Category Archives: Washington Court of Appeals

Attorney-Client Communications During COVID

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Coronavirus, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Sentencing, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Defendant in credit union robbery makes initial appearance | News, Sports, Jobs - Messenger News

This is an interesting case that arose in the early days of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

In State v. Anderson, the WA Court of Appeals held that courts must try to ensure that criminal defendants are able to confidentially communicate with counsel throughout court proceedings. Failure to provide a confidential means to communicate may be grounds for reversal on appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, a Franklin County jury convicted Mr. Anderson of multiple felonies including murder, assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Mr. Anderson received a sentence of 1,126 months’ imprisonment with 36 months’ community custody, and was assessed $75,430.49 in restitution. A portion of the restitution was imposed jointly and severally with two codefendants.

Three specific issues were identified for resentencing: a vague community custody
condition, two scrivener’s errors, and imposition of discretionary legal financial
obligations in light of Mr. Anderson’s indigence.

A re-sentencing hearing was scheduled to address some concerns Mr. Anderson raised. His resentencing took place in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Washington’s governor declared a state of emergency on February 29, 2020. Shortly thereafter, our Supreme Court began issuing a series of emergency orders addressing court operations during the pandemic. On April 29, 2020, the Supreme Court
issued an order that specified as follows:

Courts must allow telephonic or video appearances for all scheduled criminal and juvenile offender hearings whenever possible. For all hearings that involve a critical stage of the proceedings, courts shall provide a means for defendants and respondents to have the opportunity for private and continual discussion with their attorney.

Mr. Anderson attended the May 12 resentencing hearing via video. His attorney appeared telephonically. The hearing was very brief, generating only seven substantive pages of a report of proceeding. During the hearing, there was no discussion regarding whether Mr. Anderson had consented to appear via video.

Nor was there any clarification about whether Mr. Anderson and his attorney were able to communicate throughout the hearing. The parties agreed to modify the judgment and sentence according to the three issues identified in our prior decision. When addressed by the court, Mr. Anderson confirmed he agreed with the modifications.

At the hearing’s close, the court asked Mr. Anderson if he had been able to hear and understand the proceedings. Mr. Anderson responded affirmatively, but also asked how he was supposed to pay the outstanding restitution. The court instructed Mr. Anderson to confer with his attorney. Mr. Anderson subsequently asked the court how long he had to appeal the decision. The court told him that he had 30 days to make a direct appeal, and that he should speak to his attorney regarding the process. The hearing then adjourned.

Mr. Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal. He argues the videoconference resentencing hearing deprived him of his right to be present and to confer with counsel.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying the right to counsel applies to all critical stages of criminal proceedings, including resentencing.

“The constitutional right to counsel demands more than just access to a warm body with a bar card,” said the Court. “Among other things, it requires individuals charged with crimes to be able to confer privately with their attorneys at all critical stages of the proceedings.” It further reasoned that the ability for attorneys and clients to consult privately need not be seamless, but it must be meaningful. “It is the role of the judge make sure that attorneys and clients have the opportunity to engage in private consultation.”

The Court relied on State v. Gonzalez-Morales, a WA Supreme Court case with similar issues. In Gonzalez-Morales, the defendant’s rights were violated when the trial court failed to give him an interpreter to communicate with his attorney.

“Mr. Anderson argues his case fails to meet the constitutional standard recognized
in Gonzales-Morales,” said the Court of Appeals. “We agree.”

“Unlike what happened in Gonzales-Morales, the trial court here never set any ground rules for how Mr. Anderson and his attorney could confidentially communicate during the hearing. Nor were Mr. Anderson and his attorney physically located in the same room, where they might have been able to at least engage in nonverbal communication.

