Category Archives: Search Warrant

State v. Peppin: No Privacy for Public File Sharing

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, felony, Forensics, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Sex Crimes, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

In State v. Peppin, the WA Court of Appeals ruled law enforcement’s warrantless use of enhanced  peer to peer file sharing software to remotely access shared files on an individual’s computer does not violate either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, sec. 7 of the Washington Constitution.

In other words, an individual does not have a constitutionally protected privacy right in image files he shares with the public.

Here, defendant Casey Peppin was found guilty of three counts of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the First Degree under RCW 9.68A.670. On December 29,2011, Spokane Detective Brian Cestnik conducted an online investigation of the Gnutella network to identify persons possessing and sharing child pornography. Using peer to peer software called “Round Up” version 1.5.3, Detective Cestnik found child pornography on Mr. Peppin’s computer in a shared folder. He obtained a warrant, searched he defendant’s home and recovered the computer(s) allegedly used to view and share images of minors engaged in sexual conduct.

BACKGROUND ON “PEER TO PEER FILE SHARING”

For those who don’t know, “peer to peer file sharing” is a method of Internet communication that allows users to share digital files. User computers link together to form a network; the network allows direct transfer of shared files from one user to another. Peer to peer software applications allow users to set up and share files on the network with others using compatible peer to peer software. For instance, LimeWire and Shareaza are software applications that allow users to share files over the Gnutella network.

To gain access to shared files, a user must first download peer to peer software, which can be found on the Internet. Then, the user opens the peer to peer software on his or her computer and conducts a keyword search for files that are currently being shared on the network. The results are displayed and the user selects a file for download.

The downloaded file is transferred through a direct connection between the computer wishing to share the file and the user’s computer requesting the file. The Gnutella network gives users the ability to see a list of all files that are available for sharing on a particular computer.

F or example, a person interested in obtaining child pornographic images opens the peer to peer software application on his or her computer and conducts a file search using keyword terms such as “preteen sex.” The search is sent out over the network of computers to those using compatible peer to peer software. The results of the search are returned and displayed on the user’s computer. The user selects the file he or she wishes to download. The file is then downloaded directly from the host computer onto the user’s computer. The downloaded file is stored on the user’s computer until moved or deleted.

A peer to peer file transfer is assisted by reference to an Internet Protocol (IP) address. In general, the numeric IP address is unique to a particular computer during an online Internet session. The IP address provides a location, making it possible for data to be transferred between computers.

This is where the police work comes in: investigators can search public records on the Internet to determine which Internet provider is assigned the IP address. Investigators can contact the Internet provider and gain information about the user based on the IP address assigned to the computer.

THE INVESTIGATIONS

Here, Detective Cestnik searched the Gnutella network for “pthc,” the commonly used term for preteen hard core Internet pornography. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 17. The results indicated that images matching the search terms could be found on a host computer with an IP address linked to Spokane. Detective Cestnik’s check of the IP address through two different Internet search engines confirmed that the IP address was in Spokane and that Qwest Communications was the provider.

Next, Detective Cestnik presented Qwest Communications with a search warrant requesting information on the IP address for the host computer. Qwest Communications advised Detective Cestnik that the IP address was connected to Mr. Peppin and provided Mr. Peppin’s address.

Detective Cestnik then obtained a search warrant for Mr. Peppin’s computer. A complete forensic investigation uncovered over 100 videos of what appeared to be minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

TRIAL OUTCOME

Mr. Peppin moved to suppress the computer files downloaded by Detective Cestnik during his Internet search. He maintained that law enforcement’s access and download of his computer files via the Internet was an intrusion into his private affairs and an unlawful warrantless search. The court denied Peppin’s motions to suppress. At trial, he was found guilty on all 3 counts.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The legal issue addressed by the court was whether Mr. Peppin had a constitutionally protected privacy right in the image files he shared with the public. In short, the Court said, “No.”

First, federal circuit courts have consistently held that a person who installs and uses file sharing software does not have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in the files to be shared on his or her computer.

