Category Archives: Due Process

State v. Quaale: WA Supreme Court Upholds WA Court of Appeals & Grants Mistrial Due To Trooper’s Opinion Testimony

Constitutional Rights, Drug Recognition Expert, Due Process, DUI, Evidence, Jury Trial, law enforcement, misdemeanor, police, Terry Stop, Uncategorized, Washington Court of Appeals, Washington State Patrol, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

Lay Witnesses and Opinion Testimony: Admissible?

Excellent opinion from the WA Supreme Court. In State v. Quaale, the WA Supreme Court decided that a Washington State Trooper’s opinion testimony regarding the defendant’s sobriety violated the defendant’s rights at trial.

Trooper Stone pulled the defendant Ryan Quaale over for Eluding and DUI. Trooper Stone then performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test (HGN test) on Quaale.

Some explanation of the HGN test is necessary. The HGN test is a routinely used field sobriety test in which the administrator tells the subject to follow a pen or fingertip with his or her eyes as the administrator moves the stimulus from side to side. After consuming alcohol, a person will have difficulty smoothly following the stimulus; the person’s eyes will jerk or bounce as they move from side to side.

For those who don’t know, “Nystagmus” is this very involuntary oscillation of the eyeballs – the jerking – which results from the body’s attempt to maintain orientation and balance. HGN is the inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they turn from side to side or move from center focus to the point of maximum deviation at the side.

Here, Trooper Stone testified that in his opinion, the HGN test is very important to determining impairment because, unlike the walk the line test, which a person can practice, the HGN test measures an involuntary reflex. Trooper Stone did not perform any other sobriety tests on Quaale in the field.

During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale’s eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, Reckless Driving, and Attempting to Elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was charged with Attempting to Elude a police vehicle and with Felony DUI. The DUI was charged as a felony because Quaale had been previously convicted of Vehicular Homicide While Under the Influence. RCW 46.61.502(6)(b)(i).

Quaale was tried twice. At the first trial, the jury convicted him of attempting to elude but could not agree on a verdict for the DUI charge. During a second trial on the DUI charge, the State concluded its direct examination of Trooper Stone with the following questions:

Q. In this case, based on the HGN test alone, did you form an opinion based on your training and experience as to whether or not Mr. Quaale’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired? [Defendant’s objection that the question goes to the ultimate issue is overruled]
Q …. Did you form an opinion?
A. Absolutely. There was no doubt he was impaired.

The WA Supremes reasoned that Trooper Stone’s testimony that he had “no doubt” the defendant was impaired was an improper opinion on the defendant’s guilt and therefore inadmissible. Trooper Stone based his opinion solely on a HGN test, which can indicate physical signs consistent with alcohol consumption. The test, however, cannot establish impairment by itself, and testimony to the contrary violates the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Baity.

An explanation of State v. Baity is necessary. In Baity, the WA Supreme Court considered whether drug recognition protocol employed by police officers to detect behavior associated with certain drugs constituted novel scientific evidence generally accepted in the scientific community, satisfying the Frye test for admissibility of expert testimony.  Police officers trained to use this protocol are often referred to as Drug Recognition Experts (DREs).

DREs use a 12-step procedure to classify behavioral patterns associated with seven categories of drugs. Officers employ the HGN test as one ofthe 12 steps. In Baity, the Court analyzed whether the HGN test satisfied Frye when used for drug detection. The Court held that it did. It reasoned that the underlying scientific basis of the test-an intoxicated person will exhibit nystagmus was undisputed. T

he Court also noted that officers perform the test in the same way whether the officer tests for alcohol or drug impairment and that the officer also looks for the same result: involuntary jerking in the driver’s eyes. Thus, the Court’s analysis of the HGN test in the DUI drug detection context, as discussed in Baity, applies equally to the DUI alcohol detection context in this case.

Although the Baity Court heard testimony on the HGN test admissible as evidence that a person was intoxicated on drugs, the Court also placed limits on that testimony because the HGN test merely shows physical signs consistent with ingestion of intoxicants. The Court said that an officer may not testify in a manner that casts an “aura of scientific certainty to the testimony.”