Given Mr. Anderson participated by video from the jail and his attorney was appearing by telephone from a separate location, it is not apparent how private attorney-client communication could have taken place during the remote hearing. It is unrealistic to expect Mr. Anderson to assume he had permission to interrupt the judge and court proceedings if he wished to speak with his attorney.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Despite the communication obstacles, the Court nevertheless held Mr. Anderson was not entitled to relief because of harmless error. It also said that although Mr. Anderson was not entitled to relief, this case is a cautionary tale for trial judges administering remote criminal proceedings:

“The COVID-19 pandemic has complicated the administration of justice in innumerable ways. Videoconferencing has been an essential component of continued court operations. But courts must ensure videoconferencing occurs in a way that allows for private attorney client consultation. The best method is to arrange for attorneys and clients to be located in a shared physical space, with access to additional communication technologies (such as text messaging devices) if necessary to maintain physical distancing.”

My opinion? The COVID-19 Pandemic has certainly increased the difficulty of practicing law. Courtroom proceedings went virtual or were put on hold, causing delays in justice. Law schools and bar exams were upended. The shift was dramatic. We’ve had to learn new technologies and skills. We’ve had to revolve our practice to adhere and comply with new Executive Orders from our courts. And In the face of change and challenge, we do what American lawyers have done since lawyers helped found this country: we choose to get to work to help to solve the problems before us.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Blake Case & Bail Jumping

Bail Jumping, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

HOW PROSECUTORS USE BAIL JUMPING CHARGES TO COERCE GUILTY PLEAS

Ever since the WA Supreme Court decided State v. Blake – which held Unlawful Possession  of Controlled Substance charges and convictions unconstitutional – I’m inundated with questions from defendants on what that means. Can other charges filed alongside the drug charge get dismissed? Are Bail Jumping charges dismissible, too?

Fortunately,  the WA Court of Appeals decided the issue and answered these questions. In State v. Stacy, the Court of APpeals found that the invalidation of the defendant’s  conviction for a Drug Possession charge does not affect the validity of his Bail Jumping convictions.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Here, Mr. Stacy seeks relief from personal restraint imposed following his 2019 plea of guilty to one count of Unlawful Possession of Controlled Substances (UPCS) and two counts of Bail Jumping, committed while charged with UPCS. He argues that under State v. Blake, which held UPCS charges and convictions unconstitutional, he is entitled to have all convictions vacated.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals’ decision is captured in two sentences below:

“The State concedes that under Blake, Stacy is entitled to have his conviction for unlawful possession of controlled substances vacated. But the invalidation of his conviction for unlawful possession of controlled substances does not affect the validity of the bail jumping convictions. State v. Downing, 122 Wn. App. 185, 193, 93 P.2d 900 (2004).” ~WA Court of Appeals

In other words, Mr. Stacy’s Bail Jumping conviction was upheld despite the fact his UPCS – were later found unconstitutional. The Court’s usage of State v. Downing was notable.

In Downing, the WA Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s Bail Jumping charges even though his underlying Unlawful Issuance of Bank Check charges were dismissed. It reasoned that although no Washington cases addressed whether the charge underlying an allegation of Bail Jumping must be valid, the State is not required to prove that a defendant was detained under a constitutionally valid conviction.

With that, the Court of Appeals in Mr. Stacy’s case dismissed his UPCS convictions and upheld his Bail Jump convictions.

Please read my guide on Making Bail and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Not a Toy, Still a Gun

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Evidence, felony, Firearm, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Kessler Arms 12Ga. Bolt Action Shotgun

In State v. Gouley, the WA Court of Appeals held that an antique shotgun that was missing a bolt action was still a “firearm.”  The State merely has to establish that the shotgun was a real gun, not a toy gun.  The State was not required to prove that the firearm could be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable period of time.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Gouley was convicted of a felony and was under community supervision when he missed an appointment with his community corrections officer. Because of Gouley’s failure to report, the Department of Corrections issued a warrant for Gouley’s arrest.

Several officers attempted to locate Gouley at his listed residence to execute the warrant. The officers found Gouley asleep in his bedroom. In searching the bedroom, the officers discovered a shotgun under Gouley’s bed. Gouley was previously convicted of a serious offense and was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

After Gouley was placed in the squad car, he said the shotgun was given to him by his great uncle. The shotgun was a 20-gauge bolt action shotgun made by Kessler Arms. Although the company was out of business, the shotgun is not rare and is relatively inexpensive. When the shotgun was discovered under Gouley’s bed, it was missing a bolt action assembly and was not operable in that condition.

