Category Archives: Washington Court of Appeals

State v. Ross: Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms Statute Is Constitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Philadelphia Law Firm, Kenny, Burns & McGill | New District Court Opinion on Felons and Gun Ownership

In State v. Ross, the WA Court of Appeals held that the Second Amendment does not bar the state from criminalizing the possession of firearms by felons. Consequently, Washington’s Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree statute is constitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Ross was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearms in the First Degree. His conviction was based on a prior 2010 conviction for second degree burglary. Unfortunately for Ross, his burglary conviction is a defined “serious offense” under WA’s Sentencing Reform Act.

Ross appealed. He argued that under the Second Amendment and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, Washington’s Firearms Statute RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court began with a critique of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The Court recognized, however, that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court identified several longstanding prohibitions, including possession by felons:

“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” ~WA Court of Appeals quoting District of Columbia v. Heller.

Next, the Court of Appeals analayzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. In Bruen, the Supreme Court considered and struck down New York’s regulatory licensing program requiring applicants to prove that they had “proper cause” to carry a handgun in public.

The WA Court of Appeals emphasized that Bruen was intentionally drafted to be limited in its scope. As a result, Bruen did not overrule Washington’s own time-stested caselaw on the subject matter:

“Indeed, at least 11 times the majority referenced the Second Amendment right of “law-abiding” citizens . . . Of the six justices in the majority, three wrote or joined in concurring opinions clarifying the scope of their decision. We hold that consistent with Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, the Second Amendment does not bar the state from prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons as it has done in RCW 9.41.040(1). RCW 9.41.040(1) is facially constitutional.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

Next the WA Court of Appeals adressed Ross’s argument that because his underlying crime of second degree burglary was nonviolent,  RCW 9.41.040(1) was unconstitutional as applied.

“We disagree for two reasons,” said the Court. First, Ross’s attempt to distinguish violent and nonviolent felons is of his own construct. There are no prior court opinions distinguishing violent felons from nonviolent felons. Second, the legislature has defined second degree burglary as a violent crime:

“The prohibition on possession of firearms under RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) applies to any person previously convicted of “any serious offense.” A “serious offense” is defined by the same statute to include “[a]ny crime of violence.” RCW 9.41.010(42)(a). And a “crime of violence” is defined to include burglary in the second degree . . . Ross offers no support for the proposition that the legislature did not intend to define burglary in the second degree as a serious offense and a crime of violence.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Ross’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Right to Privately Speak With Defense Counsel

Assault, Bellingham, Coronavirus, Drive-By Shooting, Eluding, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Court hearings via video conference have pros and cons, area lawyers say - masslive.com

In State v. Bragg, the WA Court of Appeals held that the trial court violated Mr. Bragg’s
right to confer with his attorney by requiring Bragg to participate in all nontrial
hearings via Webex while his counsel appeared in the courtroom.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Bragg allegedly fired a gun at sheriff’s deputies during a high-speed car chase. He was apprehended. The State charged him with three counts of Assault in the First Degree, Drive-By Shooting, Attempting to Elude, and Fiream Offenses. The trial court set Bragg’s bail at $750,000, which he was unable to pay.

Before trial, the court granted multiple continuances requested by Bragg and the State. For all pretrial proceedings, Bragg appeared on video via Webex from jail, while his counsel and the State appeared in person before the trial judge. Multiple times, Bragg expressed frustration with the pretrial proceedings and distrust of his counsel. At a hearing on December 29, 2021, defense counsel tried to withdraw due to allegedly irreconcilable conflicts. The court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw.

The four-day jury trial began January 3, 2021. Bragg appeared in person for trial. After the State rested, Bragg did not call any witnesses. The jury then found Bragg guilty of numerous counts. The court sentenced Bragg to 648 months of prison. Again, Bragg appeared at sentencing via Webex.

On appeal, Bragg argues that at least 8 court hearings were critical stage proceedings. Consequently, the court violated his Sixth Amendment rights because he was unable to privately consult with his attorney during those hearings.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying that a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at “critical stages” in the litigation. A “critical stage” is one “‘in which a defendant’s rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or in which the outcome of the case is otherwise substantially affected.

Furthermore, the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel carries with it a reasonable time for consultation and preparation. This includes the opportunity for a private and continual discussions between the defendant and his attorney during the trial. The ability for attorneys and clients to consult privately need not be seamless, but it must be meaningful.

