Monthly Archives: February 2018

Emergency Blood Draws

Image result for hospital airlift

In State v. Inman, the WA Court of Appeals held that a warrantless blood draw was proper under exigent circumstances where: (a) the injury collision occurred in a rural area; (b) there is spotty phone service; (c) a search warrant takes 30-45 minutes to create; and (d) helicopters airlifted the DUI suspect to a hospital. A search warrant is not required before a blood sample collected under the exigent circumstances exception is tested for alcohol and drugs.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In May 2015, Inman and Margie Vanderhoof were injured in a motorcycle accident on a
rural road. Inman was the driver of the motorcycle and Vanderhoof was his passenger. Captain Tim Manly, the first paramedic on the scene, observed a motorcycle in a ditch and two people lying down in a driveway approximately 20 to 25 feet away. Captain Manly observed that Inman had facial trauma, including bleeding and abrasions on the face, and a deformed helmet. Based on Inman’s injuries, Captain Manly believed that the accident was a high-trauma incident.

Captain Manly learned from a bystander that Inman had been unconscious for approximately five minutes after the collision before regaining consciousness. Manly
administered emergency treatment to Inman, which included placing Inman in a C-Spine, a device designed to immobilize the spine to prevent paralysis.

While Captain Manly provided Inman with treatment, Sergeant Galin Hester of the Washington State Patrol contacted Vanderhoof, who complained of pelvic pain. Sergeant Hester spoke with Inman and smelled intoxicants on him.

Later, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Przygocki arrived on the scene and observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage.  He contacted Inman in the ambulance and, smelling alcohol, asked whether Inman had been drinking and driving. Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

Deputy Przygocki believed he had probable cause to believe Inman was driving under the influence. Helicopters came to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest trauma center. Deputy Przygocki knew that preparation of a search warrant affidavit takes 30-45 minutes. There was no reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area. Deputy Przygocki conducted a warrantless blood draw after reading a special evidence warning to Inman informing him that he was under arrest and that a blood sample was being seized to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood.

There is a process by which a search warrant for a blood draw may be obtained
telephonically and executed by an officer at the hospital to which Inman was being transported. However, this process is problematic and, in the experience of Officer Hester, had never worked in the past.

TRIAL COURT PROCEDURES

Inman was charged with vehicular assault while under the influence and filed a motion to
suppress evidence of the warrantless blood draw. He argued that the implied consent statute authorized a warrantless blood draw but that the implied consent statute was not constitutional, so there was no valid authority for the blood draw. He also argued that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify a warrantless blood draw in this case.

In response, the State argued that Inman’s blood was lawfully drawn pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

The trial court heard testimony from six witnesses, who testified consistently with the
factual findings summarized above. The trial court orally ruled that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw and later entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Inman filed a reconsideration motion. He argued that there was no probable cause for DUI. He also argued that, even assuming that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw, a warrant was needed to test the blood. The State disagreed.

The trial court denied Inman’s reconsideration motion. The trial court concluded that Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. In addition, the trial court concluded that the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the trial court concluded that because the blood was lawfully seized under exigent circumstances, no warrant was required to test the blood. After a stipulated facts trial, the trial court found Inman guilty of vehicular assault. Inman appealed.

COURT’S CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

  1. The Arrest Was Supported by Probable Cause.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an arrest is lawful only when supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer, at the time of the arrest, has knowledge of facts sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that an offense has been committed. Whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Here, Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. When Deputy Przygocki arrived on the scene, he observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage and, after running the license plates, knew the vehicle belonged to Inman. Deputy Przygocki learned from Sergeant Hester that Inman was in the ambulance and smelled of alcohol. Deputy Przygocki then contacted Inman in the ambulance, and Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

“Based on these facts, Deputy Przygocki knew that Inman was driving the motorcycle after drinking alcohol when he crashed. This knowledge is sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that Inman was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol,” said the Court of Appeals.

2. Exigent Circumstances Supported a Warrantless Blood Draw.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a warrantless search is impermissible under both article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless an exception to the warrant requirement authorizes the search. Drawing a person’s blood for alcohol testing is a search triggering these constitutional protections. A warrantless search is allowed if exigent circumstances exist.  The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is not practical because the delay would permit the destruction of evidence.