The State charged Gouley with one count of First Degree Unlawful Possession of a Firearm
and one count of Escape from community custody.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the definition of “inoperable firearms.” The instruction said that a “temporarily inoperable firearm that can be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable time.” Also, a “disassembled firearm that can be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable time” met the definition of a firearm. Gouley consented to the use of this instruction. The jury convicted Gouley as charged. Gouley appealed on arguments that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals defined the term “firearm” under the statute. A “firearm” is a “weapon or device from which a projectile or projectiles may be fired by an explosive such as gunpowder.” Furthermore, a firearm need not be operable in order to qualify as a firearm under the statute. Instead, the inquiry is whether the firearm is a “gun in fact” rather than a “toy gun.”

The Court reasoned the evidence sufficient to show that the device at issue was a firearm  because it was a gun in fact and not a toy. “Although the shotgun was missing a bolt action, Schoeman testified that the gun could be made operable and could fire if a bolt or bolt assembly is inserted into the receiver.”

The Court raised and dismissed Gouley’s argument the firearm was inoperable. Gouley pointed to the fact that there was something wrong with the firing pin of that firearm or maybe the trigger spring, or the firing pin spring.

“However, the fact that the shotgun was defective or inoperable when it was discovered does not mean that the shotgun was a toy, or anything other than a “gun in fact.” And whether the device was a gun in fact is the only relevant determination that the jury had to make.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Ultimately, the Court reasoned the evidence established that the firearm possessed by Gouley met the definition of firearm. With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Gouley’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Unlawful” Isn’t “Knowing”

Bellingham Defense Attorney, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, , , , ,

This man has had so many scooters stolen he can't get theft insurance anymore - Wales Online

In  State v. Level, the WA Court of Appeals held that the term “Knowledge” cannot be inferred from the use of the term “Unlawfully” in the context of a Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle charge.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A police officer stopped Mr. Level for driving a moped without wearing a helmet. The condition of the moped led the officer to suspect it was stolen. A review of the moped’s VIN confirmed this suspicion. The State charged Mr. Level with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The Prosecutor’s charging documents, in pertinent part, said the following:
“The crime of Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Count 5, the maximum penalty for which is 10 yrs. imprisonment and/or $20,000 fine, plus restitution, assessments and court costs, in that the said Jacob Daniel Level in the County of Stevens, State of Washington, on or about July 22, 2019, did unlawfully possess a stolen motor vehicle, to-wit: a Taotao Scooter, the property of (victim’s name omitted); Contrary to RCW 9A.56.068(1), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.”
A jury convicted Mr. Level of the stolen vehicle charge. He timely appealed on arguments that the charge failed to apprise him of any component of knowledge. Consequently, this violated his constitutional right to notice and required reversal of his conviction.
COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
The Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Level.
“The crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle includes an element of knowledge,” said the Court. “The type of knowledge required has two components: the defendant must both knowingly possess the motor vehicle and also act with knowledge that the motor vehicle had been stolen.”
The Court raised and dismissed the State’s arguments that allegations of “‘unlawful and felonious’” conduct sufficient imply guilty knowledge in the context of drug and firearm offenses. “But none of our decisions have held that knowledge can be inferred from the use of “unlawfully” in the context of a possession of stolen property charge,” said the Court. Furthermore, the court reasoned that proof of knowledge is multifaceted. The State must not only prove knowing possession, but also that the defendant knew of the object was stolen.
“Given the state of the law, an information’s allegation that the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to convey an inference that the conduct was done with a mental state of knowledge.” ~WA Court of Appeals
Thus, reasoned the Court, the inclusion of the adverb “unlawfully” in the charges does not satisfy the requirements of sufficient notice.
Next, the Court held that the remaining language in the State’s charges was insufficient to fill in the gaps. Although the State tried to salvage its charges by pointing to the allegation that the moped was the property of someone other than Mr. Level, that contention was inadequate. “It says nothing about Mr. Level’s knowledge. It merely confirms that the moped was stolen,” said the Court. With that, the Court reversed Mr. Level’s conviction.
My opinion? Good decision. In criminal law, the defendant must have both the Mens Rea and Actus Reus to commit the crime. Mens Rea refers to criminal intent. The literal translation from Latin is “guilty mind.” A mens rea​ refers to the state of mind statutorily required in order to convict a particular defendant of a particular crime. Actus Reus refers to the act or omission that comprise the physical elements of a crime as required by statute.
The only exception is if the charged crime is a Strict Liability crime. Strict liability exists when a defendant is liable for committing an action, regardless of what his/her intent or mental state was when committing the action. Crimes like DUI, possession crimes and statutory rape are all examples of strict liability offenses.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Offender Score Post-Blake

