Category Archives: Privacy

State v. Flores: WA Court of Appeals Decides Frisk for Gun Was Unconstitutional

Bellingham, Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Evidence, felony, Firearm, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 

In State v. Flores, Division III of the WA Court of Appeals UPHELD the suppression of a gun that officers found on an individual who was walking with a known-gang member and fugitive who had just threatened another person with a firearm. The reason for the suppression? There were no grounds to frisk the defendant because he made no furtive movements, had no known violent propensities, and was compliant with all of the officer’s directions.

Here, Moses Lake police were responded to an anonymous report that Giovanni Powell held a gun to somebody’s head. Dispatch also reported an outstanding warrant for the arrest of Powell. He was a known gang member and a fugitive.

The defendant, Cody Flores, was with Powell. Although Flores had no warrants for his arrest and did not point a firearm at anyone, Flores did, in fact, possess a firearm on his person. Unfortunately, he possessed the firearm unlawfully because a prior felony conviction barred his possession.

Police apprehended both Powell and Flores. Although Flores complied with officers, had no known violent propensities and was compliant with all of the officer’s directions, Flores was nevertheless frisked. Officers found his firearm. He was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). However, Flores’ his defense attorney prevailed in a 3.6 Motion to suppress the firearm due to an unlawful search.

Among other findings, the trial court found that the officers lacked individualized articulable suspicion to suspect Cody Flores of criminal activity. The trial court granted Cody Flores’ motion to suppress evidence of the gun found on his person and dismissed the charge against him. The State filed an appeal.

The WA Court of Appeals sided with the trial court’s suppression. It reasoned that the Washington Constitution, not the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is the controlling law. Article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution provides that “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” The Court reasoned that WA’s protection encompasses and exceeds the protection guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Court further reasoned that, as a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. There are five exceptions to the warrant requirement. They include (1) exigent circumstances, (2) searches incident to a valid arrest, (3) inventory searches, (4) plain view searches, and (5) Terry investigative stops. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless seizure falls into a narrow exception to the rule. “This is a strict rule.” said the Court. “Exceptions to the warrant requirement are limited and narrowly drawn.

“Merely associating with a person suspected of criminal activity does not strip away the protections of the constitution,” said the Court. “In order for police to lawfully seize an otherwise innocent individual present with an arrestee, the arresting officer must articulate an ‘objective rationale’ predicated specifically on safety concerns.”

Finally, the court reasoned that automatically authorizing the search of non-arrested individuals because those individuals happen to be associated with the arrestee, or within the vicinity of the arrest, would distort the narrow limits of the warrant exceptions and offend fundamental constitutional principles. Because the privacy interest of a non arrested individual remains largely undiminished, full blown evidentiary searches of non-arrested individuals are constitutionally invalid even when officers may legitimately fear for their safety. “A generalized concern for officer safety has never justified a full search of a non-arrested person,” said the court.

With that, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges against Cody Flores.

My opinion? This is a well-reasoned case. It’d be different if the defendant was doing something unlawful, being uncooperative and/or raising safety concerns with the police. Here, the situation was purely mathematics. Again, there can search incident to arrest if there is no arrest. And there can be no arrest without probable cause. Here, there was no probable cause to arrest and search Mr. Flores. Period.

Good opinion!

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Wisdom: Unlawful Search of Zipped Shaving Kit Bag

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Miranda, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Interesting opinion. In State v. Wisdom, the WA Court of Appeals Division III decided the removal and warrantless inspection of a zipped shut shaving kit bag found in the front seat of a stolen vehicle the defendant was driving was not a lawful search incident to arrest because  the defendant sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. The methamphetamine found in the zipped shut shaving kit is not lawful pursuant to the impound inventory doctrine, as unzipping the kit exceeded the lawful scope of an impound.

Defendant Heath Wisdom drove a Chevrolet pickup truck with an ATV in its back. Someone earlier reported both vehicles as stolen. Yakima County Sheriff Deputy Nate Boyer, while on patrol, passed the pickup, and Boyer’s automated license plate reader identified the pickup as stolen. Officer Boyer pulled Wisdom over and arrested him for possession of a stolen vehicle. Boyer handcuffed Wisdom, searched his body, and escorted him to the patrol vehicle. Officer Boyer found on Wisdom’s body a pipe that Wisdom admitted he used for smoking methamphetamine.