Second, even the broader protection of the Washington State Constitution also does not offer any relief to Mr. Peppin. It stated, “What is voluntarily exposed to the general public and observable without the use of enhancement devices from an unprotected area is not considered part of a person’s private affairs.” The court emphasized that here, Mr. Peppin voluntarily offered public access to the computer files obtained by Detective Cestnik. Mr. Peppin used peer to peer software to make these shared files available without restriction. Anyone wanting to view or download the files could do so. Law enforcement’s access of these files was not an intrusion into Mr. Peppin’s private affairs.

The court summed it up:

Additionally, this is not the type of information that a citizen of this state is entitled to hold as private. The inherent nature of peer to peer software is the public sharing of digital computer files. Individuals using file sharing software cannot expect a privacy interest in files they hold open to the public. Again, Mr. Peppin’s use of peer to peer file sharing voluntarily opened this information to the public for anyone to access, including law enforcement. There is no disturbance of a person’s private affairs when law enforcement accesses shared computer files that the person holds publically available for viewing and download. Thus, there is no violation within the context of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

My opinion? Although I understand the logic – as well as the government’s desire to criminalize the sexual exploitation of minors – at what point does “private” communications end and “public” communications begin? How intrusive is the government’s technology? How often do they use the internet to spy on citizens for public safety reasons? I suppose we’ll see . . .

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Manlove: “Deliberate Cruelty” Enhancements Apply to Property Crimes.

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Exceptional Sentencing, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, law enforcement, Legislation, Property Crimes, Search Warrant, Sentencing, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Manlove, the Division III Court of Appeals held that a upward sentencing enhancement applies to Residential Burglary and other property crimes if a jury finds the defendant’s conduct during the commission of crime manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.

In 2005, Paula Parker and her then-husband purchased a remote cabin on forty acres in Stevens County, Washington. The couple became acquainted with their neighbor, David Manlove, whose home lay a half mile from Parker’s cabin.

Paula Parker divorced in 2011, and she retained sole custody of the cabin. Parker and Manlove occasionally joined one another at each other’s homes for dinner. The two enjoyed a pastoral, idyllic, and platonic relationship, until . . .

Paula Parker went on vacation from June 19 to July 2, 2013 and returned to her cabin the morning of July 3. Once inside her home, Parker discovered her cabin was ransacked. Property was destroyed. The intruder left a hand-rolled cigarette. Paula realized her neighbor, David Manlove, smoked similar cigarettes.

Parker contacted police and informed them she believed the culprit was Manlove. She avoided her home for a few days.

On July 7, she returned home. Again, her house was ransacked. The damage was even more extensive this time. The intruder shredded Paula Parker’s medical records, high school diploma, and college degree. Parker kept her mother’s ashes in an urn, and the prowler dumped the ashes onto the floor.

After surveying the damage at Paula Parker’s cabin on July 8, 2013, Stevens County sheriff deputies traveled to David Manlove’s home. When asked why he damaged Paula Parker’s home, Manlove responded, “It’s my mountain.” When arrested, Manlove repeated several times: “It’s my mountain so there’s no crime.”

Law enforcement obtained two search warrants for David Manlove’s home. Officers seized many items that belonged to Paula Parker, including a hatchet, a chainsaw, a veil for a belly dancing costume, a mortar and pestle, journals, and jewelry. Officers also found marijuana plants and a rifle.

David Manlove was charged with Residential Burglary, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the Second Degree, Possession of more than Forty Grams of Marijuana, Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree, and Malicious Mischief in the First Degree. The State further alleged that Manlove committed Residential Burglary with deliberate cruelty in violation of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a).

The trial court found Manlove competent to stand trial after an evaluation by Eastern State Hospital. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that: “Deliberate cruelty” means gratuitous violence ,or other conduct which inflicts physical, psychological, or emotional pain as an end in itself, and which goes beyond what is inherent in the elements of the crime or is normally associated with the commission of the crime. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 177. The jury found David Manlove guilty as charged.

On appeal, the issue was whether the aggravating factor of deliberate cruelty under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(a) applies to Residential Burglary.

The Court of Appeals decided, “Yes.” They gave two reasons why, under appropriate circumstances, the deliberate cruelty aggravating factor may apply to a property crimes. First, when the legislature desired to limit the application of an aggravating factor to certain offenses, it expressly provided that limitation in the statute. Second, the statute allows a sentence enhancement when the current offense is a burglary and the victim ofthe burglary was present in the building or residence when the crime was committed.

