The Most Dangerous States In the Nation

According to a map published by Visual Capitalist using FBI figures covering March 2025 through February 2026, a new ranking has successfully scored every state on violent crime per 100,000 residents. The nation’s two major tools for measuring crime, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) measures crime data across states. Their combined data shows long-term trends for rates of serious violent crime, motor vehicle theft, and burglary.

WHICH STATES HAVE THE HIGHEST VIOLENT CRIME RATE?

Washington, D.C., sits at the top with 789 violent crimes per 100,000 residents. The figure is partly elevated because the district is entirely urban, unlike states that also include suburbs and rural areas. Among the 50 states, Alaska leads at 731, and the rate is driven largely by rape and aggravated assault. New Mexico is next at 645, the highest in the contiguous United States, followed by Arkansas (533), Tennessee (482), Kansas (465) and Louisiana (461). The numbers cover murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault, drawn from the FBI Crime Data Explorer.

WHICH STATES HAVE THE LOWEST CRIME RATES?

Maine reports the lowest violent crime rate in the country at 92 per 100,000, followed by Connecticut (108), New Hampshire (121) and Rhode Island (143). New Jersey (194) and Virginia (201) also land near the bottom. A few results break the geographic pattern. Wyoming (189) and Hawaii (190) both post rates lower than New Jersey despite sitting nowhere near the Northeast. Illinois is the bigger shock. Home to the city Americans instinctively associate with crime, Illinois ranks 31st among the 50 states at 250, below Florida (252) and Massachusetts (267).

IS CRIME GETTING WORSE?

No. The FBI released its full 2025 crime report on Aug. 14, showing that violent crime was down 9.3% from the year before, the largest single-year decline since national estimates began in 1936. The murder rate fell 18.1% to 4.1 per 100,000, matching the rates in 1955 and 1956 for the lowest ever recorded. Property crime dropped 12.4%, and motor vehicle theft fell 22.7%.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Pretrial Drug-Monitoring “Sweat” Patches Ruled Unconstitutional

In Bailey-Cobb v.Snohomish County District Court, No. 87738-1-I (Aug. 17, 2026), the WA Court of Appeals held that Pretrial Drug Monitoring Patches (PDMP’s) are a search and must therefore be supported by authority of law to be lawful.

WHAT ARE PRETRIAL DRUG MONITORING PATCHES?

Ingested drugs have been known to appear in sweat. This has created the development of sweat collection devices for use in drug detection, such as the PDMP sweat patches. However, externally applied drugs or drugs deposited on the skin, can cause false positives or contamination from within (CFWI). Different cleaning procedures are used to remove externally applied drugs, however some drugs can remain causing false positives. Also, if an individual lives in a drug-contaminated environment, CFWI could occur also producing misleading results for drug use.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In these consolidated cases, the State charged Mrs. Simone Bailey-Cobb and Mr. Toombs with DUI. As a condition of their pretrial release, the court required them to wear PDMP’s. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs challenged the imposition of the drug patch as a condition of pretrial release. The trial court denied the petitions. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs appealed, alleging the drug-monitoring patch violated the Washington State Constitution.

Additionally, Bailey-Cobb contended the trial court erred in finding she would interfere with the administration of justice, and Toombs claimed the trial court did not make the requisite findings under CrRLJ 3.2 to impose any conditions. We conclude that Bailey-Cobb and Toombs did not suffer diminished privacy interests as pretrial releasees, and the court’s imposition of a drug-monitoring patch violated their rights under article I, section 7. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to remove the drug-monitoring patch condition from Bailey-Cobb’s and Toombs’s pretrial release requirements.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) began by saying both the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. When a party challenges an action, contending it violates constitutional rights, the court conducts a two-part inquiry.

“First, we must determine whether the alleged action “intruded upon a person’s private affairs,” said the COA. “If a privacy interest exists, the next question is whether relevant authority of law justifies the disturbance.”

Next, the COA discussed CrRLJ 3.2. This court rule gives courts the ability to impose conditions on the accused if the court determines there exists a substantial danger that the accused will commit a violent crime or that the accused will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. The conditions include prohibiting the accused from “consuming any intoxicating liquors or drugs not prescribed to the accused” and “any condition other than detention to assure noninterference with the administration of justice[] and reduce danger to others or the community.” To determine which conditions are reasonable, the court shall consider, among others, the accused’s criminal record, the nature of the charge, and the accused’s past interference with the administration of justice.

