deal with Roden via text messages. Roden was arrested for Attempted Possession of Heroin. The trial court denied Roden’s motion to suppress and found Roden guilty. On appeal, Roden argued that the detective’s conduct violated Washington’s Privacy Act.

The Washington Supreme Court agreed with Roden. It reviewed  the Privacy Act act and analyzed the following excerpt in pertinent part: “[I]t shall be unlawful for … the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any: (a) Private communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.”

Furthermore, RCW 9.73.050 declares that evidence obtained in violation of the act is inadmissible for any purpose at trial.

Against this backdrop, the court gave the four-part analysis under State v. Christensen to be considered when analyzing alleged violations of the privacy act. There must have been (1) a private communication transmitted by a device, which was (2) intercepted or recorded by use of (3) a device designed to record and/or transmit ( 4) without the consent of all parties to the private. Roden stated the communications in the text message were intended to be private when intercepted by the detective posing as Lee.

Applying those factors, the Court reasoned that Washington’s privacy act was violated because the detective intercepted private communications without Lee’s or Roden’s consent or a warrant.

My opinion? Good decision. In my experience, this type of situation happens quite often. It’s entrapment, plain and simple. And it  violates a defendant’s rights in the process. Contact an experienced criminal defense attorney if you’re facing similar circumstances. Your privacy matters!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Ollivier: What Happens When the Defense Attorney Wants a Continuance and the Defendant Doesn’t?

How to Write a Letter for Not Being Able to Attend Court

In State v. Ollivier, the WA Supremes held that a defendant’s speedy trial rights were NOT violated when a defendant’s attorney requested the continuance over the objection of his client. The facts were such that the defendant, Ollivier, was charged with Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexual Activity. The depictions involved the use of the defendant’s computer. Ollivier was arraigned on April 18, 2007. His case went pending for 5 years before finally going to trial.

There were, in total, 22 continuances. The reasons for the continuances varied: defense counsel sought most of the continuances to allow time for investigation, obtain expert review of computer content, obtain discovery material from the Washington State Department of Corrections and the King County Sheriff’s Office, and because of a new investigator on the case.

Some of the requested continuances mentioned circumstances involving the State and some motions were joined by the State. At one point, an arresting officer resigned. Consequently, a continuance was requested to allow time to investigate her misconducts.

The Court reasoned that, in order to establish that multiple continuances of Ollivier’s trial dates violated his constitutional right to trial, a defendant must establish actual prejudice to the ability to prepare a defense. Further, prejudice will only be presumed in extremely unusual cases in which the post-indictment delay lasted at least five years or the government was responsible for the delay by virtue of something beyond simple negligence.

Finally, the Court stated the following: “Nearly all of the continuances were sought so that defense counsel could be prepared to defend. This is an extremely important aspect of the balancing and leads us to conclude that the length of delay was reasonably necessary for defense preparation and weighs against the defendant.”

My opinion? I agree with the WA Supremes. I’ve conducted MANY jury trials in my career, and shall probably conduct many more. Although few, my trial losses typically happen when clients insist on going to trial too early, and usually against my advice.

It’s important for clients and attorneys to have frank discussions of how long it will take to resolve the case. This decision usually depends on whether the client wants to resolve the case or go to trial. And THAT decision usually rests on the evidence contained within witnesses, police reports, forensics, etc. These decisions are not easy. It takes an exorbitant amount of time, preparation and patience for all parties to fashion and execute a successful trial defense. But as the old saying goes, “Cooler heads will prevail.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.