The report indicates that the increase can be attributed in large part to victims feeling more comfortable reporting bias crimes due to enhanced trust, improved reporting mechanisms and ongoing community outreach by the Department.
“SPD continues to be a national leader in investigating and reporting bias crimes as well as outreach to communities experiencing these acts,” said Chief of Police, Kathleen O’Toole. “In the spirit of transparency and accountability we continue to release these reports letting the community know that the Department works hard every day to make sure our most vulnerable victims are heard and we pursue the justice they deserve.”
Highlights From the Report:
Bias crimes often occur between complete strangers and take victims by surprise. Many of them are property crimes committed anonymously under the cover of darkness. The Seattle Police Department’s clearance rate for these incidents is 39%. Many of these arrests are made by patrol officers arriving on the scene soon after an incident has occurred. Detectives work hard to locate suspects not found at the time of the incident. 13 cases from this period remain open and may be cleared by arrest.
The Seattle Police Department’s Bias Crime Coordinator partnered with community organizations to reach out to some of Seattle’s most vulnerable populations. Refugee and immigrant populations were a focus for outreach during this period. Information has been distributed in 18 different languages describing how to report a crime.
The highest rate of increase in reporting is in the category of crimes with bias elements, which are incidents which are not primarily motivated by bias, but bias language is used during the commission of a crime. These incidents went up 64%. Officers and the community recognize and report bias when they observe it.
“The first half of 2017 was characterized by a high level of interest in the community regarding hate crimes, as evidenced by the high rate of reporting in Seattle. I was contacted many times by people wanting to report incidents they had witnessed, or asking how they could help if they were to see someone being victimized,” said Detective Beth Wareing, Bias Crimes Coordinator. “We rely on the community to stay involved and aware for our efforts in combating hate crimes to be successful. The community is our most valuable partner.”
“SPD has adopted a number of best practices with regards to hate crime prevention, response and reporting,” said Dr. Jack McDevitt, Director of Institute on Race and Justice, at Northeastern University and a leading expert in bias crimes. “The Department has made numerous efforts toward improving both the data collection and reporting of bias crimes incidents. This data is not only collected, but analyzed monthly, a rarity in law enforcement.”
The Seattle Police Department encourages you to call 911 immediately if you’ve been a victim or witnessed a bias crime and lists the following resources available to victims of hate crimes:
Interesting article by Stephen Dinan of The Washington Times claims that a stunning 22 percent of the federal prison population is immigrants who have either already been deemed to be in the country illegally or who the government is looking to put in deportation proceedings, the administration said Tuesday.
All told, the government counted more than 42,000 aliens in federal prisons as of June 24. About 47 percent already face final deportation orders, making them illegal immigrants, and 3 percent are currently in immigration courts facing deportation proceedings.
Almost all of the rest are being probed by federal agents looking to deport them.
Immigrants who commit serious crimes, even if they once had legal status, can have that status revoked and can be subject to deportation, which explains the high number of cases where an alien is still being probed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The U.S. Marshal Service, meanwhile, is holding about 12,000 “self-reporting” aliens, and almost all of them have already been ordered deported.
Government officials said they’re still trying to collect information on the foreign-born population in state and local prisons and jails.
Kelly suggest reforms to rein in the charging powers of prosecutors. He recommends the creation of independent panels of clinical experts that would screen offenders and recommend to prosecutors who ought to be diverted to treatment.
“There is nothing about punishment that changes the underlying conditions, disorders and deficits that the majority of criminal offenders bring into the justice system,” Kelly says. Arrestees with mental illness, substance-use disorders, homelessness and other problems churn through the system and into prison, where the underlying issues that led to a lawless life are ignored.
In a conversation with TCR Contributing Editor David J. Krajicek, Kelly explains why he believes the system should incorporate more carrot and less stick for offenders and how the Trump administration’s approach threatens to make things worse. He also suggests that the public already has a more sophisticated view of how to fix the system than our political leaders.
The Crime Report: What is the impact of the country’s justice policy failures?
William R. Kelly: The short financial and statistical answer is that over the past 45 years, we have spent $1 trillion on the war on crime, $1 trillion on the war on drugs and have accomplished a recidivism rate of 65 percent. Nearly all of this effort has focused on trying to punish crime out of people, based on naïve conceptions of criminality such as “hanging around with the wrong people” and “making bad decisions.” The evidence is quite clear that crime has much more complex origins and correlates.
What we have accomplished is a nearly perfect recidivism machine, placing all of us at the unnecessary and avoidable risk of criminal victimization, and wasting extraordinary amounts of money.