PDMP’s Are Invasive Technology

The COA reasoned that although Bailey-Cobb and Toombs would not need to submit a urine sample, they would be submitting far more personal information with the patch than urinalysis testing.

“And once affixed to the body, the patch collects and retains evidence of any and all drugs ingested, regardless of whether it is prescribed or otherwise not prohibited, and the individual wearing the patch is required to go into Triton’s office every 10 to14 days to get a new patch. Additionally, the patch does not test for alcohol, which is one of the substances the court order prohibited, so it is conceivable that further testing would be required. The drug patch is also susceptible to outside environmental contamination in limited situations. Because the drug-monitoring patch is invasive and would reveal far more personal information than necessary, it is not narrowly tailored and cannot survive the Olsen balancing test.” ~WA COA

The State Does Not Have a “Special Need”  to Monitor By Imposing PDMP’s.

Next, the COA rejected the argument that the State had a “special need” to monitor the drug use of pretrial releasees via a drug-monitoring patch. “The special needs exception permits an otherwise unlawful search when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impractical,” said the COA.

“Here, the State maintains a special need exists because requiring a warrant or probable cause would jeopardize the State’s need to monitor the defendants for the sake of public safety. But our Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to apply a special needs exception under article I, section 7. See, e.g., Evans, 5 Wn.3d at 215 (declining to adopt the federal special needs exception for administrative searches of pretrial releasees); Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 410 (declining to apply the special needs exception for urinalysis testing of pretrial releasees). Like the balancing test, precedent does not support applying the special needs exception to the imposition of a drug-monitoring patch for pretrial releasees.” ~WA COA

The COA concluded there was no authority of law to impose PDMP’s.  Also, neither the compelling interest test, nor the “special needs” exception to the search warrant requirement applied. “The drug monitoring patch, and the process for obtaining the patch, reveal more personal information than necessary,” said the COA.  “Thus, the patch condition was not narrowly tailored, and not lawful.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Crime of “Receiving Unlawful Compensation” Also Includes Receiving Sexual Contact

In State v. Tarver, No. 40603-2-III (Jul. 14, 2026), the WA Court of Appeals held that the word “compensation” in the Receiving Unlawful Compensation statute is not limited to receiving money. It also includes receiving sexual contact that a public servant receives in exchange for exercising official discretion to assist another with a “transaction.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Tarver, a former Department of Children, Youth and Families (the Department) caseworker, was charged with several crimes after having sexual contact with a mother he was assigned to investigate. Following a bench trial, he was acquitted of extortion but convicted of perjury and Receiving Unlawful Compensation. On appeal, he challenges only his conviction for receiving unlawful compensation. He argued that sexual contact is not “compensation,” and a “transaction” does not include parent-child visitations or a dependency case.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) began its analysis by reviewing the Receiving Unlawful Compensation statute, which reads: “A person is guilty of receiving or granting unlawful compensation if,being a public servant, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she is likely to have an official discretion to exercise (emphasis added).

The COA ruled that the definition of “Compensation” is not limited to an economic or financial exchange. While compensation might include something of pecuniary value, nothing in its ordinary meaning limits compensation to an economic benefit.:

“Instead, the definition of compensation, along with the context in which the word is used in RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a), focuses on whether the thing received functioned as remuneration . . . In short, we conclude compensation and pecuniary benefit are not interchangeable or synonymous.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The COA also ruled that the word “transaction” includes visits between a parent and child or a dependency case that the public servant assists with:

“Here, the dependency action filed by the State was a communicative activity that involved and reciprocally affected the children (through the State) and Mr. Tarver, as a public servant, advised and assisted in preparing this transaction by providing testimony intended to influence the ultimate decision-maker and exercising discretional authority to determine the terms of visitation.”  ~WA Court of Appeals

With that, the COA ruled that Tarver’s request for sexual contact was a request for compensation in exchange for his advice and assistance in preparing a transaction, which included R.J.’s visitation with her children and his influence in the dependency action.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

High Court Rules “Geofence Warrants” Constitute a Search Under 4th Amendment

In Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (Jun. 29, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Geofence Warrants constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. They acquire people’s location data from Google by linking to their cell-phone location information.

WHAT ARE “GEOFENCE WARRANTS?”