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Drug Offenses, felony, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Comment | Where is the Literature of Dissent?

In State v. Markovich, the WA Court of Appeals held that an out-of-state conviction for drug possession may not be included in the calculation of an offender score. There is no longer a comparable Washington offense after State v. Blake declared Washington’s strict liability simple possession statute to be unconstitutional.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of July 13, 2017, police officers broke down the door of an apartment in Everett while executing a search warrant. The defendant Mr. Markovich was sitting on a couch in the front room of the apartment. Officers noticed digital scales, loaded and unloaded syringes, baggies, burnt aluminum foil, and a small stack of cash near the couch. Markovich was handcuffed and led outside the apartment. He had a small “baggie” containing a white substance in his pocket. The substance was later determined to be less than a gram of methamphetamine.

In the bedroom, officers also discovered a black fabric bag containing a larger quality of methamphetamine, heroin, and related drug paraphernalia. Markovich was charged with Possession of Methamphetamine and Heroin With Intent to Deliver or Manufacture.

At trial, Markovich was convicted as charged. The court imposed a high-end standard range sentence of 108 months in prison followed by 12 months of community custody. Markovich appealed on numerous grounds.

While this appeal was pending, the Washington Supreme Court decided State v. Blake, holding that Washington’s drug possession statute, RCW 69.50.4013(1), violated the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions and was void. 197 Wn.2d at 186. Markovich filed a motion for resentencing in superior court, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing in light of Blake because his two prior out-of-state convictions for drug possession were included in the calculation of his offender score.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

On this issue, the Court of Appeals reasoned that a prior conviction based on a constitutionally invalid statute may not be considered when calculating an offender score.

“A sentence that is based upon an incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice,” said the Court, quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin. The Court emphasized that the remedy for such a defect is resentencing under the correct offender score:

“In Blake, the Supreme Court declared Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute unconstitutional and void. Because penalties imposed under the invalid statute are void, defendants who were sentenced based on an offender score that included prior convictions under this unconstitutional statute are entitled to resentencing.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

Consequently, although the Court agreed with Markovich on this issue and re-sentenced his accordingly, it nevertheless denied his remaining claims on appeal.

My opinion? Good decision, overall. Our Court’s are dutifully re-calculating offender scores in the wake of the Blake decision. However, this opinion dealt only with convictions from other states.  A specific statute, RCW 9.94A.525(3) treats federal convictions for crimes for which there is no clearly comparable offense under Washington law as a class C felony equivalent in the offender score.  Federal simple drug possession felonies should, therefore, continue to be included in the offender score.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Access Devices

Access Devices, Bail Jumping, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Evidence, felony, Forgery, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Possession of Stolen Property, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

How to Spot a Forged Check | SQN Banking Systems

In State v. Arno, the WA Court of Appeals Division III held that a paper check presented to a bank is excluded from the definition of an “access device.” Such a paper check will not support a conviction for Second Degree Possession of Stolen Property.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The defendant Mr. Ibrahim Arno brought a forged check for $1,000 to a Wells Fargo Bank in May 2018. He was charged with Forgery and Possession of Stolen Property. While his charges were pending, Mr. Arno missed a court date. He was later charged with Bail Jumping.

The case proceeded to trial. The check was nominally written and bore a signature from the victim Mr. Pinnow. He testified that a box of checks had been stolen from his house in 2017 and that the check in question was one of those that had been stolen. He denied writing the check, and the signature on the check did not match the bank’s records. The account the check was drawn on had been closed earlier after several of the stolen checks were fraudulently cashed.