The Court affirmed Manlove’s convictions and sentence, including the enhancement for deliberate cruelty.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Budd: Ferrier Warnings Improperly Given

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Ferrier Warnings, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals,

Good decision. In State v. Budd, the WA Court of Appeals decided a law enforcement officer must properly deliver all three parts of the Ferrier warnings before entering a residence.

Some background on Ferrier warnings is necessary. In State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) the WA Supreme Court held that, before entering a citizen’s home without a warrant, a law enforcement officer must (1) ask the citizen for consent, (2) inform the citizen that he can revoke consent at any time and (3) notify the citizen that he can limit the scope of the entry into the home. If an officer fails to provide these Ferrier rights/warnings, then any evidence obtained from the search is “fruits of the poisonous search” and also subject to being suppressed.

Appellant Michael Allen Budd was convicted of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct under RCW 9.68A.070. He contends that the trial court erred in its denial of his ER 3.6 motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his residence by the officers investigating the case. He argued the Ferrier warnings were insufficient.

Washington State Patrol’s Missing and Exploited Children Task Force  received an anonymous “cybertip” from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The anonymous source declared that Michael Allen Budd communicated with young girls on Yahoo! Messenger and Windows Live Messenger, both free online chat services. The anonymous source stated that he or she had seen child pornography on Budd’s computer.

On March 11,2009, Detective Kim Holmes travelled to Ephrata to Mr. Budd’s home. In law enforcement, a “knock and talk” is an investigative technique where one or more police officers approaches a private residence, knocks on the door, and requests consent from the owner to search the residence. Law enforcement performs the “knock and talk” when criminal activity is suspected, but officers lack probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

Detective Kim and other officers made contact with Holmes at his home. Although many of the facts are in dispute, it appeared that Detective Kim did not properly discuss Ferrier warnings with Mr. Holmes.

The court reasoned that Detective Holmes’ police report lacked any mention of Holmes’ informing Budd that he had a right to decline consent to enter the home, limit the scope of the search, and revoke consent at any time. Finally, the report implied that Holmes misrepresented that a court would authorize a search warrant. Based on this, the Court of Appeals ruled that the detective did not voice all Ferrier warnings before entering the home, and that law enforcement officers MUST deliver all cautions before entering the residence. Consequently, the Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case.

My opinion? I agree with this excerpt from the Court of Appeals:

Viewing child pornography is a hideous crime that robs children of innocence and scars them for life. Those who watch child pornography obsessively gamer gratification through violent acts on defenseless children. Catching one at the crime takes diligence since the viewer indulges in the privacy of his home, often by elaborate security measures on his computer. Thus, we reluctantly reverse the trial court.

Nevertheless, as judges, we pledged to uphold the constitution and the endearing rights protected by the constitution. Those engaged in hideous conduct are entitled to the protections afforded under our state and federal constitution including the right to be free of unlawful searches and seizures.

Well said.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Samalia: Search of Abandoned Cell Phone is Lawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Forensics, law enforcement, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Pretrial Investigations, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense,

In State v. Samalia, the WA Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction for Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle under RCW 9A.56.068 because the police used evidence from the defendant’s cell phone found in the abandoned stolen vehicle after he fled from the vehicle and evaded pursuit.

Yakima Police Officer Ryan Yates was on patrol when his vehicle license plate reader indicated he had passed a stolen vehicle. The officer followed the stolen vehicle. The driver got out of the vehicle and faced towards Officer Yates. The driver would not obey Officer Yates’ command to get back in the vehicle and fled. Officer Yates pursued the male driver but he got away.

Officer Yates searched the car and found a cell phone in the center console. Officer Yates conducted some investigations and discovered that the phone belonged to the defendant Mr. Samilia. Later, Officer Yates located Mr. Samalia’s picture in a police database. Officer Yates then identified Mr. Samalia from the database picture as the fleeing man who had been driving the stolen vehicle.