Geofence warrants are an investigative tool typically employed when law enforcement knows the approximate time and location of a crime but not the identities of suspects. In executing a geofence warrant, law enforcement compels a company to provide certain information indicating which particular smartphones were present within a geographic area during a specified time frame. Law enforcement can then use the information to potentially identify the owner of a smartphone found in the area of interest during the time frame. Because geofence warrants do not begin with an identifiable suspect, they have been said to “‘work in reverse” from traditional search warrants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Virginia. Local police officers learned from witness interviews and surveillance footage that the robber had approached the credit union from a corner of an adjacent church while appearing to talk on a cell phone, but they could not find out anything more, and the robber remained at large. On June 14, the police officers applied to a Virginia magistrate for a Geofence Warrant directed to Google.

Here, the Geofence Warrant would require Google to hand over data about the cell phones located within a 150-meter radius of the credit union—the so-called “geofence”—near the time of the crime.

The federal magistrate judge granted and issued the warrant. Through this process, Google ultimately produced three cell-phone users’ identifying information, including the Defendant Mr. Chatrie. His location data showed that he entered the geofence about ten minutes before the robbery and headed toward a residential area immediately after leaving the bank.

Following further police work, a federal grand jury charged Chatrie with robbery and related firearms offenses. He moved to suppress the information the police obtained from Google. According to Chatrie, the officers had acquired that data through a Fourth Amendment search, and the warrant ostensibly authorizing that search was invalid.

The Fourth Circuit found that the Geofence Warrant “plainly violates the rights enshrined in the Fourth] Amendment. However, it denied the motion based on the good-faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed on different reasoning, holding that no search occurred because Chatrie did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the case solely on the question whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Justice Kagan based his reasoing in Carpenter v. United States, which held that accessing cell-site location information (CSLI) constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. In Carpenter, the Court reasoned that CSLI provides a “detailed” and “encyclopedic” portrait of a person’s whereabouts, and, with that, an intimate window into a person’s life. Because people compulsively carry their cell phones all the time, the Carpenter Court explained, a cell phone tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner, and thus faithfully follows him not only through public thoroughfares but into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. The Carpenter Court further observed that the newfound tracking capacity that CSLI gives the police runs against everyone —not just those under investigation—and travels back in time, making possible a form of surveillance that would have been unknown prior to the digital age.

“Most cell-phone users have no awareness of CSLI records, and would never try to retrieve them; by contrast, Google users regularly employ Location History as a personal journal. In that way, Location History resembles other private materials – e.g., emails, documents, photographs, or calendars – that even if stored on Google’s servers, a user reasonably views as his own and expects to be shielded from the inquisitive eyes of the government.” ~Justice Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court

Against that background, Justice Kagan rejected the Government’s argument that accessing only a short amount of cell-phone location information does not count as a Fourth Amendment search fails. “Even short-term monitoring can provide a wealth of detail about a person’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” said Justice Kagan.

Next, Justice Kagan rejected the Government arguement that the so-called third-party doctrine precludes Chatrie from invoking the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The Government’s idea is that in authorizing Google to collect, retain, and use his location information, Chatrie lost his legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore his right to complain of a search. However, Justice Kagan emphasized that Carpenter refused to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI, and no good reason exists to reach a different result for Location History:

“The exposure of that information to Google is merely what happens when a user avails himself of one of the services on his cell phone. The Government’s argument that generating Location History, unlike producing CSLI, is a voluntary choice is meritless.” ~Justice Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court

With that, Justice Kagan remanded the case back to the Federal Court of Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search process, the Geofence Warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime involving Search & Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

U.S. Supreme Court Limits the Federal Gun Ban on Drug Users

In United States v. Hemani, the U.S. Supreme Court voted unanimously to narrow the federal ban on gun possession by people who use illegal drugs. Additionally, the Court ruled government must show that their drug use poses a risk of dangerous behavior.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ali Hemani was a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan who was born in Texas. He has spent most of his life living in the Dallas area with his parents and working a stable job. Suspecting Mr. Hemani and his family members of terrorism-related activities, the government conducted a search of the family home in 2022. Throughout the process, Mr. Hemani proved cooperative. He surrendered a gun he kept in the house, pointed agents to some marijuana on the property, and consented to an interview during which he told law enforcement agents that he used marijuana about every other day.

