Category Archives: Malicious Mischief

Leave Your Neighbor’s Campaign Sign ALONE

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Malicious Mischief, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Political Signs, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Tis the season: Vandalism and theft of political signs back again | Local News | latrobebulletinnews.com

The 2024 general election is less than a month away.  By now, you’ve probably seen at least a few yard signs endorsing someone’s preferred candidate, and even more will likely pop up as the election approaches. Political polarization is peaking online and in our communities.

But what if someone sees a yard sign they disagree with and takes it down? Is that protected political expression or destruction of someone else’s property?

While some might view taking down or defacing yard signs as an act of civil discourse or political activism, the law is clear on the issue: Theft or vandalism of political signs is a crime in all 50 states. Trespassing on private property is also a punishable offense in every state.

WASHINGTON’S LAW REGARDING THE THEFT OR DEFACING OF POLITICAL YARD SIGNS

State law addresses the exact topic in RCW 29A.84.040. It is a misdemeanor to “[remove] or [defaces] lawfully placed political advertising” without permission. In Washington, misdemeanors can be punished by up to 90 days in prison or a fine of up to $1,000, and in some cases can carry both a sentence and a fine. The statute includes yard signs – the law mentions them specifically – and each yard sign taken down is considered a separate violation.

Additionally, violators face Criminal Trespass and/or Malicious Mischief charges, which are also misdemeanors. Criminal Trespass refers to intentionally entering someone else’s private property without their permission. Malicious Mischief refers to Knowingly and maliciously causing physical damage to the property of another.

POLITICAL YARD SIGNS ARE FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH

The right of a property owner to post signs representing their political beliefs is one that is rooted in the First Amendment, which protects every citizen’s right to freedom of expression. Generally, yard signs have proven to be an easy and inexpensive way to participate in public debate, and the courts have recognized the protected form of expression as such.

It is believed that the first political yard sign in American politics dates back to John Quincy Adams’ presidential run in 1824. The current wire-framed version of political lawn signs originated in the 1960s. However, the concept of political signage can be traced all the way back to Ancient Rome.

Increased theft and vandalism of political signs has prompted some property owners to attempt to catch trespassers by installing cameras such as security cameras, smart video doorbells, or trail cams. The footage is being used to shame people online and also helps law enforcement track down offenders.

Stealing or defacing political lawn signs is a terribly embarassing criminal conviction. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged.  Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Federal Judge Prohibits Seattle from Enforcing Its Anti-Graffiti Law

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Federal Crimes & Prosecutions, First Amendment, Graffiti, Malicious Mischief, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Seattle court ruling halts enforcement of graffiti-related property crimes | KOMO

A U.S. district court has ruled by injunction that Seattle must temporarily cease enforcement of property crimes with regard to graffiti.

Judge Marsha Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington issued a preliminary injunction. It says the city’s ordinance that punishes graffiti “targets speech” and “poses a real and substantial threat of censorship.”

Seattle’s municipal code says a person is guilty of “property destruction,” a gross misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in jail, if “he or she… [w]rites, paints, or draws any inscription, figure, or mark of any type on any public or private building or other structure or any real or personal property owned by any other person.”

“On its face, the Ordinance sweeps so broadly that it criminalizes innocuous drawings (from a child’s drawing of a mermaid to pro-police messages written by the Seattle Police Foundation) that can hardly be said to constitute ‘visual blight’ and which would naturally wash away in the next rain storm.” ~Justice Pechman, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington

The Seattle Police Department (SPD) released a statement to address the court’s ruling, stating that a lack of future enforcement is not a conscious decision by the government.

“Late yesterday afternoon, SPD received an order from a US District Court judge that enjoined, in full, enforcement of SMC 12A.080.020 – the City’s misdemeanor property destruction law. This means that until further order of the Court, SPD cannot take action on damage to property under this law. This is not a matter within SPD or City discretion; we are bound by the court order as it is written.” ~Seattle Police Department

Vandalism and graffiti have become a prominent issue in Seattle, and the city government is expected to request an expedited reconsideration of the ruling.

