Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

WA Changes Execution Method

Death Penalty, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Drugs Used In Execution By Lethal Injection

Washington state has changed its method of execution from a three-drug cocktail to a one-drug system, according to paperwork filed Tuesday with the WA Supreme Court.

The three-drug method uses sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Only sodium thiopental, followed by a saline flush, is used in the one-drug policy.  In case the first dose does not kill the inmate, an additional 5 grams of sodium thiopental will be made available at the time of execution.  The change in the lethal injection protocol comes despite the fact that a lawsuit challenging the former protocol is before the Washington Supreme Court.  The State moved to dismiss that portion of the lawsuit and go forward with executions.

My opinion?  I’m no proponent of the Death Penalty.  The government should not kill its own citizens.  However, until the Death Penalty is abandoned, it seems the one-drug executions are more appropriate and humane.  Three injections seems cruel, unusual and Draconian.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Dow: Corpus Delicti vs. RCW 10.58.03

Constitutional Rights, Corpus Delicti, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Uncategorized, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Important Facts about Corpus Delicti

In State v. Dow, the WA Supreme Court held that RCW 10.58.035 does NOT change the corpus delicti rule that the State must prove every element of an alleged crime by evidence independent of the defendant’s statement.

 Defendant Mr. Dow was charged with with first degree child molestation.  The victim was a three year old female, and too young to testify.  Consequently, her statements to others about the alleged offense were inadmissible.  No persons other than Dow and the child were present at the time of the alleged offense.  During a recorded police interview, Dow made statements regarding the events surrounding the alleged molestation.

The trial court found these statements to be exculpatory and not an admission.  The State sought to introduce Dow’s statements as substantive evidence that he committed the crime charged.  Dow moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were inadmissible for lack of  corpus delicti.  The trial court agreed.  Dow’s case was dismissed.  The State appealed.  The case found its way to the Supreme Court.

Some background is necessary: the corpus delicti doctrine generally is a principle that tests the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence, other than a defendant’s confession, to corroborate the confession.  The purpose of the rule is to ensure that other evidence supports the defendant’s statement and satisfies the elements of the crime.  Where no other evidence exists to support the confession, a conviction cannot be supported solely by a confession.  The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to prevent defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.  Historically, courts have grounded the rule in judicial mistrust of confessions.

Along comes RCW 10.58.035. It allows a statement to be admitted into evidence if there is substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the statement.   The following factors determine whether the statement is trustworthy:

(a)  Whether there is any evidence corroborating or contradicting the facts set out in the statement, including the elements of the offense;

(b)  The character of the witness reporting the statement and the number of witnesses to the statement;

(c)  Whether a record of the statement was made and the timing of the making of the record in relation to the making of the statement; and/or

(d)  The relationship between the witness and the defendant.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that even if the statements are admissible, no other evidence exists to establish the corpus delicti independent of Dow’s statement. Further, corpus delicti cases have always required sufficient evidence independent of a defendant’s confession to support a conviction.  RCW 10.58.035 does nothing to change this requirement. The State concedes it lacked evidence.  Indeed, the only evidence the State purported to have is Dow’s statement, which is insufficient under any standard.

Consequently, the WA Supremes upheld Dow’s dismissal.

My opinion?  I like the decision.  The WA Supremes dutifully followed corpus delicti and held people shouldn’t be charged with crimes unless evidence exists.  I fear, however, that even though the Court did not allow RCW 10.58.035 to swallow the corpus delicti rule, such decisions may come few and farther in between.  The statute was MADE to chip away at corpus delicti.  Period.  Perhaps it didn’t apply to Dow’s case because his statement was the ONLY evidence the State had.  Future defendants in future cases, however, might not be so lucky.

My prediction?  Future courts may find that if a scintilla of evidence beyond the defendant’s statement exists, then the statute kicks into effect and does away with corpus delicti.  Keep your eyes peeled . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. A.N.J: WA Supremes Withdraw Guilty Plea Due To Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Constitutional Rights, Ineffective Assistance, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Blog | Speaker Law

In State v. A.N.J., the WA Supreme Court held that Defendant A.N.J’s court appointed counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to do an adequate investigation, failed to consult with experts, failed to fully inform him of the consequences of his plea, and failed to form a confidential relationship with him independent of his parents.

In 2004, when A.N.J. was 12 years old, he pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation.  Almost immediately, he moved to withdraw his plea upon realizing (1) his juvenile sex offense criminal history would remain on his record once he was an adult, (2) that he might have to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life, (3) that he would have to notify his school, and (4) that he would probably be shadowed by an adult while he was at the school.  He argued that under the facts of this case, his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and that he should have been allowed to withdraw it.