“Like the right to counsel in general, whether the court violated the defendant’s constitutional right to privately confer with his attorney is a very facts-specific inquiry.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that in February 2020, our governor declared a state of emergency due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. It discussed how the WA Supreme Court authorized criminal defendants to appear via video.

Nevertheless, the Court of appeals reminded all parties that the Supreme Court’s pivot to video court hearings was meant to be limited in its scope:

“However, the Supreme Court further made clear that for all hearings that involve a critical stage of the proceedings, courts shall provide a means for defendants and respondents to have the opportunity for private and continual discussion with their attorney.” ~WA Court of Appeals

In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals reasoned the Supreme Court made it clear that for all hearings that involve a critical stage of the proceedings. Also, courts shall provide a means for defendants and respondents to have the opportunity for private and continual discussion with their attorney.

“Here, by way of summary, the trial court violated Bragg’s right to counsel by not providing guidance to Bragg and his counsel about how to confer privately during at least four nontrial critical stage proceedings and by placing an unreasonable expectation on Bragg to assert his rights. And the State fails to meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such errors were harmless. Thus, without making any comment on the weight of the evidence or the conduct of the trial, we are compelled to reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the Court of Appeals revesed Mr. Bragg’s convictions.

My opinion? The use of technology in the courtroom has resulted in numerous benefits to the litigants and the public. These technological benefits should only improve as our courts, judges and litigants become more familiar with the features of the existing technology.

Clearly, however, the over-use of technology may undermine a defendant’s right to legal representation.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Remote Jury Selection

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REMOTE JURY SELECTION DURING A PANDEMIC - BCBA

In State v. Wade, the WA Court of Appeals held that Remote Jury Selection does not violate the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Wade was convicted of first degree burglary, first degree robbery, and second degree assault (X2) following an attack on a married couple and their grandson.

His jury trial took place during the COVID-19 Pandemic. At that time, King County Superior Court had just reopened for in-person criminal jury trials. Nevertheless, remote jury selection was still the preferred process for conducting voir dire. This process allowed the parties to conduct jury selection by video conference using the ZOOM Meeting Application.

Mr. Wade objected to electronic or virtual jury selection on various grounds. He argued this process violated his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The trial court denied his motion. The jury found him guilty as charged.

On appeal, Wade challenged the use of remote videoconferencing technology for jury selection pursuant to court orders authorizing its use to reduce risk of COVID-19 exposure. He claims this method of jury selection violated his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community because it excluded people based on their race and economic status, as well as his right to a fair trial.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals gave its criteria for establishing a violation of the defendant’s right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community:

“A prima facie violation requires three elements: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Applying this criteria, the Court acknowledged that Wade indeed established that both African-Americans and people of low economic status comprise distinct groups.

“However, Wade fails to show that representation of these groups in the venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community,” said the Court. “He presents no evidence establishing the proportion of African-Americans or the prevalence of low economic status either in King County or Wade’s venire.”

Furthermore, the Court found that Wade failed to establish the third element of his case. Here, potential jurors had already been selected from the jury pool, summonsed by postcard, questioned, and hardship dismissals granted before the technical requirements of remote jury selection were introduced.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Wade’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Drivers Can’t Consent to Police Searching a Passenger’s Belongings

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Search and Seizure, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs? | The New Republic

In State v. Garner, No. 56861-6-II (2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that a driver’s consent to search their car does not extend to searching the contents of closed containers inside the car that do not belong to the driver.

BACKGROUND FACTS

A police officer arrested Mr. Garner on an outstanding warrant after stopping a car and encountering Garner as a passenger. Garner tried to flee on foot but the officer apprehended him. After placing Garner under arrest, the officer spoke with the car’s driver, who said Garner left three backpacks behind in her car. The officer asked the driver for permission to search the car and she granted it.

The officer then searched Garner’s backpacks without requesting his permission and found controlled substances. Later testing established that the controlled substances found in the backpacks were 86.9 grams of methamphetamine and 3.8 grams of heroin.

The State charged Garner with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before trial, Garner moved to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his backpacks. The trial court denied Garner’s suppression motion. After a bench trial, the trial court found Garner guilty of both counts of possession with intent to deliver.

On appeal, Mr. Garner argued that the trial court improperly denied his suppression motion.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the WA Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted Garner’s suppression motion. It reasoned that a person’s bag or closed container heightened protection under the federal and state constitutions. It emphasized that the Washington Supreme Court has also recognized an expectation of privacy in purses, briefcases, and other traditional containers of personal belongings.