Regarding the Bail Jumping Charge, Mr. Arno testified that he received a scheduling order with several dates crossed out and was “confused.”

A jury found Mr. Arno guilty of all charges. He appealed the Possession of Stolen Property conviction because the statutory definition of “access device” specifically excludes paper checks from its definition.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying a person is guilty of second degree possession of stolen property if he “possesses a stolen access device.” An “Access device” is defined as “any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used . . . to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.”

“Mr. Arno argues that the statute’s plain language excludes an attempt to transfer
funds by presenting a bad check for payment,” said the Court of Appeals. “We agree. If the exclusion is to mean anything, it clearly applies to the presentation of a paper check at a bank.”

The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s arguments that that it was prosecuting Mr. Arno for possessing an account number, not for presenting a forged check. “The record belies the State’s argument,” said the Court. “In addition, it is clear that the State was not charging Mr. Arno for possessing bank account numbers; it was charging him with possession of a stolen check.”

“We hold that a paper check presented to a bank is excluded from the definition of an access device as ‘a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.’ RCW 9A.56.010(1). Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support Mr. Arno’s conviction for second degree possession of stolen property.” ~ WA Court of Appeals

Nevertheless, the Court of appeals affirmed Mr. Arno’s convictions for forgery and bail jumping.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Consensual Seizures

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, misdemeanor, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

MTS Says Its Officers Aren't Bound by New State Use-of-Force Law

In State v. Meredith, the WA Court of Appeals held that a bus passenger consents to a warrantless search and seizure consisting of a bus fare enforcement officer requests the passenger provide proof of payment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The defendant Mr. Meredith was riding the Swift regional transit bus in Everett late one morning. Two officers from the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office boarded to conduct fare enforcement. When conducting fare enforcement, officers would board a bus at a stop and then ask individual passengers for proof of payment while the bus was driving from one stop to the next. A “chase vehicle” would follow the bus to help with identifying and processing anyone ordered off the bus for nonpayment.

Officer Dalton moved to the back of the bus. He began working his way forward and saying “proof of payment or ORCA card” to each passenger in a conversational tone. His partner moved to the front of the bus and worked backward. The bus drove to its next stop while the officers checked for proof of payment.

Officer Dalton requested “proof of payment or ORCA card” from Meredith, who began to check his pants and backpack. Failure to provide proof of payment could result in a notice of infraction or arrest. The bus continued along its route, and Meredith searched for four or five minutes without producing proof of payment. Officer Dalton ordered him to disembark at the next stop, and they left the bus together.

Officer Dalton asked Meredith for his name and identification. Meredith gave a fake name. Officer Dalton radioed dispatch to run the name, and it produced no returns in either Washington or Colorado. Officer Dalton suspected Meredith gave a fake name. Officer Zelaya arrived to help determine Meredith’s identity.

Officer Zelaya used a mobile fingerprint reader to scan Meredith’s fingerprints. He learned Meredith’s real name and that he had two outstanding felony warrants. Meredith was arrested on his warrants and for committing third degree theft of services for nonpayment of fare. He was charged with Making a False Statement to a Public Servant.

Pretrial, Meredith moved to suppress evidence resulting from Officer Dalton’s fare enforcement. The trial court denied the motion. A jury found Meredith guilty of making a false statement. Meredith appealed under arguments that his constitutional rights were violated by the officers when they executed an unauthorized and warrantless seizure.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals said the Washington Constitution  provides, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Furthermore, the WA Constitution protects against unauthorized seizures by government, despite not using the word “seize.”

However, the Court emphasized that Meredith did not allege his privacy was violated. It reasoned that the analysis does not not depend upon the “privacy” of information requested when police merely request proof of payment on public transit. Therefore, a person can be unlawfully seized without a violation of their privacy.

Next, the Court analyzed whether Meredith validly consented to being seized. “We consider whether his consent was voluntary, whether the seizure was limited to the scope of the consent granted, and whether consent was granted by a party with authority to do so,” said the Court. “We determine whether consent was voluntary by considering the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable—meaning innocent—person.”