The court record showed that A.N.J.’s defense counsel spent as little as 55 minutes with A.N.J. before the plea hearing, did no independent investigation, did not carefully review the plea agreement, and consulted with no experts.

Consequently, the WA Supremes reasoned that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution.  A.N.J. was also misled into believing his criminal record of the sex offense could be expunged in the future.

My opinion?  Justice Chamber’s introduction in this opinion says it all:

“While the vast majority of public defenders do sterling and impressive work, in some times and places, inadequate funding and troublesome limits on indigent counsel have made the promise of effective assistance of counsel more myth than fact, more illusion than substance.

Public funds for appointed counsel are sometimes woefully inadequate, and public contracts have imposed statistically impossible case loads on public defenders and require that the costs of experts, investigators, and conflict counsel must come out of the defenders’ own already inadequate compensation.”  ~Justice Chambers, State v. A.N.J.

Public defenders have tough jobs.  Period.  Many of my colleagues are public defenders.  Trust me, they’re on the battlefield every day; in the trenches, trying cases to the best of their abilities.  Unfortunately, glutted trial calendars and lack of resources stretch time/energy/resources excruciatingly thin. I only hope this opinion gives all criminal defense attorneys, and not only public defenders, some insights into how to avoid ineffective assistance of counsel.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Erickson: Probation Officers Have Too Much Power

Assault, Bench Warrant, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Probation, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

NY Probation Violation Hearing Lawyer - E. Stewart Jones Hacker Murhpy

In State v. Erickson, the WA Supreme Court decided a court may issue a bench warrant without a formal finding of probable cause on the underlying allegations after the defendant fails to appear at a probation violation hearing.

Anthony Erickson received probation after he was convicted of fourth degree assault.  His probation officer alleged Erickson violated the terms of his probation.  Erickson was issued a summons ordering him to appear at a probation violation hearing.  When Erickson failed to appear, the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.  Erickson was subsequently arrested.  A strip search at the jail revealed he possessed cocaine.

The WA Supremes reasoned that because Erickson failed to notify the court of any change of address, the judge in the lower court had a “well-founded suspicion” that Erickson had violated that condition of his release.  Consequently, the judge had authority to issue the bench warrant based on that alone.

My opinion?  It’s unbelievable that the allegations – and that’s all they are, mere allegations – of a probation officer are upheld as stone-cold truth by judges if a defendant fails to show up for a hearing.  It’s unbelievable that judges can now issue bench warrants because a defendant failed to notify their probation officer of an address change.  It’s unbelievable that defendants can be taken into custody, strip searched, and arrested because they failed to notify their probation officer of an address change.

This case highlights how unfairly the gears of the criminal justice system grind away at individual rights.  Let’s hope this gets appealed to a higher court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Drum: Good Decision Regarding Stipulated Evidence At Drug Court Trials

Burglary, Drug Court, Evidence, felony, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What's good 'evidence-based' practice for classrooms? We asked the teachers, here's what they said | EduResearch Matters

In State v. Drum, the WA Supreme Court held a trial court may find a defendant NOT GUILTY if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all of the elements of a crime beyond all reasonable doubt.

Patrick Drum entered into a contract to participate in drug court, which provided for the eventual dismissal of a Residential Burglary charge if  Drum  successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program.  The contract required Drum to stipulate that the facts set forth in the investigation reports, witness statements, and laboratory tests were true and sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

After waiting in custody for 42 days for a bed to open up at a treatment facility, Drum requested to leave the drug court program.  He had a bench trial.  The judge found him guilty based on the evidence that was stipulated when Mr. Drum entered the contract.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that by entering a drug court contract, a defendant is NOT giving up his right to an independent finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  A trial court still has the authority to find the defendant not guilty if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, if a trial court independently reviews the evidence and makes findings, a stipulated drug court agreement is NOT the equivalent of a guilty plea.

My opinion?  EXCELLENT DECISION.

For those who don’t know, Drug Courts are programs that divert nonviolent, drug-related offenders into intensive treatment programs with the  goal of encouraging offenders  into a productive, drug-free lifestyle.  In general, offenders participate in required drug treatment and counseling, find work, meet with corrections officers, attend regular visits with a judge, and meet any other conditions set by the court.  Personal involvement by the drug court judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and treatment providers is cited as the key to the success of drug courts.