Deputy Nate Boyer advised Heath Wisdom of his Miranda rights. Officer Boyer asked if there were drugs in the truck, and Wisdom replied that methamphetamine lay on the front seat. Officer Boyer looked inside the cab of the truck and saw filters, some cleaner, and a black “shaving kit type” bag. Officer Boyer concluded that the bag contained the methamphetamine. The toiletry bag was closed, but Boyer spied money through the mesh side of the bag.

After photographing the truck, Deputy Boyer removed the bag from the vehicle, opened it, and found methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, drug paraphernalia, and two thousand seven hundred dollars in cash. Heath Wisdom told Deputy Boyer that he owned the black bag. Deputy Boyer had not asked Wisdom if he owned the black bag before searching inside the bag.

Deputy Boyer never obtained a warrant for his search, nor did he request Heath Wisdom’s consent before opening the black bag. Law enforcement impounded the truck and ATV, since the legal owner could not be located.

The State of Washington charged Heath Wisdom with three counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of RCW 69.50.4013(1) (cocaine, ecstasy, and heroin) and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) (methamphetamine). Wisdom moved under CrR 3.6 to suppress all evidence found in the black toiletry bag. However, the trial court denied Heath Wisdom’s motion to suppress. The WA Court of Appeals accepted review of this case.

First, the Court reasoned that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did NOT excuse police from obtaining a search warrant before unzipping and perusing the inside of the shaving kit bag. The court’s opinion was quite lengthy in explaining the need for society to trust police, and that doing so required officers to obtain search warrants in cases like this, and that failure to do so violates a defendants rights under article I, section 7 of the WA Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Court emphasized how the caselaw treats “luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers” as unique for purposes of police searches. Washington courts recognize an individual’s privacy interest in his closed luggage, whether locked or unlocked. Indeed, the Court gave a very colorful analyses on this subject:

A person does not rummage through a woman’s purse, because ofsecrets obtained therein. A man’s shaving kit bag can be likened to a woman’s purse. The kit bag could obtain prescription drugs, condoms or other items the owner wishes shielded from the public. The bag is intended to safeguard the privacy of personal effects. Literature, medicines, and other things found inside a bag may reveal much about a person’s activities, associations and beliefs.

The Court further reasoned that Washington allows a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include exigent circumstances, searches incident to an arrest, inventory searches, plain view searches, and Terry stops. Furthermore, under Arizona v. Gant, a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest is authorized when the arrestee would be able to obtain a weapon from the vehicle or reach evidence ofthe crime of arrest to conceal or destroy it. Here, Heath Wisdom sat handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the seizure and search of the toiletry bag. He lacked access to the bag.

Furthermore, under State v. Snapp, the Court reasoned the WA Constitution disapproves expansive application of the search-incident-to arrest exception to the period of time after the arrestee is secured and attendant risks to officers have passed. When a search can be delayed without running afoul of concerns for officer safety or to preserve evidence of the crime of arrest from concealment or destruction by the arrestee, and does not fall within another applicable exception, the warrant must be obtained. The police officer can prevent destruction of evidence by holding the bag as a sealed unit until obtaining a warrant.

Finally, the Court ruled that the police officer’s inventorying of the pickup’s contents did NOT excuse the need to obtain a search warrant. Inventory searches, unlike other searches, are not conducted to discover evidence of crime. Although a routine inventory search does not require a warrant, a police department policy should not, however, justify an unconstitutional search. The permitted extent of an inventory search pursuant to police department policy must be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify the exception warrant clause.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held the warrantless search inside of Mr. Wisdom’s black bag was not justified by either a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Wisdom’s motion to suppress evidence, reversed his four convictions, and dismissed all charges filed against him.

Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Reis: Search & Seizure in Medical Marijuana Case

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, felony, law enforcement, Legislation, marijuana, Plain View, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

In State v. Reis, the WA Supreme Court decided that although medical marijuana use is a defense, police officers can still obtain search warrants and search people’s homes if sufficient probable cause of criminal activity exists.

In 2012, Detective Thomas Calabrese received an anonymous tip from an individual living in the Shorewood area of Burien, informing him that a man named “William” was actively growing marijuana in a house in that neighborhood. The informant, who feared retaliation by Reis, declined to provide any additional information. Detective Calabrese began investigating.

