Category Archives: Homicide & Manslaughter

State v. Fedoruk: Ineffective Assistance AND Prosecutorial Misconduct

Constitutional Rights, DNA, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Ineffective Assistance, Jury Trial, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Prosecutorial Misconduct? - Angus Lee Law Firm

In State v. Fedoruk, Division II overturned the conviction of a defendant charged with Murder in the Second Degree. The court ruled (1) Mr. Fedoruk received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to timely pursue a mental health defense and did not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and (2) the prosecutor committed flagrant and ill-intentioned misconduct in closing argument by undermining the presumption of innocence, encouraging the jury to decide the case on grounds other than reasoned evaluation of the evidence, expressing personal opinions as to Fedoruk’ s guilt, and presenting evidence not admitted at trial.

Mr. Fedoruk was charged with Murder in the Second Degree of a relative named Ischenko, whom Fedoruk had accused of raping a family member.

Apparently, Mr. Fedoruk had a long history of serious mental illness. He suffered a head injury in a motorcycle accident at the age of 18, was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was twice admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Doctors have prescribed numerous psychotropic and antipsychotic medications, but Fedoruk had a history of poor compliance with the medication regimens.

During a 2007 competency evaluation, doctors at Western State Hospital diagnosed Fedoruk with bipolar disorder, most recent episode manic, with psychotic features. Fedoruk underwent another mental health evaluation after the State charged him with Robbery, Assault, Theft, and Criminal Trespass in 2008, and a court ultimately found Fedoruk not guilty by reason of insanity.

Despite the above background of mental health issues, Fedoruk’ s defense counsel stated at a pretrial hearing that “the Defense has no intention of putting forward an affirmative defense of diminished capacity or arguing that … Fedoruk was incapable of forming intent at the time.” And although defense counsel later requested a 60-day continuance to pursue an Insanity defense, the trial judge denied the motion and ruled defense counsel failed to lay the foundation for the defense, and that diligence was not shown.

Fedoruk’s case proceeded to trial. At trial, the medical examiner testified that Ischenko died from blunt force trauma, and possibly also strangulation. A crime laboratory analyst testified that the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) profile obtained from bloodstains on Fedoruk’ s clothing matched Ischenko’ s. DNA from numerous bloodstains at the end of the driveway also matched Ischenko’ s profile, as did DNA in blood obtained from under Fedoruk’ s fingernails.

The trial proceeded to Closing Argument. The Prosecutor had a lengthy closing argument on PowerPoint. Among other improper statement, the Prosecutor concluded the presentation by showing a large image of Ischenko’ s body in a ravine under the heading “Murder 2.” On the final PowerPoint slide, under an enlarged ” Murder 2″ heading, the word “GUILTY” flashes, written with all capitals in a 96 -point red font. As these words and images appeared on the screen, the prosecutor delivered the following summation:

Serhiy Ishchenko. He’ s a brother. He was an uncle. He was a father. He was a tidy man, a hard worker and considerate. He was beaten to death, stomped to death, strangled to death. His body was left in a ravine and he was left for dead by the Defendant. Murder two. The Defendant is guilty, guilty, guilty. Thank you.

Fedoruk’s attorney did not object to any portion of the State’ s closing argument, or to the PowerPoint presentation.

First, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Fedoruk received ineffective assistance of counsel. It launched  into an in-depth analysis of State v. A.N.J., which is a recent case regarding ineffective assistance of counsel by defense attorneys. The court reasoned that pursuant to State v. A.N.J., the extensive history of Fedoruk’s mental illness, all of which was available to the defense from the beginning of the case, indicates that the decision to not seek an expert to evaluate Fedoruk until it was too late fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. “With that, Fedoruk was prejudiced by the failure to investigate a mental health defense. Accordingly, Fedoruk received ineffective assistance of counsel, and we reverse his conviction.”

Second, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a defendant must show that the Prosecutor’ s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury verdict.

Additionally, a Prosecutor who throws the prestige of her public office and the expression of her own belief of guilt into the scales against the accused deprives the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Finally, a Prosecutor enjoys wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, but must seek convictions based only on probative evidence and sound reason.

The court also reasoned that a prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. Although a Prosecutor may point out a lack of evidentiary support for the defendant’ s theory of the case or  state that certain testimony is not denied, the general rule is that the State cannot comment on the lack of defense evidence because the defense has no duty to present evidence.

Here, the Court concluded that the Prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. First, the Prosecutor did not couch her assertions of guilt in terms of the evidence in the case, and she reinforced those assertions with inflammatory images. The Prosecutor conveyed to the jury her personal opinion that Fedoruk was guilty. This argument was improper.