TCR: You refer to “the culture of American criminal justice.” What are its key characteristics and how do you change it?
Kelly: It is squarely based on the “tough on crime” mantra. This has dictated the decisions of legislators, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials. The focus over the past 45 years has been driven by retribution and misguided assumptions that punishment deters re-offending. The question that has been routinely asked is how much punishment does this offender deserve. A more productive question for many offenders is how do we reduce the likelihood a particular offender will reoffend…
We need to provide clear incentives to motivate changing how we think about crime and punishment. Cost-benefit analyses conclusively show that behavioral change through clinical intervention like mental health and substance use disorder treatment is much more effective and cost efficient. The financial advantages should motivate legislators and local government officials. Reducing recidivism should be an incentive for prosecutors, judges, public defenders, and probation and parole officers, who will benefit from reductions in caseloads. Then there is the greater good of enhanced public safety, something we incorrectly assume the justice system already does.
TCR: You say the facile American view of crime and punishment got us here. Have voters grown more sophisticated, or are reform-minded pols still at risk of being Willie Hortoned?
Kelly: Public opinion data demonstrate that much of the public has a more nuanced view of crime and punishment than many legislators, prosecutors and judges. The public believes that the purpose of corrections is to rehabilitate offenders and therefore reduce recidivism. Many have moved beyond “lock ‘em up and throw away the key.”
Unfortunately, many policymakers, elected officials and some segments of the public still seem to be holding on to the idea that criminals are just bad people deserving maximum punishment. I’m sorry to say that Willie Horton is alive and well…There appears to be a reluctance to really embrace meaningful, comprehensive criminal justice reform.
TCR: You write, “We have arrived at the nadir of politics and policy.” Did you write that before or after Donald Trump’s election?
Kelly: I wrote that before Trump was elected when I incorrectly believed that we had already reached bottom. Who would have thought that anyone with any sense of history and even a superficial exposure to the evidence would run as the law-and-order candidate and resurrect the war on drugs?
TCR: How do you demonstrate that “tough” and “dumb” are synonyms when it comes to criminal justice?
TCR: Who’s to blame for the state of “correctional malpractice” you say we are in?
Kelly: First and foremost, elected officials who have blindly championed “tough on crime” policies to their political benefit, but to the detriment of public safety and the prudent use of tax dollars. State legislators and Congress have provided the mechanisms for tough on crime—mandatory sentences, restrictive parole release laws, and an ever-expanding criminal code that seems to make criminal justice the go-to system for just about every social ill.
But the culpability of elected officials goes well beyond that. The vast majority of offenders in the criminal justice system have a substance-use disorder, 40 percent are mentally ill, and 60 percent have had a least one traumatic brain injury often leading to neurocognitive dysfunction…The decision to not properly fund public health, schools and social welfare agencies has created problems that by default are managed by the criminal justice system.
Criminal justice reform means much more than merely reforming the criminal justice system. It requires massive changes to and investment in a variety of collateral institutions.
TCR: Your book articulates and recommends a scientific approach to justice reform. Yet science is out of favor in Washington and many state houses. Is there a scientific path forward?
Kelly: Yes there is, but I am afraid that we need to disguise it for some, by minimizing the science and emphasizing the public safety benefits and cost savings.
TCR: You note an overlooked data point: The country has 21 million people with substance-use disorders, the world’s third-highest rate. What explains this particular American exceptionalism?
Kelly: It is largely a result of the lack of public substance abuse resources, including inadequate treatment capacity and insurance coverage. Much of it can be attributed to the failure of the war on drugs and the belief that we can either punish or threaten substance abuse out of people. Criminalizing substance abuse rather than treating it as a public health problem has led to the failure to provide adequate funding for treatment.
Unfortunately, the picture is bleaker. The majority of substance abuse and mental health treatment in the U.S. is paid for by Medicaid. Current versions of repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act call for substantial cuts to Medicaid. That does not bode well for a problem that is crippling the country, the economy, communities, families, and the justice system.
TCR: You write that we have used an absurdly simplistic approach (lock ‘em up) for a boundlessly complex problem. Explain briefly the research on co-morbidity among inmates.
Kelly: The vast majority of offenders in the criminal justice system have clearly identifiable disorders, deficits and impairments. Many have more than one disorder, known as co-morbidity or co-occurring disorders. For example, the majority of offenders with a mental illness also have a substance-use disorder. Neuro-cognitive problems are often co-morbid with mental health and substance abuse. It does not require a clinician to appreciate that “lockin’ ‘em up” does nothing to alleviate these conditions and in fact typically exacerbates them.
