Category Archives: Washington Supreme Court

State v. Tibbles: “Exigent Circumstances” for Warrantless Search = Unlawful Search

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, marijuana, misdemeanor, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Haddonfield Criminal Defense Lawyers | Illegal Search and Seizure

In State v. Tibbles, the WA Supreme Court held the search  of a defendant was not justified by exigent circumstances and the marijuana/paraphernalia evidence obtained as a result of  the search should have been suppressed.

Micah Tibbles was pulled over following a traffic stop.  During the stop, Trooper Norman Larsen detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from Tibbles’s car.  Though he did not arrest Tibbles or seek a warrant, he searched the car and found the contraband.  Trooper Larsen and the prosecutors argued that although they lacked a search warrant, “exigent circumstances” justified the search nonetheless.  Tibbles was convicted of for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.  The case wound up in the WA Supreme Court.

The Court reasoned the Trooper had probable cause to arrest Tibbles based on the odor of marijuana alone under the Plain View Doctrine.   However, the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search. The Court also reasoned that because Trooper Larsen did not arrest Tibbles, and did not have a warrant when he searched Tibbles’s car, the search must be justified by one of our recognized warrant exceptions; such as “exigent circumstances.”

Here’s the law on exigent circumstances: basically, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.

Under State v. Tibbles, there are five circumstances types of exigent circumstances: (1) hot pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3) danger to arresting officer or to the public; (4) mobility of the vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of the evidence.”  A court must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether exigent circumstances exist.

Here, the WA Supremes decided the State failed to show that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Tibbles’s car.  Tibbles was outside the vehicle when Trooper Larsen searched it and the State has not established that the destruction of evidence was imminent.  Additionally, the State failed to establish that obtaining a warrant was otherwise impracticable.

“For example, we do not know whether Larsen could have used a cell phone or radio to procure a telephonic warrant or whether he could have called backup to secure the scene while Larsen went to procure a warrant,” said Justice Debra Stephens of WA Supremes.

Additionally, regarding the safety concerns, the facts do not establish that Trooper Larsen felt he or anyone else was in danger as a result of Tibbles’s actions.  Tibbles was not stopped on suspicion of impaired driving, but rather for a defective taillight.   Tibbles was alone, was compliant with the  trooper’s requests, and moreover, was released rather than arrested and allowed to drive away even after Trooper  Larsen searched the car and seized the marijuana and drug paraphernalia.  For these reasons, the WA Supremes reversed the WA Court of Appeals which upheld Tibbles conviction.

My opinion?  BEAUTIFUL.  The State’s “exigent circumstances” arguments were totally baseless.  Let’s boil it down: exigent circumstances should be found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape, or permit the destruction of evidence.  If these situations do not exist, then neither does exigent circumstances.  PERIOD.

Well done, WA Supremes.  Thank you.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Harvill: The “Duress” Defense

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Duress Defense, felony, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

He Made Me Do It! Duress in Criminal Cases

In State v. Harvill, the WA Supreme Court held that the lower court abused its discretion by disallowing the defendant to argue the defense of “Duress.”

Defendant Joshua Harvill sold cocaine to Michael Nolte in a controlled buy organized by the Cowlitz County Sheriff’s Office.  At trial, Harvill admitted to selling cocaine to Nolte because he feared that, if he did not, Nolte would hurt him or his family.  Both men knew each other for several years.  Nolte was 5′ 10″ and weighed around 200 pounds.  Harvill was 5’5″ and weighed about 140 pounds.

Harvill feared Nolte.  They worked together, and Nolte bragged about smashing another man’s head with a beer bottle, causing brain damage.  Harvill also knew that Nolte grabbed a gun from another man and then stabbed him.  Harvell knew that Nolte used steroids and that he feared what Nolte was capable of.

Despite their background, the trial court denied Harvill’s jury instruction on the defense of duress.  The jury found Harvill guilty.  He appealed.  The case wound up in the WA Supreme Court.

The Court reasoned that a defendant is entitled to the defense of duress if the defendant proves that (a) he participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in his mind that in case of refusal he or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and (b) such apprehension was reasonable upon his part; and (c) he would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.  “The question comes down to whether the duress statute requires an explicit threat or whether an implicit threat that arises from the circumstances.”

Here, the Court ruled that defining “threat” to include both explicit and implicit threats serves the purpose of proving duress.  This applies with equal force to direct threats, arising from overtly threatening words or physical intimidation, and to indirect threats, arising from other conduct and circumstances.  As long as the defendant’s perception of the implicit threat is reasonable under the circumstances, he is put to the choice between two evils through no fault of his own and should be allowed to argue the defense.  Additionally, there is no legal authority requiring a threat to be an explicit threat.