The officer also cannot predict the specific level of  drugs present in a suspect.  Furthermore, the Baity court held that a DRE officer, properly qualified, could express an opinion that a suspect’s behavior and physical attributes are consistent or inconsistent with those behaviors and physical signs associated with certain categories of drugs.

With that background, the Quaale Court reasoned that the Trooper’s testimony that Quaale was “impaired” parroted the legal standard contained in the jury instruction definition for “under the influence.” The word “impair” means to “diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (2002).

Thus, the trooper concluded that alcohol diminished Quaale in such an appreciable degree that the HGN test could detect Quaale’s impairment. Because the Trooper’s inadmissible testimony went to the ultimate factual issue-the core issue of Quaale’s impairment to drive-the testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt.

With that, the WA Supremes affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment and sentence, and remanded Mr. Quaale’s case for a new trial.

Great decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Espey: Prosecutor’s Improper Comments During Trial Reverses Defendant’s Convictions

Assault, Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Drug Offenses, Due Process, felony, Firearm, Jury Trial, Privacy, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Robbery, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

New trial ordered for murder suspect; Fifth District says Baricevic allowed improper testimony | Madison - St. Clair Record

Good opinion. In State v. Espey, The Court of Appeals ruled that a Prosecutor’s improper comments during a jury trial required reversal of the defendant’s convictions.

Mr. Espey was charged with Robbery First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm First Degree, Possession of a Stolen Firearm and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance. He had three separate jury trials. During closing argument at the second trial, the prosecutor argued the jury should consider Espey’s statement to police in light of the time he had spent consulting with attorneys prior to making the statement. The prosecutor said the following:

“Where I suggest you start is, start with his own recorded statement that he gave to the police. Keep in mind that he had been on the run for approximately six weeks. Keep in mind that he had already consulted with two attorneys, Chip Mosley and Gary Clower. He had lots of time to figure out what story he was going to tell the police.

If you have ever dealt with somebody who is a good liar, they have a pattern. What they do is this: admit everything you can’t admit without getting into trouble and only deny the stuff that you have to . . . You heard Tom Espey’s story in there. ‘I’m not guilty of robbery because i personally didn’t take anything. I’m free. Okay, I did everything else, but guess what? You can’t touch me.’ And he is wrong. He is wrong because he doesn’t understand what it means to be an accomplice. He doesn’t understand what accomplice liability means.”

Defense counsel did not object to these highly inflammatory and prejudicial statements. The jury convicted Espey of 3 of the 5 felonies.

In overturning the convictions, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Prosecutor’s comments were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that no curative instruction could have stopped their prejudicial effect from swaying the jury. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object at trial did not waive the issue.

The court further reasoned that a defendant has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, subsection 22 of the Washington Constitution. Under these laws, several courts have held that a prosecutor violates these rights by using “an accused’s decision to meet with counsel, even shortly after the incident giving rise to a criminal indictment,” to imply guilt or suggest that the defendant hired an attorney to concoct an alibi. No prosecutor may employ language which denigrates the right of a criminal defendant to retain counsel of his choice, or otherwise limits the fundamental due process right of an accused to present a vigorous defense.

Finally, the court reasoned that the Prosecutor strikes at the core of the 6th Amendment right to counsel when it seeks to create an inference of guilt out of a defendant’s decision to meet with defense counsel. “That is precisely what the state did here and reversal is required as a result. The State thereby improperly commented on and penalized Espey’ s exercise of the right to counsel, a right guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.”

The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions.

My opinion? Great decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Miller: Judge Eliminates Prospective Juror Who Overheard Pretrial Motions

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Evidence, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Jury Trial, Violent Crime, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

Being a juror ain't so bad – Long Island Business News

In State v. Miller, the WA Court of Appeals decided that the pretrial dismissal of a potential juror who wandered into the courtroom and heard the attorneys arguing pretrial motions did NOT violate public trial right or defendant’s right to be present.