When we do attempt to address these problems–diversion to a drug court or a mental health court–our focus is on just one crime-related condition. Our correctional treatment and rehabilitation efforts typically ignore co-morbidity.
TCR: What do the rest of us in a presumably civilized society owe these damaged people?
Kelly: I don’t think it’s so much what we owe them, but what do we owe ourselves: lower crime and recidivism, lower risk of being victims of crime, and lower cost of criminal justice. We have the tools to accomplish these things, but making it a political priority has been elusive.
TCR: You compare the U.S. system to those of Germany and Holland; it doesn’t stack up well. You cite one lesson we can learn from those countries: “If you treat inmates like humans, they will act like humans.” How is it possible that we don’t know that already?
Kelly: In order to justify our draconian and dysfunctional reliance on punishment, we need to think of criminals as “not like us” in fundamental ways, as deserving retribution and harsh punishment. Punishment is what we have been told is the only thing “these people” will understand.
Psychological research confirmed a long time ago that, in most cases, incentives work much better than punishment for changing behavior. This is another example of the disjuncture between scientific evidence and criminal justice policy.
TCR: Your key recommendation is an “unprecedented expansion” of diversion away from court toward intervention and treatment. Describe the panel review process you suggest.
Kelly: Traditional criminal prosecution, conviction and punishment are entirely appropriate for many offenders. For example, violent offenders and chronic, habitual offenders probably need to be separated from society through incarceration in the interest of public safety. For many others, such as non-violent offenders and many drug offenders, we have a much better chance of reducing recidivism by diverting them and mitigating the factors that are associated with their criminality. One of the key issues here is making good decisions about who to divert and who to prosecute.
We developed the concept of independent panels of clinical experts to facilitate better decision-making, both in terms of who should be diverted and what treatment or intervention will decrease the probability of recidivism. Offenders often have complex clinical needs that require the special expertise of psychiatrists, psychologists and clinical social workers who can assess and diagnose, determine the risk of re-offending, and make recommendations to prosecutors.
The goal is to divert appropriate individuals away from traditional prosecution to situations where their risk can be supervised and managed and where they can receive adequate treatment and intervention.
TCR: And this is the “disruptive innovation” of your book title?
Kelly: The panels are part of it. Implementing this concept will require a substantial shift in how prosecutors do their jobs, as well as how we think about crime and punishment. In effect, this requires changing the criminal justice culture.
We also argue that all levels of government need to address major deficiencies in public health, a fundamental consideration in assuring adequate capacity and expertise for intervention and treatment. The bigger picture is that criminal justice reform requires disruptive innovation of collateral institutions, such as public health.
TCR: And how might it be greeted by prosecutors, who hold all the power right now?
Kelly: This will not be easy. However, reasonable incentives for prosecutors should be recidivism reduction, in turn reducing caseloads.
The primary reasons that prosecutors’ caseloads are so large and unmanageable relate to the failure to reduce recidivism.
TCR: You say these changes will force us to redefine success in our justice system. How so?
Kelly: Success should be measured by recidivism rates, something directly related to performance of criminal justice. As it stands now, there really is no accountability. Everyone involved in criminal justice–legislators, police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and corrections officials–should all be held responsible for recidivism reduction. That would also be a disruptive change.
TCR: Tell me about the process of partnering with Robert Pitman and William Streusand in this book.
Kelly: I wrote the book, but both Pitman and Streusand played very important roles in devising solutions. For example, Pitman, a former U.S. Attorney who is now a federal judge, brought his knowledge and expertise to the task of developing statutory and procedural details for how the expert panels would fit into the roles and responsibilities of prosecutors, defense counsel and judges.
The input of Streusand, a psychiatrist, was crucial in the development of the clinical protocol for the expert panels and assessing offender dysfunction, as well as the discussions about fixing public health.
TCR: You were going through a serious health crisis while writing this book, as you point out in the introduction. I hope you are doing well. I wonder if that diversionsomehow informed the book’s content.
Kelly: Thank you. I am in complete remission and feel very blessed. To be honest, it could not have worked out any better. I was diagnosed in early March of 2016, when I had a rough draft of one chapter written. I was so fortunate that I had this project to distract me from the reality of being pretty sick and going through some difficult chemo. It was also fortuitous that I had two collaborators who are very good friends and played important roles in my recovery.
I’m not sure that being sick informed the content, but I suspect it influenced the tone. If I sound impatient at times in the book, it is probably a result of being confronted with the reality that life is short.