The State charged Mr. Samalia with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He moved unsuccessfully to suppress the cell phone evidence under ER 3.6. From the above facts, the trial court concluded the cell phone was abandoned, therefore, Mr. Samalia no longer had an expectation of privacy in it. Following a bench trial, the court found Mr. Sam alia guilty as charged. He appealed.

The court reasoned that a warrantless search and/or seizure violates the WA Constitution unless it falls under one of ”’a few jealously guarded exceptions” to the warrant requirement. Searching voluntarily abandoned property is an exception to the warrant requirement. In other words, law enforcement may retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned property without a warrant or probable cause.

The court also considered the status of the area where the cell phone was located. Here, the search area was an unattended stolen vehicle that Mr. Samalia had been driving and had fled from when a police officer approached and directed him to return to the vehicle. Consequently, the court found that a suspect’s hasty flight under these circumstances is sufficient evidence of an intent to abandon the vehicle. In conclusion, because the cell phone was abandoned; used in pursuit of the fleeing suspect, and not directly used to identify Mr. Samalia, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying suppression of Mr. Samalia’s identification from a police database.

My opinion?

I disagree with the court’s decision. This decision is too great a leap in the wrong direction; and fails to follow Washington’s current jurisprudence. Despite the Court’s reasoning, there is NO reported Washington decision which has directly addressed whether a citizen relinquishes his reasonable expectation of privacy in the data on his cell phone by leaving the phone behind at the scene of a crime.

Our jurisprudence says police must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of data on a cell phone – even one that has been left behind in a place where its owner has no privacy interest. Requiring a search warrant will assure that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity can be found in the data on the cell phone.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Vanness: Unlawful Search of a Lockbox Inside a Backpack

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals

In State v. Vanness, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided that the warrantless search of a locked box found inside a backpack that the defendant was wearing at the time of arrest violated both the Fourth Amendment and Washington Const. art. I, § 7.

Defendant VanNess was arrested for having outstanding warrants in Everett, WA. When arrested, VanNess was wearing a backpack and carrying a bag. A police officer removed the backpack and asked permission to search it. VanNess did not respond. Everett Police Department had a policy requiring officers to search backpacks for dangerous items. Following that policy, officers searched VanNess’s backpack and found knives. They also found a small box with a combination lock.

The police officer used a flathead screwdriver to pry open the box. He looked inside. Although he did not see any dangerous items, he saw a scale and small plastic “baggies” and smelled vinegar, which he associated with heroin. The box was delivered to the Everett Police Department’s property room.

Police obtained a warrant to search the box. They found suspected methamphetamine and heroin, a digital scale, a glass pipe, and several plastic baggies. The Prosecutor charged VanNess with Possession of Heroin with Intent to Deliver and Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver. Both crimes are Class B felonies. The trial court denied VanNess’s motion to suppress. At trial, the court admitted the evidence. A jury found VanNess guilty of all charges. VanNess appealed.

A warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless the State can prove a “carefully drawn and jealously guarded exception” applies. These exceptions include a search incident to arrest and an inventory search. If an exception does not apply, a warrantless search is illegal and the exclusionary rule prevents the State from presenting the illegally seized evidence. Here, the defendant argued that the inventory search of his lockbox violated his Constitutional rights.

The Court of Appeals agreed. It reasoned that although State v. Stroud and State v. Valdez each involved a locked container found in an automobile, the court’s consideration of the Chimel v. California applies just as well to the facts of our case:

“Where a container is locked and officers have the opportunity to prevent the individual’s access to the contents of that container so that officer safety or the preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest is not at risk, there is no justification under the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of the locked container.”

Under Chimel, the Court reasoned that police officers may conduct a warrantless inventory search (1) to protect the arrestee’s property, (2) to protect the government from false claims of theft, and (3) to protect police officers and the public from potential danger. Courts generally uphold inventory searches conducted according to standardized procedures which do not afford police officers excessive discretion and when they serve a purpose other than discovery of evidence.

The Court of Appeals decided that here, an officer’s compliance with an established police procedure does not constitutionalize an illegal search. Similarly, the court rejected the claim that the possibility of a bomb or dangerous firearm in the locked box established a “manifest necessity” to search the box. They reasoned that without exigent circumstances, a legitimate inventory search only calls for noting such an item as a sealed unit. With that the court concluded that neither the search incident to arrest nor the inventory search exception applies to the officer’s initial search of VanNess’s locked box. Therefore, the police unconstitutionally searched the locked box.