Drug Court is a privilege.  It’s difficult to get into.  A defendant must be evaluated and found a good candidate by the evaluator, prosecutor and judge.  To gain entry, defendant must also stipulate – essentially, agree – to the truth of the evidence alleged against them in the police reports.  Worst-case scenario; if defendants either quit or are kicked out of Drug Court, then they have already waived their right to a jury trial, waived their right to challenge the evidence through direct/cross examination of witnesses, and essentially waived their presumption of innocence.  Ouch.

State v. Drum gives judges broad discretion to review the truth and veracity of the “stipulated evidence.”  In other words, judges may consider whether the State can prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Best-case scenario for a defendant, it appears they have a chance to get a case acquitted by a judge upon leaving Drug Court.

Practically speaking, the likelihood of an acquittal is slim.  Drug Courts are highly political venues.   Indeed, look at how the WA Supreme Justices voted, it was a SLIM 5-4 majority.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pugh: WA Supremes Admit “Excited Utterance” Hearsay Evidence of 911 Call; Disregard State v. Crawford

911 Call, Assault, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Evidence, felony, Jury Trial, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What is EXCITED UTTERANCE? What does EXCITED UTTERANCE mean? EXCITED UTTERANCE meaning & explanation - YouTube

In State v. Pugh, the WA Supreme Court admitted “Excited Utterance” hearsay evidence of a 911 call, thus disregarding State v. Crawford.

Defendant Timothy Pugh and his wife Bridgette are married.  They had problems.  In November 2004, she obtains a no-contact order (NCO) against him.  On March 21, 2005, and in violation of the NCO, the Pughs were together at a friend’s apartment.  At 3:13 a.m., she calls 911 and states, “My husband was beating me up really bad.”

She provided his description.  When the operator asked her whether he was still there, Mrs. Pugh said, “He’s just outside.” She again reported being beaten, but this time stated it in the present sense.  She also said she needed an ambulance.  The call terminated when police officers arrived.  Mrs. Pugh had a bruised face and a chipped tooth.  The officers soon arrested Mr. Pugh in the parking lot outside the apartment where Bridgette was.

Before trial, the State delivered a subpoena to Mrs. Pugh.  However she refused to arrive and/or testify at trial.  Despite her decision, and in clear violation of State v. Crawford (2004 case where WA Supremes upheld the Confrontation Clause and dismissed a case where the State’s victim/witness refused to testify) , the trial court admitted her 911 call as evidence.  Pugh was convicted of felony violation of the court order, domestic violence.

 The WA Supremes held Mrs. Pugh’s statements to the 911 operator were nontestimonial, and therefore admission of a recording of the 911 call at Mr. Pugh’s trial did not violate his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  They reasoned that her statements qualify as res gestae under the res gestae doctrine as it applied at the time the state constitution was adopted.

They further argued that statements of this type do not implicate the state confrontation clause.  Because the statements are nontestimonial and do not implicate article I, section 22, admission of the 911 recording violated neither the federal nor the state confrontation clause.

My opinion?  I hold the same disdain as Justice Sanders’ dissenting opinion.  Article I, Section 22 of the WA Constitution states, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . .”  This is the essence of the Confrontation Clause.

And, to quote Justice Sanders, “What is there about face to face that the majority opinion does not understand?”  Crawford applies – and cases get dismissed – if a victim refuses to testify.  Period.  Here, the victim refused to testify.  Nevertheless, and in total violation of Crawford, the majority pulls out some archaic res gestae analysis, breathes life into it, and totally stomps the heck out of Crawford.

 Unbelievable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Washington Supreme Court Statistics: 2009

Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Statistics Education Resources for Teachers and Students from the ASA | Institute of Competition Sciences

Veeery interesting information!

David Reitz, who co-manages an incredibly impressive blog of the Washington Supreme Court, tracked the opinions and votes of each WA Supreme Court justice and provided a spreadsheet with case-by-case breakouts.

The Supreme Court Washington Blog provides news, information, and analysis of the cases before the Supreme Court of Washington.  I consider them an authority on the subject.  Here’s some highlights of the 2009 statistics:

* Soon-to-be Chief Justice Barbara Madsen was the most prolific writer this year.  She authored 18 majority opinions and 39 total opinions;

* Justice Richard Sanders is the most frequent dissenter, writing nearly three times as many dissents as any other justice;

* The justices with the highest rates of agreement were Madsen and Fairhurst (88%);

* The justices with the lowest rates of agreement were Sanders and Fairhurst (66%);

* Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which sees many narrow 5-4 decisions, the state Supreme Court enjoys a number of strong majority opinions, with nearly half of its rulings unanimous or 9-0 in the outcome.