**Excellent article, and excellent book by Mr. Kelly.
In State v. Weyand, the WA Supreme Court held that officers lacked sufficient facts to justify a Terry stop of the defendant. Walking quickly while looking up and down the street at 2:40 a.m. is an innocuous act, which cannot justify intruding into people’s private affairs.
On December 22, 2012, at 2:40 in the morning, Corporal Bryce Henry saw a car parked near 95 Cullum Avenue in Richland, Washington, that had not been there 20 minutes prior. The area is known for extensive drug history. Corporal Henry did not recognize the car and ran the license plate through an I/LEADS (Intergraph Law Enforcement Automated System) database. However, that license plate search revealed nothing of consequence about the vehicle or its registered owner.
After parking his car, Corporal Henry saw Weyand and another male leave 95 Cullum. As the men walked quickly toward the car, they looked up and down the street. The driver looked around once more before getting into the car. Weyand got into the passenger seat. Based on these observations and Corporal Henry’s knowledge of the extensive drug history at 95 Cullum, he conducted a Terry stop of the car.
After stopping Weyand, Corporal Henry observed that Weyand’s eyes were red and glassy and his pupils were constricted. Corporal Henry is a drug recognition expert and believed that Weyand was under the influence of a narcotic. When Corporal Henry ran Weyand’ s name, he discovered an outstanding warrant and arrested Weyand. Corporal Henry searched Weyand incident to that arrest and found a capped syringe. Corporal Henry advised Weyand of his Miranda3 rights, and Weyand admitted that the substance in the syringe was heroin that he had bought from a resident inside 95 Cullum.
After the hearing, the court concluded that the seizure was a lawful investigative stop. According to the court, Corporal Henry had reasonable suspicion to believe that Weyand was involved in criminal activity. The court found Weyand’s case distinct from State v. Doughty, because in this case there was actual evidence of drug activity at, as well as known drug users frequenting, 95 Cullum.
The court additionally found that Weyand knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; thus, all post-Miranda statements were admissible at trial. Weyand waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case to a stipulated facts trial. Finding that Weyand possessed a loaded syringe that contained heroin, the court found Weyand guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
Weyand appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It reasoned that the totality of the circumstances, coupled with the officer’s training and experience, showed that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified the stop. Those circumstances included “the long history of drug activity at 95 Cullum, the time of night, the 20 minute stop at the house, the brisk walking, and the glances up and down the street.”
Whether the specific facts that led to the Terry stop would lead an objective person to form a reasonable suspicion that Weyand was engaged in criminal activity.
COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
The Court held that officers lacked sufficient facts to justify a Terry stop of the defendant. It reasoned that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an officer generally may not seize a person without a warrant. There are, however, a few carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. The State bears the burden to show that a warrantless search or seizure falls into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions.
One of these exceptions is the Terry investigative stop. The Terry exception allows an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning, without a warrant, if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. An officer may also briefly frisk the person if the officer has reasonable safety concerns to justify the protective frisk.
The Court found that the totality of the circumstances did not justify a warrantless seizure. It reasoned that in order to conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop. To evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion, Courts look at the totality of the circumstances known to the officer. The totality of circumstances includes the officer’s training and experience, the location of the stop, the conduct of the person detained, the purpose of the stop, and the amount of physical intrusion on the suspect’s liberty. The suspicion must be individualized to the person being stopped.
“Here, the trial court’s decision rested primarily on evidence that 95 Cullum was a
known drug location,” said the Court. “However, Corporal Henry did not observe current activity that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that criminal activity was taking place or about to take place in the residence.”
Also, the Court reasoned that reliance on ‘furtive movements’ as the basis for a Terry stop can be problematic. “Case law has not precisely defined such movements, and courts too often accept the label without questioning the breadth of the term.” It explained that ‘furtive movements’ are vague generalizations of what might be perceived as suspicious activity which does not provide a legal ( or factual) basis for a Terry stop.”
The Court quoted Judge Richard Posner in recognizing that “furtive movements,” standing alone, are a vague and unreliable indicator of criminality:
“Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited.”
With that, the WA Supreme Court reasoned that simply labeling a suspect’s action a “furtive movement,” without explaining how it gives rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion, is not sufficient to justify a Terry stop. Furthermore, reasoned the Court, police cannot justify a suspicion of criminal conduct based only on a person’s location in a high crime area:
“It is beyond dispute that many members of our society live, work, and spend their waking hours in high crime areas, a description that can be applied to parts of many of our cities. That does not automatically make those individuals proper subjects for criminal investigation.”