He conducted stakeout surveillance of the home and watched the defendant William Reis tending to numerous marijuana plants growing in the backyard. The detective also heard a distinct humming sound coming from the northwest side of the target home and observed black plastic covering the daylight basement window. Detective Calabrese also noticed condensation on this window.

Detective Calabrese also discovered Mr. Reis had a prior DV conviction and, during that arrest, officers discovered significant evidence of a marijuana grow operation, as well as a rifle and $18,000 cash hidden in the attic. Additional searches of Reis’s financial records in 2005 connected him to a large marijuana grow operation in California. Detective Calabrese also learned that Reis had been arrested in 2011 for possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana.

Based on this information, Detective Calabrese put all of this information in an affidavit of probable cause to support a search warrant of Reis’s home. Judge Eide granted a search warrant, finding probable cause to believe that Reis was violating Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50. A search of Reis’s home pursuant to the search warrant revealed plants, scales, ledgers, sales receipts, and tools indicative of a marijuana grow operation. The search also revealed 37 plants and 210.72 ounces of cannabis.

Reis moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that officers lacked probable cause to search his home. The trial court denied his motion. The WA Court of Appeals granted review. They decided the authorized use of medical marijuana under RCW 69.51A.040 does not stop an officer from searching a home for criminal activity. Although compliant use of medical marijuana under the statute is an affirmative defense, it does not negate probable cause required for a search warrant. State v. Reis, 180 Wn.App. 438, 322 P.3d 1238 (2014). The WA Supreme Court  granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

The WA Supremes reasoned that RCW 69.51A.040, as passed, does not decriminalize the medical use of marijuana. Instead, the plain language of the statute establishes a limited exception to the general prohibition against marijuana that existed at the time that the search warrant in this case issued. The Court summarized it best here:

The legislature may have intended to create heightened protections for qualifying patients who registered. However, because registration is currently impossible, the statute provides qualifying patients with only an affirmative defense until the legislature is able to establish a registry. Therefore, we reject Reis’s argument and affirm the Court of Appeals.

The Court describes how the “Medical Marijuana Defense” works under RCW 69.51A.040.

There are six required “terms and conditions” contained within RCW 69.51A.040. Subsection (1) places limits on the quantity of cannabis that a qualifying patient or designated provider may possess. Subsections (2) and (3) require registration with the Department of Health-now impossible in light of the governor’s veto-and require that the patient keep their registration within their home and present it to inquiring investigating officers. Subsections (4 ), (5), and (6) require that the investigating officer not possess evidence that the qualifying patient or designated provider is converting marijuana for their own use or benefit, or otherwise violating distribution requirements or registration requirements. If a qualifying patient or designated provider complies with all of these requirements, including registration, the use of marijuana does not constitute a crime.

Here, the search was valid because the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent lead to the conclusion that a user or possessor of cannabis may raise only an affirmative defense.

My opinion? Hate to say, but the reasoning makes sense. After all, assaulting people in the street is still a crime. One must prove a defense – hypothetically speaking, self-defense – by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be found not guilty of the crime of assault. The same reasoning applies here. The medical use of marijuana does not decriminalize marijuana use – it only provides a defense if one is charged with marihuana-related crimes. Police officers can still investigate citizens and apply for search warrants if probable cause exists that a crime is being committed.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Fuentes & Sandoz: Are Terry Stops Legal in High-Crime Areas?

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, marijuana, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

Joyce Carol Oates revisits past in 'High Crime' tales

The WA Supreme Court consolidated two search & seizure cases with very similar facts. Both cases involve Terry stops of a defendants who entered a high-crime areas and visited homes occupied by suspected drug dealers.

TERRY STOPS

 Generally, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of Washington’s constitution, an officer may not seize a person without a warrant. However, exceptions exist. A Terry investigative stop is one of the exceptions.

For those who don’t know, a “Terry stop” is a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. Picture an officer walking up to you and asking for your I.D. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that police may briefly detain a person who they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity. Also, police may conduct a limited search of the suspect’s outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be “armed and dangerous”. When a search for weapons is authorized, the procedure is known as a “stop and frisk.”

