Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

State v. Erickson: Probation Officers Have Too Much Power

Assault, Bench Warrant, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Probation, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

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In State v. Erickson, the WA Supreme Court decided a court may issue a bench warrant without a formal finding of probable cause on the underlying allegations after the defendant fails to appear at a probation violation hearing.

Anthony Erickson received probation after he was convicted of fourth degree assault.  His probation officer alleged Erickson violated the terms of his probation.  Erickson was issued a summons ordering him to appear at a probation violation hearing.  When Erickson failed to appear, the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.  Erickson was subsequently arrested.  A strip search at the jail revealed he possessed cocaine.

The WA Supremes reasoned that because Erickson failed to notify the court of any change of address, the judge in the lower court had a “well-founded suspicion” that Erickson had violated that condition of his release.  Consequently, the judge had authority to issue the bench warrant based on that alone.

My opinion?  It’s unbelievable that the allegations – and that’s all they are, mere allegations – of a probation officer are upheld as stone-cold truth by judges if a defendant fails to show up for a hearing.  It’s unbelievable that judges can now issue bench warrants because a defendant failed to notify their probation officer of an address change.  It’s unbelievable that defendants can be taken into custody, strip searched, and arrested because they failed to notify their probation officer of an address change.

This case highlights how unfairly the gears of the criminal justice system grind away at individual rights.  Let’s hope this gets appealed to a higher court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Drum: Good Decision Regarding Stipulated Evidence At Drug Court Trials

Burglary, Drug Court, Evidence, felony, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

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In State v. Drum, the WA Supreme Court held a trial court may find a defendant NOT GUILTY if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all of the elements of a crime beyond all reasonable doubt.

Patrick Drum entered into a contract to participate in drug court, which provided for the eventual dismissal of a Residential Burglary charge if  Drum  successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program.  The contract required Drum to stipulate that the facts set forth in the investigation reports, witness statements, and laboratory tests were true and sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

After waiting in custody for 42 days for a bed to open up at a treatment facility, Drum requested to leave the drug court program.  He had a bench trial.  The judge found him guilty based on the evidence that was stipulated when Mr. Drum entered the contract.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that by entering a drug court contract, a defendant is NOT giving up his right to an independent finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  A trial court still has the authority to find the defendant not guilty if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not establish all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, if a trial court independently reviews the evidence and makes findings, a stipulated drug court agreement is NOT the equivalent of a guilty plea.

My opinion?  EXCELLENT DECISION.

For those who don’t know, Drug Courts are programs that divert nonviolent, drug-related offenders into intensive treatment programs with the  goal of encouraging offenders  into a productive, drug-free lifestyle.  In general, offenders participate in required drug treatment and counseling, find work, meet with corrections officers, attend regular visits with a judge, and meet any other conditions set by the court.  Personal involvement by the drug court judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and treatment providers is cited as the key to the success of drug courts.

Drug Court is a privilege.  It’s difficult to get into.  A defendant must be evaluated and found a good candidate by the evaluator, prosecutor and judge.  To gain entry, defendant must also stipulate – essentially, agree – to the truth of the evidence alleged against them in the police reports.  Worst-case scenario; if defendants either quit or are kicked out of Drug Court, then they have already waived their right to a jury trial, waived their right to challenge the evidence through direct/cross examination of witnesses, and essentially waived their presumption of innocence.  Ouch.

State v. Drum gives judges broad discretion to review the truth and veracity of the “stipulated evidence.”  In other words, judges may consider whether the State can prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Best-case scenario for a defendant, it appears they have a chance to get a case acquitted by a judge upon leaving Drug Court.

Practically speaking, the likelihood of an acquittal is slim.  Drug Courts are highly political venues.   Indeed, look at how the WA Supreme Justices voted, it was a SLIM 5-4 majority.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Pugh: WA Supremes Admit “Excited Utterance” Hearsay Evidence of 911 Call; Disregard State v. Crawford

911 Call, Assault, Constitutional Rights, Domestic Violence, Evidence, felony, Jury Trial, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What is EXCITED UTTERANCE? What does EXCITED UTTERANCE mean? EXCITED UTTERANCE meaning & explanation - YouTube

In State v. Pugh, the WA Supreme Court admitted “Excited Utterance” hearsay evidence of a 911 call, thus disregarding State v. Crawford.