More than six months after the search, and relying solely on Mr. Hemani’s admitted use of marijuana, the government prosecuted Mr. Hemani under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3) (herein, “§922(g)(3)”) for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Mr. Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s effort to enforce §922(g)(3) against him violated the Second Amendment. The federal district court granted the motion, and after an unsuccessful appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the government asked this Court to review the case.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.

He explained that under the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, courts should uphold restrictions on gun rights only when there is a tradition of such regulations in early U.S. history.

Here, Gorsuch wrote, the federal government cannot meet this high bar. Although the government points to early American laws targeting “habitual drunkards” – for example, by jailing them, placing them in workhouses, committing them to asylums, or requiring them to post a bond to ensure their good behavior – these laws are not sufficiently analogous to justify Hemani’s prosecution.

Gorsuch suggested, a “habitual drunkard” was not the same thing as someone who regularly uses intoxicants such as alcohol. He wrote that even some of the Founding Fathers were heavy drinkers by today’s standards, Gorsuch noted, but to be regarded as a “habitual drunkard” someone would have to frequently be so drunk that they were practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs.

Gorsuch next rejected the government’s argument that the law at the center of this case serves a similar purpose as the law targeting habitual drunkards – that is, to protect the public from ‘unusually dangerous’ individuals who will misuse firearms to commit violent crimes. Even if that is the goal of the law in this case, Gorsuch countered, the habitual drunkard laws normally had little to do with protecting the public from categorically violent and unusually dangerous persons.

Moreover, Gorsuch continued, the habitual drunkard laws are not an apt analogy because their operation differs significantly from the operation of the law at the center of this case. In particular, Gorsuch stressed, those laws usually provided some form of process – such as a trial, proceedings in a probate court, or a bond hearing – before an individual lost any of his liberties, even temporarily. By contrast, under the government’s rule, the law in this case automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user and until he ends his drug use.

Gorsuch made clear that the court did not question that sometimes an individual’s unlawful use of marijuana (or any other controlled substance) may render him a danger to others. But here, he said, the government is asking the court to conclude that anyone who regularly uses marijuana is categorically violent and dangerous without any further showing. Such a position, Gorsuch posited, is at odds with the government’s own actions – for example, its recent decision to downgrade the categorization of marijuana on its list of controlled substances, so that it is now classified as having a lower potential for dependence and abuse and a currently accepted medical use.

Gorsuch emphasized this ruling was “a narrow one” that did not address whether the government could prosecute drug addicts for having a gun or the legality of other gun restrictions – such as the ban on the possession of guns by people who have been convicted of felonies. Indeed, Gorsuch added, the decision did not even address whether the government could prosecute someone if it had proof that a specific individual’s drug use renders him a danger to himself or others.

My opinion? Good decision. Hemani makes it clear that the government cannot make it crime for people to own a gun – which the Supreme Court has held is a fundamental constitutional right – simply because they use marijuana. With nearly half of Americans reporting marijuana use at some point in their lives, this ruling protects the rights of millions and curbs the government’s ability to impose arbitrary and discriminatory penalties. The court has sent a strong message that the government cannot criminalize the conduct of large numbers of people by making categorical and unfounded assumptions about whether they are dangerous.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Firearm Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

The Crackdown On Repeat Impaired Driving

Between Memorial Day and Labor Day, DUI arrests spike dramatically across the country. Law enforcement agencies ramp up patrols, set up more checkpoints, and dedicate extra resources to catching impaired drivers.

Earlier this year, Washington State is updated its DUI laws in ways that could have significant consequences for drivers with prior DUI convictions. One of the most important changes involves how past offenses are counted when determining whether a DUI charge rises to a felony.

EXTENDED “LOOK-BACK” PERIOR FOR PRIOR DUI’S

Under the updated law, HB 1493 updates the “look-back” period used to determine whether an impaired driving offense becomes a felony by increasing it from 10 years to 15 years. This means that if a person has three or more prior DUI or physical control convictions within the past 15 years, a subsequent impaired driving offense can be charged as a felony rather than a gross misdemeanor. Also, older convictions that would not have counted under the previous 10-year rule may now be considered in charging and sentencing.