Consequently, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and hold that walking quickly and looking around, even after leaving a house with extensive drug history at 2:40 in the morning, is not enough to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a Terry stop.
My opinion? Excellent decision. I’m very impressed the Court addressed the term “furtive movements” and put it in perspective. Law enforcement officers regularly use this catch-phrase to describe suspicious behavior allowing them stop/search/seize people. Although officer safety is a primary concern and a very good reason to search people who are already in police custody and making “furtive movements” in the presence of officers, it cannot be a basis for stopping and searching people who are simply going about their business walking down the street. Great decision.
In 2013, Matthew Erickson, a black man, was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with Unlawful Use of a Weapon and Resisting Arrest. After voir dire, the City of Seattle (City) exercised a peremptory challenge against tjuror #5, who was the only black juror on the jury panel. After the jury was empaneled and excused from the courthouse with the rest of the venire, Erickson objected to the peremptory challenge, claiming the strike was racially motivated. The court found that there was no prima facie showing of racial discrimination and overruled Erickson’s objection.
Erickson was convicted on both counts.
Erickson appealed the municipal court’s decision to King County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the municipal court, finding that the circumstances surrounding the challenge did not raise any inference that the juror was stricken because of his race. The judge did not address whether Erickson’s motion was timely.
The WA Supreme Court granted review of Erickson’s appeal on the following issues:
1. Did Erickson waive his right to a Batson challenge when he objected after the jury was empaneled and both the jury and venire excused?
2. Did the trial court error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the City struck juror #5?
BATSON V. KENTUCKY: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND ON RACE-BASED PEREMPTORY STRIKES
For those who don’t know, in Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court created a 3-step process for enforcing the constitutional rule against excluding a potential juror based on race. First, the defense must show that the circumstances at trial raise an inference of discrimination. Second, the prosecutor must give a nonracial reason for the strike. Third, the court decides if the prosecutor intentionally discriminated against the juror because of race. The decision was made to stop the unfair practice of race-based peremptory strikes of qualified minority jurors because at that time, prosecutors could easily mask their efforts to exclude racial minorities from jury service.
COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
First, the Court ruled that Erickson did notwaive His Right to a Batson challenge when he objected to the striking of a juror after the jury was empaneled but before testimony was heard. It reasoned that a number of federal courts also allow Batson challenges after the jury has been sworn. Read together, the case law has adopted rules requiring that a Batson challenge be brought at the earliest reasonable time while the trial court still has the ability to remedy the wrong.
“These cases recognize that judges and parties do not have instantaneous reaction time, and so have given both trial courts and litigants some lenience to bring Batson challenges after the jury was been sworn,” said the Court. “This is in line with our own jurisprudence.”
The Court further stated that objections should generally be brought when the trial court has the ability to remedy the error, and allowing some challenges after the swearing in of the jury does not offend that ability.
“Although the timing was not ideal, the Batson challenge was raised when the trial court still had an opportunity to correct it,” said the Court. “So even though Erickson brought his Batson challenge after the jury was empaneled, the trial court still had adequate ability to remedy any error. Therefore, Erickson made a timely Batson challenge.”
Second, the WA Supreme Court Court ruled that the trial court did, in fact, error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the Prosecutor struck juror #5.
Here, and in bold strokes, the Court changed how Batson is applied in Washington so that striking a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group automatically triggers a full Batson analysis by the trial court:
“The evil of racial discrimination is still the evil this rule seeks to eradicate,” the court explained, writing that “this alteration provides parties and courts with a new tool, allowing them an alternate route to defend the protections espoused by Batson. A prima facie case can always be made based on overt racism or a pattern of impermissible strikes. Now, it can also be made when the sole member of a racially cognizable group is removed using a peremptory strike.”
With that, the WA Supreme Court carved the following bright-line rule adopted from State v. Rhone:
“We hold that the trial court must recognize a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose when the sole member of a racially cognizable group has been struck from the jury. The trial court must then require an explanation from the striking party and analyze, based on the explanation and the totality of the circumstances, whether the strike was racially motivated.”
In other words, the peremptory strike of a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group on a jury panel does in fact, constitute a prima facie showing of racial motivation. Also, the trial court must ask for a race-neutral reason from the striking party and then determine, based on the facts and surrounding circumstances, whether the strike was driven by racial reasons.
The WA Supreme Court reverse Erickson’s conviction and remanded his case back to the trial court for a new trial.