My opinion? Good decision. It appears the Court of Appeals announced a new balancing test for some items found on an arrested person at the time of arrest. Basically, if the item to be searched falls within a category that implicates an arrestee’s significant privacy interests, the court must balance the government interests against those individual privacy interests. Only when government interests in officer safety and evidence preservation exceed an arrestee’s privacy interest in the category of item to be searched may it be searched incident to arrest without a warrant.

Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Marijuana / THC Breathalyzer Available Soon.

Blood Test, Boating Under the Influence, Drug Offenses, Drug Recognition Expert, DUI, marijuana, police, Search Warrant, Uncategorized, Washington State Patrol, , ,

Technology appears to be catching up.

Since Colorado and Washington legalized the recreational use of marijuana in 2014, and the growing trend to legalize pot in some capacity across the nation, there is an increased interest in addressing drugged driving.

However, today’s standardized testing marijuana intoxication is not as simple as detecting alcohol. More science and research are required. It the meantime, technology will be coming to market, such as the marijuana breathalyzer being developed by Cannabix Technologies, Inc. to give police officers an on-site tool to enhance detection of THC, the psychotropic metabolite in marijuana.

In the future, devices of this type will likely be dialed in by the forensic community and become an integral element in identifying marijuana-intoxicated drivers and in other settings, including workplaces and general consumer use, just as the alcohol breathalyzer is today.

My opinion? We saw this coming. It’s almost humorous. Typically, the law lags behind technological advances. Here, technology appears to be lagging behind the evolution of marijuana legalization! Interesting development, no? This device is another tool in the hands of law enforcement – along with Drug Recognition Experts, and search warrants for the testing of blood – for investigating DUI charges.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Weller: Community Caretaking

Assault, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Plain View, police, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

In State v. Weller, the WA Court of Appeals decided an officers’ entry into a garage to privately interview children about their allegations of abuse was lawful under the health and safety check community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Also, the seizure of the board the children stated was used by the parents while beating the children, was lawful under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

Sandra and Jeffrey Weller had six children in their care. In 2011, CPS became suspicious that the Wellers were abusing the children. Eventually, CPS conducted a welfare check of the family home with the assistance of numerous police officers. The officers did not have a search warrant. Officer Aldridge asked if they could come inside and speak with Sandra and the children.

Sandra stepped back from the door and the officers entered the house. The officers attempted to talk privately with the twins. Officer Jensen and CW talked in one room. Officer Aldridge and CG talked in another room, and ultimately moved into the garage for greater privacy. Both children described being beaten repeatedly with a board.

Officer Aldridge was standing in the same place as when she entered the garage when she looked around and saw a board leaning against the garage wall in plain view. She asked the children if that was the board used to beat them, and they replied that it was. Officers saw what appeared to be bloodstains on the board. Based on her observations, Officer Aldridge decided to remove the twins and the other children from the Weller residence.

After speaking with the children, the State filed multiple charges against the Wellers, including several charges of second, third, and fourth degree assault, and several counts of unlawful imprisonment. At trial, the Wellers tried to suppress the evidence and dismiss the case on theories

The Wellers moved to suppress the board, arguing that it was seized during an unlawful search of their residence without a warrant. They argued that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement was inapplicable because there was no immediate threat of injury to any persons and that entry into the house was a pretext for a search for evidence of a crime.

However, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding in a detailed oral ruling that the officers lawfully were in the garage under the community caretaking exception and that they were authorized to seize the board because it was in plain view.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Jeffrey guilty on most counts and the trial court sentenced him for five counts of Assault Second Degree, one count of Unlawful Imprisonment, one count of Assault Third Degree of a Child, and two counts of Assault Fourth Degree. The jury also found Sandra guilty on most counts and the trial court sentenced her for four counts of Assault Second Degree and one count of Unlawful Imprisonment. The defendants appealed.