To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” that would indicate to a reasonable person that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Reasonable suspicion depends on the “totality of the circumstances”, and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous.

State v. Fuentes

In this case, police officers were conducting a stakeout of a known drug house. They saw Marisa Fuentes park her car across the street from the apartment. She walked up to the apartment, entered, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car. She opened the trunk of her car and removed a small plastic bag. The bag contained something about the size of a small football. Then Fuentes reentered the apartment, stayed for about five minutes, and returned to her car with a bag that had noticeably less content than when she entered the apartment.

Based on what officers observed, police stopped Fuentes’ car on suspicion of narcotics activity. An officer advised Fuentes that he needed to talk with her. For safety reasons, the officer requested that Fuentes come to the police vehicle, which she did. The officer read Fuentes her Miranda rights. Fuentas waived those rights and admitted she delivered marijuana to Fenton’s apartment.

The State charged Fuentes with Delivery of Marijuana. Fuentes moved to suppress evidence uncovered from the investigative stop of her car, including her statement about delivering marijuana, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop of her vehicle. The trial court concluded that officers had reasonable   suspicion to stop the vehicle and therefore denied the motion to suppress. Fuentes was subsequently convicted of delivery of marijuana at a stipulated facts trial. She appealed.

The WA Supreme Court decided the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to Fuentes before the stop occurred.

The officers in this case. They knew about past drug activity at Fenton’s apartment. Police made controlled buys from Fenton and conducted a search of the apartment 11 months before and found drugs. The officers also testified they had recent information from individuals arrested on drug-related charges that Fenton was still dealing drugs. Additionally, officers observed foot traffic that morning (10 visits between 10 p.m. and midnight) that suggested ongoing drug transactions.

Additionally, officers could reasonably infer that Fuentes participated in the ongoing drug transactions: Fuentes entered the apartment briefly, then returned to her car. She then carried a plastic bag into the apartment, and she left with a bag that had noticeably less content. Her stay lasted approximately five minutes. From these observations, officers could form a reasonable suspicion that Fuentes made a delivery at the apartment.

The WA Supremes affirmed the Court of Appeals in Fuentes because, under the totality of circumstances, the officers had individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Sandoz

In this case, around 11:30 p.m., Officer Chris Pryzgocld drove his patrol car past a six-unit apartment building in SeaTac. A high number of documented criminal incidents occurred in the area of this apartment building, including drug-related activity.

He saw a white vehicle parked illegally. The driver of the Jeep slumped down, as if to hide from the officer’s view, as the officer drove by. The officer parked his marked patrol car about 20 yards away. After waiting, he made contact with the slumped-over driver.

The officer observed Steven Sandoz leaving the apartment. The officer asked Sandoz what was going on. Sandoz replied that his friend gave him a ride to collect $20 from a friend. After more conversation, Sandoz admitted that he had a drug problem and said that he had a crack pipe in his pocket. Sandoz took out the pipe, and the officer arrested Sandoz for possession of drug paraphernalia. During a search incident to arrest, the officer felt something in Sandoz’s groin area. The officer read Sandoz his Miranda rights, and Sandoz admitted that he had two small envelopes of cocaine in his underwear.

Sandoz was arrested and charged with Possession of Cocaine. Although he tried suppressing the evidence at pretrial, the Judge denied the motion for the following reasons: (1) the officer knew the area had extremely high drug activity based on 911 calls and drug dealing investigations, (2) the officer knew that the apartment Sandoz exited belonged to Ms. Meadows, who had numerous drug-related convictions, including possession with intent to deliver, (3) the officer had express authority from the complex owner to trespass nonoccupants for “loitering” at the complex, (4) the Jeep did not belong to any of the tenants at the complex, (5) the driver of the Jeep slouched down when the officer drove past, (6) the driver and Sandoz had conflicting stories for why they were in the area, (7) Sandoz looked surprised when he saw the officer, and (8) Sandoz visibly shook and looked pale when the officer talked to him.

Sandoz was found guilty at a bench trial he appealed. The WA Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the WA Supreme Court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity individualized to Sandoz to justify his Terry stop. First, Sandoz’s surprise at seeing the officer did not suggest criminal behavior. Next, the driver’s story did not conflict with Sandoz’s story. The driver said that his friend called him for a ride, and Sandoz said his friend gave him a ride to the apartment to collect $20. Rather than conflict, the stories confirmed one another.