The defendant was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Murder in the First Degree. Before  jury selection, a juror from the jury pool entered the courtroom while pretrial issues were discussed between the attorneys and the judge. The trial court dismissed the juror from participating in the defendant’s trial before beginning voir dire.

At any rate, the defendant was found guilty of the charges. He appeals his conviction on the grounds that dismissing the potential juror from the jury pool violated his right to a public trial and his right to be present at critical trial stages.

The Court of Appeals decided ( 1) the trial court’ s pre -voir dire dismissal of the prospective juror did not violate Miller’ s public trial right, and 2) even if dismissal of the prospective juror during a recess violated Miller’ s right to be present at critical trial stages, the violation was harmless error.

The court reasoned that the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 22 of the WA Constitution guarantees the right to a public trial.  In general, this right requires that certain proceedings be held in open court unless a “Bone-Club” analysis set forth in State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 (1995) supports closure of the courtroom.

The threshold determination when addressing an alleged violation of the public trial right is whether the proceeding at issue even implicates the right. Not every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial or constitute a closure if closed to the public.

Here, the Court reasoned that the trial court’s dismissal of the juror did not occur during voir dire itself, and therefore did not fall within the “category of proceedings that our Supreme Court has already acknowledged implicates a defendant’s public trial right.”  Finally, the Court held that even if Miller’ s right to be present was violated, this violation was harmless error.

 My opinion? Good decision. I’ll take a wild guess and assume the attorneys were arguing Motions in Limine when the potential juror wandered into court and listened. Motions in Limine are a very critical phase in the jury trial process, and happen before jury selection actually begins.

Among other things, motions in limine practice allow attorneys to establish the rules of engagement (what you can and can’t say during trial). More important, they address whether certain controversial evidence is going to be suppressed from the jury; and/or the manner/purpose for which said evidence is going to be admitted (if it is).

Worst-case scenario, a potential juror who overhears a conversation about Motions in Limine take place between the attorneys and judges can inform the jury about all the evidence which the jury doesn’t know about — all the evidence which was suppressed, scrubbed up; deemed irrelevant; prejudicial, cumulative, distracting, etc.

Watching attorneys practice Motions in Limine is like watching a butcher making sausage. It gets to the ugly, brutal and bloody aspects of the case; some of which are purposefully sealed away from the eyes and ears of the jury. Besides, jurors are only supposed to judge cases with the facts they know about and the law as it applies. Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Button: Public Shaming Sentence Struck

Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Due Process, felony, Jail, Sentencing, Shaming, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

VERY interesting opinion. In State v. Button, the WA Court of Appeals says that a “shaming” sentence for a defendant convicted of is unlawful. More specifically, the Sentencing Reform Act does NOT support a sentencing court’s requirement that a defendant convicted of Theft First Degree must stand on a street corner holding a sign that states, “I stole from kids. Charlotte Button.” 

          

The defendant Charlotte Button was convicted for First Degree Theft for embezzling funds from a high school club. The trial court sentenced her to two months in jail and imposed an additional condition which intended to “send a message to the community.” The court explained the sentencing condition: “Before you begin your jail time, you are going to spend 40 hours standing at the corner of Wishkah and Broadway with a sign that says, ‘I Stole Money From Kida. Charlotte Burton.’ You’re going to do it two hours at a time twice a day from 7:00 to 9:00 in the morning and 4:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon.” Along with the “public shaming condition, the judge also imposed 60 days jail.

Ms. Button appealed the “public shaming” portion of her sentence on the grounds that it violated her Constitutional Rights under the First Amendment and 8th Amendment of the Constitution. In other words, her Free Speech rights were violated and the judge’s sentence was arguably Cruel & Unusual Punishment.

The Court of Appeals decided that although Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act allows a number of sentencing alternatives – including drug treatment for drug offenders and sexual deviance treatment for sex offenders – “public shaming” is not a designated sentencing alternative. “Nor does any other Sentencing Reform Act provision independently authorize the sign-holding condition, which clearly requires Button to affirmatively engage in some conduct. Thus, there is no statutory authority allowing the imposition of a sign-holding condition in the first instance.”