The department added, “We know, as evidenced by the thousands of calls for service we receive each year reporting acts of vandalism and other forms of property damage that property damage is, in fact, a crime that is of significance to community members.”

My opinion? This is a thorny subject. Many cities around the US deal with the problem of graffiti art everyday. Sometimes it may be a name, a threat, an image, a symbol, or a brilliant canvas of the graffiti artist’s imagination. Whatever the case, it usually involves painting something on someone else’s property. So, whose rights should win out? The artist’s right to free speech or the property owner’s right to the quiet use and enjoyment of their own property?

Generally, one cannot exercise a right, even one guaranteed by the constitution, if it interferes with another person’s right. While Americans do not have a right to be free from annoyance by the speech or expression of another, even through artistic means, they do have the right to the exclusive use and possession of property. Thus, most graffiti art will not be protected as free speech when it is done on someone else’s property, and the property owner does not consent.

The parameters of the federal court’s ruling may invalidate similar anti-graffiti ordinances in  Washington and other States.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with Malicious Mischief or any other crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Harming a Police Dog

Arson, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Harming a Police Dog, Malicious Mischief, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Resisting Arrest, Self-Defense, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , ,

Man Who Shot, Killed Ohio K-9 Officer Jethro Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison - ABC News

In State v. Moose, the WA Court of Appeals decided an interesting case involving a defendant maliciously harming a K-9 officer.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Defendant Mr. Moose attempted to light a car on fire. In the process, he intentionally lit a police dog on fire while resisting arrest. The State filed four charges against him—attempted Arson in the Second Degree, Harming a Police Dog, Resisting Arrest, and attempted Malicious Mischief in the Third Degree. A jury convicted him of all charges. Mr. Moose appealed his conviction. He argued that the term “maliciously” under the Malicious Mischief statute does not include police dogs.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals began by framing Mr. Moose’s appellate arguments. In short, Moose argued that the State lacked evidence to convict him because the Malicious Mischief statute defines “maliciously” as “an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.”  Because Mr. Moose harmed a police dog, not “another person,” the State failed to prove he acted maliciously as required by statute.

However, the Court of Appeals denied Moose’s interpretation of the statute:

“Mr. Moose’s argument is unconvincing . . . A statute criminalizing malicious injury of a police dog plainly requires a definition of “maliciously” that applies to police dogs. Further, Mr. Moose’s reading of “maliciously” in RCW 9A.76.200 to require acting against “another person” violates multiple canons of statutory interpretation . . .

He suggests we read RCW 9A.76.200 so as to render the entire statute meaningless. This is an absurd result that was clearly not intended by the legislature. The State was not required to prove Mr. Moose harmed “another person” to prove he harmed a police dog, and the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain his conviction.”

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Moose’s conviction.

My opinion? In nearly every state, there are specific laws that, for all intents and purposes, equate an attack on a police dog as the same as an attack on a regular officer. WA State is no different, and the penalties are incredible harsh. Recently, a man was sentenced to 45 years for killing a police dog. Generally, though, individuals do have the right to resist unlawful arrests, excessive force, and unprovoked attacks from officers and K-9s.

However, when a police dog is attacking a person, depending on what the dog is doing, a person may be able to claim that the use of a police dog constitutes excessive force. Many police dogs are trained to “bite and hold” suspects, which as the name implies, involves a K-9 literally biting down on a suspect in order to prevent them from fleeing until human officers can arrive. Because dog bites can be extraordinarily severe, an individual may be justified in fighting back in that situation. Self-Defense may apply if the bite is drawing blood, or severely injuring an individual.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

No Interpreter is Court Mismanagement

Assault, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Dismissal, Interpreter, Malicious Mischief, misdemeanor, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Image result for court interpreter

In State v. Jieta, the WA Court of Appeals held that a trial court judge may dismiss a criminal prosecution due to the court’s failure to arrange for an interpreter for all scheduled court hearings.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On May 19, 2015, Mr. Jieta was first arraigned on charges of fourth degree assault and third degree malicious mischief in Snohomish County District Court. The court continued the arraignment after ordering that Jieta be provided a Marshallese interpreter. Over the next 15 months, the court held 14 more pretrial hearings, and the interpreter repeatedly failed to appear telephonically or personally.