Ultimately, the Court ruled Harvill presented sufficient evidence of fear arising from an implicit threat, and the jury should have had the opportunity to decide if this fear was reasonable and if Harvill would have sold cocaine to Nolte under the threat.

My opinion?  Great decision.  Although the WA Supremes split hairs and engaged many semantics to get there, but they issued a good opinion all around.  We’ve all seen the famous mafia movies.  Duress is intimidation, whether implicit or express.  “Let’s go for a car ride” usually means “you’ll be dead before dawn.”  This is the implicit language of the criminal underground.  Things aren’t always nice and clear, especially veiled threats.  Kudos to the WA Supremes for knowing this.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Nason: “Automatic Jail” Held Unconstitutional

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jail, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

N.H. Judges Illegally Jail Poor People Who Can't Pay Fines

In State v. Nason, the WA Supreme Court decided that imposing “auto jail” on defendants who can’t pay their legal financial obligations violates due process.

In July 1999, James Nason pleaded guilty to one count of second degree burglary.  He largely failed probation and neglected paying court fines.  At numerous times, he was sentenced to jail for these failures.   In July 2006, he was charged and sentenced with another crime.  The court ordered Nason to serve 60 days in jail.  Additionally, the order included an auto-jail provision; which said that if he failed to pay court fines by a certain date, he had to either request a stay or book himself into jail.

The WA Supremes held due process requires that a court inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFO’s) at the time it incarcerates the defendant for failure to pay.  In short, “auto jail” violates due process.

The court’s reasoning was simple:

Due process prevents the jailing of an offender for failure to pay a fine if the offender’s failure to pay was due to his or her indigence/poverty.  However, if an offender is capable of paying but willfully refuses to pay, or if an offender does not “make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay,” the State may imprison the offender for failing to pay his or her LFO.  The burden is on the offender to show that his nonpayment is not willful.

Although the offender carries the burden, due process still imposes a duty on the court to inquire into the offender’s ability to pay.  Inquiry into the offender’s ability to pay comes at “the point of collection and when sanctions are sought for nonpayment.”

Here, Because due process requires the court to inquire into  Nason’s reason for nonpayment,  and because the inquiry must come at the time of the collection action or sanction, ordering Nason to report to jail without a contemporaneous inquiry into his ability to pay violated due process.

My opinion?  The Supremes exercised sound reasoning.  It violates due process to impose immediate jail if defendants cannot pay future court fines.  The decision to impose jail is a question which should be decided at a future time.  Jail should not be imposed because of some future-retroactive court condition.  Period.  Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Sublett: Defendant’s Right to be Present at Trial DOES NOT Extend to Questions Submitted by Jury and Answered in Judge’s Chambers

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A Judge's Personality Comes out in the Chambers through Artifacts and Collections

In State v. Sublett, the WA Court of Appeals held that an in-chambers conference held by the trial judge in response to a juror’s question did not violate the defendant’s his right to an open and public trial. In general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

A jury entered verdicts finding co-defendants Michael Sublett and Christopher Olsen guilty of first degree murder.  Sublett and Olsen appealed, asserting that the trial court violated their public trial rights and their right to be present by holding an in-chambers conference to address a question submitted by the jury during its deliberations and that the trial court violated their due process rights by refusing to answer the jury’s question.

The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public trial.   However, the court also determined that “[a] defendant does not . . . have a right to a public hearing on purely ministerial or legal issues that do not require the resolution of disputed facts.”

Here, the trial court’s in-chambers conference addressed a jury question regarding one of the trial court’s instructions.  This was a purely legal issue that arose during deliberations, and did not require the resolution of disputed facts.  Thus, the defendants’ right to a public trial did not apply in this context.

More important, questions from the jury to the trial court regarding the trial court’s instructions are part of jury deliberations and, as such, are not historically a public part of the trial.  Because the public trial right does not apply to a trial court’s conference with counsel on how to resolve a purely legal question  which  the jury submitted during its deliberations, we hold that the trial court did not violate the appellants’ public trial right by responding to the jury’s question in writing.

The court further reasoned that because the in-chambers conference held in response to a jury question was not a critical stage of the proceedings, the trial court did not violate the appellants’ right to be present.  A “critical stage” is one where the defendant’s presence has a reasonably substantial relationship to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.   But in general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

The in-chambers conference here was not a critical stage of the proceedings because it involved only the purely legal issue of how to respond to the jury’s request for a clarification in one of the trial court’s instructions.  Accordingly, the appellants’ right to be present did not apply in this context.