“Here, Meredith freely chose to contract with Swift Transit for transportation. He agreed to pay and provide proof of payment. And as a reasonable rider, he necessarily understood his duty to pay his fare and provide proof of payment when asked. Thus, like the civilian base visitor in Farkas, Meredith was aware of the possible seizure of his person and consented to it.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The Court concluded by saying Meredith voluntarily consented to Officer Dalton’s initial contact. With that the Court affirmed Meredith’s conviction.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Jury Questions

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Jury Trial, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Should Jurors Be Allowed to Ask Questions During a Criminal Trial? – GRAND JURY TARGET

In State v. Sutton, the WA Court of Appeals held that, when answering a deliberating jury’s questions, a trial court has a responsibility to ensure that the jury understands the law.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Law enforcement executed a search warrant looking for evidence of drug trafficking at an address on in Newman Lake, Washington. At the property, they found the defendant Ms. Sutton and numerous co-defendants. The ensuing investigation led to Sutton and the co-defendants being arrested for the Kidnapping and Murder.

The State charged Sutton with first degree felony murder predicated on kidnapping, first degree kidnapping, and Leading Organized Crime. With respect to the charge of Leading Organized Crime, the State alleged that Sutton did intentionally organize, manage, and direct three or more persons  with the intent to engage in a pattern of criminal profiteering activity, to-wit: Delivery of a Controlled Substance.

Sutton testified in her defense. She admitted she sold drugs, but denied she sold drugs or directed the co-defendants to commit any crimes.

During deliberations, the jury forwarded a written question to the judge.  “For instruction #25, must the defendant have organized (etc.) all three of the listed persons specifically, or just any 3 or more persons (as instruction #24 states)?”

The judge asked counsel for suggestions on how it should respond to the jury’s question. Both the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel agreed the answer was, “Yes.” Ultimately, the trial judge decided that the best answer was to simply direct the jury to refer back to its instructions. Soon after, the jury returned guilty verdicts.

Sutton appealed her conviction on arguments that the trial court abused its discretion by declining the proposed defense jury instruction that accurately stated the law.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by saying that Defendants are guaranteed a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires jury instructions that accurately inform the jury of the relevant law. Furthermore, CrR 6.15(f)(1) permits trial judges to give the jury supplemental written instructions on any point of law after deliberations begin. This is done to ensure a jury is informed of the relevant law.

“A trial court should ensure that the jury understands the law . . . When it is apparent the jury does not understand the law, the trial court may and should issue a supplemental written instruction. A failure to do so is inconsistent with its responsibility to ensure the jury understands the law and risks the jury rendering a verdict contrary to the evidence.” ~WA Court of Appeals

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court should have given a supplemental instruction to clarify the law. It raised and dismissed Mrs. Sutton’s arguments that under State v. Backemeyer, a trial court should ensure that the jury understands the law. “Backemeyer is distinguishable from this case,” said the Court of Appeals. “There, it was clear that the jury misunderstood the law. Here, the to-convict instruction was clear.”

The Court further reasoned that the jury’s question did not create an inference that the entire jury was confused or that any confusion was not clarified.

“At a minimum, the jury’s question showed that some jurors wanted assurance they need not be concerned about the different wording in instruction 24. And because the trial court has a responsibility to ensure that the jury understands the law, it should have answered the jury’s question. It could have answered: ‘To convict Sutton of leading organized crime, the State must prove the elements of that crime as set forth in Instruction 25 beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Nevertheless, the trial court’s decision not to answer the jury’s question was not an abuse of discretion.” ~ WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Sutton’s conviction.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Cell Site Location Info