On August 26, 2016, Jieta moved under CrRLJ 8.3(b) to dismiss all charges. On September 12, — another hearing where the interpreter failed to appear — the court dismissed all charges with prejudice and found the interpreter’s absences “seriously interfered with Mr. Jieta’s right to representation by counsel.” In short, out of 14 pretrial hearings conducted after the court directed the appointment of a interpreter, the interpreter failed to appear 10 times, appeared by phone – ineffectively – two times, and appeared in person two times. The superior court affirmed the dismissal on the State’s appeal.

The State sought discretionary review in this court, which was granted on the narrow question whether CrRLJ 8.3(b) can apply when court administration mismanages a case.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals explained that CrRLJ 8.3(b) gives courts discretion to dismiss “any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused’s right to a fair trial.” To satisfy the rule, the alleged misconduct “need not be of an evil or dishonest nature; simple mismanagement is sufficient.”

The Court also reasoned that the judiciary has a statutory duty of appointing an interpreter to assist the defendant throughout the proceedings:

“Reliable interpreter services are necessary to secure a non-English speaking defendant’s fair trial rights. Thus, to assist a defendant throughout the proceedings, the interpreter must actually deliver translation services throughout the proceedings.”

The purpose of CrR 8.3(b) is to ensure fairness to defendants by protecting their right to a fair trial. Thus, when mismanagement by court personnel prevents a defendant from receiving reliable interpreter services and effective assistance of counsel for more than one year, the defendant has a viable claim of “governmental misconduct” consistent with the text and purpose of CrRLJ 8.3(b).

Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned that “governmental misconduct” can extend to mismanagement by court administration.

“We need not decide the exact types of court mismanagement that could warrant relief or when dismissal is an appropriate remedy for such mismanagement,” said the Court. “On the record before us, the State does not establish that the trial court erred in its conclusion that CrRLJ 8.3(b) may extend to a court’s administrative mismanagement of its statutory obligation to provide translator services.”

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all charges.

My opinion? Good decision.

Court interpreters are important in legal proceedings, especially when criminal charges are involved. Interpreters ensure that defendants fully understand the charges and the proceedings. Indeed, the constitutional right to simply understand the charges and their maximum consequences is captured under the 6th Amendment.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime and they need an interpreter to move forward in their defense. Hiring a competent, experienced attorney is the first and best step toward achieving justice.

A Snowmobile Is Not a Motor Vehicle

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Burglary, Malicious Mischief, Mount Vernon Criminal Defense Attorney, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Theft, Theft of Motor Vehicle, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , , , ,

Image result for snowmobile theft

In State v. Tucker, the WA Court of Appeals held that a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle for purposes of RCW 9A.56.65, which makes it a class B felony to commit theft of a motor vehicle.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In February 2016, Ms. Tucker and her accomplice broke into a cabin near Stampede Pass. The cabin was accessible only by snowmobiles. The pair stole several items of personal property, including a snowmobile.

The State charged Ms. Tucker with residential burglary, second degree theft, theft of motor vehicle, and third degree malicious mischief. A jury found Ms. Tucker guilty of first degree criminal trespass and theft of motor vehicle, but could not reach a verdict on the charge of second degree theft. The trial court declared a mistrial on that count, and it later was dismissed without prejudice.

Defense counsel, relying on State v. Barnes, filed a motion to arrest judgment on the theft of a motor vehicle conviction. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the snowmobile was licensed and has a motor. Ms. Tucker timely appealed this aspect of her conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the Court of Appeals reviewed existing caselaw under State v. Barnes and concluded that, similar to the riding lawn mower in the Barnes case, a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle.

“Here, a snowmobile is not a car or other automobile. To paraphrase the Barnes lead opinion, the legislature was responding to increased auto thefts, not increased snowmobile thefts.”