Here, the defendant passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the backpacks he left inside the car when he fled from the police during a traffic stop.  He did not abandon the backpacks or relinquish his privacy interest in them because he was in the vehicle with permission, and took steps to conceal the backpacks from the officer before fleeing.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that that the driver’s consent to search her car did not extend to Garner’s backpacks.

“Garner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpacks. And while Washington case law does not squarely address whether a passenger has a reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in another’s car, our cases point to the conclusion that Garner did not relinquish his expectation of privacy when he left his backpacks in the driver’s car. Unlike the defendant in Samalia, Garner did not leave his backpacks in a stolen car. He left them in a car he had occupied with the driver’s permission.”

“And unlike the defendant in Reynolds, he did not remove the backpacks from the car and leave them on the road. Rather, Garner, who lacked housing, left his belongings with a person he knew. Moreover, Garner never disclaimed ownership of the backpacks. He took the time to put two of the backpacks on the vehicle’s rear floorboard and tried stowing the third backpack under the driver’s seat. The circumstances lend themselves to the conclusion that he intended to safeguard the backpacks until he could recover them.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Garner’s convictions because the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. This is especially true if Search and Seizure issues are involved. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Victim Penalty Assessment” Court Fine Held As Constitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Court Fines, Eighth Amendment, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

HB 1795 reduces driver's license suspensions for court fines and fees - Oklahoma Policy Institute

In State v. Griepsma, the WA Court of Appeals held that a mandatory $500 victim penalty assessment is still not an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, even if it might be partially punitive.

BACKGROUND FACTS

IN 2019, a jury convicted Griepsma of six counts of third degree felony assault of a law enforcement officer and one count of third degree malicious mischief. The trial court imposed concurrent midrange sentences of 55 months for each of the assault convictions. It also imposed a current 364-day sentence for the misdemeanor, but it did not order community custody. Finally, the court imposed a mandatory $500 Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA).

Griepsma appealed imposition of the mandatory $500 VPA. He argued it was unconstitutional under the excessive fines clauses of the Eighth Amendment and the Washington State Constitution.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court explained that under the Eighth Amendment, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” And under the WA Constitution, “Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”  Finally, for a fine to be unconstitutional, it must be at least partially punitive and it must be excessive.

On appeal, Griepsma argued that the United States and Washington Supreme Court cases make clear that the VPA is at least partially punitive. In support of his argument, Griepsma pointed to Timbs v. Indiana and City of Seattle v. Long. Both cases held that in their specific circumstances, the excessive fines clause was aprtially punitive and therefore unconstitutional.

“But neither case addresses whether the VPA is subject to an excessive fines clause analysis,” said the Court of Appeals. With that, it affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the mandatory $500 VPA.

My opinion? States and municipalities are increasingly relying on fines and fees imposed on defendants by criminal courts to fund their court systems and other government operations. Rather than relying on taxes, state and local governments have opted to extract wealth from their poorest and most vulnerable citizens in the form of “criminal legal debt”—financial sanctions imposed as part of the criminal legal system.

These types of penalties are inherently regressive—that is, they have a greater impact on those who are poorer as compared to those who are richer. And such a financial sanction would be difficult for many Americans to bear. A 2020 report issued by the Federal Reserve found that nearly 40 percent of adults would be unable to immediately cover an unexpected $400 expense.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Avoid resolving your criminal case by paying excessive and/or punitive court fines. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

A Trial Court’s COVID-19 Protocols Are “Trial Management Decisions.”

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Coronavirus, Jury Trial, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Courts Making Juror Safety a Top Priority | United States Courts

In State v. Ferguson, the WA Court of Appeals held that imposing COVID-19 protocols are “trial management decisions.” The use of masks, a transparent partition between counsel and client, and some jurors being seated behind counsel table during trial to allow for social distancing did not violate the defendant’s rights at trial.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On April 16, 2019,  a man and his son went for a walk. When they returned home, they noticed a man inside the garage. They recognized the man as Mr. Ferguson. An altercation occurred. Afterward, Ferguson fled the scene by running through a nearby field to a neighbor’s home. The police responded and ultimately found Ferguson at the neighbor’s house. Ferguson was arrested.

Ferguson was initially charged with first degree burglary. His charges were later amended to also include felony harassment, third degree malicious mischief, second degree criminal trespass of the neighbor’s house, bail jumping, and witness tampering.