My opinion?  Shady.  I’ve tried cases where jurors asks/submits questions to the judge while they deliberate.  Typically, the judge reads the question on the record, and in the defendant’s presence.  The attorneys and judge either formulate an agreed answer the question or choose to not answer the question.

In my mind, this is an important stage of the proceedings.  jurors decide guilt and innocence based upon the answer to the question!  How is this not important?  Why shouldn’t the defendant be present to hear the question and answer(s)?

Again, shady.  this decision flies in the face of the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Paumier, a case which I blogged about earlier this month.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Hall: WA Supremes Determine The “Unit of Prosecution” For Multiple Charges of Witness Tampering.

Assault, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Legislation, Unit of Prosecution, Violent Crime, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Freehold NJ Witness Tampering Lawyer | Asbury Park NJ Witness Tampering Charge Attorney

In State v. Hall, the WA Supreme Court decided that an incarcerated defendant’s numerous phone calls to a witness constituted only one charge of Witness Tampering.

Defendant Mr. Hall threatened his girlfriend and her lover with a gun after finding them together in her apartment.  He flees the scene and drives away in a car owned by his friend, Desirae Aquiningoc.  Police later confront Aquiningoc about lending her car to Hall.  She said that Hall was her boyfriend, that he lived with her, that he had borrowed her car on that January 14 to visit his mother.  Later, police find Hall at his home and arrest him.

Based on what happened at Salazar’s apartment, Hall was charged with Burglary First Degree Burglary and Assault Second Degree and held in jail pending trial.  While in jail, Hall attempted to call Aquiningoc over 1,200 times. During those phone calls, some of which were played for the jury, Hall attempted to persuade Aquiningoc that his legal woes were her fault and that she had a moral obligation not to testify or to testify falsely.

The phone calls were recorded.  The State charged Hall with four counts of Witness Tampering.  Hall goes to trial.  The trial judge treated each count of Witness Tampering as a separate unit of prosecution.  Hall appeals.  The case winds its way to the WA Supreme Court.

The legal issue was whether Witness Tampering is a continuing offense or whether it is committed anew with each single act of attempting to persuade a potential witness not to testify or to testify falsely.

The WA Supremes reasoned that a “unit of prosecution” can be either a single act or a course of conduct.  Here, the plain language of the statute supports the conclusion that the unit of prosecution is the ongoing attempt to persuade a witness not to testify in a proceeding.  They further reasoned that, in the alternative, each conversation is a separate crime and, in this case for example, could lead to as many as 1,200 separate crimes.

“Such an interpretation could lead to absurd results, which we are bound to avoid when we can do so without doing violence to the words of the statute,” said the Court.  “It seems unlikely the legislature intended that a person could be prosecuted for over a thousand crimes under the circumstances presented here.”  Consequently, the Court held, under the facts of this case, Hall committed one crime of Witness Tampering, not three.

My opinion?  Makes sense.  It DOES seem absurd to stack multiple charges in this case.  After all, a unit of prosecution can either be a single act or a course of conduct.  It seems more realistic to view Halls many calls as a continuing course of conduct.  You can’t label the calls as single acts because he didn’t change his plans, motive, or modus operandi.

Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Jones: Rape Shield Statute vs. Defendant’s Right to Testify

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

What Is A Rape Shield Law? | The Defence Group

In State v. Jones, the WA Supreme Court held that the Rape Shield Statute does not stop a defendant from offering evidence or cross-examining a victim about the events on the night of the alleged sexual encounter, including the victim’s sexual conduct with other individuals during a wild sex party.

Defendant Mr. Jones was charged with first and second degree rape after his niece, K.D., claimed that Jones put his hands around her neck and forcibly raped her.  At trial, the jury acquitted Jones of first degree rape but could not reach a decision on second degree rape.  Jones was tried again for second degree rape along with the aggravating factor of being an individual in a position of trust to the victim.

Jones wanted to present evidence that K.D. consented to sex during an all-night sex party.  The party included one additional woman and two additional men, cocaine and alcohol.  During this party, K.D. consented to sex with all three men (which included Jones).  The judge, citing the Rape Shield Law, would not allow Jones to introduce such evidence because it was only being introduced to attack K.D.’s credibility.

Furthermore, during the trial, the prosecutor noted that Jones was compelled to give a DNA sample (did not do so voluntarily) and that he refused to clear up matters with the police.  At the end of trial, the judge backtracked a little and claimed that it allowed Jones to present evidence that the sex was consensual (but without mentioning the sex party).   Jones was convicted and appealed.  Jones claimed that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence of the sex party and for the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments with respect to speaking with police and giving a DNA sample.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed.

