Category Archives: Legislation

Death Penalty Repealed?

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DWLS-III Decriminalized?

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Excellent article by Seattle Times staff reporter discusses how a birpartisan group of lawmakers is continuing to push for change in a law that legislators, civil-rights groups and others say disproportionately burdens the poor and communities of color.

Senate Bill 6189, which is sponsored by Sen. Joe Fain, R-Auburn, would decriminalize the charge of third-degree driving with a suspended license (DWLS-III), a misdemeanor. Under current state law, those caught driving with a suspended license due to unpaid traffic tickets or because they didn’t show up for court hearings can be jailed.

The bill has been referred to the Senate’s Law and Justice Committee but not yet scheduled for a hearing. Sen. Jamie Pederson, D-Seattle, who chairs the committee, said he agreed the issue is important, but with a short legislative session and many bills to review, he was hesitant to say if he will schedule a hearing on a proposal that in the past hasn’t been successful.

According to a 2017 report by the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Driving While License Suspended Third Degree is the state’s most commonly charged crime. SB 6189 would remove its misdemeanor status and make the charge a traffic infraction with a $250 penalty. The penalty would be reduced to $50 if a defendant could show he or she got the license reinstated.

 Pacheco reports that since 1994, prosecutors in Washington state have filed some 1.4 million charges and obtained 860,000 convictions, according to the ACLU report. Native Americans were twice as likely as whites to be charged with the crime of third-degree driving while license suspended (DWLS-III), and blacks were three times as likely.

According to Pacheco, unpaid traffic infractions can pile up quickly, with some people accumulating thousands of dollars in fines that must be paid off to reinstate their license, said Rick Eichstaedt, executive director of the Center for Justice, which operates a program in Spokane that helps people reinstate a suspended license.

The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs has opposed previous efforts to decriminalize DWLS-III, but Executive Director Steve Strachan said the organization recognizes the financial burden the law has caused. The association wants to work with legislators to find a balanced solution to DWLS-III where accountability still exists and abuse of the system is discouraged, Strachan said.

Fain, the Auburn lawmaker, previously worked in the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and said he witnessed a deluge of DWLS-III cases that made it difficult to focus on more important cases, such as drunken driving.

In 2009, in conjunction with King County District Court, the prosecutor’s office stopped charging stand-alone DWLS-III cases, but Fain said prosecutors still spent a lot of time handling such cases tied to other crimes.

“I want to spend more of my time on things that will actually improve public safety,” Fain said. “I think individuals, especially lower-income people, living paycheck to paycheck need to be able to go to work and pay their fines,” Fain said, “so you want to make sure you’re not inhibiting a person’s ability to comply with the law.”

Pacheco correctly states that DWLS-III charges are the least serious of the DWLS charges. First- and second-degree driving with a suspended license are charges aimed at habitual offenders and those who lost their licenses due to drunken-driving or reckless-driving convictions.

Co-sponsor Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle, said fines and the possibility of jail time under the current law effectively criminalize poverty and hurt communities of color.

“Putting people into this cycle where people get fined and they can’t pay and get further fined,” said Frockt, “there’s other alternatives.”

Pacheco says that if a measure is passed, Washington would join a handful of states that have decriminalized driving with a suspended license, including Oregon, Wisconsin and Maine, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.

In 1993, Senate Bill 1741 made driving with a suspended license due to unpaid traffic infractions a misdemeanor.

My opinion? I hope the legislature decriminalizes DWLS-III. These charges essentially hook people into the criminal justice system for failing to pay traffic fines.  The charges also expose people to a search incident to arrest with the very real possibility of police finding illegal contraband which may lead to heavier charges. Also, a DWLS-III conviction makes it difficult for people to get to work and further holds back those working their way toward paying off fines and avoiding more fines or jail time.  Please contact me if you, a friend or family member is charged with DWLS III.

I-940 & Police Misconduct

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Wonderful article by  of the Seattle Times  reports that Initiative 940 (I-940) gives an opportunity to prosecute police for deadly shootings in Washington state.