TRIAL COURT’S COVID-19 PROTOCOLS

Following delay and multiple continuances partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ferguson’s case proceeded to trial. Ferguson’s jury trial was the first to take place in the county since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the trial court implemented a variety of COVID-19 protocols for the trial.

Some members of the jury were seated behind the counsel tables in the courtroom gallery. This was done in order to socially distance the jurors and the participants. And everyone in the court room was instructed to wear face masks. The trial court also instructed the jurors to raise their hands if they could not hear something during the trial.

Plexiglass partitions were also placed between participants, including between Ferguson and his counsel at their table. Throughout the trial, Ferguson and his counsel would lean or move back behind the partition to speak to each other and would pass notes to each other.

After all witnesses had testified, Ferguson’s counsel requested a mistrial based on the COVID-19 protocols. Specifically, counsel argued the plexiglass partition between counsel and Ferguson, coupled with the seating arrangement for the jurors, compromised their ability to have necessary attorney-client communications. Ferguson’s counsel contended that because they could not hear each other through the plexiglass partition, the jurors were possibly able to overhear private communications. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial.

The jury found Ferguson guilty of first degree burglary, third degree malicious mischief, second degree criminal trespass, bail jumping on a class A felony, and tampering with a witness.

Ferguson appealled his conviction on numerous arguments challenging the COVID-19 protocols used for his trial. Ferguson argued that the plexiglass between him and his counsel forced them to lean back to communicate with each other and may have allowed the jurors to overhear them. Ferguson also argued that the masks required him and his counsel to speak louder than they typically would, potentially disclosing their confidential attorney-client communications to the jurors and the State. Finally, he argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a mistrial due to these protocols.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Ferguson’s trial was the first in the county since the beginning of the pandemic and the suspension of all jury trials. The trial court implemented these protocols to ensure that the trial could safely proceed, as it was required to do by our Supreme Court.

“Plexiglass partitions, mandatory masking, and social distancing that forced jurors to be located throughout the gallery were all modifications to the trial court’s typical courtroom arrangement and procedures that fall within the court’s discretion and were based on the Supreme Court’s multiple orders.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the impact on Ferguson’s rights, while not negligible, was not onerous. Although Ferguson and his counsel were not able to communicate as easily as they would have been without the COVID-19 protections in place, the video record of the trial shows that he and his counsel were able to lean back minimally to speak around the plexiglass partition and write notes to each other. And the record shows that Ferguson and his counsel communicated in those ways frequently. Ferguson claims that he spoke louder than normal because of the masks, but private communication with his counsel would have been more likely because of the same social distancing requirements about which Ferguson now complains.

“No reasonable juror would draw any inference personally against Ferguson because of the implementation of plexiglass partitions, masks, and social distancing. COVID-19 protocols are simply not comparable to other inherently prejudicial decisions, like requiring the defendant to wear prison clothes or restraints that could signal dangerousness. See Caver, 195 Wn. App. at 780-81. Because impermissible factors were not brought into play and the changes furthered essential state interests, the COVID-19 protocols satisfy the closer scrutiny required for inherently prejudicial trial management decisions.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the Court of Appeals held that the COVID-19 protocols implemented in Ferguson’s trial were permissive trial management decisions. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ferguson’s motion for a mistrial.

Fortunately, I’ve held numerous jury trials in the era of COVID-19. Unfortunately, it hasn’t gotten an easier. How do you question a prospective juror when the juror is wearing a mask? Watch the eyes. After all, that is about all you can see of the juror’s face.  Body language plays a role.  Jury questionnaires are enormously helpful, as are the use of electronic exhibits. And making sure everyone—you, the judge, and jury—can hear what is being said is always important. It takes patience and care.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Cold-Hearted”

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Recording Your Spouse – A Preliminary Guide | Goranson Bain

In  State v. Fleeks, No. 82911-4-I (January 23, 2023), the WA Court of Appeals held that a recorded police interrogation – where the detective referred to the defendant as being “cold-hearted” – was improperly admitted opinion testimony.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Nineteen-year-old Mr. Fleeks often sold drugs on the streets of Seattle to make money. On December 3, 2018, Fleeks was in the Pioneer Square neighborhood of Seattle selling drugs. After Fleeks received a text message from an unknown number, one of Fleeks’s regular customers approached him and told him the text message was from Mr. George who wanted to buy some crack cocaine. Fleeks met George and sold him a small amount of crack cocaine.