ADDITIONAL DUI LAW CHANGES

In addition to the extended look-back period, the new law also includes the following:

  • New sentencing alternatives for some felony DUI cases, including treatment-based options aimed at addressing substance use issues.
  • Expanded options for deferred prosecution, including limited eligibility for a second deferred prosecution in certain circumstances.
  • Clarifications to ignition interlock and license processes, which may affect driving privileges and reinstatement procedures after a DUI.

WHY DO THESE CHANGES IN THE LAW MATTER?

A DUI conviction—especially a felony impaired driving charge—can carry serious penalties. Longer jail sentences, extended probation, ignition interlock device requirements, and lasting impacts on your driving record and insurance. And because the new law looks further back into a person’s history, older convictions now heavily influence how current charges are handled.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with DUI or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Public Defenders Join Lawsuit Against WA For Funding

Public defenders are suing.

To be more precise, the King County Department of Public Defense is joining a lawsuit by rural counties that’s already in progress. The move shows that some advocates are running out of patience with the Legislature, which earlier this year retracted a proposal to dedicate some revenue from the state’s new “millionaires tax” for public defenders.

THE PROBLEM

For years, public defenders have reasoned and pleaded with Washington lawmakers to address a crisis in the courts by dramatically increasing what the state spends to provide attorneys for poor people. Unfortunately, the lawmakers haven’t taken much action. Public Defenders now see legal action as a way to force the Legislature’s hand to fund public defense.

“You don’t want to become a pessimist and say there’s no chance, but you realize you may have to have different approaches to motivate lawmakers. Sometimes, litigation is the only way.” ~Matt Sanders, Director of King County’s Public Defense Department

THE LAWSUIT

The lawsuit began in 2023, when Lincoln, Pacific and Yakima counties and the Washington State Association of Counties accused the state of neglecting its constitutional obligations by not adequately funding public defense. The suit suffered an initial setback in 2024. At this time a Superior Court Judge dismissed it, saying the counties lacked standing. But an appeals court disagreed last year and the state Supreme Court declined to intervene.

Under Washington’s longstanding approach, the Legislature has delegated its public defense obligations to the counties. This forces the counties to shoulder almost all those expenses, which total hundreds of millions of dollars each year. The counties claim the system is broken. They argue they can’t raise enough money at the local level to provide all their defendants with adequate counsel. Although the Legislature boosted its spending last year, the counties want much more.

WHY DOES THIS MATTER?

The debate matters because funding struggles and heavy caseloads have led to attorney shortages and uneven services across Washington, sometimes depriving defendants of representation and hampering prosecutions. The state Supreme Court has scheduled lower caseloads for defenders to reduce burnout and attract more recruits over time. For some counties, the new standards could exacerbate budget and staffing woes in the short term.

My opinion? Public defenders are indeed overworked. The situation is driven by systemic underfunding, high caseloads, and the growing complexity of criminal cases. This overwork not only affects the mental health and retention of attorneys but also undermines the constitutional right to effective legal representation. We urgently need reform in the public defense system.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Study: Forest Fire Smoke Leads to Increased Criminal Activity

Summer approaches. And with it, wildfires are on the rise. In Washington State, the wildfire season usually begins in early July and typically culminates in early October when regular rain returns to the Northwest. around the globe. Ever more frequent, severe and longer lasting fire hotspots are expanding to new territories, as the fingers of climate change reach farther around the planet. This isn’t just hazardous to our physical health, it’s impacting people’s mental wellbeing as well.

Interestingly, the most insidious threat is only now being understood. New research has found that wherever the smoke goes, a rise in crime may not be far behind.

THE REPORT

Doctoral researcher Lion Kircheis is a political scientist from the University of Konstanz. He analysed crime report data from the Seattle Police Department from 2013 to 2023, and identified smoky days caused by wildfires on the basis of satellite data, analyses of wind direction and local monitoring stations.

What he found surprised him. According to his report, For 11 years, assaults were higher on days when nearby wildfires had released smoke and particulate matter into the Seattle air. anD when the particulate matter increased by 7.0 μg m−3, there were 3.6 per cent more assaults on these smoky days.

“That’s equivalent to around one additional assault per day in a city the size of Seattle. The statistical increase of 3.6 per cent is not high but, crucially, it is consistent. On those days, when air pollution is up by 7.0 μg m−3, it’s not as if the sun gets blocked by a thick haze of smoke or anything – the air still looks clear. But what is striking is that even a little bit of smoke in the air has an impact on people.” ~Lion Kircheis, Political Scientist

Kircheis looked for any other likely causes for the increase in violence, such as more traffic jams or an increase in police response time. But neither of these were the case. Interestingly, domestic violence call numbers didn’t rise when wildfire smoke was present. That suggests that outdoor exposure to wildfire smoke was the culprit – not indoor air pollution.