The Court did not address Ms. Button’s Constitutional arguments.

My opinion? Good decision. It’s well-grounded in statutory authority (and lack thereof). Sure, the defendant’s actions leading to the conviction were bad. Nevertheless, she paid her debt to society by serving a significant amount of jail (60 days). And I’m sure the court imposed restitution and court fines, as well. Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Nason: “Automatic Jail” Held Unconstitutional

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jail, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

N.H. Judges Illegally Jail Poor People Who Can't Pay Fines

In State v. Nason, the WA Supreme Court decided that imposing “auto jail” on defendants who can’t pay their legal financial obligations violates due process.

In July 1999, James Nason pleaded guilty to one count of second degree burglary.  He largely failed probation and neglected paying court fines.  At numerous times, he was sentenced to jail for these failures.   In July 2006, he was charged and sentenced with another crime.  The court ordered Nason to serve 60 days in jail.  Additionally, the order included an auto-jail provision; which said that if he failed to pay court fines by a certain date, he had to either request a stay or book himself into jail.

The WA Supremes held due process requires that a court inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFO’s) at the time it incarcerates the defendant for failure to pay.  In short, “auto jail” violates due process.

The court’s reasoning was simple:

Due process prevents the jailing of an offender for failure to pay a fine if the offender’s failure to pay was due to his or her indigence/poverty.  However, if an offender is capable of paying but willfully refuses to pay, or if an offender does not “make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay,” the State may imprison the offender for failing to pay his or her LFO.  The burden is on the offender to show that his nonpayment is not willful.

Although the offender carries the burden, due process still imposes a duty on the court to inquire into the offender’s ability to pay.  Inquiry into the offender’s ability to pay comes at “the point of collection and when sanctions are sought for nonpayment.”

Here, Because due process requires the court to inquire into  Nason’s reason for nonpayment,  and because the inquiry must come at the time of the collection action or sanction, ordering Nason to report to jail without a contemporaneous inquiry into his ability to pay violated due process.

My opinion?  The Supremes exercised sound reasoning.  It violates due process to impose immediate jail if defendants cannot pay future court fines.  The decision to impose jail is a question which should be decided at a future time.  Jail should not be imposed because of some future-retroactive court condition.  Period.  Good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Racial Disparities In Jury Selection Still Exist

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Jury Trial, Race & Law, Studies, , ,

How racism shapes jury selection - Vox

Racial exclusion in jury selection is still common, according to a study of practices in southern states.

In courtrooms across the United States, people of color are dramatically underrepresented on juries as a result of racially biased use of peremptory strikes,” the report by the Alabama-based Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) stated. “This phenomenon is especially prevalent in capital cases and other serious felony cases. Many communities have failed to make juries inclusive and representative of all who have a right to serve.”

The staff of the EJI looked closely at jury selection procedures in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  they uncovered shocking evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection in every state.  They identified counties where prosecutors excluded nearly 80% of African Americans qualified for jury service.  They discovered majority-black counties where  capital defendants nonetheless were tried by all-white juries.  And they found evidence that some prosecutors employed by state and local governments were actually trained to exclude people on the basis of race on how to conceal their race bias.

In many cases, people of color were not only excluded, but also denigrated and insulted with pretextual reasons intended to conceal race bias.  African Americans were excluded because they appeared to have “low intelligence”; wore eyeglasses, were single, married, or separated; or were too old for jury service at age 43 or too young at age 28.  They were barred for having relatives who attended historically black colleges; for the way they walk; for chewing gum; and frequently, for living in predominantly black neighborhoods.