Defendant Timothy Pugh and his wife Bridgette are married.  They had problems.  In November 2004, she obtains a no-contact order (NCO) against him.  On March 21, 2005, and in violation of the NCO, the Pughs were together at a friend’s apartment.  At 3:13 a.m., she calls 911 and states, “My husband was beating me up really bad.”

She provided his description.  When the operator asked her whether he was still there, Mrs. Pugh said, “He’s just outside.” She again reported being beaten, but this time stated it in the present sense.  She also said she needed an ambulance.  The call terminated when police officers arrived.  Mrs. Pugh had a bruised face and a chipped tooth.  The officers soon arrested Mr. Pugh in the parking lot outside the apartment where Bridgette was.

Before trial, the State delivered a subpoena to Mrs. Pugh.  However she refused to arrive and/or testify at trial.  Despite her decision, and in clear violation of State v. Crawford (2004 case where WA Supremes upheld the Confrontation Clause and dismissed a case where the State’s victim/witness refused to testify) , the trial court admitted her 911 call as evidence.  Pugh was convicted of felony violation of the court order, domestic violence.

 The WA Supremes held Mrs. Pugh’s statements to the 911 operator were nontestimonial, and therefore admission of a recording of the 911 call at Mr. Pugh’s trial did not violate his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  They reasoned that her statements qualify as res gestae under the res gestae doctrine as it applied at the time the state constitution was adopted.

They further argued that statements of this type do not implicate the state confrontation clause.  Because the statements are nontestimonial and do not implicate article I, section 22, admission of the 911 recording violated neither the federal nor the state confrontation clause.

My opinion?  I hold the same disdain as Justice Sanders’ dissenting opinion.  Article I, Section 22 of the WA Constitution states, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . .”  This is the essence of the Confrontation Clause.

And, to quote Justice Sanders, “What is there about face to face that the majority opinion does not understand?”  Crawford applies – and cases get dismissed – if a victim refuses to testify.  Period.  Here, the victim refused to testify.  Nevertheless, and in total violation of Crawford, the majority pulls out some archaic res gestae analysis, breathes life into it, and totally stomps the heck out of Crawford.

 Unbelievable.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Washington Supreme Court Statistics: 2009

Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Statistics Education Resources for Teachers and Students from the ASA | Institute of Competition Sciences

Veeery interesting information!

David Reitz, who co-manages an incredibly impressive blog of the Washington Supreme Court, tracked the opinions and votes of each WA Supreme Court justice and provided a spreadsheet with case-by-case breakouts.

The Supreme Court Washington Blog provides news, information, and analysis of the cases before the Supreme Court of Washington.  I consider them an authority on the subject.  Here’s some highlights of the 2009 statistics:

* Soon-to-be Chief Justice Barbara Madsen was the most prolific writer this year.  She authored 18 majority opinions and 39 total opinions;

* Justice Richard Sanders is the most frequent dissenter, writing nearly three times as many dissents as any other justice;

* The justices with the highest rates of agreement were Madsen and Fairhurst (88%);

* The justices with the lowest rates of agreement were Sanders and Fairhurst (66%);

* Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which sees many narrow 5-4 decisions, the state Supreme Court enjoys a number of strong majority opinions, with nearly half of its rulings unanimous or 9-0 in the outcome.

This information is valuable.  Good criminal defense attorneys defend their clients’ constitutional rights at every opportunity.  They achieve this goal by (1) educating themselves on new court opinions, and (2) applying these opinions to pretrial motions which suppress illegally obtained evidence or dismiss the State’s case altogether.

A major component of educating oneself involves watching the activities of the State Supreme Court.  In short, attorneys can predict how a certain justice will rule on future cases based on how they ruled in past cases (I’m being flippant, but those who play odds on roulette tables understand what I’m saying).  Additionally, attorneys can also predict how the State Supremes address controversial opinions handed down from the United States Supreme Court.

For example, Arizona v. Gant was a recent controversial opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court.  Gant is extremely defendant-friendly: the U.S. Supremes ruled that, depending on the circumstances, a vehicle search is unlawful when a defendant is merely arrested for a traffic violation.  Gant essentially put a stop to unlawful pretextual searches by police.  Beautiful.

Recently, in State v. Bueln-Valdez, the WA Supremes supported Gant as good Washington law.  (I excitedly blogged this last month).  Us defense attorneys  who watch the WA Supremes were ecstatic.  We saw State v. Bueln-Valdez come down the pike and hoped/believed the WA Supremes would use it as a vehicle (no pun intended) to embrace Gant.  As a result, our pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence are now that much stronger because trial judges must follow the opinions of higher judical authorities when ruling on pretrial motions.