My opinion? I’m very pleased. I wrote about unlawful race-based peremptory strikes in my blog on State v. Saintcalle; a WA Supreme Court case having similar dynamics, peremptory strikes and Batson challenges to the case at hand. In that post, I was very disappointed that the WA Supreme Court failed to fix a systemic problem of Prosecutors exercising race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection.
Finally, the WA Supreme Court has become more proactive in stopping this unfair, unconstitutional practice. It’s not enough for Prosecutors to give utterly superficial reasons for striking minority jurors when the real reason for striking them is blatantly staring us in the face. Now, and finally, Prosecutors must prove that their decision to strike is not race-based. This subtle, yet oh-so-important shift in perspective effectively addresses what’s really happening during jury selection and makes a solution toward preventing race-based peremptory strikes. Excellent.
Article by Samantha Michaels of Mother Jones discusses how one out of every nine prisoners in the United States is currently serving a life sentence—a record high—even as the overall prison population has fallen.
That’s according to a depressing new report by the Sentencing Project, an advocacy group that’s been tracking life sentences since 2004. Almost 162,000 people are now serving life behind bars, up from 132,000 about a decade ago and 34,000 in 1984.
To put that in perspective, for every 100,000 people in America, 50 have been locked up for life. That’s roughly the total incarceration rate—including inmates whose sentences are just a few months—in Scandinavian countries like Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. And it doesn’t even account for the tens of thousands of Americans handed sentences of 50 years or more, which are considered “de facto life sentences,” says Ashley Nellis, a senior research analyst at the Sentencing Project who co-authored the report.
What’s driving the uptick? It’s not a rise in violent crime or murder—both have dropped substantially since the mid-1990s. Nor is it an increase in the number of criminals behind bars: A majority of states saw declining overall prison populations from 2010 to 2015.
According to Michaels, the continuing rise in lifers is a legacy of three-strikes laws and mandatory minimum sentencing.
“It may also be related to the shift away from capital punishment,” she says. She further elaborates that in some states that no longer allow executions, elected officials like governors and prosecutors have championed life-without-parole sentences—which account for the biggest increase in life sentences nationally—as a way to appear tougher on crime.
“Going forward, we will have a system that allows us to put these people away for life, in living conditions none of us would want to experience,” Connecticut Gov. Dannel Malloy, a Democrat, said in 2012 when his state abolished the death penalty. But these lengthy punishments probably aren’t keeping the public safer. “The impulse to engage in crime, including violent crime, is highly correlated with age,” the Sentencing Project notes. “Most criminal offending declines substantially beginning in the mid-20s and has tapered off substantially by one’s late 30s.”
The biggest losers of all this? Minorities. Of all the lifers and de facto lifers in the country, almost half are African American. What’s more, 12,000 of the total are locked up for crimes they committed as kids, though some are eligible for release thanks to recent court decisions.
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that life-without-parole sentences are unconstitutional for juveniles who didn’t commit homicide. In 2012, the justices went further, saying that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for kids, including those who committed homicide, are also unconstitutional. Nineteen states and DC now ban any kind of life-without-parole sentence for juveniles.)
Finally, according to Michaels, it’s important to remember that many of the prisoners serving these long sentences never actually hurt anyone: Two-thirds of lifers or de facto lifers in the federal system committed nonviolent crimes—and one-third of them are serving time for drug crimes.
Meanwhile, detainees at an Aurora, Colorado, detention center run by GEO Group have filed a class-action lawsuit. It claims the detention center violates federal anti-slavery laws.
Attorney Nina Disalvo is an attorney represents the detainees in Colorado. She said it’s illegal to pay them $1 a day.
“It’s not the market wage that GEO would have to pay if it were absorbing the real cost of running an immigrant detention center,” Disalvo said. “If GEO actually had to hire janitorial staff to clean its facility, it would have to pay that staff a market wage. And it’s not paying the detainees a market wage for this work.”
Disalvo said some of her clients were forced to do janitorial work and clean large areas within the facility without pay. “If they did not do so, they were threatened with or placed in solitary confinement,” Disalvo said. “Our clients allege that forcing people to work under threat of solitary confinement constitutes forced labor under the federal forced labor laws.”
GEO Group has denied the lawsuit’s allegations. A spokesperson for Immigration and Customs enforcement says the agency does not comment on pending litigation. Virginia Kice, ICE spokeswoman, confirmed that detainees at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma earn $1 per day for voluntary work. She said about 25 percent of detainees participate in the program, and that no detainees perform unpaid work at the facility.
The Colorado lawsuit could have implications for the Northwest Detention Center. Northwestern University political science professor Jacqueline Stevens said that if the plaintiffs prevail, GEO Group will need to pay out up to hundreds of millions of dollars in back wages and penalties.
