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In State v. Gwin, the WA Court of Appeals decided an interesting case of a defendant who wanted to represent himself pro se.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Gwin was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, felony harassment, and possession of heroin with intent to deliver. At trial, Mr. Gwin exercised his right to self-representation. The court conducted a colloquy and determined that Gwin knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court granted Gwin’s motion to represent himself, and Gwin completed a waiver of counsel. However, the trial court denied his request for standby counsel, citing its blanket policy to deny such requests.

Gwin opted for a bench trial, waiving his right to a jury. The court found Gwin guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree and felony harassment. Gwin was acquitted of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. On appeal, Gwin argued the court’s categorical denial of his request for standby counsel violated his right to represent himself under Washington Constitution article I, section 22.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals (COA) began by saying the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution afford a criminal defendant both the right to (1) assistance of counsel and the right to (2) reject that assistance and to represent himself. While both are guaranteed, the right to proceed pro se and the right to assistance of counsel are mutually exclusive.

“Self-representation is a grave undertaking, one not to be encouraged. Its consequences, which often work to the defendant’s detriment, must nevertheless be borne by the defendant . . . The federal right to self-representation does not include a right to standby counsel or hybrid representation.” ~WA Court of Appeals

The COA addressed Mr. Gwin’s argument that the trial court’s refusal to appoint standby counsel violated his rights.

Because there is no constitutional right to standby counsel, the court’s failure to consider Gwin’s request is not of constitutional magnitude and is subject to analysis under the nonconstitutional harmless error standard. Under this nonconstitutional harmless error standard, ‘an accused cannot avail himself of error as a ground for reversal unless it has been prejudicial An error is not prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred.

From there, the COA made a very clear record of Mr. Gwin’s self-representation and largely disagreed with his arguments:

“While standby counsel may have improved contact with defense witnesses and led to more success in impeaching State witnesses, Gwin has not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected. Thus, the trial court’s failure to meaningfully consider Gwin’s request for standby counsel was harmless error.” ~WA Court of Appeals.

With that, the COA upheld his convictions.

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