Category Archives: Fifth Amendment

Shackled in Court

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In United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lower federal court’s policy of routinely shackling all defendants in the courtroom was unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2013, the judges of the Southern District of California approached the U.S. Marshals Service and requested “a district-wide policy of allowing the Marshals Service to bring all in-custody defendants in full restraints for most non-jury proceedings.” “Full restraints” means that a defendant’s hands are closely handcuffed together, these handcuffs are connected by chain to another chain running around the defendant’s waist, and the defendant’s feet are shackled and chained together.

Starting on the first day of the policy’s implementation, the Federal Defenders of San Diego objected to the routine use of shackles and requested that each defendant’s shackles be removed. The judges routinely denied the requests, relying on the Marshals Service’s general security concerns. The judges also pointed to increasing security threats from what they viewed as changing demographics and increasing case loads in their district.

The shackling was the same regardless of a defendant’s individual characteristics. One defendant had a fractured wrist but appeared in court wearing full restraints. Nevertheless, the judge denied her motion to remove the restraints, Another defendant was vision-impaired. One of his hands was free of restraint so he could use his cane, but his other hand was shackled and secured to a chain around his waist and his legs were shackled together. His objection to the restraints was also denied.  And another defendant was shackled despite being brought into court in a wheelchair due to her “dire and deteriorating” health. The court “noted” her objection to the shackles and denied the defendant’s motion to remove the shackles.

Defendants appealed these denials to the district court and also filed motions challenging the constitutionality of the district-wide policy. The district courts denied all relief. All four cases were consolidated for review of the policy’s constitutionality.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

This 9th Circuit said that under the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court has said time and again that “liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).

Liberty from bodily restraint includes the right to be free from shackles in the courtroom, reasoned the court. Also, the right to be free from unwarranted shackles no matter the proceeding respects our founding principle that defendants are innocent until proven guilty.

“The principle isn’t limited to juries or trial proceedings,” said the Court. It also includes the perception of any person who may walk into a public courtroom, as well as those of the jury, the judge and court personnel:

“A presumptively innocent defendant has the right to be treated with respect and dignity in a public courtroom, not like a bear on a chain . . . The fact that the proceeding is non-jury does not diminish the degradation a prisoner suffers when needlessly paraded about a courtroom, like a dancing bear on a lead, wearing belly chains and manacles.”

The Court further reasoned that the most visible and public manifestation of our criminal justice system is the courtroom. “Courtrooms are palaces of justice, imbued with a majesty that reflects the gravity of proceedings designed to deprive a person of liberty or even life.” It reasoned that a member of the public who wanders into a criminal courtroom must immediately perceive that it is a place where justice is administered with due regard to individuals whom the law presumes to be innocent. That perception cannot prevail if defendants are marched in like convicts on a chain gang. “Both the defendant and the public have the right to a dignified, inspiring and open court process. Thus, innocent defendants may not be shackled at any point in the courtroom unless there is an individualized showing of need.”

Moreover, the Court reasoned that it has a long tradition of giving correctional officials a wide berth in maintaining security within their own facilities. “But we don’t have a tradition of deferring to correctional or law enforcement officers as to the treatment of individuals appearing in public courtrooms.”

Here, in the courtroom, law enforcement officers have no business proposing policies for the treatment of parties as a class. Insofar as they have information pertaining to particular defendants, they may, of course, bring it to the court’s attention. But a blanket policy applied to all defendants infuses the courtroom with a prison atmosphere. The Marshals Service should not have proposed it and the judges should not have paid heed.

“We must take seriously how we treat individuals who come into contact with our criminal justice system—from how our police interact with them on the street to how they appear in the courtroom. How the justice system treats people in these public settings matters for the public’s perception, including that of the defendant. Practices like routine shackling and “perp walks” are inconsistent with our constitutional presumption that people who have not been convicted of a crime are innocent until proven otherwise. We must treat people with respect and dignity even though they are suspected of a crime.”