Second, the Prosecutor asked the jury to infer guilt from the intuition of other witnesses who testified. Indeed, this served as the theme of her prepared remarks during closing argument. Therefore, this argument was improper. Finally, the prosecutor improperly commented on the lack of defense evidence by arguing that because Fedoruk did not present contrary evidence, Fedoruk agreed with the State’ s position. This, also, was improper. In sum, the court found the Prosecutor’s conduct was improper,  reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

My opinion? Although my heart goes out to the victim’s family, I’m happy with the Court of Appeals decision. Prosecutorial misconduct violates a defendant’s rights to a fair trial. It creates prejudices against the defendant which overwhelm a juror’s clear and rational thinking. And ultimately, it’s unnecessary. If a Prosecutor’s case is strong, then there is no need for misconduct. And the Court of Appeals said it best at the end of the opinion:

In legal doctrines, some distinctions seem cut with a jeweller’ s eye. Others seem more a work of watercolor, with one shade blurred into another. Although the line between zealous advocacy and improper argument may seem drawn in part in watercolor, the conduct at issue here fell outside its blurred zones. The prosecutor’ s actions described above constituted misconduct.

Exactly.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Miller: Judge Eliminates Prospective Juror Who Overheard Pretrial Motions

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Being a juror ain't so bad – Long Island Business News

In State v. Miller, the WA Court of Appeals decided that the pretrial dismissal of a potential juror who wandered into the courtroom and heard the attorneys arguing pretrial motions did NOT violate public trial right or defendant’s right to be present.

The defendant was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Murder in the First Degree. Before  jury selection, a juror from the jury pool entered the courtroom while pretrial issues were discussed between the attorneys and the judge. The trial court dismissed the juror from participating in the defendant’s trial before beginning voir dire.

At any rate, the defendant was found guilty of the charges. He appeals his conviction on the grounds that dismissing the potential juror from the jury pool violated his right to a public trial and his right to be present at critical trial stages.

The Court of Appeals decided ( 1) the trial court’ s pre -voir dire dismissal of the prospective juror did not violate Miller’ s public trial right, and 2) even if dismissal of the prospective juror during a recess violated Miller’ s right to be present at critical trial stages, the violation was harmless error.

The court reasoned that the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 22 of the WA Constitution guarantees the right to a public trial.  In general, this right requires that certain proceedings be held in open court unless a “Bone-Club” analysis set forth in State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 (1995) supports closure of the courtroom.

The threshold determination when addressing an alleged violation of the public trial right is whether the proceeding at issue even implicates the right. Not every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial or constitute a closure if closed to the public.

Here, the Court reasoned that the trial court’s dismissal of the juror did not occur during voir dire itself, and therefore did not fall within the “category of proceedings that our Supreme Court has already acknowledged implicates a defendant’s public trial right.”  Finally, the Court held that even if Miller’ s right to be present was violated, this violation was harmless error.

 My opinion? Good decision. I’ll take a wild guess and assume the attorneys were arguing Motions in Limine when the potential juror wandered into court and listened. Motions in Limine are a very critical phase in the jury trial process, and happen before jury selection actually begins.

Among other things, motions in limine practice allow attorneys to establish the rules of engagement (what you can and can’t say during trial). More important, they address whether certain controversial evidence is going to be suppressed from the jury; and/or the manner/purpose for which said evidence is going to be admitted (if it is).

Worst-case scenario, a potential juror who overhears a conversation about Motions in Limine take place between the attorneys and judges can inform the jury about all the evidence which the jury doesn’t know about — all the evidence which was suppressed, scrubbed up; deemed irrelevant; prejudicial, cumulative, distracting, etc.

Watching attorneys practice Motions in Limine is like watching a butcher making sausage. It gets to the ugly, brutal and bloody aspects of the case; some of which are purposefully sealed away from the eyes and ears of the jury. Besides, jurors are only supposed to judge cases with the facts they know about and the law as it applies. Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Saintcalle: The WA Supreme Court’s Recent Ruling on Race Discrimination in Our Criminal Justice System

Constitutional Rights, Homicide & Manslaughter, Race & Law, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

That a man was tried six times for the same crime is remarkable enough.

In State v. Saintcalle, the WA Supreme Court addressed an interesting case regarding peremptory strikes against potential black jurors.