Furthermore, as to Sandoz’s physical appearance, the officer did not attribute Sandoz’s pallor or shaking to drugs or to any illicit conduct. Thus, this fact does not add to circumstances that suggest criminal activity. The fact that the officer did not recognize the Jeep might justify the officer’s contact with the driver, but the oflicer did not connect this fact with anything the officer observed about Sandoz.

Additionally, Sandoz did not loiter or trespass. “Loiter” means “to remain in or near a place in an idle or apparently idle manner.” Sandoz did not remain idle: he left the apartment and walked immediately to the Jeep without stopping. Although the individuals in the Jeep may have loitered, that issue is not before the court. Similarly, Sandoz did not appear to trespass: he entered a tenant’s apartment, stayed inside at least 15 minutes without any known discord, and left directly to the Jeep. The facts suggest that Sandoz was an invited guest of Ms. Meadows, and as the officer stated, simply going into an apartment does not equal wrongdoing.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although Sandoz was visiting the apartment of a suspected drug dealer late at night in a high-crime area, this fact by itself does not justify a Terry stop. Other facts must exist to suggest criminal behavior. An officer’s hunch does not justify a stop. The totality of the circumstances in this case do not justify a Terry stop.

The WA Supremes concluded officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Sandoz engaged in criminal activity and reversed the Court of Appeals decision affirming his guilt.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. A.A.: Unlawful Search of Juvenile

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Community Caretaking, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, Juvenile, Methamphetamine, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

 In State v. AA, the Washington Court of Appeals decided an officer who detained a runaway juvenile under RCW 13.32A, the Family Reconciliation Act, unlawfully removed methamphetamine and marijuana from the youth’s pocket. The court reversed his conviction.

In State v. AA, the juvenile defendant A.A. was reported as a runaway. Officer Escamilla found A.A. walking down an alley a few blocks north of his mother’s house. The Officer detains AA and conducts a search before taking AA to the Crisis Residential Center (CRC), a detention center for minors.

Officer Escamilla searched A.A. near his patrol car. During the search, the officer found methamphetamine in a coin pocket of A.A.’s pants and marijuana in another pocket. The officer then transported A.A. to a juvenile detention center, rather than the CRC. The State charged A.A. with two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.

The trial court denied AA’s motion to suppress the evidence. At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Officer Escamilla testified that A.A. was “just walking down an alley” and appeared “upset,” but that he was not engaged in criminal activity and did not appear dangerous to himself or others. At a bench trial, A.A .was found guilty on both drug charges. He appealed. The Court of Appeals took the case.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court mistakenly concluded Officer Escamilla’s search of  A.A. was reasonable under the Family Reconciliation Act (the Act) because A.A. was going to be transported to the CRC, a secure facility for juveniles, which requires a search of juveniles before admission.

The Court of Appeals decided that while an officer may lawfully conduct a pat-down search for weapons prior to transporting the youth, the officer may not conduct a full search.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution  prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Under these provisions, warrantless searches are “per se” unreasonable. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The exception allows an officer to search an arrestee for weapons as a measure to protect the officer or to search for evidence that may be destroyed. The community caretaking function, which allows for limited searches when it is necessary for police officers to render emergency aid or assistance, is also a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. These types of searches are “divorced” from a criminal investigation. Finally, the State has the burden of proving the search was lawful.

The Court reasoned that here, the particular circumstances did not justify the search of A.A.’s pockets. Once the officer conducted the pat-down search and determined that A.A. did not have a weapon, the search should have stopped. A.A. had not committed a crime and, therefore, there was no need to preserve evidence of a crime. A.A. did not exhibit signs of dangerousness to himself or others. The only concern was for officer safety.

Finally, the Court reasoned that although A.A. would be transported to a detention facility with other minors, this facility “was a noncriminal protective custody situation, which requires us to accord maximum weight to A.A.’s privacy interest in evaluating the reasonableness of the search.”

The Court of Appeals reversed A.A.’s conviction.