Again, these statistics help.  Major kudos goes out to David Reitz, Jonathan Bechtle, and Trent England for their blogging efforts.  Thank you, gentlemen. 🙂

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Buelna Valdez: Search Incident to Arrest is Invalid (Tip of the Hat To Arizona V. Gant)

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Requirement - FindLaw

In State v. Buelna Valdez, the WA Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest was invalid under the 4th Amendment.

Here, a police officer pulled over a vehicle because it had only one working headlight.  The officer ran a records search on the driver, Mr. Buelna-Valdez, and discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  The officer handcuffed and secured the defendant in his patrol car.  Officer searched the vehicle.  He noticed loose dashboard panels.  He calls a K-9 unit.  The K-9 uncovered methamphetamine located under a moldy cup holder.  The passenger was then also arrested. Both men were charged with drug offenses.

The WA  Supremes held that the automobile search incident to arrest was unlawful.  They reasoned that because the arrestee was handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, he no longer had access to any portion of his vehicle.  The officer’s search of the vehicle was therefore unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the WA Constitution.  The Court also embraced the U.S. Supreme Court’s Arizona v. Gant in finding factual similarities between the cases:

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the arrestee was secured and not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, so neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest warranted the search.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.  Furthermore, the arrestee was arrested based upon an outstanding warrant; the State has not shown that it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the underlying crime might be found in the vehicle.  See Gant, citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).”

The Court also reasoned the search was conducted without a warrant, even though the circumstances did not prevent officers from obtaining one prior to the search:  “There was no showing that a delay to obtain a warrant would have endangered officers or resulted in evidence related to the crime of arrest being concealed or destroyed.  As such . . . the evidence collected from that search should be suppressed, and the resulting convictions reversed.”

My opinion?  Obviously, I’m happy.  The case is great law for defense attorneys.  Indeed, it goes even further than Gant. Although good, Gant was slightly problematic because it allowed police to search for evidence of the crime of arrest.   In this decision, however, the WA Supremes only allow a search if there is evidence of destruction.  Therefore, in WA, if the defendant is in the squad car, the police cannot search the defendant’s vehicle.  Beautiful.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harrington: “Progressive Intrusion” = Unlawful Search

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

4 Charts That Show Stop-and-Frisk Is a Terrible Crime-Fighting Tool

In State v. Harrington, the WA Supreme Court held that the “Progressive Intrusion” of the officer during the investigations was an unlawful search.

Issue was whether the police unlawfully searched/seized the defendant prior to arrest, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, requiring suppression of drugs found on his person.

In short (yes, I’m getting to the good part), the WA Supremes decided the search WAS unlawful, and amounted to a “progressive intrusion.”  Evidence suppressed, case thrown out of court.

The facts: On August 13, 2005, 11:00PM, Officer Reiber of the Richland Police was driving his police car on duty.  He noticed soon-to-be defendant, Dustin Harrington, walking down the sidewalk.  Officer Reiber made a U-turn, drove past Harrington, and pulled into a driveway.  He did not activate his lights or siren.  Officer exited his car and made contact with Harrington (this is called a “social contact”).

Officer Reiber asked questions.  Harrington answered them awkwardly and non-sensically.  Officer became nervous because Harrington kept putting his hands in his pockets.  The conversation lasted about five minutes.

State patrol Trooper William Bryan drove by the scene.  He initiated a U-turn, got out of his car, and approached the two men.  Similar to Officer Reiber, Trooper Bryan did not activate his emergency lights.  Upon contact, Trooper Bryan did not speak to either gentleman.  He stood about eight feet away.

Officer Reiber asked Mr. Harrington if he could pat down Harrington “for officer safety reasons.”  Mr. Harrington said “No.”  Officer patted Harrington down anyway, against Harrington’s consent.  During the pat-down, Officer Reiber found a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine.  Reiber arrested Harrington.  During the search, officers discovered a pipe and baggie containing methamphetamine on Harrington’s person. Harrigton was charged with Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine.

The WA Supremes articulated why the search/arrest was illegal, and consequently, why the evidence should be suppressed.  They discussed what “social contact” between an officer and citizen means:

“The phrase’s plain meaning seems somewhat misplaced.  ‘Social contact’ suggests idle conversation about, presumably, the weather or last night’s ball game — trivial niceties that have no likelihood of triggering an officer’s suspicion of criminality.  The term ‘social contact’ does not suggest an investigative component.”

