Category Archives: DUI

Emergency Blood Draws

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In State v. Inman, the WA Court of Appeals held that a warrantless blood draw was proper under exigent circumstances where: (a) the injury collision occurred in a rural area; (b) there is spotty phone service; (c) a search warrant takes 30-45 minutes to create; and (d) helicopters airlifted the DUI suspect to a hospital. A search warrant is not required before a blood sample collected under the exigent circumstances exception is tested for alcohol and drugs.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In May 2015, Inman and Margie Vanderhoof were injured in a motorcycle accident on a
rural road. Inman was the driver of the motorcycle and Vanderhoof was his passenger. Captain Tim Manly, the first paramedic on the scene, observed a motorcycle in a ditch and two people lying down in a driveway approximately 20 to 25 feet away. Captain Manly observed that Inman had facial trauma, including bleeding and abrasions on the face, and a deformed helmet. Based on Inman’s injuries, Captain Manly believed that the accident was a high-trauma incident.

Captain Manly learned from a bystander that Inman had been unconscious for approximately five minutes after the collision before regaining consciousness. Manly
administered emergency treatment to Inman, which included placing Inman in a C-Spine, a device designed to immobilize the spine to prevent paralysis.

While Captain Manly provided Inman with treatment, Sergeant Galin Hester of the Washington State Patrol contacted Vanderhoof, who complained of pelvic pain. Sergeant Hester spoke with Inman and smelled intoxicants on him.

Later, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Przygocki arrived on the scene and observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage.  He contacted Inman in the ambulance and, smelling alcohol, asked whether Inman had been drinking and driving. Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

Deputy Przygocki believed he had probable cause to believe Inman was driving under the influence. Helicopters came to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest trauma center. Deputy Przygocki knew that preparation of a search warrant affidavit takes 30-45 minutes. There was no reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area. Deputy Przygocki conducted a warrantless blood draw after reading a special evidence warning to Inman informing him that he was under arrest and that a blood sample was being seized to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood.

There is a process by which a search warrant for a blood draw may be obtained
telephonically and executed by an officer at the hospital to which Inman was being transported. However, this process is problematic and, in the experience of Officer Hester, had never worked in the past.

TRIAL COURT PROCEDURES

Inman was charged with vehicular assault while under the influence and filed a motion to
suppress evidence of the warrantless blood draw. He argued that the implied consent statute authorized a warrantless blood draw but that the implied consent statute was not constitutional, so there was no valid authority for the blood draw. He also argued that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify a warrantless blood draw in this case.

In response, the State argued that Inman’s blood was lawfully drawn pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

The trial court heard testimony from six witnesses, who testified consistently with the
factual findings summarized above. The trial court orally ruled that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw and later entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Inman filed a reconsideration motion. He argued that there was no probable cause for DUI. He also argued that, even assuming that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw, a warrant was needed to test the blood. The State disagreed.

The trial court denied Inman’s reconsideration motion. The trial court concluded that Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. In addition, the trial court concluded that the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the trial court concluded that because the blood was lawfully seized under exigent circumstances, no warrant was required to test the blood. After a stipulated facts trial, the trial court found Inman guilty of vehicular assault. Inman appealed.

COURT’S CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

  1. The Arrest Was Supported by Probable Cause.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an arrest is lawful only when supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer, at the time of the arrest, has knowledge of facts sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that an offense has been committed. Whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Here, Deputy Przygocki had probable cause to believe Inman had committed a DUI. When Deputy Przygocki arrived on the scene, he observed a motorcycle in a ditch with significant front-end damage and, after running the license plates, knew the vehicle belonged to Inman. Deputy Przygocki learned from Sergeant Hester that Inman was in the ambulance and smelled of alcohol. Deputy Przygocki then contacted Inman in the ambulance, and Inman admitted he had been driving the motorcycle and that he had been drinking before he drove.

“Based on these facts, Deputy Przygocki knew that Inman was driving the motorcycle after drinking alcohol when he crashed. This knowledge is sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that Inman was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol,” said the Court of Appeals.

2. Exigent Circumstances Supported a Warrantless Blood Draw.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a warrantless search is impermissible under both article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless an exception to the warrant requirement authorizes the search. Drawing a person’s blood for alcohol testing is a search triggering these constitutional protections. A warrantless search is allowed if exigent circumstances exist.  The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is not practical because the delay would permit the destruction of evidence.

“The natural dissipation of an intoxicating substance in a suspect’s blood may be a factor in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless blood search, but courts determine exigency under the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.”

The Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances, obtaining a warrant was not practical. Inman and Vanderhoof were both injured from a motorcycle accident that resulted in significant front-end damage to the motorcycle, which was found in a ditch. Both Inman and Vanderhoof received emergency medical services, and Inman was receiving treatment for possible spine injuries. At the time of the blood draw, helicopters were coming to airlift Inman and Vanderhoof to the nearest hospital. It would have taken at least 45 minutes to prepare and obtain judicial approval for a search warrant. Deputy Przygocki lacked reliable cell phone coverage in the rural area, so obtaining a telephonic warrant may have been a challenge.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Inman’s suppression motion. First, there was probable cause to arrest Inman for DUI. Second, exigent circumstances existed to authorize a warrantless blood draw. Third, the implied consent statute does not bar a warrantless search under exigent circumstances. Finally, a legal blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception allows testing of the blood without a warrant when there is probable cause to arrest for DUI.

My opinion? Exigent circumstances are one of many arguments that the government uses to get around search warrant requirements. Contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving DUI, blood draws, or exigent circumstances which arguably circumvent the need for officers to obtain search warrants. In difficult cases like the one described above, competent legal counsel is definitely needed to protect constitutional rights against unlawful search and seizure.

Wine Glass Sizes Are Increasing

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An article by of the Guardian reports that scientists at the University of Cambridge have found that the capacity of wine glasses has ballooned nearly seven-fold over the past 300 years, rising most sharply in the last two decades in line with a surge in wine consumption.

Wine glasses have swelled in size from an average capacity of 66ml in the early 1700s to 449ml today, the study reveals – a change that may have encouraged us to drink far more than is healthy. Indeed, a typical wine glass 300 years ago would only have held about a half of today’s smallest “official” measure of 125ml.

Smithers reports that the university’s behaviour and health research unit quizzed antique experts and examined 18th-century glasses held at the Ashmolean museum in Oxford, glassware used at Buckingham Palace, and more recent glasses in John Lewis catalogues.

The evidence was clear: the newer glasses were bigger.

The study, published on Wednesday in the BMJ, measured wine glass capacity from 1700 to the present day to help understand whether any changes in their size might have contributed to the rise in wine consumption.

“Wine will no doubt be a feature of some merry Christmas nights, but when it comes to how much we drink, wine glass size probably does matter,” said Prof Theresa Marteau, director of the Behaviour and Health Research Unit at the University of Cambridge, who led the research.

In 2016, Marteau and her colleagues carried out an experiment at the Pint Shop in Cambridge, altering the size of wine glasses while keeping the serving sizes the same. They found this led to an almost 10% increase in sales.

Smithers reports that for the new study, the researchers obtained measurements of 411 glasses from 1700 to the modern day. They found wine glass capacity increased from 66ml in the 1700s to 417ml in the 2000s, with the mean wine glass size in 2016-17 even higher at 449ml.

“Wine glasses became a common receptacle from which wine was drunk around 1700,” says author Dr. Zorana Zupan. “This followed the development of lead crystal glassware by George Ravenscroft in the late 17th century, which led to the manufacture of less fragile and larger glasses than was previously possible.”

The study points out that alcohol is the fifth largest risk factor for premature mortality and disability in high income countries. In England, the type of alcohol and volume consumed has fluctuated over the last 300 years, in response to economic, legislative and social factors. Significantly, wine consumption increased almost fourfold between 1960 and 1980, and almost doubled again between 1980 and 2004, a trend attributed to better marketing and licensing liberalisation which allowed supermarkets to compete in the lucrative drinks retail business.

“Our findings suggest that the capacity of wine glasses in England increased significantly over the past 300 years,” added Zupan.

“Since the 1990s, the size has increased rapidly. Whether this led to the rise in wine consumption in England, we can’t say for certain, but a wine glass 300 years ago would only have held about a half of today’s small measure.”

The strength of wine sold in the UK has also increased since the 1990s, adding to the amount of pure alcohol being consumed by wine drinkers.

In England, wine is increasingly served in pubs and bars in 250ml servings, with smaller measures of 125ml often absent from wine lists or menus despite a regulatory requirement that licensees make customers aware of them.

The Wine and Spirits Trade Association said sociological trends were probably part of the reason for the growing wine glasses.

“The size of a wine glass reflects the trend and fashions of the time and is often larger for practical reasons” said the WSTA chief executive Miles Beale. “Red wine, for example, is served in a larger glass to allow it to breathe, something which perhaps wasn’t a priority 300 years ago.”