Unfortunately, a confrontation took place. As a result, George died from a gunshot wound inflicted from Fleeks.

After arrest, the police interviewed Fleeks and he denied any connection with George’s death. When the police showed Fleeks surveillance footage, he continued to deny being the person in the footage. Detective Cooper continued to ask Fleeks to explain the encounter and shooting. Detective Cooper asked whether George was “fucking with you or . . . something like that?” Fleeks continued to deny any involvement. Detective Cooper made the following comment:

“Do you wanna explain anything to me? This, this is probably your last chance to try to make yourself not look so cold-hearted and stuff like that. We have witnesses that put you there, that identified you there. We have those pictures, that’s off a video, dude . . . I, I mean you’re 19 . . . was there an argument was there a disturbance, a fight, anything . . . so do you wanna explain what happened?”

The State charged Fleeks with one count of murder in the second degree, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree.

At trial, Fleeks raised self-defense. The State offered the police interview recording as evidence to prove its case. Defense counsel objected to the jury hearing the interview recording. However, the judge allowed the jury to review the transcript from a portion of the police interview with Fleeks. The jury watched the interview, including the police detective referred to Fleeks as “cold-hearted.”

Robert Fleeks Jr. was convicted as charged. He appealled his conviction on numerous issues. One issue was whether the trial judge improperly allowed opinion evidence of the police detective saying Fleeks was “cold-hearted.”

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals agreed with Fleeks that the officer’s opinion testimony was improper.

The Court reasoned that “Opinion Testimony” is testimony that is “based on one’s belief or idea rather than on direct knowledge of the facts at issue.” Furthermore, witnesses may not testify in the form of opinions about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Opinions on guilt are improper because they impede the jury’s ability to make an independent determination of the facts. And testimony given by police officers possess an aura of reliability that make them particularly problematic.

“Testimony that is not a direct comment on the defendant’s guilt or on the veracity of a witness, is otherwise helpful to the jury, and is based on inferences from the evidence, is not improper opinion testimony. Opinion testimony is improper when it comments on the veracity or intent of a witness, tells the jury what decision to reach, or leaves no other conclusion but that a defendant is guilty.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Fleeks argued that the comment was an improper opinion of guilt, specifically, referring to Fleeks as “cold-hearted.” Conversely, the State argued that Detective Cooper was referring to his casual demeanor and unwillingness to cooperate, in conflict with Fleeks’s claim of self-defense. The trial court found the interview admissible:

“We disagree with the trial court. While Detective Cooper’s statement is an observation that Fleeks did not appear remorseful, it improperly commented on Fleeks’s intent and effectually directed the jury to not believe Fleeks’s self-defense theory. Detective Cooper’s opinion that Fleeks should make himself ‘look not so cold-hearted’ could easily appear to the jury as a belief that Fleeks was guilty of murder, not acting in self-defense. This testimony could interfere with the jury’s ability to determine every fact beyond a reasonable doubt. ~WA Court of Appeals

Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed Fleeks’s conviction on other grounds and remand for a new trial with instructions that the detective’s testimony should be redacted to exclude the “cold-hearted” statement.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Harming a Police Dog

Arson, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Harming a Police Dog, Malicious Mischief, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Resisting Arrest, Self-Defense, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Man Who Shot, Killed Ohio K-9 Officer Jethro Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison - ABC News

In State v. Moose, the WA Court of Appeals decided an interesting case involving a defendant maliciously harming a K-9 officer.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Defendant Mr. Moose attempted to light a car on fire. In the process, he intentionally lit a police dog on fire while resisting arrest. The State filed four charges against him—attempted Arson in the Second Degree, Harming a Police Dog, Resisting Arrest, and attempted Malicious Mischief in the Third Degree. A jury convicted him of all charges. Mr. Moose appealed his conviction. He argued that the term “maliciously” under the Malicious Mischief statute does not include police dogs.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by framing Mr. Moose’s appellate arguments. In short, Moose argued that the State lacked evidence to convict him because the Malicious Mischief statute defines “maliciously” as “an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.”  Because Mr. Moose harmed a police dog, not “another person,” the State failed to prove he acted maliciously as required by statute.

However, the Court of Appeals denied Moose’s interpretation of the statute:

“Mr. Moose’s argument is unconvincing . . . A statute criminalizing malicious injury of a police dog plainly requires a definition of “maliciously” that applies to police dogs. Further, Mr. Moose’s reading of “maliciously” in RCW 9A.76.200 to require acting against “another person” violates multiple canons of statutory interpretation . . .