“The natural dissipation of an intoxicating substance in a suspect’s blood may be a factor in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless blood search, but courts determine exigency under the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.”

The Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances, obtaining a warrant was not practical. Inman and Vanderhoof were both injured from a motorcycle accident that resulted in significant front-end damage to the motorcycle, which was found in a ditch. Both Inman and Vanderhoof received emergency medical services, and Inman was receiving treatment for possible spine injuries. At the time of the blood draw, helicopters were coming to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest hospital. It would have taken at least 45 minutes to prepare and obtain judicial approval for a search warrant. Deputy Przygocki lacked reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area, so obtaining a telephonic warrant may have been a challenge.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Inman’s suppression motion. First, there was probable cause to arrest Inman for DUI. Second, exigent circumstances existed to authorize a warrantless blood draw. Third, the implied consent statute does not bar a warrantless search under exigent circumstances. Finally, a legal blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception allows testing of the blood without a warrant when there is probable cause to arrest for DUI.

My opinion? Exigent circumstances are one of many arguments that the government uses to get around search warrant requirements. Contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving DUI, blood draws, or exigent circumstances which arguably circumvent the need for officers to obtain search warrants. In difficult cases like the one described above, competent legal counsel is definitely needed to protect constitutional rights against unlawful search and seizure.

Burglary of Inmate’s Cell?

Image result for jail cell fights

In State v. Dunleavy, the WA Court of Appeals held that a jail cell is a separate building for purposes of supporting a burglary charge/conviction, and the that the victim’s jail cell need not be secured or occupied at the time of the crime in order to support the charge.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Dunleavy was an inmate at the Walla Walla County jail in Unit E. In Unit E, there are eight cells capable of housing two inmates per cell. The cells open into a day room. In Unit E, the cell doors are open from about 6:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. An inmate is permitted to close his cell door, but if he does, the door will remain locked until opened the next morning.

Dunleavy was hungry one day, so he asked inmate Kemp LaMunyon for a tortilla. LaMunyon responded that he did not have enough to share, but would buy more later and share with Dunleavy at that time. Dunleavy later bullied LaMunyon and threatened to “smash out.” Soon after, inmate John Owen attacked LaMunyon. During the attack, Dunleavy snuck into LaMunyon’s jail cell and took some of LaMunyon’s food. LaMunyon was seriously injured by Owen. Jail security investigated the fight and the theft, and concluded that the two were related. Security believed that Dunleavy staged the fight between Owen and LaMunyon to give him an opportunity to take LaMunyon’s food.

Because of the seriousness of LaMunyon’s injuries, and because security concluded that the fight and the theft were related, the jail referred charges to the local prosecuting authority. The State charged Dunleavy with second degree burglary, third degree theft, and second degree assault. After the State presented its case, Dunleavy moved to dismiss the second degree burglary charge on the basis that an inmate’s cell is a separate building. The trial court considered the parties’ arguments, denied Dunleavy’s motion to dismiss, and the case continued forward.

Dunleavy called one witness who testified that Dunleavy did not conspire with Owen to assault LaMunyon. After closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury began deliberating at 1:30 p.m. At 4:00 p.m., the jury sent a written note to the trial court through the bailiff. The note asked, “Are the Walla Walla county jail policies legally binding? Are they considered law? What if we are not unanimous on a certain count?” The trial court, counsel, and Dunleavy discussed how the trial court should respond. The trial court’s response read, “You are to review the evidence, the exhibits, and the instructions, and continue to deliberate in order to reach a verdict.” No party objected to this response.

Less than one hour later, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Dunleavy guilty of second degree burglary and third degree theft but not guilty of second degree assault.

ISSUES

Dunleavy appealed on the issues of whether (1) jail cells are separate buildings for purposes of proving burglary, and (2) whether there is an  implied license for unlawful entry.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

1. Jail cells are separate buildings for purposes of proving burglary.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under statute, a person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling. Furthermore, Washington law defines “building” in relevant part as any structure used for lodging of persons; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building.