This information is valuable.  Good criminal defense attorneys defend their clients’ constitutional rights at every opportunity.  They achieve this goal by (1) educating themselves on new court opinions, and (2) applying these opinions to pretrial motions which suppress illegally obtained evidence or dismiss the State’s case altogether.

A major component of educating oneself involves watching the activities of the State Supreme Court.  In short, attorneys can predict how a certain justice will rule on future cases based on how they ruled in past cases (I’m being flippant, but those who play odds on roulette tables understand what I’m saying).  Additionally, attorneys can also predict how the State Supremes address controversial opinions handed down from the United States Supreme Court.

For example, Arizona v. Gant was a recent controversial opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court.  Gant is extremely defendant-friendly: the U.S. Supremes ruled that, depending on the circumstances, a vehicle search is unlawful when a defendant is merely arrested for a traffic violation.  Gant essentially put a stop to unlawful pretextual searches by police.  Beautiful.

Recently, in State v. Bueln-Valdez, the WA Supremes supported Gant as good Washington law.  (I excitedly blogged this last month).  Us defense attorneys  who watch the WA Supremes were ecstatic.  We saw State v. Bueln-Valdez come down the pike and hoped/believed the WA Supremes would use it as a vehicle (no pun intended) to embrace Gant.  As a result, our pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence are now that much stronger because trial judges must follow the opinions of higher judical authorities when ruling on pretrial motions.

Again, these statistics help.  Major kudos goes out to David Reitz, Jonathan Bechtle, and Trent England for their blogging efforts.  Thank you, gentlemen. 🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Buelna Valdez: Search Incident to Arrest is Invalid (Tip of the Hat To Arizona V. Gant)

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Requirement - FindLaw

In State v. Buelna Valdez, the WA Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest was invalid under the 4th Amendment.

Here, a police officer pulled over a vehicle because it had only one working headlight.  The officer ran a records search on the driver, Mr. Buelna-Valdez, and discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  The officer handcuffed and secured the defendant in his patrol car.  Officer searched the vehicle.  He noticed loose dashboard panels.  He calls a K-9 unit.  The K-9 uncovered methamphetamine located under a moldy cup holder.  The passenger was then also arrested. Both men were charged with drug offenses.

The WA  Supremes held that the automobile search incident to arrest was unlawful.  They reasoned that because the arrestee was handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, he no longer had access to any portion of his vehicle.  The officer’s search of the vehicle was therefore unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the WA Constitution.  The Court also embraced the U.S. Supreme Court’s Arizona v. Gant in finding factual similarities between the cases:

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the arrestee was secured and not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, so neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest warranted the search.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.  Furthermore, the arrestee was arrested based upon an outstanding warrant; the State has not shown that it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the underlying crime might be found in the vehicle.  See Gant, citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).”

The Court also reasoned the search was conducted without a warrant, even though the circumstances did not prevent officers from obtaining one prior to the search:  “There was no showing that a delay to obtain a warrant would have endangered officers or resulted in evidence related to the crime of arrest being concealed or destroyed.  As such . . . the evidence collected from that search should be suppressed, and the resulting convictions reversed.”

My opinion?  Obviously, I’m happy.  The case is great law for defense attorneys.  Indeed, it goes even further than Gant. Although good, Gant was slightly problematic because it allowed police to search for evidence of the crime of arrest.   In this decision, however, the WA Supremes only allow a search if there is evidence of destruction.  Therefore, in WA, if the defendant is in the squad car, the police cannot search the defendant’s vehicle.  Beautiful.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harrington: “Progressive Intrusion” = Unlawful Search

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

4 Charts That Show Stop-and-Frisk Is a Terrible Crime-Fighting Tool

In State v. Harrington, the WA Supreme Court held that the “Progressive Intrusion” of the officer during the investigations was an unlawful search.

Issue was whether the police unlawfully searched/seized the defendant prior to arrest, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, requiring suppression of drugs found on his person.

In short (yes, I’m getting to the good part), the WA Supremes decided the search WAS unlawful, and amounted to a “progressive intrusion.”  Evidence suppressed, case thrown out of court.

The facts: On August 13, 2005, 11:00PM, Officer Reiber of the Richland Police was driving his police car on duty.  He noticed soon-to-be defendant, Dustin Harrington, walking down the sidewalk.  Officer Reiber made a U-turn, drove past Harrington, and pulled into a driveway.  He did not activate his lights or siren.  Officer exited his car and made contact with Harrington (this is called a “social contact”).

Officer Reiber asked questions.  Harrington answered them awkwardly and non-sensically.  Officer became nervous because Harrington kept putting his hands in his pockets.  The conversation lasted about five minutes.