First, the court reasoned that the trial court violated Jones’ 6th Amendment rights by refusing to allow Jones testify about the sex party.  “Jones’s evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape.”  Furthermore, since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to stop the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated Jones’ Sixth Amendment rights when it barred his testimony.

Second, the Court held the Rape Shield Statute did not apply.  Washington’s rape shield law provides:

Evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim’s marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim’s consent except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense.

Here, the Court decided the Rape Shield Statute protects victims from testifying about past sexual behavior.  In this case, however, Jones was attempting to introduce evidence of present sexual behavior.  Thus, to deny such evidence under the rape shield law would be to read out the term past.   Furthermore, since the evidence that Jones sought to be introduced involved Jones’s defense and version of what occurred the night of the crime, the denial of such evidence was NOT harmless error.  Jones is entitled to a new trial.

My opinion?  Under the circumstances, the court made a well-reasoned decision.  Their interpretation of the Rape Shield Statute appears correct: although one cannot admit evidence of the victim’s past sexual history, the statute does not prevent present sexual history from being admitted into evidence.  This evidence seems especially relevant when the victim is engaged in exploits in the manner described in this case.  Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a Sex Offense or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Eaton: A Defendant’s Sentence Cannot Be Enhanced For Involunatry Acts

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, DUI, felony, Jail, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Search and Seizure, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

sentence enhancements Archives - Oklahoma Justice Reform

In State v. Eaton, the WA Supreme Court decided a defendant must act volitionally – with intent – to put himself within a zone that requires an upward sentencing enhancement.  An enhancement should not apply for drugs the defendant possessed when arrested and brought to jail.

Mr. Eaton was arrested for DUI and taken by police to the Clark County Jail.  At the jail, Eaton was searched by staff who discovered a small bag of methamphetamine taped to his sock.  The State charged Eaton with DUI and Possession of Methamphetamine and sought a sentencing enhancement for possessing a controlled substance in a jail or prison.  A jury convicted Eaton on both charges and found by special verdict that Eaton possessed methamphetamine while in a jail.  The trial court imposed an enhanced sentence.

The WA Supremes overturned the sentencing enhancement.  They reasoned that once Eaton was arrested, he no longer had control over his location.  From the time of arrest, his movement from street to jail became involuntary: involuntary not because he did not wish to enter the jail, but because he was forcibly taken there by State authority. He no longer had the ability to choose his own course of action.  Nor did he have the ability through some other course of action to avoid entering the area that would increase the penalty for the underlying crime.

My opinion?  Again, excellent decision.  It’d be different if Eaton knew he was going to jail and tried sneaking meth within the facility. However, those circumstances did not exist.  He was arrested for DUI  – a different matter altogether – and immediately booked into jail.  He never voluntarily brought the drugs into the jail itself.  He merely happened to possess them when arrested for DUI.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

WA Changes Execution Method

Death Penalty, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

The Drugs Used In Execution By Lethal Injection

Washington state has changed its method of execution from a three-drug cocktail to a one-drug system, according to paperwork filed Tuesday with the WA Supreme Court.

The three-drug method uses sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Only sodium thiopental, followed by a saline flush, is used in the one-drug policy.  In case the first dose does not kill the inmate, an additional 5 grams of sodium thiopental will be made available at the time of execution.  The change in the lethal injection protocol comes despite the fact that a lawsuit challenging the former protocol is before the Washington Supreme Court.  The State moved to dismiss that portion of the lawsuit and go forward with executions.

My opinion?  I’m no proponent of the Death Penalty.  The government should not kill its own citizens.  However, until the Death Penalty is abandoned, it seems the one-drug executions are more appropriate and humane.  Three injections seems cruel, unusual and Draconian.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Dow: Corpus Delicti vs. RCW 10.58.03

Constitutional Rights, Corpus Delicti, felony, Jury Trial, Rape, Sex Crimes, Uncategorized, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Important Facts about Corpus Delicti

In State v. Dow, the WA Supreme Court held that RCW 10.58.035 does NOT change the corpus delicti rule that the State must prove every element of an alleged crime by evidence independent of the defendant’s statement.

 Defendant Mr. Dow was charged with with first degree child molestation.  The victim was a three year old female, and too young to testify.  Consequently, her statements to others about the alleged offense were inadmissible.  No persons other than Dow and the child were present at the time of the alleged offense.  During a recorded police interview, Dow made statements regarding the events surrounding the alleged molestation.