With Thursday’s expected delivery of signatures for Initiative 940, years of debate and stalemate over Washington’s deadly-force law look to be coming to a head. If I-940 qualifies, state lawmakers — and probably ultimately voters — will face big decisions on a charged issue.

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De-Escalate Washington

De-Escalate Washington didn’t just pull together the bare-bones 260,000 signatures for I-940, which would make it easier to prosecute law-enforcement officers for alleged misuse of deadly force. The group hopes to turn in about 360,000 signatures Thursday to the Washington Secretary of State’s office, according to Leslie Cushman, the group’s policy director.

In his article, O’Sullivan reports that community advocates have argued Washington’s law — considered the nation’s most restrictive for holding officers accountable for unjustified use of deadly force — is overdue for a change. Right now, an officer can’t be convicted of a crime for using deadly force if he or she acted in good faith and without malice, or what the law calls “evil intent.” That makes it nearly impossible for prosecutors to bring criminal charges even if they find an officer committed a wrongful killing, according to a 2015 report by The Seattle Times.

I-940 would change the law to a more detailed, multipart threshold that considers what a “reasonable officer” might have done under the circumstances. It would also take into account an officer’s intentions to determine if she or he acted in good faith.

The initiative also requires more de-escalation and mental-health training for law- enforcement officers.

O’Sullivan also writes that the effort comes on the heels of high-profile shootings including the deaths in Seattle of Che Taylor and Charleena Lyles by white officers of African Americans and other minorities in recent years have underscored concerns about law enforcement.

Family members of several victims of police shootings have been involved in the campaign, including Che’s brother Andrè, who chairs De-Escalate Washington.

Law Enforcement Response to I-940

O’Sullivan reports that law-enforcement groups have protested changes to the deadly-force statute. They say the new legal standard could prompt officers to hesitate in ways that could endanger themselves and others.

 “Unfortunately, this initiative will not do anything to reduce violent interactions between law enforcement and the public,” said Teresa Taylor, executive director for the Washington Council of Police & Sheriffs, which represents more than 4,300 law- enforcement officers.
However, success in the legislative session that begins in January appears unlikely. Lawmakers this year couldn’t find a compromise that satisfied both law enforcement and community activists.
My opinion? I-940 is a step in the right direction. And it’s about time. Police misconduct is a hot-button issue. Granted, being a police officer is a very difficult job. Officers make difficult judgment calls in very complex, risky and dangerous situations. That said, officers need training on diffusing situations which don’t necessarily rise to public safety and/or officer safety risks. I-940 is not made to put police in jail for doing their jobs. It’s made to foster public trust, train officers in de-esclating their contacts with citizens and avoid unnecessary shooting deaths.

Vacating Convictions

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In State v. Lambert, the WA Court of Appeals held that when an offender has been convicted of an offense that is a crime against a person, the record of that conviction may not be vacated. Third degree statutory rape is a crime against a person.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 1986, when Lambert was nineteen years old, he was charged with third degree statutory rape. The charge was based on an incident involving a victim fifty-five months younger than Lambert. Lambert pleaded guilty as charged.

Lambert was sentenced in May 1987. The law at that time said that the record of conviction for statutory rape could be vacated, in the trial court’s discretion, after the offender satisfied his sentence and completed five years after discharge without a new conviction.

In July 1987, however, the law concerning vacation of the record of conviction was amended. Under the new law, statutory rape in the third degree was defined as a crime against persons that could not be vacated.

In 1988, the legislature enacted broad changes to the criminal code concerning sex offenses. The sections defining statutory rape in each degree were replaced with provisions defining three degrees of rape of a child. “Rape of a child” replaced “statutory rape” in the list of crimes against persons that could not be vacated.

In 2016, Lambert moved to vacate the record of his conviction. He argued that the 1988 amendments did not apply retroactively and the trial court thus had discretion to vacate the record of conviction for his offense, third degree statutory rape. The trial court ruled that Lambert was “not eligible to have his conviction vacated because rape of a child third degree is a crime against a person.” Lambert appealed.