Drink responsibly. If, however, your family or friends are charged with DUI or face any other alcohol-related charges, then contact my law offices and schedule a free consultation. You need effective and competent representation before the judge, prosecutors and the Department of Licensing.

Who Is The Toxicologist?

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In the deeply divided 5-4 court decision State v. Salgado-Mendoza, the WA Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) even though the defendant was not informed which State toxicologist would testify.

I originally discussed this case in my blog titled, “Prosecutors Must Reveal Toxicologist Identities in DUI Trials.” At that time, the WA Court of Appeals Division II reversed the defendant’s DUI conviction because the Prosecutor failed to give Defense Counsel the name of their Toxicologist expert witness before trial.

On appeal, however, the WA Supreme Court decided differently. It overturned the Court of Appeals and said the trial court, in fact, was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On the evening of August 11, 2012, a Washington State Patrol trooper stopped and arrested Mr. Salgado-Mendoza for DUI. His BAC test showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.103 and 0.104; which is over the .o8 limit.

Before trial, the State initially disclosed the names of nine toxicologists from the Washington State Patrol toxicology laboratory, indicating its intent to call “one of the following.” It whittled the list to three names the day before trial, but did not specify which toxicologist it would call until the morning of trial, noting that it provided the witness’s name “as soon as we had it and that’s all that we can do in terms of disclosure.”

Mendoza moved to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony under CrRLJ 8.3(b) based on
late disclosure, asking the court to “send a message to the state patrol crime lab and
say this isn’t okay anymore.” The trial court refused, finding no actual prejudice to the defense and observing that the practice of disclosing a list of available toxicologists rather than a specific witness was driven more by underfunding of the crime labs than by mismanagement.

Salgado-Mendoza appealed to the superior court, which found the district
court had abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the
delayed disclosure violated the discovery rules and caused prejudice. Again, however, the WA Court of Appeals disagreed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court reasoned that while the State’s disclosure practice amounted to mismanagement within the meaning of CrRLJ 8.3(b), Salgado-Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression.

The majority Court explained that under CrRLJ 8.3(b), the party seeking relief bears the burden of showing both misconduct and actual prejudice.

“In this case, Salgado-Mendoza can demonstrate misconduct within the meaning of the rule, but not actual prejudice. He can prove misconduct because a discovery violation need not be willful—simple mismanagement will suffice. Here, the State’s failure to at least narrow the list of possible toxicology witnesses pretrial reflects mismanagement,” said the Court. “However, Salgado-Mendoza cannot show prejudice that wan’ants complete suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court held that Mr. Mendoza has not demonstrated actual prejudice to justify suppression of the toxicologist’s testimony. “Because there was no abuse of discretion, we reverse the Court of Appeals.”

THE DISSENT

Justice Madsen authored the dissenting opinion. She was joined by Justices Yu, Gordon McCloud and Johnson.

In short, the dissenting judges disagreed with the majority because they believed the defendant was prejudiced by this delayed disclosure of the possible toxicologists who would testify. They reasoned that forcing a defendant to bear the burden of preparing to cross-examine a long list of witnesses when the State only intends to call one is not how our system of justice operates.

“The State cannot cite funding deficiencies and simply shift its burden of prosecution onto defense counsel,” wrote Judge Madsen. “If the State wishes to pursue prosecution, it must allocate sufficient resources to its departments so that they may operate in a way that is consistent with a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

“By under-staffing the State’s toxicology laboratory so that they cannot confirm who will testify until the day of trial, the State is not meeting this burden and defendants are being forced to compensate for the deficiency. Therefore, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Salgado-Mendoza’s motion to suppress the toxicologist’s testimony.”

My opinion? I must agree with the dissenting opinion. Under the Sixth Amendment and the WA Constitution, The State bears the burden of proving their charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the State must follow discovery rules under CrR 4.7. One of the State’s discovery obligations is to name their witnesses who they call to testify. Period. Collateral issues revolving around the State’s under-staffing and a lack of funding should not excuse violating a defendant’s Constitutional rights.