The Wellers argue that the officers seized the board used to beat CW and CG in an unlawful warrantless search of their garage, and therefore that the trial court erred in denying their CrR 3. 6 motion to suppress the board. The Court disagreed, and held that the trial court did not err when it concluded that ( 1) the officers’ entry into the garage to privately interview the children was lawful under the community caretaking function exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the seizure of the board was lawful under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Some background on these legal principles is necessary.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution prohibit warrantless searches and seizures unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.

 COMMUNITY CARETAKING

The community caretaking function exception to the warrant requirement arises from law enforcement officers’ community caretaking function and involves two aspects: officers rendering aid or assistance ( emergency aid exception) or making routine checks on health and safety (health and safety exception). Another exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception, which allows officers to seize an object if they are lawfully present in a constitutionally protected area and the object is in plain view.

A search pursuant to the community caretaking function exception must be totally divorced from  a criminal investigation. The exception does not apply where an officer’ s primary motivation is to search for evidence or make an arrest.

Here, the Court reasoned that the officers entered the garage because they were trying to find a private place to interview the children in conjunction with their welfare check. Nothing in the record suggests that the officers were searching the garage or looking for evidence.

HEALTH AND SAFETY CHECK INSPECTION

To invoke the health and safety check exception, the State must show that ( 1) the officer subjectively believed someone needed health or safety assistance, and (2) a reasonable person in the same situation would believe that there was a need for assistance, and ( 3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance with the place searched. Next, the State must show that the encounter under this exception was reasonable, which depends upon a balancing of the individual’ s interest in freedom from police interference against the public’ s interest in having the police perform a community caretaking function.

Here, the Court reasoned that the three requirements for application of the health and safety check exception clearly were satisfied. The officers subjectively and reasonably believed that the Weller children needed health or safety assistance. A trained CPS investigator relayed to the officers her professional opinion that the Weller children were not safe and were expressing severe fear.

PLAIN VIEW

The ” plain view” exception to the warrant requirement applies when officers ( 1) have a valid justification for being in a constitutionally protected area, and ( 2) are immediately able to realize that an item they can see in plain view is associated with criminal activity. The test for determining when an item is immediately apparent for purposes of a plain view seizure is whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude that the item is incriminating evidence. Officers do not need to be certain that the item is associated with criminal activity – probable cause is sufficient.

Here, the Court decided the officers were lawfully present in the Wellers’ garage. Further, the surrounding facts and circumstances led the officers to believe that the board was evidence of a crime. As the welfare check progressed, the children said Mr. Weller periodically beat them with a board. Further, when the officers were in the garage, the children began to look for the board. And the children immediately confirmed that the board in the garage was in fact the board used to beat them. As a result, the Court held that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement applied to the officers’ seizure of the board.

The Court of Appeals upheld the convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Rubio: “Exigent Circumstances” Found in Arrest for Possession of Methamphetamine

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

In State v. Rubio, the WA Court of Appeals Division III upheld the defendant’s conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine because exigent circumstances existed to seize and search the defendant after it was discovered he had open warrants for his arrest and possibly witnessed a domestic violence incident.

Officers from the Spokane police department responded to a domestic disturbance call and found Ricardo J. Rubio inside the apartment at the reported address. Police ran a check on Mr. Rubio and discovered three outstanding warrants for his arrest. He was subsequently arrested and booked into jail. While being booked, police discovered methamphetamine in Mr. Rubio’s sock. He was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The judge denied Rubio’s pretrial motion to suppress the evidence. He was later convicted at a bench trial.

Rubio appealed on the argument that he was unlawfully seized because he was merely witnessed the reported DV disturbance. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. They reasoned the seizure was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Some background is necessary. Generally, warrantless searches are unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, courts recognize a few carefully drawn exceptions to this rule. The State carries the burden of proving that a warrantless seizure falls into one of these exceptions. A recognized exception to the warrant requirement allows police to seize and search a person without a warrant when justified by “exigent circumstances.”

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

An officer is allowed to stop a witness under exigent circumstances when (1) the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor or felony involving danger or forcible injury to persons has just been committed near the place where he finds such person, (2) the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has knowledge of material aid in the investigation of such crime, and (3) such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the identification of such person, or to obtain an account of such crime. The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.