LEGAL ISSUE

Whether statutory rape in the third degree is a crime against a person that may not be vacated.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

“The legislature expressly designated statutory rape in the third degree, and that crime as it ‘may be renamed in the future,’ as a non-vacatable crime against a person,” reasoned the Court. “Rape of a child in the third degree criminalizes the same essential conduct as third degree statutory rape: engaging in sexual intercourse with a person between fourteen and sixteen years of age.”

The court further reasoned that the offenses differ in replacing the requirement that the offender be at least eighteen years old with the requirement that the offender be at least forty eight months older than the victim. Rape of a child is expressly defined as a crime against persons.

“It appears that the 1988 amendments renamed statutory rape and retained the prohibition on vacating the record of conviction for that offense,” said the Court.

“We conclude that where, as here, an offender was convicted of statutory rape, and the facts proved establish each element of that offense as amended and renamed, the prohibition on vacating the record of conviction remains in effect.”

Finally, the Court said Lambert had no vested right to vacate the conviction because he failed to satisfy all statutory conditions for vacating his sentence before the change in law took place.

My opinion? It’s important to seek qualified, competent legal representation when trying to vacate prior criminal convictions. It’s not abundantly clear that prior crimes against others cannot be vacated under the law. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member need advice on vacating criminal convictions.

“Revenge Porn” Outlawed by the Feds?

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Excellent article by Brian Murphy and Andrea Drusch of mcclatchydc.com discusses how congressional lawmakers are pushing to make “revenge porn” or “sextortion” a federal crime.

Tuesday, Sens. Richard Burr, R-N.C., Kamala Harris, D-Calif., and Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., said they’d sponsor the new legislation to make “revenge porn” a federal crime by passing a bill very similar to a bill introduced last year by Rep. Jackie Speier, D-Calif. Speier introduced the bill in the House again Tuesday.

According to the article, Rep. Joe Barton, a Texas Republican who is sponsoring the bill, said he shared a sexually explicit video and text messages with a woman he was seeing after he separated from his second wife. An image from that video of a naked Barton, now 68, appeared on the internet last week, becoming the talk of his hometown and spurring debate over criminal intent.

Barton apologized last week for the leaked video, saying he should have used better judgment. He also suggested he’d been the victim of the crime of revenge porn, which is illegal under Texas’s law, but not federal law.

Barton sent the video to a woman who he saw over the span of several years. In a recorded phone conversation that the woman gave to the Washington Post, Barton asked her not to use the video to hurt his career. She said she had no intention of doing so, but the video surfaced last week from an anonymous Twitter account.

Barton took the incident to the U.S. Capitol Police, but said last week he’d heard no word that an investigation had been opened.

According to Murphy and Drusch’s article, thirty-eight states and D.C. have laws against distributing “revenge porn.” The new federal legislation would make it “unlawful to knowingly distribute a private, visual depiction of an individual’s intimate parts or of an individual engaging in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless disregard for the individual’s lack of consent to the distribution, and for other purposes.”

Murphy and Drusch wrote that North Carolina passed legislation outlawing “revenge porn” in 2015 and updated the provision in 2017. The state law makes it illegal to post nude photos online without the consent of the victim.

The FBI defines “sextortion” as “when someone threatens to distribute your private and sensitive material if you don’t provide them images of a sexual nature, sexual favors, or money.”

In short, the proposed federal legislation would establish federal criminal liability for people who share private, explicit images without consent. In order to prosecute someone under the proposed law, officials would have to prove the defendant was aware of a substantial risk that the victim expected the image would remain private and that sharing could cause harm to the victim.

“Perpetrators of exploitation who seek to humiliate and shame their victims must be held accountable,” said Harris, the former attorney general of California who prosecuted operators of “revenge porn” sites. “It is long past time for the federal government to take action to give law enforcement the tools they need to crack down on these crimes.”

The bill provides up to five years in prison and/or unspecified fines.

My opinion? Washington State has already outlawed “revenge porn” as a Class C Felony under the “Disclosing Intimate Images” statute RCW 9A.86.010. Other states have also followed suit. It appears the feds are simply catching up.

Immediately contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges for distributing suggestive content online. It’s imperative to find a competent criminal defense attorney who can possibly suppress the evidence and/or convince prosecutors and judges to reduce or dismiss these egregious charges.