My opinion? Excellent decision. The law was simple, and simply applied. The State failed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. Period. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Rodriguez v. United States: Nonconsensual Dog Sniff of Car Held Unconstitutional

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court, Whatcom County Criminal Defense, , ,

In State v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that absent reasonable suspicion, police extending a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) the 4th Amendment does Fourth Amendment does not tolerate a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop, (2) a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violated the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures, (3) a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the issuing of a ticket for the violation, and (4) a stop may, however, be prolonged for a dog sniff when there is independent information giving rise to an individualized suspicion that the occupants of the car are involved in a drug offense.

The 6-3 ruling is indeed a big win for the 4th Amendment.

In this case, Officer Struble, a K-9 officer, stopped the defendant Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder. After issuing a warning for the traffic offense Officer Strubble asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. Struble detained him until another police officer arrived. Struble’s dog performed a search and alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The dog found methamphetamine.

Seven or eight minutes elapsed between the time Struble issued the warning and the dog alerting to the presence of contraband.

Rodriguez faced several federal drug charges. Although he moved to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle on the basis that Officer Struble prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff search, the lower court denied Rodriguez’s motion. Eventually, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the search and seizure issues.

The Court reasoned that a routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio than an arrest. Its duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission,” which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

The court further reasoned that a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission. Also, the Court was concerned that seizing citizens for traffic stops and holding them to conduct a more intrusive search with no evidence of criminal activity beyond the mere traffic stop is unlawful: “The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop.

My opinion? Great ruling! It’s rare that the Supreme Court upholds the 4th Amendment these days. Fortunately, this favorable outcome happened because the suspect asserted his rights by refusing the dog sniff. Past rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court limit 4th Amendment protections where suspects DID NOT assert their rights. See Florida v. Bostick.

Yet here’s a case where the suspect did flex their rights. Look at the outcome! It’s a testament – a reminder, if you will – that asserting your rights makes a difference. Great case.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Budd: Ferrier Warnings Improperly Given

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Dismissal, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Ferrier Warnings, Knock & Talk, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals,

When Police Knock on the Door: What Are My Rights? - The Seattle Criminal Lawyer Blog

Good decision. In State v. Budd, the WA Court of Appeals decided a law enforcement officer must properly deliver all three parts of the Ferrier warnings before entering a residence.

Some background on Ferrier warnings is necessary. In State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) the WA Supreme Court held that, before entering a citizen’s home without a warrant, a law enforcement officer must (1) ask the citizen for consent, (2) inform the citizen that he can revoke consent at any time and (3) notify the citizen that he can limit the scope of the entry into the home. If an officer fails to provide these Ferrier rights/warnings, then any evidence obtained from the search is “fruits of the poisonous search” and also subject to being suppressed.

Appellant Michael Allen Budd was convicted of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct under RCW 9.68A.070. He contends that the trial court erred in its denial of his ER 3.6 motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his residence by the officers investigating the case. He argued the Ferrier warnings were insufficient.

Washington State Patrol’s Missing and Exploited Children Task Force  received an anonymous “cybertip” from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The anonymous source declared that Michael Allen Budd communicated with young girls on Yahoo! Messenger and Windows Live Messenger, both free online chat services. The anonymous source stated that he or she had seen child pornography on Budd’s computer.

On March 11,2009, Detective Kim Holmes travelled to Ephrata to Mr. Budd’s home. In law enforcement, a “knock and talk” is an investigative technique where one or more police officers approaches a private residence, knocks on the door, and requests consent from the owner to search the residence. Law enforcement performs the “knock and talk” when criminal activity is suspected, but officers lack probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

Detective Kim and other officers made contact with Holmes at his home. Although many of the facts are in dispute, it appeared that Detective Kim did not properly discuss Ferrier warnings with Mr. Holmes.

The court reasoned that Detective Holmes’ police report lacked any mention of Holmes’ informing Budd that he had a right to decline consent to enter the home, limit the scope of the search, and revoke consent at any time. Finally, the report implied that Holmes misrepresented that a court would authorize a search warrant. Based on this, the Court of Appeals ruled that the detective did not voice all Ferrier warnings before entering the home, and that law enforcement officers MUST deliver all cautions before entering the residence. Consequently, the Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case.