State patrol Trooper William Bryan drove by the scene.  He initiated a U-turn, got out of his car, and approached the two men.  Similar to Officer Reiber, Trooper Bryan did not activate his emergency lights.  Upon contact, Trooper Bryan did not speak to either gentleman.  He stood about eight feet away.

Officer Reiber asked Mr. Harrington if he could pat down Harrington “for officer safety reasons.”  Mr. Harrington said “No.”  Officer patted Harrington down anyway, against Harrington’s consent.  During the pat-down, Officer Reiber found a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine.  Reiber arrested Harrington.  During the search, officers discovered a pipe and baggie containing methamphetamine on Harrington’s person. Harrigton was charged with Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine.

The WA Supremes articulated why the search/arrest was illegal, and consequently, why the evidence should be suppressed.  They discussed what “social contact” between an officer and citizen means:

“The phrase’s plain meaning seems somewhat misplaced.  ‘Social contact’ suggests idle conversation about, presumably, the weather or last night’s ball game — trivial niceties that have no likelihood of triggering an officer’s suspicion of criminality.  The term ‘social contact’ does not suggest an investigative component.”

The Court further reasoned that subsequent events quickly dispelled the social contact and escalated the encounter to an unlawful seizure. First, Trooper Bryan’s arrival at the scene escalated the situation away from a mere “social contact” because a reasonable person would think twice about the turn of events.  As a result, Trooper Bryan’s presence contributed to the eventual seizure of Harrington.

Second, Officer Reiber’s request for Mr. Harrington  to remove hands from pockets added to the officer’s unlawfully progressive intrusion.  Third, Mr. Harrington did not consent to the search.  Officers MUST have a well-founded suspicion to search when they lack a defendant’s consent.

Here, these circumstances lacked the foundational basis for a search.  Finally, and before Officer Reiber’s request to search, he did not ask for Harrington’s name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs.

The court concluded Harrington was unconstitutionally seized because, like him, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when officers asked to frisk.  Consequently, the seizure violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My Opinion?  Excellent.  Beautiful.  On point.  The WA Supremes got it right.  The cumulative effect of these violations — all three of them — amounted to an unlawful search.  I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes addressed the fine line between a lawful “social contact” and unlawful “progressive intrusion.”  I’ve had numerous clients face criminal charges as a result of an officer’s apparently innocent “social contact,” which was, in reality, a progressive intrusion into their privacy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Winterstein: Parole Officers Cannot Search A Home If Facts Do Not Support the Officer’s Belief That Probationer Lives There.

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Parole and probation have grown far beyond resources allocated to support them

In State v. Winterstein, the WA Supreme Court held that parole officers cannot search a home if the facts do not support the officer’s belief that that defendant on probation lives there.

Terry Lee Winterstein was convicted of Unlawful Manufacture of Methamphetamine after his probation officer conducted a warrantless search of his residence. After trial, Winterstein’s counsel discovered that Winterstein had reported a change of address with the Department of Corrections at least three weeks prior to the search.

Neverthless, the probation officer searched Winterstein’s prior residence. Winterstein argued that the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed because his probation officer did not have the authority of law to search a house that was not Winterstein’s documented residence.

The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals also held that regardless of the illegal search, the evidence could be admissible under the “inevitable discovery doctrine”—that is, evidence that police would have ultimately or inevitably discovered through other (lawful) means.

The case wound its way up to the WA Supreme Court.

First, the Court addressed whether the probation officer’s search of the Winterstein’s former residence was proper.  They reasoned that, generally speaking, individuals under Department of Corrections supervision have a lesser expectation of privacy, and can be searched on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.  However, the Court also said that probation officers must have probable cause—a higher standard—to believe that their probationers live at the residences they search:

“In this context, probable cause exists when an officer has information that would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the probationer lives at the place to be searched. The information known to the officer must be reasonably trustworthy. Only facts and knowledge available to the officer at the time of the search should be considered.”

Second, the Supremes addressed the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine.  They reasoned it is well-established that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Section 7 says: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

While federal cases have allowed for inevitable discovery, and the state Court of Appeals has applied the doctrine, the Supreme Court said the doctrine is “speculative and does not disregard illegally obtained evidence”—and is therefore incompatible with the state constitution’s expansive protection of privacy.

My opinion?  Extremely well-articulated and correct decision.  The WA Supremes’ handling/dispatching of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine acknowledges the expanded freedoms under the WA Constitution in comparison to the U.S. Constitution.  Admitting evidence under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine leaves no incentive for the State to comply with the constitution’s requirement that arrests precede searches.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.