Dealing in Depictions

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In State v. Gray, the WA Supreme Court decided that the Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct statute allows the State to prosecute a minor for taking and distributing a sexually explicit photo of himself.
BACKGROUND FACTS
When he was 17 years old, Eric D. Gray electronically sent an unsolicited picture of his erect penis to an adult woman. The woman contacted the police, and Gray was charged with and convicted of one count of Second Degree Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct under ROW 9.68A.050. It also charged him with one count of Telephone Harassment under RCW 9.61.230. Gray moved to dismiss both charges for insufficient evidence, which the trial court denied.
In a stipulated facts trial, the court found Gray guilty of the second degree dealing in depictions of a minor charge. The State agreed to dismiss the telephone harassment charge and chose not to charge him with two counts of misdemeanor indecent exposure stemming from an unrelated incident. He was sentenced to 150 hours of community service, 30 days of confinement, and fees, before being released with credit for time served. He was ordered to register as a sex offender.
Mr. Gray appealed to Division Three of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his adjudication. He appealed again, this time to the Washington Supreme Court, claiming the plain language of the statute does not anticipate minors who take and transmit sexually explicit images of themselves. The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, the Juvenile Law Center, Columbia Legal Services, and TeamChild subsequently filed a joint brief as amicus curiae, or “friend of the court”.
ISSUES
1. Does RCW 9.68A.050 allow the State to prosecute a minor for taking and distributing a sexually explicit photo of himself?
2. Is RCW 9.68A.050 impermissibly overbroad or vague in violation of the federal or state constitutions?
COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The WA Supreme Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute prohibits transmitting sexually explicit images of a minor even if the minor himself sent it:
“Under this statute, the State properly charged Gray for his actions. When he was 17, Gray took a photo of his erect penis and sent it, unsolicited, to another person. Gray is a “natural person” and therefore a person for purposes of the statute. He was also under the age of 18, making him a minor under the statute as well. He stated he was attracted to T.R., and when he sent the picture he included the phrase “Do u like it, babe?,” indicating an attempt to arouse the recipient. The picture he transmitted was, therefore, a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct because it was a picture of a minor’s genitals designed to sexually stimulate the viewer. This falls squarely within the statute’s plain meaning.”
The Court also reasoned that the statute here is unambiguous. A “person” is any person, including a minor. “Images of a ‘minor’ are images of any minor,” reasoned the Court. It elaborated that nothing in the statute indicates that the “person” and the “minor” are necessarily different entities. Therefore, the photographer or distributor may also be the minor in the photograph. “Because of this, Gray was properly charged with taking and disseminating sexually explicit images of a minor,” said the Court.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the Legislature’s findings support the Court’s plain reading of the statute. “The legislature intended to destroy the blight of child pornography everywhere, from production of the images to commercial gain,” said the Court. “Because the statute was intended to curtail production of child pornography at all levels in the distribution chain, the statute prohibits Gray’s actions.”
Finally, the Court reasoned that the statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague. First, it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Despite Gray’s arguments, the Court reasoned that the State is vested with great discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges. Here, Gray presents no evidence the State made the choice to charge Gray for an arbitrary or discriminatory purpose.
Second, the wording of the statute allows a reasonable person to understand what conduct is prohibited. “It states that ‘a person’ will be guilty if they transmit sexually explicit images of ‘a minor,’ said the Court. “On its face, this includes any person, even a minor taking a picture of himself. Our responsibility is to interpret the law, not to write it, and here the law is clear.”
With that, the WA Supreme Court voted 6-3 to affirm the Court of Appeals and upheld Gray’s conviction.
THE DISSENT
Justice McCloud authored the dissenting opinion. He reasoned that RCW 9.68A.050 is designed to tackle a significant problem: trafficking in sexual depictions of children. Furthermore, the statute tackles that problem with severe criminal penalties for the traffickers but protection for the depicted children.