My opinion? I agree with this excerpt from the Court of Appeals:

Viewing child pornography is a hideous crime that robs children of innocence and scars them for life. Those who watch child pornography obsessively gamer gratification through violent acts on defenseless children. Catching one at the crime takes diligence since the viewer indulges in the privacy of his home, often by elaborate security measures on his computer. Thus, we reluctantly reverse the trial court.

Nevertheless, as judges, we pledged to uphold the constitution and the endearing rights protected by the constitution. Those engaged in hideous conduct are entitled to the protections afforded under our state and federal constitution including the right to be free of unlawful searches and seizures.

Well said.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Samalia: Search of Abandoned Cell Phone is Lawful

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Cell Phone, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Forensics, law enforcement, police, Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Pretrial Investigations, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals, Whatcom County Criminal Defense,

Why this B.C. woman's 'cell phone in the car' ticket should never have been issued - Vancouver Is Awesome

In State v. Samalia, the WA Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction for Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle under RCW 9A.56.068 because the police used evidence from the defendant’s cell phone found in the abandoned stolen vehicle after he fled from the vehicle and evaded pursuit.

Yakima Police Officer Ryan Yates was on patrol when his vehicle license plate reader indicated he had passed a stolen vehicle. The officer followed the stolen vehicle. The driver got out of the vehicle and faced towards Officer Yates. The driver would not obey Officer Yates’ command to get back in the vehicle and fled. Officer Yates pursued the male driver but he got away.

Officer Yates searched the car and found a cell phone in the center console. Officer Yates conducted some investigations and discovered that the phone belonged to the defendant Mr. Samilia. Later, Officer Yates located Mr. Samalia’s picture in a police database. Officer Yates then identified Mr. Samalia from the database picture as the fleeing man who had been driving the stolen vehicle.

The State charged Mr. Samalia with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He moved unsuccessfully to suppress the cell phone evidence under ER 3.6. From the above facts, the trial court concluded the cell phone was abandoned, therefore, Mr. Samalia no longer had an expectation of privacy in it. Following a bench trial, the court found Mr. Sam alia guilty as charged. He appealed.

The court reasoned that a warrantless search and/or seizure violates the WA Constitution unless it falls under one of ”’a few jealously guarded exceptions” to the warrant requirement. Searching voluntarily abandoned property is an exception to the warrant requirement. In other words, law enforcement may retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned property without a warrant or probable cause.

The court also considered the status of the area where the cell phone was located. Here, the search area was an unattended stolen vehicle that Mr. Samalia had been driving and had fled from when a police officer approached and directed him to return to the vehicle. Consequently, the court found that a suspect’s hasty flight under these circumstances is sufficient evidence of an intent to abandon the vehicle. In conclusion, because the cell phone was abandoned; used in pursuit of the fleeing suspect, and not directly used to identify Mr. Samalia, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying suppression of Mr. Samalia’s identification from a police database.

My opinion?

I disagree with the court’s decision. This decision is too great a leap in the wrong direction; and fails to follow Washington’s current jurisprudence. Despite the Court’s reasoning, there is NO reported Washington decision which has directly addressed whether a citizen relinquishes his reasonable expectation of privacy in the data on his cell phone by leaving the phone behind at the scene of a crime.

Our jurisprudence says police must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of data on a cell phone – even one that has been left behind in a place where its owner has no privacy interest. Requiring a search warrant will assure that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity can be found in the data on the cell phone.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Vanness: Unlawful Search of a Lockbox Inside a Backpack.

Bellingham Defense Attorney, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, Evidence, Exigent Circumstances, felony, law enforcement, Methamphetamine, police, Privacy, Probable Cause, Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, Washington Court of Appeals

LOCKMED GUARDIAN LARGE Combination Lockbox

In State v. Vanness, the WA Court of Appeals Division I decided that the warrantless search of a locked box found inside a backpack that the defendant was wearing at the time of arrest violated both the Fourth Amendment and Washington Const. art. I, § 7.

Defendant VanNess was arrested for having outstanding warrants in Everett, WA. When arrested, VanNess was wearing a backpack and carrying a bag. A police officer removed the backpack and asked permission to search it. VanNess did not respond. Everett Police Department had a policy requiring officers to search backpacks for dangerous items. Following that policy, officers searched VanNess’s backpack and found knives. They also found a small box with a combination lock.