My opinion?  Batson v. Kentucky was supposed to eliminate race-based jury selection.  However, it appears the specter still exists.  It’s unbelievable to me ho today’s “race-neutral” explanations and the tolerance of racial bias by court officials has made jury selection for people of color a hazardous venture, where the sting of exclusion is accompanied by painful insults and injurious commentary.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Berghuis v. Thompkins: Miranda Applies, BUT Defendants MUST Clearly Invoke Constitutional Rights

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, Duress Defense, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Interrogation, law enforcement, police, Privacy, Search and Seizure, Self-Incrimination, United States Supreme Court, , ,

Why Interrogation in Jail May Not Count as “Custodial”: The Supreme Court Makes New Law in Howes v. Fields | Sherry F. Colb | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal suspect must specifically invoke the right against self-incrimination in order for constitutional protections to apply.

The case centered around the interrogation of Van Chester Thompkins, who was suspected of Homicide. He remained virtually silent for hours in police custody before giving a few brief responses to police questions. Most significantly, Thompkins answered “yes” when asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” The statement was introduced at trial and Thompkins was convicted.

In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that criminal suspects who do not clearly state their intention to remain silent are presumed to have waived their 5th Amendment rights. Ironically, suspects must literally open their mouths and speak in order for their silence to be legally protected. The new rule will defer to police in cases where the suspect fails to unambiguously assert their right to remain silent.

My opinion?  Naturally, I’m concerned about any retreat from the basic principle that criminal suspects should not be compelled or coerced into incriminating themselves.  The opinion is wrong because it creates additional challenges for suspects who already understand too little about how their constitutional rights apply during police interrogations.

Fortunately, however, the Berghuis decision leaves intact the best strategy for handling any police interrogation: keeping your mouth shut. Requiring suspects with limited legal knowledge to clearly assert their rights may seem a bit strict, but it’s irrelevant if the suspect never says a word to begin with. The point of the 5th Amendment isn’t to protect you after you’ve foolishly incriminated yourself; it’s to remind you that you’re not obligated to answer police questions in the first place.

Ultimately, the burden is on each of us to understand our rights and use that information to make the best decisions. It’s unlikely that any Supreme Court decision will ever change the fact that remaining silent is your best and only strategy if police ask you incriminating questions.

I can’t stress this enough: your attorney can suppress unlawfully obtained evidence IF you clearly assert your rights.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Sublett: Defendant’s Right to be Present at Trial DOES NOT Extend to Questions Submitted by Jury and Answered in Judge’s Chambers

Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Homicide & Manslaughter, Washington Supreme Court, , ,

A Judge's Personality Comes out in the Chambers through Artifacts and Collections

In State v. Sublett, the WA Court of Appeals held that an in-chambers conference held by the trial judge in response to a juror’s question did not violate the defendant’s his right to an open and public trial. In general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

A jury entered verdicts finding co-defendants Michael Sublett and Christopher Olsen guilty of first degree murder.  Sublett and Olsen appealed, asserting that the trial court violated their public trial rights and their right to be present by holding an in-chambers conference to address a question submitted by the jury during its deliberations and that the trial court violated their due process rights by refusing to answer the jury’s question.

The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public trial.   However, the court also determined that “[a] defendant does not . . . have a right to a public hearing on purely ministerial or legal issues that do not require the resolution of disputed facts.”

Here, the trial court’s in-chambers conference addressed a jury question regarding one of the trial court’s instructions.  This was a purely legal issue that arose during deliberations, and did not require the resolution of disputed facts.  Thus, the defendants’ right to a public trial did not apply in this context.

More important, questions from the jury to the trial court regarding the trial court’s instructions are part of jury deliberations and, as such, are not historically a public part of the trial.  Because the public trial right does not apply to a trial court’s conference with counsel on how to resolve a purely legal question  which  the jury submitted during its deliberations, we hold that the trial court did not violate the appellants’ public trial right by responding to the jury’s question in writing.

The court further reasoned that because the in-chambers conference held in response to a jury question was not a critical stage of the proceedings, the trial court did not violate the appellants’ right to be present.  A “critical stage” is one where the defendant’s presence has a reasonably substantial relationship to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.   But in general, in-chambers conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings except when the issues involve disputed facts.

The in-chambers conference here was not a critical stage of the proceedings because it involved only the purely legal issue of how to respond to the jury’s request for a clarification in one of the trial court’s instructions.  Accordingly, the appellants’ right to be present did not apply in this context.