With these legal definitions in mind, the court noted that that a jail is a building used for lodging of persons, specifically inmates. Each cell is secured at night and an inmate can secure his cell from others. Furthermore, each cell is separately occupied by two inmates. “We discern no ambiguity,” said the Court of Appeals. “A jail cell is a separate building for purposes of proving burglary.”

2. No implied license for unlawful entry.

The Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Dunleavy’s arguments that he did not commit burglary when he entered LaMunyon’s cell because his entry was lawful from an implied license to enter the cell.

Contrary to Dunleavy’s argument, the Court explained that under Washington law, a person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises when he or she is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.”

The Court of Appeals explained that the victim, LaMunyon, did not give Dunleavy permission to enter his cell. Furthermore, the Jail Sergeant testified that inmates are told when they are first booked into jail that they may not enter another inmate’s jail cell.

“Inmates are subject to punishment for breaking these rules, including criminal charges,” said the Court of Appeals. “A rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunleavy entered LaMunyon’s cell unlawfully.”

Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed Dunleavy’s conviction, yet remanded for resentencing on the separate issue that his offender score was incorrectly calculated.

Death Penalty Repealed?

Image result for lethal injection

Driving With Wheels Off the Roadway

Image result for ON RAMP

In State v. Brooks, the WA Court of Appeals held that the neutral area separating a highway on-ramp from an adjacent lane of travel does not meet the definition of “roadway.” A driver who crosses this area is properly stopped for a violation of Driving with Wheels Off Roadway under RCW 46.61.670.

BACKGROUND FACTS

While merging onto westbound U.S. Route 97 from U.S. Route 2 in Chelan County, Jena Brooks’s car crossed over a portion of the highway designated as a “neutral area.” A neutral area is a paved triangular space separating an entrance or exit ramp from an adjacent lane of highway. The neutral area between Route 97 and its merger with westbound Route 2 is marked on each side by thick white channelizing lines. The drawing below is a depiction of a neutral area similar to the one crossed by Ms. Brooks:

Image result for ON RAMP NEUTRAL AREA

A Washington State Patrol trooper observed Ms. Brooks’s vehicular activity and performed a traffic stop. Ms. Brooks was ultimately arrested for driving on a suspended license and other misdemeanor offenses.

During proceedings in district court, Ms. Brooks filed a motion to suppress, arguing her vehicle had been stopped without probable cause. The motion was denied. Pertinent to this appeal, the district court ruled Ms. Brooks’s merger over the highway’s neutral area constituted “driving with wheels off roadway,” in violation of RCW 46.61.670. 2

Ms. Brooks was subsequently convicted of several misdemeanor offenses after a jury trial. Later, she successfully appealed the suppression ruling to the superior court. It found Washington’s definition of a roadway ambiguous in the context of a highway’s neutral area. The superior court then invoked the rule of lenity and determined Ms. Brooks should not have been stopped for driving with wheels off the roadway in violation of RCW 46.61.670.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeals addressed (1) whether the term roadway is ambiguous in the current context, and (2) if the term is ambiguous, whether the rule of lenity is an available tool of statutory construction that might benefit a defendant such as Ms. Brooks.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“A highway’s neutral area is not a vehicle lane. It is too short to facilitate meaningful travel. And its triangular shape cannot consistently accommodate the size of a vehicle. Rather than being designed for vehicular travel, it is apparent the neutral area is designed as a buffer zone. It keeps vehicles separate so as to facilitate speed adjustment and, in the context of a highway on-ramp, safe vehicle merging.”

The Court further reasoned that National standards set by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD) confirmed its observations about the apparent design purpose of a highway’s neutral area. In short, the Court reasoned the MUTCD refers to the neutral area as an “island.” As such, it is an area intended for vehicle “separation.”

“Although a neutral area may be designated either by a wide or double solid white channelizing line, the two options carry no substantive significance” said the Court of Appeals. “Like a double white line, a solid white line can serve as an indicator that crossing is prohibited. The whole point of a neutral area is to exclude vehicles and promote orderly and efficient traffic flow,” said the Court of Appeals.

The Court concluded that Ms. Brooks failed to maintain her vehicle wheels on an area of the highway meeting the statutory definition of a roadway. A vehicle stop was therefore permitted under Washington’s wheels off roadway statute. Consequently, the superior court’s order on appeal from the district court is reversed.