He suggests we read RCW 9A.76.200 so as to render the entire statute meaningless. This is an absurd result that was clearly not intended by the legislature. The State was not required to prove Mr. Moose harmed “another person” to prove he harmed a police dog, and the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain his conviction.”

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Moose’s conviction.

My opinion? In nearly every state, there are specific laws that, for all intents and purposes, equate an attack on a police dog as the same as an attack on a regular officer. WA State is no different, and the penalties are incredible harsh. Recently, a man was sentenced to 45 years for killing a police dog. Generally, though, individuals do have the right to resist unlawful arrests, excessive force, and unprovoked attacks from officers and K-9s.

However, when a police dog is attacking a person, depending on what the dog is doing, a person may be able to claim that the use of a police dog constitutes excessive force. Many police dogs are trained to “bite and hold” suspects, which as the name implies, involves a K-9 literally biting down on a suspect in order to prevent them from fleeing until human officers can arrive. Because dog bites can be extraordinarily severe, an individual may be justified in fighting back in that situation. Self-Defense may apply if the bite is drawing blood, or severely injuring an individual.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Trial Strategy: The Lesser-Included Jury Instruction

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Some Thoughts About Trial Strategy - California Desert Trial Academy College of Law

At trial, criminal defendants have the right for the jury to be instructed on any applicable lower or lesser-included crimes. The evidence must support an inference that the lesser crime was committed instead of the greater offense.

However, should defendants always seek lesser-included jury instructions if the facts warrant this strategy? Isn’t it true that giving a jury too many alternatives to decide convict ultimately result in a conviction? A recent case captured the trickiness of deploying (or not) the lesser-included jury instruction at trial.

In State v. Conway (10/27/22), the WA Court of Appeals held that Defense Counsel’s “all-or-nothing” trial strategy was effective, even when counsel declined to seek a lesser included jury instruction. The Court found Counsel’s decision was deliberate and strategic, and did not prejudice the defendant at trial.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Conway allegedly attacked three different individuals at the Spokane Amtrak Station in a series of incidents. The State charged Conway with one count of second degree assault, one count of third degree assault, and one count of fourth degree assault. At trial, defense counsel admitted to the fourth degree assault. He also admitted that the other crimes amounted to fourth degree assault. However, counsel did not request an instruction for a lesser-included offense. The jury found Conway guilty of second and fourth degree assault but acquitted him of third degree assault.

On appeal, Conway argues ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to request an instruction for the lesser-included offense of fourth degree assault.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying that Criminal defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel. A defendant bears the burden of showing (1) that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances and, if so, (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s poor performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

The Court further elaborated that In reviewing the record for deficiencies, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable. The burden is on a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel to show deficient representation.

“A decision by defense counsel to forgo an instruction on a lesser-included offense may be a legitimate trial tactic . . . Both the defendant and the State have the right to present an instruction for a lesser-included offense if all of the requirements have been met.” ~WA Court of Appeals, Division III.

Here, defense counsel’s decision to forgo an instruction on the lesser-included offense was not deficient. It was clearly strategic.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that there was strong evidence in support of the State’s assault charges. “The State presented the jury with undisputed video evidence of Conway assaulting the victims,” said the Court. “Because the State presented undisputed video evidence of the assaults, it was a legitimate trial tactic for defense counsel to admit that Conway had committed fourth degree assault.”

Moreover, even though an all-or-nothing strategy is legitimate regardless of success, in this case it worked. The jury acquitted Conway of third degree assault even though counsel acknowledged the assault.

With that, the Court of Appeals decided that Conway’s attorney was not constitutionally ineffective. “Defense counsel made a strategic decision to forego a lesser-included instruction on a felony assault charge,” said the Court. “The decision was not deficient and did not prejudice Conway at trial.” The Court upheld Conway’s conviction second and fourth degree assault.

My opinion? The above case captures the trickiness of allowing juries to convict a defendant of a lesser charge. In many cases, lesser included charges are important to defendants because jurors do not always exactly follow the law. For example, in an assault case, the jury might be so outraged at what they consider to be a brazen attack by the defendant that they don’t carefully consider whether the injuries were significant enough to rise to a felony or misdemeanor before returning a guilty verdict.