My opinion?  Shady.  I’ve tried cases where jurors asks/submits questions to the judge while they deliberate.  Typically, the judge reads the question on the record, and in the defendant’s presence.  The attorneys and judge either formulate an agreed answer the question or choose to not answer the question.

In my mind, this is an important stage of the proceedings.  jurors decide guilt and innocence based upon the answer to the question!  How is this not important?  Why shouldn’t the defendant be present to hear the question and answer(s)?

Again, shady.  this decision flies in the face of the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Paumier, a case which I blogged about earlier this month.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Graham v. Florida: Court Strikes Down “Cruel & Unusual” Sentencing on Minor

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Due Process, felony, Juvenile, United States Supreme Court, , ,

What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment? - YouTube

In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender to life in prison without parole when the crime does not involve murder, given the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual” punishment.

Petitioner Graham was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime.  under a plea agreement, the Florida trial court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld adjudication of guilt.  Subsequently, the trial court found that Graham violated the terms of his probation by committing additional crimes.  The trial court adjudicated Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in prison for the Burglary.  Because Florida abolished its parole system, the life sentences left Graham no possibility of release.  He challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.

The U.S. Supremes sided with Graham, and reasoned the inadequacy of penological theory to justify life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the limited culpability of such offenders, and the severity of these sentences all lead the Court to conclude that Graham’s sentence was cruel and unusual.  Moreover, defendants who do not kill, or foresee that life will be taken are less deserving of such punishments than are murderers.

Finally, the court reasoned that serious nonhomicide crimes may be devastating in their harm, but in terms of moral depravity and the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be compared to murder in their severity.

My opinion?  The U.S. Supremes made the right decision.  It seems Draconian to impose a life sentence on a minor who committed a non-homicide crime.  Period.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

State v. Paumier: Court Upholds the Right to Public Trial & Self-Representation

Burglary, Constitutional Rights, Due Process, felony, Jury Trial, Theft, Washington Court of Appeals, , ,

The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Self-Representation for Artists - RedDotBlog

In State v. Paumier, the WA Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions because the trial court improperly (1) excluded public citizens from a portion of his trial, and (2) denied his right to represent himself.

Mr. Paumier was charged with Burglary and Theft.  Jury selection involved questioning jurors in chambers and recording their responses.  The public was not allowed to watch jury selection.  The trial court stated at the outset that potential jurors who preferred to answer questions privately to avoid possible embarrassment would be taken into the judge’s chambers.

Several jurors indicated during the course of voir dire that they preferred to answer certain questions in chambers.  The judge and the parties questioned five jurors in chambers, recording the jurors’ responses. Jury selection was completed that same day.

The following day, the trial court permitted the State to amend the information.  Paumier then pleaded not guilty and asked to represent himself, stating:

“I just don’t feel like a — I feel like there’s [sic] things about the trial getting this far that it shouldn’t have.  And I feel that my attorney should have spoke [sic] up for me instead of getting pissed off at me in court.  And I just don’t feel like he’s doing his job like he should.  I don’t feel it should have gotten this far, and I’d just rather present my, you know, case myself.”

His request was denied because the lower court decided that it came too late.

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned, however, that Paumier’s right to a public trial was violated when the court allowed the jurors to be questioned privately in chambers.  The guaranty of open criminal proceedings extends to voir dire.  Additionally, the recent U.S. Supreme Court’s Presley v. Georgia makes it clear that court room closures should be rare and the court must consider alternatives prior to closing the court room.

The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied the defendant his request to represent himself at trial.  Here, there was no request for continuance, and the defendant’s request was clear.  There was no evidence that trial would have been delayed, or that granting his request would have impaired the administration of justice.

 My opinion?  Good decision.  Kudos to the defendant for stating, on the record, his preference to represent himself after the judge and attorneys conducted voir dire in chambers, and away from the public eye.  Mr. Paumier correctly followed his instincts.  I hope Mason County learns a lesson.

 

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.