The defendant Kirk Saintcalle, a black man, was charged with Felony Murder in the First Degree. At trial, the State’s prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike the only black person in the jury pool. He was found guilty by a jury. On appeal, Saintcalle claimed the strike was racially motivated in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

The WA Supreme Court disagreed and agreed with Saintcalle. They disagreed with Saintcalle to the extent that the Prosecutor’s peremptory striking of the only African-American juror in this case did not give rise to a Batson violation. However, the majority agreed that Washington’s Batson procedures were not strong enough to effectively combat race discrimination in the selection of juries.

Justice Wiggins also stated our Batson procedures must change so as to deal with unconscious, institutional, or unintentional racism, however, “[T]his is not the case in which to announce a new standard.” Saintcalle’s conviction was upheld.

Chief Justice Madsen’s concurrence, which was signed by Justice Jim Johnson, also expressed her concern about racial discrimination during jury selection. She would not adjust Batson or do away with peremptory challenges in an attempt to address nonpurposeful discrimination based on race during jury selection. Chief Justice Madsen also took issue with Justice Wiggins’ charts and graphs that compared the prosecutor’s questioning of the African-American juror to the prosecutor’s questioning of other jurors.

Justice Stephens’ concurrence, which was signed by Justices Fairhurst and Charles Johnson, “sound[s] a note of restraint amidst the enthusiasm to craft a new solution to the problem of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during jury selection.”

Justice González’s concurrence calls for the immediate abolishment of peremptory challenges.

Justice Chambers dissented.

My opinion? I’ve heard that getting attorneys to agree to something – and judges, for that matter – is akin to trying to herd cats. Clearly, State v. Saintcalle  captures the “herding cats” imagery. The smattering of different opinions by our justices captures the complexity of racism in our judicial system. Some see it.  Some don’t. Others call it something else.

Although I’m saddened the WA Supremes passed on an opportunity to capture a racist act and make an example of it, I’m happy they said Washington needs to have stronger procedures and standards in place to stop these situations from happening again. Perhaps jury pools should intentionally include more minority jurors. Who knows? The solution, it seems, is potentially as multi-layered as the problem itself.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Irby: Jury Selection Gone Wrong

Constitutional Rights, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

How to weed out bad jurors during jury selection

Very interesting case. In State v. Irby, the WA Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection was violated when the trial judge emailed the attorneys and said he was inclined to release ten prospective jurors for hardship.

The defendant, Terrance Irby, was charged with first degree murder.  During jury selection, several members of the jury were disqualified by the judge and attorneys through email exchanges.  The communications occurred without the defendant being present.  Consequently, the Court of Appeals overturned Irby’s conviction.

The WA Supremes reasoned,  “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend person, or by counsel”   under the due process clause of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the WA Constitution.  Here, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the removal of several potential jurors in Irby’s absence had no effect on the verdict.

My opinion?  Good decision.  The rule is clear as day.  Perhaps one of the jurors who was struck via email would have found Irby not guilty.  We’ll never know.  At any rate, Mr. Irby’s rights were clearly violated.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Patrol Car Video in Fatal Shooting of Woodcarver Released

Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Uncategorized, , ,

Police video documents fatal encounter between officer and woodcarver | The Seattle Times

 Patrol car video released from an officer’s fatal meeting with John T. Williams does not show the shooting, but includes audio of their interaction. Officer Ian Birk, 27, shot Williams Aug. 30 at Boren Avenue and Howell Street. Williams died at the scene.

Birk yells “Hey!” three times to Williams, then yells three times to “Put the knife down.”

The first shot appears to be fired five seconds from when Birk first told Williams to put the knife down. Court documents show the knife was closed when photographed by investigators.

Less than a minute after the shooting, before backup officers arrive, Birk’s heard telling a woman Williams had a knife and wouldn’t drop it. He tells backup officers Williams had the knife open and was carving.  Williams’ knife had a 3-inch blade — one that is legal under the Seattle Municipal Code. Hundreds of people protested the shooting in September. Critics have said Williams was deaf in one ear and was not presenting a threat to Birk.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Berghuis v. Thompkins: Miranda Applies, BUT Defendants MUST Clearly Invoke Constitutional Rights

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Duress Defense, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Interrogation, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Self-Incrimination, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Why Interrogation in Jail May Not Count as “Custodial”: The Supreme Court Makes New Law in Howes v. Fields | Sherry F. Colb | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal suspect must specifically invoke the right against self-incrimination in order for constitutional protections to apply.

The case centered around the interrogation of Van Chester Thompkins, who was suspected of Homicide. He remained virtually silent for hours in police custody before giving a few brief responses to police questions. Most significantly, Thompkins answered “yes” when asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” The statement was introduced at trial and Thompkins was convicted.