Surprisingly, there’s quite a bit of caselaw on what constitutes “Driving With Wheels Off the Roadway.” Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges following after a police officer pullover where this citation led to arrest. It’s quite possible to suppress the fruits of a search based on unlawful stop, search and/or seizure.

DWLS-III Decriminalized?

Image result for driving while license suspended

Excellent article by Seattle Times staff reporter discusses how a birpartisan group of lawmakers is continuing to push for change in a law that legislators, civil-rights groups and others say disproportionately burdens the poor and communities of color.

Senate Bill 6189, which is sponsored by Sen. Joe Fain, R-Auburn, would decriminalize the charge of third-degree driving with a suspended license (DWLS-III), a misdemeanor. Under current state law, those caught driving with a suspended license due to unpaid traffic tickets or because they didn’t show up for court hearings can be jailed.

The bill has been referred to the Senate’s Law and Justice Committee but not yet scheduled for a hearing. Sen. Jamie Pederson, D-Seattle, who chairs the committee, said he agreed the issue is important, but with a short legislative session and many bills to review, he was hesitant to say if he will schedule a hearing on a proposal that in the past hasn’t been successful.

According to a 2017 report by the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Driving While License Suspended Third Degree is the state’s most commonly charged crime. SB 6189 would remove its misdemeanor status and make the charge a traffic infraction with a $250 penalty. The penalty would be reduced to $50 if a defendant could show he or she got the license reinstated.

 Pacheco reports that since 1994, prosecutors in Washington state have filed some 1.4 million charges and obtained 860,000 convictions, according to the ACLU report. Native Americans were twice as likely as whites to be charged with the crime of third-degree driving while license suspended (DWLS-III), and blacks were three times as likely.

According to Pacheco, unpaid traffic infractions can pile up quickly, with some people accumulating thousands of dollars in fines that must be paid off to reinstate their license, said Rick Eichstaedt, executive director of the Center for Justice, which operates a program in Spokane that helps people reinstate a suspended license.

The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs has opposed previous efforts to decriminalize DWLS-III, but Executive Director Steve Strachan said the organization recognizes the financial burden the law has caused. The association wants to work with legislators to find a balanced solution to DWLS-III where accountability still exists and abuse of the system is discouraged, Strachan said.

Fain, the Auburn lawmaker, previously worked in the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and said he witnessed a deluge of DWLS-III cases that made it difficult to focus on more important cases, such as drunken driving.

In 2009, in conjunction with King County District Court, the prosecutor’s office stopped charging stand-alone DWLS-III cases, but Fain said prosecutors still spent a lot of time handling such cases tied to other crimes.

“I want to spend more of my time on things that will actually improve public safety,” Fain said. “I think individuals, especially lower-income people, living paycheck to paycheck need to be able to go to work and pay their fines,” Fain said, “so you want to make sure you’re not inhibiting a person’s ability to comply with the law.”

Pacheco correctly states that DWLS-III charges are the least serious of the DWLS charges. First- and second-degree driving with a suspended license are charges aimed at habitual offenders and those who lost their licenses due to drunken-driving or reckless-driving convictions.

Co-sponsor Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle, said fines and the possibility of jail time under the current law effectively criminalize poverty and hurt communities of color.

“Putting people into this cycle where people get fined and they can’t pay and get further fined,” said Frockt, “there’s other alternatives.”

Pacheco says that if a measure is passed, Washington would join a handful of states that have decriminalized driving with a suspended license, including Oregon, Wisconsin and Maine, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.

In 1993, Senate Bill 1741 made driving with a suspended license due to unpaid traffic infractions a misdemeanor.

My opinion? I hope the legislature decriminalizes DWLS-III. These charges essentially hook people into the criminal justice system for failing to pay traffic fines.  The charges also expose people to a search incident to arrest with the very real possibility of police finding illegal contraband which may lead to heavier charges. Also, a DWLS-III conviction makes it difficult for people to get to work and further holds back those working their way toward paying off fines and avoiding more fines or jail time.  Please contact me if you, a friend or family member is charged with DWLS III.