Finally, the Court reasoned that the Constitution enshrines a fundamental right to be free of unwarranted restraints. “Thus, we hold that if the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant.” Courts must decide whether the stated need for security outweighs the infringement on a defendant’s right. This decision cannot be deferred to security providers or presumptively answered by routine policies, said the Court. “All of these requirements apply regardless of a jury’s presence or whether it’s a pretrial, trial or sentencing proceeding. Criminal defendants, like any other party appearing in court, are entitled to enter the courtroom with their heads held high.”

My Opinion? Excellent decision. Unless a defendant is particularly dangerous to themselves or others, there is simply no reason to parade them around the court like animals. It’s degrading, demoralizing and reduces respect for the criminal justice system; especially if defendants are not yet found guilty for crimes.

Unlawful Property Seizure

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In State v. Rivera, the WA Court of Appeals Div. II decided a trial court lacks authority to order defendants to forfeit their property as a condition of their felony sentencing.

BACKGROUND & FACTS

On September 20, 2014, Alicia Clements arrived at defendant Kevin Rivera’s home to serve him papers concerning a civil matter. Ms. Clements exited her vehicle to tape the documents to a post near Mr. Rivera’s driveway. While Clements was posting the paperwork, Rivera and his wife came out the front door and into the driveway. Rivera yelled at Clements that she was trespassing and needed to leave.

As Clements was getting back into her car, Rivera took down the documents she posted and approached her car to return them. In the process of returning the documents, Rivera shattered the driver’s side window on Clements’s car, causing glass to cascade into the car and onto the street.

Ms. Clements claimed that her window was completely rolled up and that Rivera had deliberately punched through the window with the documents in hand, striking her twice with his fist in the process. However, Rivera stated that Clements’s window was still open when he returned the documents, but that because Clements was attempting to roll up her windows, his fingers caught the edge of the window causing it to shatter.

Both Rivera and Clements called 911. Pierce County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to the incident. Mr. Rivera for assault. The State charged Rivera with second degree assault by battery under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), felony harassment, and third degree malicious mischief.

At trial, Rivera conceded that he had broken Clements’s window, but argued he did so accidentally rather than intentionally. The jury convicted Rivera of second degree assault and third degree malicious mischief. As part of his sentence, Rivera was required to forfeit “all property.”

CONCLUSION & ANALYSIS.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked authority to order property forfeiture as a sentencing condition.

It reasoned that under State v. Roberts, 185 Wn. App. 94, 96, 339 P.3d 995 (2014), the authority to order forfeiture of property as part of a judgment and sentence is purely statutory.. In other words, a trial court has no inherent power to order forfeiture of property in connection with a criminal conviction.

With that, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by ordering forfeiture of seized property as a sentencing condition.

My opinion? Good decision. I’ve never heard of courts seizing a defendant’s property as a condition of sentencing. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment states that a person may not be deprived of property by the government without “due process of law,” or fair procedures. Typically, if property is an issue, then courts can lawfully order a defendant to pay restitution to the victim for the loss or damage to victim’s property. This makes sense. But to actually take a defendant’s property as a sentencing condition? No.

Pre-Arrest Silence & Business Records Exceptions to Hearsay Rule

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In State v. Magana, the WA Court of Appeals held (1) the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of a suspect’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt, and (2) the State failed to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for the Lineup ID Report, however, the erroneous admission of the document was harmless error.