“There is a long-standing and well-accepted rule that when a legislature enacts a criminal law to protect such a specific class, we cannot interpret that law to permit prosecution (and potential revictimization) of members of that protected class for their own exploitation—unless the legislature explicitly says so. The legislature did not say so here. Hence, the general rule applies,” said Justice McCloud. “Gray, the depicted minor, cannot be prosecuted under this statute for disseminating pictures of himself.”

Sessions on WA Marijuana

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Border Patrol Backs Trump

Brandon Judd, the president of the National Border Patrol Council, told "Fox and Friends" on July 17, 2017, that morale is the highest he's seen throughout his 20 years within the agency. (Fox News Channel screenshot)

According to a news article by reporter Douglass Ernst of the Washington Times, President Trump received a glowing performance review Monday from the head of the National Border Patrol Council.

Brandon Judd, who is the President of the National Border Patrol Council, appeared on “Fox and Friends” on Monday to discuss illegal immigration, Mr. Trump’s plan to build a border wall with Mexico, and morale within the agency. The union president said that agents have a new “energy” to them due to a concrete commitment to enforcing existing federal laws.

“There’s a vibe, there’s an energy in the Border Patrol that’s never been there before,” Mr. Judd told host Steve Doocy. “In the 20 years I’ve been in the patrol, we haven’t seen this type of energy, and we’re excited because we signed up to do a job and this president is allowing us to do that job.”

Mr. Judd said that having a giant contiguous wall along the southern border was not as important as having barricades at “strategic locations” such as El Paso and San Diego.

“The president has done a great job of actually enforcing the law — something we didn’t see in the last eight years,” Mr. Judd said, Fox News Channel reported. “And if we continue to do that, then a clear message will be sent throughout the world that if you cross our borders illegally, you will be detained and you will be sent back.

“If you look at the rhetoric that the president sent out, we’ve had a drop that we’ve never seen before with any president,” he continued. “If you’re in the left, right or middle, you have to say this president has done exactly what he promised to do and we do have border security like what we expect to see.”

My opinion? Let’s observe how these ongoing immigration issues develop. Last month,  the U.S. Supreme Court Supreme Court had a ruling which allowed parts of President Donald Trump’s travel ban to go into effect and will hear oral arguments on the case this fall. In its decision, the court is allowing the ban to go into effect for foreign nationals who lack any “bona fide relationship with any person or entity in the United States.” The court, in an unsigned opinion, left the travel ban against citizens of six majority-Muslim on hold as applied to non-citizens with relationships with persons or entities in the United States, which includes most of the plaintiffs in both cases.

DV Protection Orders

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In Rodriquez v. Zavala, the WA Supreme Court held that a person does not have to be a victim of domestic violence (DV) in order to be included in a DV protection order.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Esmeralda Rodriguez and Luis Zavala shared a history of domestic violence. Over the course of their relationship, Zavala repeatedly physically and emotionally assaulted Rodriguez. He shoved Rodriguez to the ground while she was pregnant with their infant child L.Z., attempted to smother her with a pillow, blamed her for his failings in life, pulled a knife on her and promised to cut her into tiny pieces, threatened to kidnap L.Z., and said he would do something so horrible to Rodriguez’s daughters from a prior relationship that she would want to kill herself. He threatened to kill her, her children, and himself. Zavala tried to control Rodriguez. He restricted her communication with friends and family members, and he appeared uninvited wherever she was when she failed to return his phone calls.

Zavala’s history of violence against Rodriguez reached its peak one day in June 2015 after the couple had separated. At 2:00 a.m. that morning and in violation of a previous restraining order, Zavala pounded on Rodriguez’s door, threatening to break windows unless she let him in. Rodriguez went to the door and opened it enough to tell Zavala to leave. Zavala pushed past Rodriguez, cornered her, and began choking her. He told Rodriguez he was going to “end what he started.” The police arrived and arrested Zavala.

A few days later, Rodriguez went to the court and petitioned for a domestic violence protection order for herself and her children, including L.Z. In her petition, Rodriguez described the assault and Zavala’s history of violence. The court issued a temporary order pending a full hearing. The temporary order restrained Zavala from contacting Rodriguez and all four children.