If the defense requests a lesser included charge of a lesser crime, the jury is more likely to carefully look at the evidence presented. Consequently, they may convict the defendant of the lesser crime if that is the only charge that they feel the evidence supported.

Requesting a lesser included charge is a double-edged sword, however. Some juries might have acquitted the defendant of assault if they didn’t believe that the prosecution proved that the incident was an upper-level felony. Ultimately, the key to deciding whether to request a lesser included charge is weighing the risks against the rewards.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Assault or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Prosecutor’s Use of Term “Mexican Ounce” At Trial Was Race-Based Misconduct

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Race & Law, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Mexican Ounce (Minus Tax) : r/heroin

 In  State v. Ibarra-Erives (9/19/2022), the WA Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s drug conviction because the Prosecutor ‘s use of the term “Mexican ounce” at trial was an intentional appeal to jurors’ potential bias.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In June 2018, the Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force executed a search warrant to recover drugs and related evidence in an apartment. A detective persuaded Mr. Ibarra Erives to open the door. Officers then “pulled him out onto the front landing” and arrested him. On the kitchen counter, police found white powder later determined to be methamphetamine.

On the closet shelf in a bedroom, officers discovered a backpack. The backpack contained
seven one-ounce “bindles” of methamphetamine and five bindles of heroin. The backpack did not contain any information identifying its owner. On the shelf next to the backpack, police found a digital scale and a box of plastic sandwich bags.

Ibarra-Erives admitted that he “temporarily” lived at the apartment. He told police he sometimes slept on the couch and sometimes on the pile of blankets officers observed in bedroom where they found the backpack. Ibarra-Erives said the prescription medication and clothes found on the floor of the bedroom were his. But he denied owning the backpack.

When police searched Ibarra-Erives’ pockets, they found a broken glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine that had white residue and burn marks on it. He also had $591 in cash in his wallet. The State charged Ibarra-Erives with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver.

At trial, Ibarra-Erives, who is Latinx, used a Spanish interpreter. During the State’s case in chief, the prosecutor questioned the lead detective about the amount of drugs found in the backpack in room. The detective testified that each “bindle” of methamphetamine weighed 28 grams, or 1 ounce. He then described the bindles of heroin, which each weighed 24.6 grams. He explained that for heroin, “25 grams is considered an ounce.”

When asked why, the detective responded, “I don’t know what the answer is to why, but the term on the street is it’s a Mexican ounce across the board, regardless of who is selling or buying 25 grams of a Mexican ounce.” Then in his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor twice emphasized that each bindle of heroin had been packaged as a “Mexican ounce.”

The jury convicted Ibarra-Erives as charged. He appealed his conviction on arguments that the prosecutor’s remarks suggested that a Latinx person likely packed or possessed the drugs.  He argues the prosecutor used this gratuitous reference to connect him to the drugs. Consequently, this terminology invoked stereotypes of Mexican drug-dealing and dishonesty against him.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reversed Ibarra-Erives’ conviction.

The Court reasoned that a prosecutor’s zealous pursuit of justice is not without boundaries. However, prosecutors have a duty to the defendant to uphold their right to a fair trial.

“Prosecutors commit misconduct when they use arguments designed to arouse the passions or prejudices of the jury . . . These kinds of arguments create a danger that the jury may convict for reasons other than the evidence produced at trial. In cases where race should be irrelevant, racial considerations, in particular, can affect a juror’s impartiality and must be removed. ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that an objective observer could view the prosecutor’s references “Mexican ounce” to describe the way heroin was packaged for sale as an intentional appeal to the jury’s potential bias. The term specifically suggests that the defendant was more likely to have possessed drugs packed to a “Mexican ounce” because he speaks Spanish and appears to be Latinx.

“Testimony that heroin is packaged in an amount commonly sold on the street is probative of an intent to sell the drugs. But the street term attributing that practice to a particular racial or ethnic group is not. And when the defendant appears to be a member of that same racial or ethnic group, such comments improperly suggest that he is more likely to have packaged or possessed the drugs.” ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

My opinion? Good decision.  The prosecution took advantage of despicable stereotypes. In the State’s closing argument at trial, the prosecutor used the term “Mexican ounce” two times. The prosecutor’s use of the term was an apparently intentional appeal to jurors’ potential bias. It improperly suggested that Mr. Ibarra-Erives was more likely to have possessed drugs packed to a “Mexican ounce” merely because he speaks Spanish and appeared to be Latinx.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a drug offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.