“This could mean the end of government contracts with the private prison industry for housing people held under immigration laws, and the return to more sensible policies,” Stevens said.
I’ve never been a fan of private prisons.
For those who don’t know, a private prison or for-profit prison is a place in which individuals are physically confined or incarcerated by a third party that is contracted by a government agency. Private prison companies typically enter into contractual agreements with governments that commit prisoners and then pay a per diem or monthly rate, either for each prisoner in the facility, or for each place available, whether occupied or not. Such contracts may be for the operation only of a facility, or for design, construction and operation.
According to the ACLU, private prisons have been linked to numerous cases of violence and atrocious conditions. Also, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, for-profit companies were responsible for approximately 7 percent of state prisoners and 18 percent of federal prisoners in 2015 (the most recent numbers currently available).
While supporters of private prisons tout the idea that governments can save money through privatization, the evidence is mixed at best—in fact, private prisons may in some instances cost more than governmental ones.
Finally, it appears that immigrants are the ones filling these detention centers. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that in 2016, private prisons held nearly three-quarters of federal immigration detainees. In light of today’s anti-immigrant presidential administration, it’s no coincidence that private stocks for U.S. prisons have increased 100% since Trump’s election.
For those who don’t know, racial biases are a form of implicit bias, which refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect an individual’s understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner. These biases, which encompass unfavorable assessments, are often activated involuntarily and without the awareness or intentional control of the individual. Residing deep in the subconscious, these biases are different from known biases that individuals may choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness.
“We all have biases,” writes Judge Doyle in her article. “These unconscious, instantaneous, almost automatic judgments can help us get through the day. However, when those unconscious biases stereotype a person because of race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, age or other qualities, they are no longer helpful but harmful to the right to a fair trial.”
She discusses how results from the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and other research show a high and nearly universal preference of whites over blacks. Even with African-American test-takers, 40 percent showed a pro-white preference. “Jurors bring these biases to court when they report for jury service,” said Judge Doyle. “However, where race is never mentioned but lurks in the background, e.g., where a party in a case . . . is a person of color, that racial or ethnic bias is most likely to rear its ugly head.”
Apparently, at the same time, the federal defenders were conducting a criminal trial. During jury selection, the federal defenders showed a videotape that dealt with potential race bias. After the trial was concluded, the committee spoke to Judge Jones, the federal prosecutors, defense lawyers and some of the jurors.
Judge Doyle said that based on all of the committee work, including the interviews, the committee developed a script and worked with a production company to produce a video presentation on the nature and impact of implicit or unconscious bias.” In February, after nearly two years of work, the video was finished and the committee had developed pattern jury instructions on implicit bias for use in criminal cases; which were adopted by the Court. “The instructions incorporate language regarding unconscious bias into a preliminary instruction, the witness credibility instruction, and a closing instruction,” said Judge Doyle.
A link to the video and jury instructions is here. It features Judge Coughenour, defense attorney Jeffery Robinson, and Annette Hays, acting U.S. attorney for the Western District of Washington. “These three explain how such automatic preferences and biases can influence our perceptions and decisions, threatening the constitutional right to fair trial and due process, and jeopardizing public confidence in the legal system,” says Judge Doyle. “Research shows that awareness of unconscious biases is key to minimizing their effects on perceptions and decision making.”
My opinion? My hat’s off to the judges and attorneys involved in the creation of this video. During jury selection, I’ve struggled to introduce these controversial and galvanizing topics. Talking about race is a difficult needle to thread. It can raise suspicion that defendants are trying to “play the race card” on behalf of my Client, which is exactly untrue: I’m trying to take the “race card” off the table. Fortunately, this video – a tool from the courts, and not an advocate – educates the jury and approaches the subject of race bias from a more objective place.
Kudos to the federal courts. Good work. I’m proud of you.
InPena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a juror says he or she relied on racial stereotypes to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the “No-Impeachment Rule” give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.
BACKGROUND FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2007, in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility, the defendant Peña-Rodriguez allegedly sexually assaulted two teenage sisters. The girls told their father and identified Peña-Rodriguez as an employee of the racetrack. The police located and arrested him. Each girl separately identified Peña-Rodriguez as the man who had assaulted her.
At trial, a Colorado jury convicted the defendant Peña-Rodriguez of harassment and unlawful sexual contact. During deliberations, a juror named “H. C.” had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward the defendant and his alibi witness. Defense Counsel, with the trial court’s supervision, obtained affidavits from the two jurors who witnessed and heard the racially biased statements from juror “H.C.”