The trial court found these statements to be exculpatory and not an admission.  The State sought to introduce Dow’s statements as substantive evidence that he committed the crime charged.  Dow moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were inadmissible for lack of  corpus delicti.  The trial court agreed.  Dow’s case was dismissed.  The State appealed.  The case found its way to the Supreme Court.

Some background is necessary: the corpus delicti doctrine generally is a principle that tests the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence, other than a defendant’s confession, to corroborate the confession.  The purpose of the rule is to ensure that other evidence supports the defendant’s statement and satisfies the elements of the crime.  Where no other evidence exists to support the confession, a conviction cannot be supported solely by a confession.  The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to prevent defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.  Historically, courts have grounded the rule in judicial mistrust of confessions.

Along comes RCW 10.58.035. It allows a statement to be admitted into evidence if there is substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the statement.   The following factors determine whether the statement is trustworthy:

(a)  Whether there is any evidence corroborating or contradicting the facts set out in the statement, including the elements of the offense;

(b)  The character of the witness reporting the statement and the number of witnesses to the statement;

(c)  Whether a record of the statement was made and the timing of the making of the record in relation to the making of the statement; and/or

(d)  The relationship between the witness and the defendant.

Here, the WA Supremes reasoned that even if the statements are admissible, no other evidence exists to establish the corpus delicti independent of Dow’s statement. Further, corpus delicti cases have always required sufficient evidence independent of a defendant’s confession to support a conviction.  RCW 10.58.035 does nothing to change this requirement. The State concedes it lacked evidence.  Indeed, the only evidence the State purported to have is Dow’s statement, which is insufficient under any standard.

Consequently, the WA Supremes upheld Dow’s dismissal.

My opinion?  I like the decision.  The WA Supremes dutifully followed corpus delicti and held people shouldn’t be charged with crimes unless evidence exists.  I fear, however, that even though the Court did not allow RCW 10.58.035 to swallow the corpus delicti rule, such decisions may come few and farther in between.  The statute was MADE to chip away at corpus delicti.  Period.  Perhaps it didn’t apply to Dow’s case because his statement was the ONLY evidence the State had.  Future defendants in future cases, however, might not be so lucky.

My prediction?  Future courts may find that if a scintilla of evidence beyond the defendant’s statement exists, then the statute kicks into effect and does away with corpus delicti.  Keep your eyes peeled . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. A.N.J: WA Supremes Withdraw Guilty Plea Due To Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Constitutional Rights, Ineffective Assistance, Sentencing, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Blog | Speaker Law

In State v. A.N.J., the WA Supreme Court held that Defendant A.N.J’s court appointed counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to do an adequate investigation, failed to consult with experts, failed to fully inform him of the consequences of his plea, and failed to form a confidential relationship with him independent of his parents.

In 2004, when A.N.J. was 12 years old, he pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation.  Almost immediately, he moved to withdraw his plea upon realizing (1) his juvenile sex offense criminal history would remain on his record once he was an adult, (2) that he might have to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life, (3) that he would have to notify his school, and (4) that he would probably be shadowed by an adult while he was at the school.  He argued that under the facts of this case, his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and that he should have been allowed to withdraw it.

The court record showed that A.N.J.’s defense counsel spent as little as 55 minutes with A.N.J. before the plea hearing, did no independent investigation, did not carefully review the plea agreement, and consulted with no experts.

Consequently, the WA Supremes reasoned that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution.  A.N.J. was also misled into believing his criminal record of the sex offense could be expunged in the future.

My opinion?  Justice Chamber’s introduction in this opinion says it all:

“While the vast majority of public defenders do sterling and impressive work, in some times and places, inadequate funding and troublesome limits on indigent counsel have made the promise of effective assistance of counsel more myth than fact, more illusion than substance.

Public funds for appointed counsel are sometimes woefully inadequate, and public contracts have imposed statistically impossible case loads on public defenders and require that the costs of experts, investigators, and conflict counsel must come out of the defenders’ own already inadequate compensation.”  ~Justice Chambers, State v. A.N.J.

Public defenders have tough jobs.  Period.  Many of my colleagues are public defenders.  Trust me, they’re on the battlefield every day; in the trenches, trying cases to the best of their abilities.  Unfortunately, glutted trial calendars and lack of resources stretch time/energy/resources excruciatingly thin. I only hope this opinion gives all criminal defense attorneys, and not only public defenders, some insights into how to avoid ineffective assistance of counsel.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.