Witness Tampering

Image result for jail call

In State v. Gonzalez, the WA Court of Appeals decided there was sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to influence a witness to testify falsely where he asked the witness to give a different story than the one she told the police.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The defendant Leonel Gonzalez was in a relationship with Nona Hook for several years. Hook lived with her mother, Carol Salyers, and several other family members, and Gonzalez was frequently in the home. Salyers owned a Jeep and permitted Hook, but not Gonzalez, to drive it.

In the early morning hours of September 21, Gonzalez called Hook, and she asked him if
he had taken her Jeep. According to Hook, Gonzalez denied knowing anything about the Jeep, but he told her that he was “coming home.” At some point after this call, someone contacted the police.

The police were waiting when Gonzalez arrived at Hook’s home in the Jeep. Upon seeing
the police, Gonzalez drove away, jumped out of the Jeep while it was still moving, and attempted to flee on foot. The Jeep rolled into and damaged a parked vehicle. The police caught and arrested Gonzalez. Following his arrest, officers discovered a white substance that later tested positive for both methamphetamine and cocaine in Gonzalez’s back pocket.

Jail Call

While in jail following his arrest, Gonzalez called Hook. This call was recorded.

During the call, Gonzalez insisted that Hook listen to him and told her that some people
were trying to contact her and that when his “investigator” or “somebody” called her, she was to tell them that she “gave him permission.” Hook responded, “Tell them that I gave you permission,” and Gonzalez interrupted her and told her to “listen” and said adamantly, “That’s it.”

Hook responded by chuckling and saying, “That’s gonna be a little bit hard for me to do.”  Gonzalez appears to respond, “Well, then don’t do it.” The rest of Gonzalez’s response is unclear.

Hook replied, “I mean, for one thing, I was—you already know what the deal was.” And Gonzalez told her aggressively to “listen” and that they were not “going to talk about all that.” He then stated, “You know what to do, so.” Gonzalez and Hook then talked about when Hook could visit so they could talk about their relationship and whether they would marry even if he was in prison. During this part of the conversation, Hook commented about how hard it was for her to be away from him, and Gonzalez responded by asking her whether she “would rather deal with” 6 or 15 years.

Criminal Charges

The State charged Gonzalez with theft of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), hit and run, and tampering with a witness.

Jury Trial & Appeal

At trial, Ms. Hook testified about the jail calls. Ultimately, the jury found Gonzalez guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and tampering with a witness.

Gonzalez appealed under arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the witness tampering conviction because (1) he asked Hook to speak to his investigator and never discussed her testimony and (2) there was no evidence he was asking Hook to testify falsely.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Gonzalez argues that the State failed to prove that he was attempting to influence Hook to
testify falsely because he asked her to tell the defense investigator only something different than she told the police. He asserts that speaking to the defense investigator is not the equivalent of testimony.

“We disagree,” said the Court of Appeals. The Court reasoned that Gonzalez’s request that Hook tell the defense investigator a different story than she told the police would have little effect if it did not also imply that Hook needed to also be willing to testify consistently with what she told the defense investigator. “Thus, a rational finder of fact could have easily found that Gonzalez was attempting to influence Hook’s potential testimony,” said the Court.

Gonzalez also argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he asked Hook
to testify falsely.

“Again, we disagree,” said the Court of Appeals. “At no point in her testimony did Hook testify that she had given Gonzalez permission to take the Jeep on September 18th,” said the Court. Instead, she testified that she dropped Gonzalez off, drove the Jeep home and parked it, and left the keys near the back door. Although Gonzalez came into her bedroom the next morning, Hook did not testify that he asked for or that she gave him permission to drive the Jeep.

The Court of Appeals further reasoned that taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could find that Hook’s testimony established that Gonzalez took the Jeep without her permission and that Hook’s testimony was truthful.

“Given that Gonzalez asked Hook to state that she had given him permission, a rational finder of fact could have easily found that Gonzalez was asking Hook to testify falsely. Accordingly, Gonzalez’s insufficient evidence arguments fail, and we affirm his witness tampering conviction.”

In sum, the Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s convictions, but remanded for re-sentencing on the unlawful possession of a controlled substance conviction consistent with this opinion.