The Court further reasoned that subsequent events quickly dispelled the social contact and escalated the encounter to an unlawful seizure. First, Trooper Bryan’s arrival at the scene escalated the situation away from a mere “social contact” because a reasonable person would think twice about the turn of events.  As a result, Trooper Bryan’s presence contributed to the eventual seizure of Harrington.

Second, Officer Reiber’s request for Mr. Harrington  to remove hands from pockets added to the officer’s unlawfully progressive intrusion.  Third, Mr. Harrington did not consent to the search.  Officers MUST have a well-founded suspicion to search when they lack a defendant’s consent.

Here, these circumstances lacked the foundational basis for a search.  Finally, and before Officer Reiber’s request to search, he did not ask for Harrington’s name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs.

The court concluded Harrington was unconstitutionally seized because, like him, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when officers asked to frisk.  Consequently, the seizure violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My Opinion?  Excellent.  Beautiful.  On point.  The WA Supremes got it right.  The cumulative effect of these violations — all three of them — amounted to an unlawful search.  I’m extremely happy the WA Supremes addressed the fine line between a lawful “social contact” and unlawful “progressive intrusion.”  I’ve had numerous clients face criminal charges as a result of an officer’s apparently innocent “social contact,” which was, in reality, a progressive intrusion into their privacy.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Winterstein: Parole Officers Cannot Search A Home If Facts Do Not Support the Officer’s Belief That Probationer Lives There.

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Parole and probation have grown far beyond resources allocated to support them

In State v. Winterstein, the WA Supreme Court held that parole officers cannot search a home if the facts do not support the officer’s belief that that defendant on probation lives there.

Terry Lee Winterstein was convicted of Unlawful Manufacture of Methamphetamine after his probation officer conducted a warrantless search of his residence. After trial, Winterstein’s counsel discovered that Winterstein had reported a change of address with the Department of Corrections at least three weeks prior to the search.

Neverthless, the probation officer searched Winterstein’s prior residence. Winterstein argued that the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed because his probation officer did not have the authority of law to search a house that was not Winterstein’s documented residence.

The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals also held that regardless of the illegal search, the evidence could be admissible under the “inevitable discovery doctrine”—that is, evidence that police would have ultimately or inevitably discovered through other (lawful) means.

The case wound its way up to the WA Supreme Court.

First, the Court addressed whether the probation officer’s search of the Winterstein’s former residence was proper.  They reasoned that, generally speaking, individuals under Department of Corrections supervision have a lesser expectation of privacy, and can be searched on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.  However, the Court also said that probation officers must have probable cause—a higher standard—to believe that their probationers live at the residences they search:

“In this context, probable cause exists when an officer has information that would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the probationer lives at the place to be searched. The information known to the officer must be reasonably trustworthy. Only facts and knowledge available to the officer at the time of the search should be considered.”

Second, the Supremes addressed the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine.  They reasoned it is well-established that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Section 7 says: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

While federal cases have allowed for inevitable discovery, and the state Court of Appeals has applied the doctrine, the Supreme Court said the doctrine is “speculative and does not disregard illegally obtained evidence”—and is therefore incompatible with the state constitution’s expansive protection of privacy.

My opinion?  Extremely well-articulated and correct decision.  The WA Supremes’ handling/dispatching of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine acknowledges the expanded freedoms under the WA Constitution in comparison to the U.S. Constitution.  Admitting evidence under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine leaves no incentive for the State to comply with the constitution’s requirement that arrests precede searches.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Magee: Police Officers MUST Witness Traffic Infractions

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Probable Cause, Red Light Cameras, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

In State v. Magee, the WA Supreme Court held police officers lack authority to issue traffic citations if the officer fails to witness the infraction take place.

Mr. Magee was cited for second degree negligent driving after the state patrol received reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong direction on the highway.  The dispatched trooper found Magee parked nose-to-nose with a friend’s car, facing the wrong direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp.

The trooper assumed Magee had driven against traffic in order to get in this position.  Magee was cited for negligent driving.  He challenged the infraction, arguing the officer lacked authority to issue a citation when she had not witnessed an infraction.  Unfortunately, his traffic court ruled against him.