In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that criminal suspects who do not clearly state their intention to remain silent are presumed to have waived their 5th Amendment rights. Ironically, suspects must literally open their mouths and speak in order for their silence to be legally protected. The new rule will defer to police in cases where the suspect fails to unambiguously assert their right to remain silent.

My opinion?  Naturally, I’m concerned about any retreat from the basic principle that criminal suspects should not be compelled or coerced into incriminating themselves.  The opinion is wrong because it creates additional challenges for suspects who already understand too little about how their constitutional rights apply during police interrogations.

Fortunately, however, the Berghuis decision leaves intact the best strategy for handling any police interrogation: keeping your mouth shut. Requiring suspects with limited legal knowledge to clearly assert their rights may seem a bit strict, but it’s irrelevant if the suspect never says a word to begin with. The point of the 5th Amendment isn’t to protect you after you’ve foolishly incriminated yourself; it’s to remind you that you’re not obligated to answer police questions in the first place.

Ultimately, the burden is on each of us to understand our rights and use that information to make the best decisions. It’s unlikely that any Supreme Court decision will ever change the fact that remaining silent is your best and only strategy if police ask you incriminating questions.

I can’t stress this enough: your attorney can suppress unlawfully obtained evidence IF you clearly assert your rights.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Yes, Crime Is Down . . . But For How Long?

Assault, Domestic Violence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Rape, Studies, Violent Crime, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

NRA-ILA | Stemming the Tide: Violent Crime Decreased in First Six Months of 2017

My opinion?  That’s good news.  It debunks any theories that economic recessions leads to increased crime rates.  I, for one, haven’t seen a dramatic increase in crime – except for maybe low-level street drugs like heroin – since the recession hit.  Still despite the successful efforts of law enforcement’s endeavors, we should not be too quick to pat ourselves on the back.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Sublett: Defendant’s Right to be Present at Trial DOES NOT Extend to Questions Submitted by Jury and Answered in Judge’s Chambers

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A Judge's Personality Comes out in the Chambers through Artifacts and Collections

In State v. Sublett, the WA Court of Appeals held that an in-chambers conference held by the trial judge in response to a juror’s question did not violate the defendant’s his right to an open and public trial. In general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

A jury entered verdicts finding co-defendants Michael Sublett and Christopher Olsen guilty of first degree murder.  Sublett and Olsen appealed, asserting that the trial court violated their public trial rights and their right to be present by holding an in-chambers conference to address a question submitted by the jury during its deliberations and that the trial court violated their due process rights by refusing to answer the jury’s question.

The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public trial.   However, the court also determined that “[a] defendant does not . . . have a right to a public hearing on purely ministerial or legal issues that do not require the resolution of disputed facts.”

Here, the trial court’s in-chambers conference addressed a jury question regarding one of the trial court’s instructions.  This was a purely legal issue that arose during deliberations, and did not require the resolution of disputed facts.  Thus, the defendants’ right to a public trial did not apply in this context.

More important, questions from the jury to the trial court regarding the trial court’s instructions are part of jury deliberations and, as such, are not historically a public part of the trial.  Because the public trial right does not apply to a trial court’s conference with counsel on how to resolve a purely legal question  which  the jury submitted during its deliberations, we hold that the trial court did not violate the appellants’ public trial right by responding to the jury’s question in writing.

The court further reasoned that because the in-chambers conference held in response to a jury question was not a critical stage of the proceedings, the trial court did not violate the appellants’ right to be present.  A “critical stage” is one where the defendant’s presence has a reasonably substantial relationship to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.   But in general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

The in-chambers conference here was not a critical stage of the proceedings because it involved only the purely legal issue of how to respond to the jury’s request for a clarification in one of the trial court’s instructions.  Accordingly, the appellants’ right to be present did not apply in this context.

My opinion?  Shady.  I’ve tried cases where jurors asks/submits questions to the judge while they deliberate.  Typically, the judge reads the question on the record, and in the defendant’s presence.  The attorneys and judge either formulate an agreed answer the question or choose to not answer the question.

In my mind, this is an important stage of the proceedings.  jurors decide guilt and innocence based upon the answer to the question!  How is this not important?  Why shouldn’t the defendant be present to hear the question and answer(s)?

Again, shady.  this decision flies in the face of the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Paumier, a case which I blogged about earlier this month.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Berghuis v. Smith: Defining the Hardship of Obtaining an Impartial “Cross Section” of the Jury Community

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Race & Law, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Jury Selection: How Social Media is Changing the Game | Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

In Berghuis v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Michigan state court did not create an unfair bias in jury selection for a murder trial. case.