At the later protection order hearing, Zavala appeared. Rodriguez discussed the choking incident and told the court that L.Z. had been asleep in another room during the most recent attack. She feared Zavala would take their son based on previous threats. Zavala admitted to coming to the house because he wanted to see L.Z., but denied Rodriguez’s allegations of abuse.

The trial court issued a protective order for Rodriguez and her daughters, but excluded L.Z., explaining that the boy was not “present” during the assault or threatened at all. According to the trial judge, “L.Z. wasn’t involved in any of this.” The order was effective for one year, expiring on June 26, 2016.

Rodriguez appealed. Among other things, she argued that her son should have been included in the final protection order based on her fear that Zavala would hurt L.Z. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that a petitioner may seek relief based only on her fear of imminent harm to herself. The WA Supreme Court granted review.

ISSUE

Whether the definition of “domestic violence” in chapter 26.50 RCW contemplates a parent’s fear of harm for a child at the hands of another parent.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The Court reasoned that in order to commence a domestic violence protection order action, a person must file a petition “alleging that the person has been the victim of domestic violence committed by the respondent. Under the statute, “Domestic violence” is defined as the following:

“(a) physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.”

The Court further explained that The Court of Appeals’s interpretation of the statute was unnecessarily narrow. “By relating the fear of harm back to the petitioner, it ignores the final prepositional phrase ‘between family or household members.'” Consequently, because domestic violence includes the infliction of fear of harm between family members generally, the definition includes a mother’s fear of harm to her child by that child’s father.

Also, the context of the statute, related provisions, and statutory scheme as a whole also indicate that “domestic violence” was intended to cover more than merely a petitioner and a perpetrator:

“This definition reflects the legislative recognition that violence in the home encompasses many different familial and household roles; violence does not distinguish on the basis of relationship.”

Moreover, the Court reasoned that a person does not have to be a victim of domestic violence to be included in a protection order. RCW 26.50.060 gives trial courts substantial discretion to protect victims and their loved ones. The provision explains that a trial court may bar a respondent from going to the “day care or school of a child” or having “any contact with the victim of domestic violence or the victim’s children or members of the victim’s household” and that, notably, the court may order “other relief as it deems necessary for the protection of the petitioner and other family or household members sought to be protected.”

Additionally, the Court said that the legislative intent of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) further supports that “domestic violence” includes a petitioner’s fear of harm between family members.

Finally, the Court explained that the plain language of RCW 26.50.010(3), related DV statutes, and the statutory scheme show that the definition of “domestic violence” allows a petitioner to seek relief based on a general fear of harm between family members. It said that deciding that “domestic violence” means the fear possessed only by the one seeking protection not only conflicts with the statute’s plain language, it would leave children unprotected:

“Even more acutely, such an interpretation would fail to protect infants and developmentally delayed children. These are the most vulnerable of our vulnerable populations. Excluding these children from protection orders because they fail to or cannot show fear of a harm they may not understand subjects them to violence the legislature expressly intended to prevent.”

Accordingly, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals because Zavala’s violent threats against L.Z. were “domestic violence” under the plain language of the statute, and Rodriguez properly petitioned for a protection order on L.Z.’s behalf based on her reasonable fear for him.

the “Do’s & Dont’s” of Washington’s Distracted Driving Law

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Great article by reporter Mike Lindblom of the Seattle Times discusses Washington’s Driving Under the Influence of Electronics (DUIE) Act set to be enforced in July.  The law forbids virtually all use of handheld gadgets such as phones, tablets, laptop computers and gaming devices while driving.

According to Lindblom, nearly one-tenth of motorists are holding a device at any given moment, state observation teams have found. That far outnumbers traffic police on the road and raises questions about the law’s chances of success. On the other hand, the state has a history of reducing drunken driving and posting a 95 percent compliance with seat-belt requirements. Linblom gave helpful insights to the law:

Q. When does the law take effect?

A. Approximately July 23, which is 90 days after the Legislature’s regular session adjourned, the governor’s staff say.

“Public safety is better served by implementing this bill this year,” Inslee wrote in his partial-veto message. Bill sponsor Sen. Ann Rivers, R-La Center, had initially proposed a Jan. 1, 2018, start, and then agreed to a year delay, in negotiations with the House, to give police and drivers more time to prepare.