Sergio Magana Jr., an adult, met met fourteen-year-old Y.L. through Facebook. After exchanging text messages, Y.L. and Mr. Magana made plans to meet at Y.L.’s home. Mr. Magana wanted to be alone with Y.L. When the day they planned to meet arrived, Mr. Magana went inside Y.L.’s home and forcibly raped her. Not long after leaving, Mr. Magana texted and told Y.L. not to mention his name and to delete all of their text messages because her “age scared him.”
After approximately two weeks, Y.L. reported Mr. Magana’s conduct to the police. Y.L. identified Mr. Magana from a photo lineup and submitted her phone so text messages could be extracted. The police then began looking for Mr. Magana.
After about six weeks, Mr. Magana made contact with the police and spoke to a detective over the telephone. During the call, Mr. Magana arranged to meet with the police. However, he never showed up for his appointment. About a month later, Mr. Magana finally met with a police detective in person. He was advised of his Miranda rights and acknowledged that he had indeed met Y.L. over Facebook, but he denied having intercourse. Mr. Magana was charged with one count of third degree rape of a child. Following a mistrial and then a second trial, he was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the trial court. Mr. Magana appealed.
1. PRE-ARREST SILENCE.
On appeal, Mr. Magana argued the jury should not have known about his failure to appear for his initial police interview. He claims this was an improper comment on his right to silence, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule from the  United States Supreme Court’s Salinas v. Texas holds that the Fifth Amendment is not an obstacle to the State’s introduction of Mr. Magana’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Furthermore, although Washington State’s Constitution typically provides more protections than the U.S. Constitution, “this is not an area where our state’s constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution.”
Consequently, the Court of Appeals reasoned Mr. Magana was not under arrest or any sort of police custody. They said his scheduled police interview was voluntary, and to the extent Mr. Magana’s failure to appear for the interview was relevant, the State was entitled to present this evidence.
PHOTO LINEUP EVIDENCE.
Also on appeal, Mr. Magana argued the State’s photo lineup exhibit was hearsay and admitted into evidence without proper foundation. However, the State argued that the exhibit was a properly authenticated business record.
The Court reasoned that under RCW 5.45.020 and ER 803(6), a document may be admitted as a business record as long as a witness testifies to the document’s identity and mode of preparation, and explains that the document “was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event.”
Here, the exhibit at issue consisted of three pages. The first page is an array of six hand-numbered photos, one of which depicts Mr. Magana. The second page is entitled “Lineup ID Report,” which is a computer-generated report that documents biographical information, including dates of birth, for the six individuals depicted on the photo array. The third page is a copy of the written admonishment form Y.L. signed prior to reviewing the photo array.
However, The Court of Appeals reasoned that during the photo identification process, Y .L. failed to review the second page of the report. Also concerning was that at trial, no witness testimony was presented regarding the creation of the Lineup ID Report included on page two.
For these reasons, and because no foundation was laid for the Lineup ID Report, it was improperly admitted as a business record. Nevertheless, and given the entirety of the evidence, the erroneous inclusion of the Lineup ID Report was harmless error which did not impact the jury’s verdict.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Magana’s convictions, but remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Protective Sweeps of Homes

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In State v. Chambers, the WA Court of Appeals decided (1) the police’s “protective sweep” of the defendant’s home was improper because the defendant was arrested outside his home and the officers did not have specific facts that other armed individuals might be inside the defendant’s home, and (2) the defendant’s 3.5 Motion to Suppress statements made to police was rightfully denied because police scrupulously honored the defendant’s Fifth Amendment invocation of his right to remain silent.

In this case, defendant Lovett Chambers was drinking at the Feedback Lounge, a neighborhood bar in West Seattle that he frequented. Chambers was a convicted felon of African-American descent who moved to Seattle in 1989, worked in the construction industry, obtained degrees in computer science and started an IT business. In 1992, he got married and later purchased a house in West Seattle with his wife. A few years later, Chambers asked his wife to buy him a Colt .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun. She did so, apparently unaware that he was a convicted felon.

On the night of the incident, Mr. Chambers had numerous drinks at the Feedback Lounge. He carried and concealed his .45 pistol.   At some point, two Caucasian men entered the bar and began drinking. The gentlemen did not know Mr. Chambers. Later, all of the gentlemen departed the bar simultaneously and walked to their respective vehicles which were parked nearby each other in the parking lot.

For reasons unknown, words were exchanged between Chambers and the two gentlemen, who apparently uttered racial epitaphs to each other, Mr. Chambers, or both. One of the gentleman – Michael Travis Hood – pulled a shovel from his vehicle; apparently to defend himself from Mr. Chambers. However, Chambers shot Mr. Hood three times with his .45 pistol. Chambers walked away, got into his car and drove home in his BMW.

Mr. Hood died from lethal gunshot wounds to his back.

Seattle police arrested Chambers at his home at 10:49 p.m. Officer Belgarde read Chambers his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. Chambers smelled of alcohol. He was “swaying,” had trouble balancing, slurred his words, and was argumentative. Officer Galbraith drove Chambers to the precinct. Officers obtained a warrant to search Chambers’ home and seized a loaded .45 caliber handgun, a spare magazine, and the BMW keys. The police impounded the BMW. Later, officers interrogated Chambers and obtained numerous incriminating statements regarding the shooting.