Here, the court reasoned Mr. Rubio was lawfully seized even though the officer had no search warrant. The officer’s detention of Mr. Rubio was reasonable due to exigent circumstances because it was imperative that the officer quickly locate the injured woman and her assailant.

The court also reasoned the seizure under exigent circumstances was lawful for three reasons. First, the police officer had reason to believe that a crime was just committed at the address involving injury to a person. Second, the officer had reason to believe that each person who was in the apartment, including Mr. Rubio, had knowledge which would aid in the investigation of the crime. Third, the officer’s request for Mr. Rubio’s identification was necessary to determine the true identity of Mr. Rubio. Running the warrant check was needed to verify that Mr. Rubio was the person he claimed to be. Consequently, Officer Kirby’s seizure of Mr. Rubio was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

My opinion? This is a difficult case to swallow. Sure, Mr. Rubio had warrants for his arrest. And yes, the police can lawfully arrest and incarcerate people for that reason alone. And yes, the authorities regularly find illegal contraband during inventory searches and/or when defendants are booked into jail on warrants.

Still, it’s difficult to accept the notion that citizens can become criminal defendants by merely being at the wrong place at the wrong time; and that merely witnessing an alleged incident can lead one to be seized, searched and charged for a totally different crime than the one police responded to in the first place. Interesting.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Witherrite: Ferrier Warnings Do Not Apply to Car Searches

Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Interesting. In State v. Witherrite, the Court of Appeals decided that law enforcement officers need not give Ferrier warnings for car searches because an automobile should not be treated in the same manner as a home.

A deputy sheriff stopped Ms. Witherrite for a traffic violation and had her perform field sobriety tests. The deputy then received permission to search Ms. Witherrite’s car after advising her that at any time she could stop or limit the scope of the search. The deputy did not tell her that she had the right to refuse consent.

The vehicle search turned up marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. The prosecutor ultimately charged Drug Offenses for each of those items. She moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that her consent was invalid due to the absence of the warnings required by State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103,960 P.2d 927 (1998). The trial court disagreed, concluding that Ferrier did not extend to vehicles and that Ms. Witherrite had consented to the search. The court found her guilty as charged. Ms. Witherrite timely appealed.

The issuel presented on appeal was whether the Court would extend Ferrier warnings to vehicle searches.

Some background on Ferrier is necessary. In Ferrier, the Washington Supreme Court faced a situation where officers wanted to get inside a house to see if they could smell growing marijuana which they suspected was present on the basis of an unsupported tip. The officers did not tell the occupant that she had the ability to refuse consent. After being invited into the home, the officers asked for consent to search the residence. A detective explained that this “knock and talk” procedure was used in order to avoid seeking a search warrant. The defendant consented to the search and was convicted of the charges.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that because the woman had a heightened right of privacy in her home. Under article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution, officers could not enter a home to seek voluntary consent to search the dwelling without first informing her that she did not need to consent to the entry. The court’s analysis repeatedly emphasized the heightened protection given the home under our constitution. The court then adopted the following rule:

When police officers conduct a knock and talk for the purpose of obtaining consent to search a home, and thereby avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant, they must, prior to entering the home, inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home.

Despite the above rule, the WA Court of Appeals in this case decided Ferrier warnings are NOT applicable outside of the home because the Washington Supreme Court has long distinguished houses from vehicles in the search and seizure context.

One particularly instructive case the court examined was State v. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d 489,28 P.3d 762 (2000). There, a deputy sheriff stopped a motor home and arrested the driver, Ms. Vrieling. A search of the motor home was conducted incident to the arrest. The question before the court was whether the then-existing vehicle search doctrine applied to the search of the motor home, which is essentially a house-like vehicle. The court ultimately concluded that when a motor home is used as a vehicle, the vehicle search doctrine applied and apparently, Ferrier warnings do not.

The treatment of the home as most deserving of heightened protection under the WA constitution led the court to conclude that Ferrier warnings need not be given prior to obtaining consent to search a vehicle.