Magee’s case found its way to the WA Supreme Court.  They reasoned that RCW 46.63.030 lists the instances where a law enforcement officer has the authority to issue a notice of traffic infraction:

(a) When the infraction is committed in the officer’s presence;

(b) When the officer is acting upon the request of a law enforcement officer in whose presence the traffic infraction was committed;

(c) If an officer investigating at the scene of a motor vehicle accident has reasonable cause to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident has committed a traffic infraction;

(d) When the infraction is detected through the use of a photo enforcement system under RCW 46.63.160; or

(e) When the infraction is detected through the use of an automated traffic safety camera under RCW 46.63.170.

The Supremes overturned Magee’s conviction after analyzing the statute: “RCW 46.63.030 plainly requires us to conclude that an officer must either be present when the infraction occurs or meet one of the other statutory circumstances before issuing a ticket. There is no contention subsections (b) through (e) apply in this case.

Instead, the State argues that the trooper actually witnessed the citable offense because the negligent behavior was “ongoing.” But negligent driving in the second degree is a moving violation. For the infraction to be valid, the movement must have been made in the officer’s presence.”

My opinion?  Again, excellent!  Officers shouldn’t hand out traffic infractions if they don’t witness the infraction happen.  PERIOD.  This violates due process.  This new opinion is (thankfully) consistent with State v. Campbell, 31 Wn.App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982).  I use Campbell in my pretrial motions to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence.

In Campbell, a motorist drove by a Washington State Trooper and yelled to the trooper that there was a drunk driver going southbound.  The unknown witness described the vehicle.  The Trooper caught up to the vehicle but did not observe the driver violate any traffic laws.  Nevertheless, the trooper stopped the vehicle, conducted a DUI investigation, and arrested the driver for DUI.

The Campbell court concluded that although a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop for suspected drunk driving, but before doing so, s/he must first possess a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that such a violation of law was or is presently being committed.

Good job, WA Supremes!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada: Court finds Lenity for Defendants In the Face of Statutory Ambiguity

DUI, Rule of Lenity, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Impact of Prior Criminal Convictions — #LadyJustice Speaks

In Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada: the WA Supreme Court found that a “prior offense” applies only to offenses that occurred before the current offense, and does not encompass all offenses the defendant has before sentencing.

Both Scott Winebrenner and Jesus Quezada were arrested multiple times for DUI. Each had a deferred prosecution agreement from one arrest which they violated with a subsequent arrest. For those who don’t know, a deferred prosecution is a contract entered into with the court.

Typically, a defendant obtains an alcohol evaluation which states they suffer from an alcohol problem; agrees to be on probation for five years; enters a grueling treatment regimen, and commits no new law violations.  If successful, the DUI gets dismissed.  If they fail, however, the court may revoke the entire agreement, find the defendant guilty, and issue a jail sentence.

Deferred sentences represent a “grey area” in criminal jurisprudence.  They are neither a conviction or a dismissal.  The issue was ripe to determine whether a deferred sentence counts as a prior conviction if the defendant violates the terms by garnering new charges.

Here, the Court reasoned that RCW 46.61.5055’s  use of “prior offense” is ambiguous because it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” The “rule of lenity” requires “that an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase the penalty imposed.” The Court further reasoned that offenses committed after the original offense are not “prior offenses” and cannot be considered at sentencing for the original offense.

My opinion? I’m impressed the WA Supremes supported the Rule of Lenity.   The spirit of the rule of lenity – fundamental fairness – lies at the heart of a respectable criminal justice system. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (the principle of “fair warning” motivates the lenity rule) (Holmes, J.).

At a high level of generality, we all agree that ambiguous criminal statutes must be construed in favor of the accused.  But the rule of lenity is often not taken seriously.  Glad to see the WA Supremes gave teeth back to the rule.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Patton: WA Supreme Court Acknowledges Search and Seizure Protections Afforded by Arizona v. Gant.

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Police Misconduct, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Traffic Infractions, United States Supreme Court, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Can Police Search Your Car Without a Warrant?

In State v. Patton, the WA Supreme Court held that an automobile search which happens after arrest is not justified unless the defendant is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest.

Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant.  A Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was on his property and leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat.  The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest.  Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer.

Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court found that Patton was arrested when the officer “manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody” while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, “the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence.”  The court elaborated their reasoning with the following:

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Congratulations to Justice Jim Johnson, who found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.   In Gant, the U.S. Supremes held that a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Drug Offense or any other crime involving Search and Seizure. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.