Defense Counsel motioned for a new trial on the grounds of juror bias. Although the trial court acknowledged racial bias, it denied Defense Counsel’s motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying as to statements made by other jurors during deliberations. The case made it’s way to the U.S. Supreme Court
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court held that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.
Curing Racial Bias
The Court began by saying that the Civil War Amendments created the imperative to purge racial prejudice from the courts. It explained that ever since then, time and again, this Court has enforced the Constitution’s guarantee against state-sponsored racial discrimination in the jury system. The Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the exclusion of jurors based on race, struck down laws and practices that systematically exclude racial minorities from juries, ruled that no litigant may exclude a prospective juror based on race and held that defendants may at times be entitled to ask about racial bias during voir dire.
The Court further reasoned this specific case lies at the intersection of the Court’s decisions endorsing the “No-Impeachment Rule” and the need to eliminate racial bias in the jury system. Those lines of precedent need not conflict. Moreover, the Court said racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns and, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.
ER 606(b): The “No-Impeachment” Rule
Under ER 606(b), a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
However, exceptions exist. For example, a juror may testify about whether (a) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (b) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (c) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.
“This case lies at the intersection of the Court’s decisions endorsing the no-impeachment rule and those seeking to eliminate racial bias in the jury system,” said the Court. “Racial bias . . . implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns and, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”
With that in mind, the Court reasoned that a constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system must be addressed—including, in some instances, after a verdict has been entered—when necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts; which is “a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.”
The Court reasoned that before the “No-Impeachment” Rule can be set aside, there must be a threshold showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. “To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”
The Court explained that whether the threshold showing has been satisfied depends on the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence. In constructing this rule, the Court said that standard and existing safeguards may prevent racial bias in jury deliberations, including careful voir dire and a trial court’s instructions to jurors about their duty to review the evidence, deliberate together, and reach a verdict in a fair and impartial way, free from bias of any kind.
With that, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Mr. Peña-Rodriguez’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
My opinion? Great decision. This case represents a substantial step toward eliminating racial bias in our courtrooms. Even better, this decision is consistent with pre-existing Washington law under Seattle v. Jackson.
In “Driven to Fail: The High Cost of Washington’s Most Ineffective Crime – DWLS III” the report describes the costs of enforcing this law, explores how it burdens individuals and communities, and calls for policies that address the harm of driving with a suspended license without criminalizing it. According to the ACLU, taxpayers spend more than $40 million a year to prosecute cases of DWLS III.
“Not every social problem needs to be treated as a crime,” said Mark Cooke, the ACLU of Washington’s Campaign for Smart Justice Policy Director. “DWLS III enforcement costs taxpayers millions of dollars, yet does little to improve public safety. The crime is largely punishing people for being poor, not because they are scofflaws or dangerous drivers,” said Cooke.
Typically, a DWLS III charge comes about this way: A driver receives a ticket for a moving violation (such as speeding or rolling through a stop sign) and for various reasons does not follow through by paying the ticket or showing up in court to contest it. Hundreds of thousands of people in Washington have had their license suspended for not responding to a ticket for a moving violation. Those who continue to drive once their license is suspended may be arrested and charged with DWLS III.
The report estimates that Washington taxpayers have spent more than $1.3 billion enforcing this crime between 1994 and 2015. These costs stem from the filing of nearly 1.5 million DWLS III criminal charges, resulting in nearly 900,000 convictions. In 2015, there were nearly 40,000 DWLS III charges filed, costing taxpayers $42,199,270. The report also shows that the law is applied unequally across the state and disproportionately impacts people of color, the young, and the poor.
The report recommends that the crime of DWLS III should be taken off the books. Short of that, law enforcement, prosecutors and courts can exercise their inherent discretion and treat DWLS III as a civil offense and offer relicensing programs. Civil remedies and relicensing can be more effective and use fewer criminal justice resources. The data in the report also shows that some jurisdictions, such as the cities of Yakima and Seattle, have started to treat DWLS III as a non-criminal offense.
My opinion? It’s no mystery that DWLS III allows police to arrest people with suspended licenses. However, most don’t know that it allows police to search people’s vehicles after arrest. Therefore, any contraband, guns or other illegal items found in people’s cars can be lawfully seized. Additionally, the defendant will face unlawful possession charges for whatever contraband found during the search. In my opinion, this is the essence of an unlawful pretextual search. And for that reason, DWLS III should be a civil infraction which circumvents the need for arrest and searches. It should not be a crime.