Q. What will be banned?

A. Texting is already illegal, as is holding a cellphone at the ear. Drivers constantly flout those rules, or evade them by holding a phone between the legs, or just below the chin.

The new bill forbids handheld uses, including composing or reading any kind of message, picture or data. Photography while driving is illegal. Drivers also cannot use handheld devices while at a stop sign or red-light signal.

Q. What is still legal?

A. Drivers may still use a smartphone mounted in a dashboard cradle, for instance to use a navigation app, but not to watch video. The new law permits “minimal use of a finger” to activate an app or device.

Built-in electronic systems, such as hands-free calling and maps, remain legal. Calls to 911 or other emergency services are legal, as are urgent calls between transit employees and dispatchers. Amateur radio equipment and citizens-band radio, remain legal. Handheld devices may be used if the driver has pulled off the roadway or traffic lanes, where the vehicle “can safely remain stationary.”

Q. What are the penalties?

A. The standard traffic fine of $136 would nearly double to $235 on the second distracted-driving citation.

Q. Is DUIE a primary offense?

A. Yes. A police officer can pull someone over just for using a handheld device.

Q. Will a ticket raise my insurance rates?

A. Probably. Distracted-driving citations will be reported on a motorist’s record for use by the insurance industry, which testified in favor of the law. There was considerable debate about that, as some lawmakers sought to keep DUIE offenses off the record, the way texting violations are currently. But the safety hawks managed to make them reportable — a penalty that House sponsor Jessyn Farrell, D-Seattle, gained in exchange for allowing that now-vetoed 1½ year implementation time.

The cost of a citation on personal insurance bills will depend on what the data show, about a correlation between someone’s violations and crash history, said Nicole Ganley, public-affairs director for the Property Casualty Insurers Association of AmericaArkansas, North Dakota, and Colorado lawmakers passed stronger distraction bills this year, she said, but insurers especially like the Washington law’s broader sweep.

“It’s modernizing the driving code, so that all the behaviors are included,” she said. “This new law will serve as a deterrent and draws a line in the sand that this behavior is not safe for anyone.”

Q. What about other kinds of distraction?

A. Miscellaneous distractions such as grooming or eating will be a secondary offense, meaning a ticket may be issued if a law-enforcement officer pulls you over for some other offense, such as speeding or a dangerous lane change. The penalty will be an extra $30.

Q. Who will enforce this?

A. Lack of staffing is a potential weakness. Earlier this year, there were as few as a half-dozen State Patrol troopers some shifts in the whole Bellevue detachment, patrolling Interstate 405 and Interstate 90. Those teams should grow somewhat. The Legislature voted to raise trooper pay 16 percent this year, based on a governor’s agreement with the troopers’ labor union, in hopes of winning recruits and stopping attrition.

A new class of 49 people just graduated from the academy May 1, of which 16 will work in King County, said Trooper Rick Johnson, a spokesman in Bellevue. Another class is due in September. “We’re moving in the right direction, definitely,” he said.

In early April, the state’s law-enforcement agencies spent $400,000 in federal grants to add 6,000 patrol hours aimed at driver distraction. The same program in April 2016 produced 5,412 citations statewide, double the usual monthly pace, according to the Washington Traffic Safety Commission. Statistics show 171 of 568 road deaths in the state in 2015 were blamed on some form of driver distraction, not necessarily electronics.

Officials haven’t issued plans for any extra patrols, to break in the new law this summer. To date, only $19,000 has been budgeted to support the distraction law. Lawmakers weren’t intending to fund a big education blitz until next year.

So the safety commission will do what it can, to possibly include informational cards for police to hand drivers, before the tougher law begins July 23, according to spokeswoman Erica Stineman.

Gina Bagnariol-Benavides, who also testified for tougher laws, said the governor’s sudden change was “a pretty exciting thing.”

“Common sense tells you (that) you shouldn’t use your phone behind the wheel of a car,” Bagnariol-Benavides said. “I don’t think there’s a huge amount of education that should have to go along with that.”