The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the stolen snowmobile should be classified as a motor vehicle because at the time and place it was stolen, a snowmobile was the only vehicle capable of transporting people or cargo. It reasoned that transporting people or cargo is not the touchstone agreed to by six justices in the Barnes Case.

“The concurring justices never stated that transporting people or cargo was a relevant consideration,” said the Court of Appeals. “Also, the lead and concurring justices also required the vehicle to be a car or other automobile. A snowmobile obviously is not a car or other automobile.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that because a snowmobile is not a car or other automobile, a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the statute. The Court reversed Ms. Tucker’s conviction for theft of motor vehicle and instructed the trial court to dismiss that conviction.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The Court appropriately relied on the Barnes decision and made the right decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Extortion & Promises

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Extortion, felony, Jury Trial, Malicious Mischief, Skagit County Criminal Defense, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Image result for extortion

In State v. McClure, the WA Court of Appeals held that extortion was satisfied by evidence that the defendant attempted to obtain valuable intangible property – a promise from the victim that he would not pursue criminal charges or a civil remedy against the defendant for the damaged property.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In late 2013, Williams and McClure entered into an agreement under which McClure would reside in a double wide trailer Williams owned that needed repairs. McClure would perform the repairs. In return, he would live in the trailer rent free for one year and then he would start paying rent. After a year, Williams contacted McClure and told him that if he did not pay rent, Williams would evict him.

McClure responded by threatening to destroy the trailer if Williams evicted him.

McClure did not pay his rent and Williams began the eviction process. Williams visited
the trailer on the day McClure was to be evicted and discovered that the sliding glass door, the front door, the kitchen cabinets, and the wood stove had been removed. In addition, pipes were ripped out of the ceiling and electrical lines had been cut. Williams contacted the sheriff.

A few days later, Williams returned to the trailer and observed people on the property who were removing siding, electrical wire, plumbing, appliances, and fixtures from the trailer and portions of his shed. A deputy sheriff informed Williams that someone had taken out a Craigslist ad inviting people onto the property to take what they wanted. Williams sent a text message to McClure asking him to remove the ad. McClure texted a response:

“I will pull the ads if you take a letter . . . signed and notarized by both you and Lisa (Williams’ wife) that will not allow any charges to be placed against me or my wife for
anything related to the property. I don’t need the hassle. I will also not have the signs placed that I made for the same purpose.” After Williams again asked McClure to remove the ad, McClure texted, “A simple letter will take you 15 minutes and it will be done.”

The State charged McClure with first degree extortion and first degree malicious
mischief. A jury convicted him of both charges.

LEGAL ISSUE

McClure appeals only his first degree extortion conviction on the issue of whether that “promise” sought by the defendant  constituted valuable intangible “property” supporting an extortion conviction or merely involved coercion under RCW 9A.36.070 – Williams abstaining from conduct that he had the legal right to engage in.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under RCW 9A.56.120(1), a person is guilty of first degree extortion if that person commits “extortion” by means of specific types of threats. “Extortion” means “knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner.” “Property” means “anything of value, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal.”

It further reasoned that McClure clearly was seeking a promise to not pursue criminal charges for a crime that involved financial loss to Williams – the cost of repairing damaged property. As a victim of a crime under RCW 9.94A.753(5), Williams would have the ability to receive restitution in a criminal proceeding for the property damage McClure caused.

“This ability to receive restitution for property damage had value to Williams,” reasoned the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, McClure also arguably was seeking a promise not to pursue any civil remedy for the property damage McClure caused. That is how Williams interpreted the threat. He testified that McClure demanded Williams’ agreement “not to hold me responsible or press any charges for the damage that was done to your property.”

Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that this ability to hold McClure responsible for the property damage in a civil lawsuit had value to Williams:

“A reasonable jury could have inferred from the evidence that McClure was attempting to obtain something intangible that had value – Williams’ promise not to pursue compensation for the property damage that McClure caused.”

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the State presented sufficient evidence to support McClure’s conviction for first degree extortion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.