The police officer used a flathead screwdriver to pry open the box. He looked inside. Although he did not see any dangerous items, he saw a scale and small plastic “baggies” and smelled vinegar, which he associated with heroin. The box was delivered to the Everett Police Department’s property room.

Police obtained a warrant to search the box. They found suspected methamphetamine and heroin, a digital scale, a glass pipe, and several plastic baggies. The Prosecutor charged VanNess with Possession of Heroin with Intent to Deliver and Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver. Both crimes are Class B felonies. The trial court denied VanNess’s motion to suppress. At trial, the court admitted the evidence. A jury found VanNess guilty of all charges. VanNess appealed.

A warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless the State can prove a “carefully drawn and jealously guarded exception” applies. These exceptions include a search incident to arrest and an inventory search. If an exception does not apply, a warrantless search is illegal and the exclusionary rule prevents the State from presenting the illegally seized evidence. Here, the defendant argued that the inventory search of his lockbox violated his Constitutional rights.

The Court of Appeals agreed. It reasoned that although State v. Stroud and State v. Valdez each involved a locked container found in an automobile, the court’s consideration of the Chimel v. California applies just as well to the facts of our case:

“Where a container is locked and officers have the opportunity to prevent the individual’s access to the contents of that container so that officer safety or the preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest is not at risk, there is no justification under the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of the locked container.”

Under Chimel, the Court reasoned that police officers may conduct a warrantless inventory search (1) to protect the arrestee’s property, (2) to protect the government from false claims of theft, and (3) to protect police officers and the public from potential danger. Courts generally uphold inventory searches conducted according to standardized procedures which do not afford police officers excessive discretion and when they serve a purpose other than discovery of evidence.

The Court of Appeals decided that here, an officer’s compliance with an established police procedure does not constitutionalize an illegal search. Similarly, the court rejected the claim that the possibility of a bomb or dangerous firearm in the locked box established a “manifest necessity” to search the box. They reasoned that without exigent circumstances, a legitimate inventory search only calls for noting such an item as a sealed unit. With that the court concluded that neither the search incident to arrest nor the inventory search exception applies to the officer’s initial search of VanNess’s locked box. Therefore, the police unconstitutionally searched the locked box.

My opinion? Good decision. It appears the Court of Appeals announced a new balancing test for some items found on an arrested person at the time of arrest. Basically, if the item to be searched falls within a category that implicates an arrestee’s significant privacy interests, the court must balance the government interests against those individual privacy interests. Only when government interests in officer safety and evidence preservation exceed an arrestee’s privacy interest in the category of item to be searched may it be searched incident to arrest without a warrant.

Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Lawson: Burglary & Voyeurism

Assault, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Evidence, felony, Privacy, Probable Cause, Uncategorized, voyeurism, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

How To Tell Who's In The Toilet Stall Next To You Without Peeking At Their Shoes - Allan Ishac

In State v. Lawson, the WA Court of Appeals supported the defendant’s convictions for both Voyeurism and Burglary. Here, the defendant was prosecuted for sneaking inside the women’s restrooms at Harrison Medical Center and Barnes & Noble and spying on different females from bathroom stalls as they entered and used the restroom facilities.

The Prosecution charged the defendant with one count of Burglary First Degree, two counts of Burglary Second Degree, one count of Assault Second Degree, one count of Voyeurism, and two counts of Criminal Attempt of Voyeurism. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each charge except for Assault Second Degree. The defendant appealed the jury verdicts on the argument that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the Barnes and Noble voyeurism charge and each of the Burglary charges.

However, the Court of Appeals disagreed. Under statute, a person commits the crime of Voyeurism if he knowingly views another person in a place where that person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy inside a restroom. The Court reasoned it is undisputed that the defendant viewed women by peeking over the restroom stall door in a place that was clearly delineated for use by women only. It stated, “Although the women’ s restroom was inside an otherwise public building and while a person might not usually disrobe inside the common area, one expects privacy in a restroom.”

 The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to support Burglary convictions because voyeurism is not “a crime against person or property,” which is a prerequisite to a Burglary conviction. Instead, the Court reasoned that voyeurism is a crime against a person and, therefore, can serve as the predicate crime for Burglary Second Degree. The Court further reasoned there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the Burglaries because he entered the women’ s restroom with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property.

With that, the Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.