The defendant was an African-American man charged with Second Degree Murder and Felony Firearm Possession.  He goes to trial.  At voir dire, the jury panel was composed of 60 and 100 individuals, only 3 of whom, at most, were African American.  At that time, African-Americans constituted 7.28% of the County’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of the pool from which potential jurors were drawn.  An all-white jury was selected.  The trial court rejected Smith’s objection to the panel’s racial composition.  The all-white jury convicted Smith of the crimes.  He was sentenced to life in prison.

For those who don’t know, the 6th Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.  The issue was whether, under the circumstances, the defendant’s right was violated by the all-white jury’s conviction.

The Court reasoned that a defendant raising a violation of the “fair-cross-section” requirement of the Sixth Amendment must establish that any existing underrepresentation was due to “systematic exclusion” of the group in the jury-selection process. Practices, such as excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to show up for jury service, reliance on mail notices, a failure to follow up on nonresponses, the use of old addresses, and the refusal of police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors, are insufficient to establish “systematic exclusion.”  Consequently, the U.S. Supremes upheld Smith’s conviction.

My opinion?  Pollyannaish as it sounds, this opinion shows why it’s SO IMPORTANT for citizens to show up for jury duty.  Juries are the last bastion of objective, impartial justice.  We all experience moments when we are wrongfully accused; not because we intentionally did something wrong, but merely because we look/think/act outside the norms of the majority.

That’s exactly why juries MUST reflect a fair cross section of the community.  That “cross section,’ however, can only happen if YOU – the citizen – do your part and answer the call to serve on a jury.  Your lone perspective adds depth.  Your life experience – which, amazingly, might be similar to the defendant’s/petitioner’s/plaintiff’s – adds insight to their arguments.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

 

State v. Hammock: Home-Made Guns Are Still Firearms

Assault, Constitutional Rights, Firearm, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Pin on Small homemade wepons + gun stuff

In State v. Hammock, the WA Court of Appeals Division II decided that a hollowed-out bolt, in which a bullet is inserted, and when used with a hammer to strike the bullet,  IS a firearm.

After an extended period of using drugs and arguing with Mr. Ford, defendant Hammock handed his girlfriend, Ms. McKee, a .22-caliber bullet, a hollowed-out bolt with a hexagonal head, and a ball peen hammer, and told her to shoot Ford.  Hammock had previously used the device to discharge a bullet.

Hammock inserted the shell into the head end of the bolt.  McKee placed the  non-head end of the  bolt against Ford’s head, struck the bullet with the ball peen hammer, discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford did not die immediately.

The following details are gruesome.  About 20 minutes later, Hammock jumped over the bed without warning  and repeatedly hit Ford  in the head  with a hammer.  Ford remained conscious for several more hours.  Later Hammock exited the room and returned with a metal object similar to a meat cleaver and struck Ford in the head two or three times.

Ford remained alive and conscious, so Hammock knotted an extension cord around Ford’s neck and placed a white plastic bag over Ford’s head.  Hammock also struck Ford again with the metal object once or twice.  Ford ultimately died from a gunshot wound to the head, blunt force impacts to the head, and ligature strangulation due to an extension cord knotted around his neck.

The State charged Hammock First Degree Murder, and numerous Drug Offenses.  A forensic scientist with the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory testified that the .22-caliber bullet is a “rimfire” cartridge, meaning that its primer, the explosive, is around the rim of the cartridge. The primer ignites the gunpowder that provides the gas that propels the bullet.  The scientist was able to discharge a bullet from the bolt by striking the rim of the cartridge with a ball peen hammer.  The jury found Hammock guilty of all charges, including possession of a deadly weapon.

Court of Appeals reasoned that the bolt, hammer, and bullet, when considered together, constitute an instrument of offensive combat.  Hammock inserted the bullet into the bolt, handed it back to McKee, and told her to shoot Ford.  McKee put the bolt up to Ford’s head, struck it with a hammer, and discharged the bullet into Ford’s head.  Ford died partly from this gunshot wound to the head.

This constitutes an “instrument” used to injure or kill someone, reasoned the Court.  Additionally, the Court held that the bolt system meets the definition of “device” as well under former RCW 9.41.010(1).  Under Webster’s Dictionary, a “device” is “something that is formed or formulated by design and usage.

Consequently, the Court upheld Hammocks guilty verdict.

My opinion?  As I said above, I’m dedicating this post to NRA members, gun enthusiasts, and 2nd Amendment buffs.  Although I’m clearly NOT providing legal advice – I cannot do that over the internet – this bit of public information should put gun enthusiasts on pause.  Home-made guns are still firearms; even if the moving parts are separated from each other.  Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.