My opinion? Sad as it seems, this opinion makes sense. There certainly are differences between a car and a home. Simply put, homes have more privacy protections than cars.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Jardinez: Parole Officer Conducts Overbroad Search of Defendant’s iPod

Constitutional Rights, Department of Corrections, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Firearm, Privacy, Probable Cause, Probation, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Good decision.

In State v. Jardinez, the Court of Appeals held that a community corrections officer’s (CCO) review of video on a parolee’s iPod Nano violated the parolee’s constitutional rights because the CCO did not have a reasonable suspicion based on articulated facts that the iPod Nano contained evidence of past, present or future criminal conduct or violations of the parolee’s conditions of release.

The defendant Felipe Jardinez was an parole for Drive-By Shooting and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm Second Degree. He served prison time followed by 18 months of community supervision. The conditions of community custody included requirements to report to his CCO, refrain from possessing controlled substances and refrain from possessing firearms.

On November 3,2011, Felipe lardinez missed a scheduled meeting with his CCO. The CCO called Jardinez. The two scheduled to meet the next day. During the appointment, Martinez asked Jardinez to submit to a urinalysis test. Jardinez admitted that the test would show marijuana use.

The CCO instructed Jardinez to empty his pockets. Jardinez placed an iPod Nano onto a desk. The CCO was interested in the iPod because parolees occasionally take pictures of themselves with other gang members or “doing something they shouldn’t be doing.” When the CCO handled the iPod, Jardinez appeared nervous. Nevertheless, the CCO lacked facts that the iPod video player would show evidence of a crime or violation of the conditions of the defendant’s community custody.

The CCO accessed the iPod. He found a video recorded earlier that morning. The CCO played the video. It showed  Jardinez pumping a shotgun in his bedroom. Jardinez was arrested. Police searched his home and found the shotgun seen in Jardinez’s iPod video.

Jardinez was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm First Degree. Jardinez moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the CCO’s search of his iPod, and all evidence seized as a result of law enforcement officers searching his home as the spoiled fruit of the unlawful viewing of the video on his iPod.

The trial court granted Felipe Jardinez’s motion to suppress. The court concluded that a warrantless search of the iPod would be justified only if the CCO had a reasonable suspicion based on articulated facts that the device contained evidence of past, present or future criminal conduct or violations of the defendant’s conditions of community custody. The case went up on appeal.

At issue was whether the CCO had legal authority to search the content of Jardinez’s iPod when the CCO did not expect the search to yield evidence related to either of the known parole violations, Jardinez’s failure to appear, or his marijuana use.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that unless an exception is present, a warrantless search is impermissible under both article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A trial court may suppress evidence seized from an illegal search under the Exclusionary Rule or the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.

The Court further reasoned that Washington law recognizes that probationers and parolees have a diminished right of privacy that permits a warrantless search based on probable cause. Parolees and probationers have diminished privacy rights because they are persons whom a court has sentenced to confinement but who are serving their time outside the prison walls. Therefore, the State may supervise and scrutinize a probationer or parolee closely.  Nevertheless, this diminished expectation of privacy is constitutionally permissible only to the extent necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.

RCW 9.94A.631 provides exceptions to the warrant requirement. RCW 9.94A.631(1) reads:

If an offender violates any condition or requirement of a sentence, a community corrections officer may arrest or cause the arrest of the offender without a warrant, pending a determination by the court or by the department. If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.

Also, the Court based its decision principally upon the Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s comment about RCW 9.94A.631(1). The Commission wrote as its official comment behind the statute:

The Commission intends that Community Corrections Officers exercise their arrest powers sparingly, with due consideration for the seriousness of the violation alleged and the impact of confinement on jail population. Violations may be charged by the Community Corrections Officer upon notice of violation and summons, without arrest. The search and seizure authorized by this section should relate to the violation which the Community Corrections Officer believes to have occurred.

Based on the court’s reading of the statute and its counterpart comment, it found RCW 9.94A.631 did not authorize the CCO’s warrantless search of the contents of Jardinez’s iPod. It affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the evidence of Felipe Jardinez’s unlawful possession of a firearm.

My opinion? Good decision. I’ve posted similar blogs stating that CCO’s and probation officers exercise too much power over defendants. This certainly is one of those cases.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.