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Cell Phone, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Possession of Stolen Property, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,
Find Your Nearest Cell Tower in Five Minutes or Less: 2021 Edition
In State v. Denham, the WA Supreme Court held there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s seized phone records and the suspected criminal activity to support the issuance of a search warrant.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A valuable diamond was stolen from a jewelry store. Within days, the Defendant Mr.  Denham sold that diamond. Police suspected Denham committed the burglary and got a warrant for his cell phone records. Cell site location information included in those phone records placed Denham’s phone near the jewelry store around the time of the burglary.
Mr. Denham was charged and ultimately convicted with second degree burglary and first degree trafficking in stolen property. At Denham’s bench trial, The trial judge cited the
fact that Denham had made phone calls that were routed through the cell tower in
the parking lot of the jewelry store around the time of the burglary. Ultimately, the trial judge found Denham guilty as charged.
Mr Denham appealed his case to the WA Court of Appeals. He challenged the admissibility of the search warrant and the evidence it produced. His argument was that the warrant based on generalizations and did not establish that evidence of wrongdoing would likely be found in his phone records. The WA Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Denham. The State, however, filed its own appeal. And Mr. Denham’s was heard in the WA Supreme Court.
COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
The WA Supreme Court began by discussing the admissibility of cell phone records.
“Our constitutions protect individual privacy against state intrusion,” said Justice Gonzalez, who authored the opinion.  He said that under the U.S. Constitution and WA State Constitution, police must have either the authority of a warrant or a well-established exception to the warrant requirement to lawfully intrude into an individual’s private affairs.
“This constitutional protection extends to cell phone location information held by cell phone companies,” said Justice Gonzalez.  He acknowledged that time-stamped data contained in cell phones provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.
Next, Justice Gonzalez described how a search warrant should be issued only if it shows probable cause that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity will be found in the place to be searched. “There must be a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be seized and between that item and the place to be searched,” he said. “The warrant must also describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.”
With that, Justice Gonzalez reasoned that the search warrant affidavits were proper:
“These affidavits present reasonable grounds to believe that the phones associated with the phone numbers belonged to Denham based on Denham’s own use of the numbers with his probation officers and with various businesses, that Denham had the phones around the time of the burglary because of specific facts suggesting he had the phones days before and after the date in question, that Denham burgled the store, and that Denham trafficked distinctive pieces stolen from the store. They also allege that Denham had both phones at the time of the burglary and used one to arrange the sale of the diamond that was the basis of the trafficking charge.
Taken together, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that evidence of burglary would be found in the cell site location information . . . The fact that there are some generalizations in the inferential chain does not defeat the reasonableness of the inference.” ~Justice Gonzalez, WA Supreme Court
Justice Gonzalez concluded by holding that the search warrant contained sufficient detail to conclude that evidence of a crime would more likely than not be found in the cell site location information in telephone company records of Denham’s cell phones.
Accordingly, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Denham’s convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Discarded DNA Admissible

Bellingham Defense Attorney, DNA, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Kidnapping, law enforcement, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Rape, Search and Seizure, Sex Crimes, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

I 100% volunteered to do it': How bakery worker got DNA to crack 30-year-old murder case - ABC News

In State v. Bass, the WA Court of Appeals held the admission of DNA profiles developed from a plastic cup and a soda can that the defendant discarded in a garbage can at his place of employment was proper.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In November 1989, 18-year-old Amanda Stavik, a freshman at Central Washington University, returned home to rural Whatcom County to celebrate Thanksgiving with her family. On Friday, November 24, 1989, Stavik decided to go for a run with the family dog, Kyra. Her route took her down the defendant Timothy Bass’s residence. She never returned home.

On Monday, November 27, 1989, law enforcement found Stavik’s naked body in shallow, slow-moving water of the Nooksack River. During the autopsy, Whatcom County medical examiner Dr. Gary Goldfogel found semen in Stavik’s vagina and, based on the sperm count, concluded sexual intercourse had occurred no more than 12 hours before her death. This evidence led the State to conclude that someone had kidnapped and raped Stavik while she was out on her Friday afternoon run and that she had died while fleeing her captor.

Dr. Goldfogel preserved the samples he collected and sent them to the FBI and the Washington State Patrol Crime Lab for analysis. The Crime Lab developed a male deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile from the sperm. The police investigation led to several suspects whom they later excluded when their DNA did not match the DNA in the sperm sample. Eventually, the case went cold.