The State charged Chambers with murder in the second degree of Hood while armed with a deadly weapon. Chambers asserted a claim of self-defense. Before trial, Chambers filed a CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house and the statements he made. The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house. The court concluded the police “were authorized to enter the house to conduct a protective sweep to ensure their safety.” The court also denied the motion to suppress Chambers’ statements to police and reasoned his “right to remain silent was scrupulously honored” under Michigan v. Mosley.

The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. By special verdict, the jury found Chambers was armed with a firearm at the time he committed the crime. The court imposed the low-end standard range sentence of 78 months plus the mandatory consecutive 60-month firearm enhancement. Chambers appealed.

  1. Evidence Seized from the House Was Obtained Through a Unlawfully Conducted “Protective Sweep,” However, The Trial Court’s Decision to Deny Chambers’ Suppression Motion Was Harmless Error.

Chambers contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his house: the Colt .45, a magazine clip with .45 caliber bullets, and the keys to the BMW.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a warrantless search and seizure unless the State demonstrates that one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a “protective sweep” of the home. The court further reasoned that under Maryland v. Buie the U.S. Supreme Court describes a protective sweep as a limited cursory search incident to arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.

The Court of Appeals decided the trial court erred in concluding the police had the authority to conduct a protective sweep of Chambers’ house. First, a warrantless search of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest” without probable cause or reasonable suspicion does not apply when the police arrest an individual outside his home.

Here, the undisputed facts do not support the warrantless entry and protective sweep of the kitchen under Buie and the court erred in denying the motion to suppress:

“The record does not support the conclusion that there were “articulable facts” that the kitchen harbored “an individual posing a danger.” The police had information that only Chambers shot Hood and was alone when he drove away. The findings establish the only individual in the house when police arrested Chambers was his spouse. The front door was open after the arrest and the police could see Sara was sitting on the living room couch watching television and remained in the living room.”

However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that the verdict would have been the same absent the trial court’s error. Chambers testified he acted in self-defense when he shot Hood with the Colt .45. Chambers admitted that he parked his BMW in front of the Beveridge Place Pub on January 21, that he kept a .45 caliber gun under the passenger seat of the BMW, and that he used the Colt .45 to shoot Hood near Morgan Junction Park. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny Chamber’s motion to suppress was harmless error.

2. Chamber’s Incriminating Statements Are Admissible.

On appeal, Mr. Chambers asserts the detectives did not “scrupulously honor” his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “No person shall be . .. compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court adopted “procedural safeguards” to protect the privilege and held that before questioning an individual in custody, the police must clearly inform the suspect of the following:

That he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Here, the Court of Appeals decided that because the circumstances leading up to the police’s interview with Chambers show the police scrupulously honored Chambers’ right to cut off questioning, the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statements Chambers made.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the record shows the police advised Chambers of his Miranda rights at 10:51 p.m. when he was arrested on January 21. Chambers stated he understood his rights and unequivocally said he did not want to talk to the police. The record establishes the police did not “ask the defendant any questions or persist in repeated efforts to wear him down or change his mind after he invoked his rights.” After he invoked his right to remain silent at 10:51 p.m. on January 21, the police did not question Chambers while at police headquarters. And while driving to Harborview to obtain a blood draw at 3:07 a.m. on January 22, the detectives did not ask Chambers any questions.

Nonetheless, on the way to Harborview, Chambers said he did not want to talk about what happened. While at Harborview, Chambers seemed to have “sobered up.” When they left Harborview approximately 45 minutes later, Detective Steiger advised Chambers of his Miranda rights again. Chambers stated he understood his rights and did not invoke the right to remain silent.

With that, the Court of Appeals concluded the undisputed facts support the conclusion that the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

The Court affirmed the jury verdict.

My opinion? The police should have advised Mr. Chambers of his Ferrier warnings, a topic which I have blogged many times. Ferrier warnings must be given if police officers seek to enter the home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime or contraband. Still, even if Ferrier warnings were given and Mr. Chambers denied the police entry into his home, his incriminating statements to police ultimately assigned harmless error to the unlawful search.