And, of course, socio-economic background then comes into play – although we might think we all breathe the same air, it’s not the case for those who work outdoors or do not have access to filtered indoor air.

This doesn’t mean the average person will become more violent just because they’re inhaling invisible wildfire smoke. What is more likely is that aggressive conflicts will spill over into violent actions when there is wildfire-induced smoke in the air. And it’s not just civilians who are susceptible. Police statistics suggest that officers in Seattle responded with more physical force on those smoky days.

The findings are supported by another study that used crime data from 21 major US cities from 2007 to 2020. This research showed that violent and drug-related crimes were particularly prevalent when wildfire smoke was in the air, with a 0.88 per cent increase in violent offences and a 1.35 per cent rise in drug-related crimes.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime during wildfire season. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

U.S. Supreme Court Sides With Death Row Inmate in Challenge to Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

In Pitchford v. Cain, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Black death row inmate’s criminal conviction and death sentence. By a vote of 5-4, the court agreed with Defendant Terry Pitchford that the judge at his 2006 trial had not properly analyzed whether the prosecutor in Pitchford’s case violated the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination in jury selection.

Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s  Batson v. Kentucky held the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor employed a peremptory challenge based on race.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

in 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed agrocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agreement and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty. During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors.

Pitchford’s counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie showing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial court declared the prosecutor’s stated reasons to be race neutral, but the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three). Nor did it make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual.

At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off defense counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and1 black juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitchford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual.

Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court. Applying the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state court had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the trial court had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to argue pretext.” The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was reasonable. The United States Supreme Court granted review.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit’s decision and sent the case back to the lower courts. Justice Kavanaugh’s delivered the majority opinion. His analysis in his opinion for the majority was succinct. “After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike,” he explained, “the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual.” Here, however, Kavanaugh emphasized that the Batson analysis was not correctly or accurately provided:

“Whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson objection.” ~U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh

Kavanaugh conceded that, in cases involving AEDPA, federal courts normally are “deferential to the state court. But deference does not mean abdication,” he stressed. And here, “the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.”

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

City of Bellingham to Lower Speed Limits

The Bellingham City Council recently voted to lower speed limits 5 to 10 mph. This means slower speeds in most neighborhoods, including arterial streets and in the downtown core.

THE DATA

In recommending the new speed limits, Public Works officials sought guidance from the “City Limits” report prepared by the National Association of City Transportation Officials. The data included the following information:

  • Over the past decade, the total number of crashes on Bellingham roads has declined, but their severity has risen.
  • From 2015 to 2019, there were five traffic deaths on Bellingham streets. That includes a 2017 crash that killed a bicyclist.
  • From 2020-2024, there were 15 traffic fatalities, including 10 bicyclists and pedestrians. Two people have been killed on Bellingham streets so far this year, including one pedestrian.
  • Bellingham has 670 “lane miles” of streets.
  • More than half of Bellingham streets have a 25 mph speed limit, and more than a third of its streets have a 35 mph limit.
  • Only 3% or streets have a limit of 50 mph or higher.
  • Lowering speed limits will require a change in city policy, which now uses a system that sets speeds as a function of how fast 85% of drivers are going on a particular street.

WILL DECREASING SPEED LIMITS LEAD TO INCREASED PRETEXTUAL POLICE STOPS?

Probabaly, yes. A pretextual traffic stop happens when a police officer pulls someone over for a minor traffic or equipment violation to try and find evidence of another more serious crime. The legality of these stops is highly controversial, relying on deeply established federal law and evolving state-specific restrictions.

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS
  • Duration Limits: Officers cannot legally prolong a routine traffic stop beyond the time it takes to issue a warning or citation unless they develop a new, independent suspicion of a crime.
  • Consent to Search: You have the right to refuse a search of your vehicle unless the officer has probable cause or a warrant.
  • Legal Defense: Because these stops walk a fine line, experienced criminal defense lawyers often challenge the validity of the initial stop or the scope of the officer’s search in court

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a driving-related crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.