In 2009, Detective Kevin Bowhay reopened the investigation and began asking for DNA samples from anyone who lived in the area or who may have had contact with Stavik near the time of her death. Over the course of the investigation, Det. Bowhay and his team collected more than 80 DNA samples for testing.

In 2013, Det. Bowhay asked Bass for a DNA sample. When Det. Bowhay indicated he was investigating Stavik’s death, Bass acted as if he did not know who she was, “looked up kind of, um, kind of like he was searching his memory” and said “oh, that was the girl that was found in the river.” Bass told Det. Bowhay that he did not really know Stavik and initially said he did not know where she lived. Bass refused to provide a DNA sample.

Bass’s refusal of a DNA sample raised suspicions. At this time, Bass was working as a delivery truck driver for Franz Bakery. Detective Bowhay reached out to Kim Wagner, the manager of the Franz Bakery outlet store. The detective informed Wagner he was looking for items that Bass might cast off that may contain his DNA.

In August 2017, Ms. Wagner saw Bass drink water from a plastic cup and throw the cup away in a wastebasket in the bakery’s employee break room. She collected that cup and stored it in a plastic bag in her desk. Two days later, she saw Bass drink from a soda can and, again, after he discarded it in the same trash can, she retrieved it and stored it with the cup. Det. Bowhay did not direct Wager to take any items and did not tell her how to handle or package these items.

Wagner contacted Det. Bowhay via text to let him know she had two items Bass had discarded in the garbage. Det. Bowhay met Wagner in the Franz Bakery parking lot, picked up the items, and sent them to the Washington State Crime Lab for analysis. The Crime Lab confirmed that the DNA collected from Bass’s soda can and cup matched the male DNA collected from the semen in Stavik’s body.

The State arrested Bass and charged him with first degree felony murder, rape and kidnapping. In pretrial motions, the trial court denied Bass’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained from items Wagner collected at the Franz Bakery. In 2019, a jury convicted Timothy Bass of all charges.

On appeal, Bass challenged, among other things, the admissibility of DNA evidence linking him to the crime. His argument on appeal was that Wagner acted as a state agent when she collected his discarded items without a warrant.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Court of Appeals began by saying the Exclusionary Rule – a law that prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal trial – does not apply to the acts of private individuals. However, evidence discovered by a private citizen while acting as a government agent is subject to the rule.

“To prove a private citizen was acting as a government agent, the defendant must show that the State in some way ‘instigated, encouraged, counseled, directed, or controlled’ the conduct of the private person.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The Court further reasoned that the mere knowledge by the government that a private citizen might conduct an illegal private search without the government taking any deterrent action [is] insufficient to turn the private search into a governmental one. For an agency relationship to exist, there must be a manifestation of consent by the principal [the police] that the agent [the informant] acts for the police and under their control and consent by the informant that he or she will conduct themselves subject to police control.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals rejected Bass’s argument and upheld the trial court’s findings that Ms. Wagner was not an agent at the time she pulled Bass’s cup and soda can from the trash and gave it to police:

“Det. Bowhay and Wagner both testified that Det. Bowhay did not ask or encourage Wagner to look for items to seize and did not tell her what type of items to take. Wagner testified Det. Bowhay did not instruct her to find an item containing Bass’s saliva; she made that assumption based on her husband’s experience in doing an ancestry DNA test and on watching television crime shows. Wagner confirmed that Det. Bowhay did not encourage her to find Bass’s DNA and gave her no guidance in how to do so.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

The co-worker who pulled the cup and soda can from the trash, was not acting as a government agent when she retrieved the items. The co-worker, not the detective, conceived of the idea of watching the defendant to see whether he discarded any items at work and the detective did not tell her how to handle any items collected.

With that, the Court concluded that Detective Bowhay did not direct, entice, or control Wagner and Wagner was not acting as a state agent when she retrieved Bass’s cup and soda can from the workplace trash can. “These findings in turn support the legal conclusion that Wagner’s seizure of Bass’s discarded items and the DNA evidence was not the fruit of an unlawful search.” The Court upheld Bass’s convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving search and seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.