Sessions on WA Marijuana

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Random UA’s & Privacy

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In State v. Olsen, the WA Supreme Court held that although random urinalysis tests (UAs) do implicate the privacy interests of a defendant who is on probation (probationer), the testing does not violate the defendant’s Constitutional rights if the UAs purpose was to  monitor compliance with a valid probation condition requiring the defendant to refrain from drug and alcohol consumption.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The facts are undisputed. In June 2014, defendant Brittanie Olsen pleaded guilty in Jefferson County District Court to one count of DUI, a gross misdemeanor offense under RCW 46.61.502. The court imposed a sentence of 364 days of confinement with 334 days suspended. As a condition of her suspended sentence, the court ordered that Olsen not consume alcohol, marijuana, or non prescribed drugs. Over defense objection, the court also required Olsen to submit to “random urine analysis screens … to ensure compliance with conditions regarding the consumption of alcohol and controlled substances.”

Olsen appealed to Jefferson County Superior Court, arguing that the random UAs requirement violated her privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. She contended a warrantless search of a misdemeanant probationer may not be random but instead “must be supported by a well-founded suspicion that the probationer has violated a condition of her sentence.” The court agreed, vacated Olsen’s sentence, and remanded to the district court for resentencing without the requirement that Olsen submit to random urine tests.

The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “offenders on probation for DUI convictions do not have a privacy interest in preventing the random collection and testing of their urine when used to ensure compliance with a probation condition prohibiting the consumption of alcohol, marijuana, and/or non prescribed drugs.

ISSUE

The WA Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether random UAs ordered to monitor compliance with a valid probation condition not to consume drugs or alcohol violate a DUI probationer’s privacy interests under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

COURT’S CONCLUSIONS & ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court held that the random UAs here were conducted with “authority of law” under article I, section 7 of our state constitution. Furthermore, although random UAs of DUI probationers do implicate privacy interests, the UAs here are narrowly tailored and imposed to monitor compliance with a valid probation conditions.

The Court reasoned that The Washington State Constitution says that no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. One area of increased protection is the collection and testing of urine.

“Compared to the federal courts, we offer heightened protection for bodily functions,” said the Court. It elaborated that our courts have generally held that for ordinary citizens, suspicionless urinalysis testing constitutes a disturbance of one’s private affairs that, absent authority of law, violates the WA Constitution.

“On the other hand, we have repeatedly upheld blood or urine tests of prisoners, probationers, and parolees of some cases without explicitly conducting an analysis under the WA Constitution,” said the Court. It elaborated that two questions must be answered in cases like this: (1) whether the contested state action disturbed a person’s private affairs and, if so, (2) whether the action was undertaken with authority of law.

a. UAs Implicate a DUI Probationer’s Privacy Interests.

“We have consistently held that the nonconsensual removal of bodily fluids implicates privacy interests,” said the Court. It further stated that UAs implicate privacy interests in two ways. First, the act of providing a urine sample is fundamentally intrusive. This is particularly true where urine samples are collected under observation to ensure compliance. Second, chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about a person, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. “These privacy interests are precisely what article I, section 7 is meant to protect.”

However, the Court also said that probationers do not enjoy constitutional privacy protection to the same degree as other citizens.

“Probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy because they are persons whom a court has sentenced to confinement but who are serving their time outside the prison walls,” said the Court.  Therefore, the State may supervise and scrutinize a probationer more closely than it may other citizens. “However, this diminished expectation of privacy is constitutionally permissible only to the extent necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.”

The Court then addressed the State’s argument that UAs do not implicate Olsen’s privacy interests because probationers lack any privacy interest in their urine.

“We disagree,” said the Court. “Even though misdemeanant probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy, this does not mean that they have no privacy rights at all in their bodily fluids.” After giving a detailed analysis under the precedent of State v. Surge, the Court summarized that, even though probationers do not enjoy the same expectation of
privacy as other citizens, the UAs here still implicate their reduced privacy
interests under the WA Constitution.

b. Random UAs of DUI Probationers Do Not Violate the WA Constitution Because They Are Conducted with Authority of Law.

Next, the Court addressed whether the UA was performed with authority of law. In short, the Court decided that issue in the affirmative. It said the State has a strong interest in supervising DUI probationers in order to promote rehabilitation and protect the public, and elaborated that probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments.

It elaborated that probation is not a right, but an act of judicial grace or lenience motivated in part by the hope that the offender will become rehabilitated. To that end, a sentencing court has great discretion to impose conditions and restrictions of probation to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.

“As such, the State has a compelling interest in closely monitoring probationers in order to promote their rehabilitation,” said the Court. “As probation officers’ role is rehabilitative rather than punitive in nature, they must, then, have tools at their disposal in order to accurately assess whether rehabilitation is taking place.” Here, in the case of DUI probationers, the Court reasoned that monitoring and supervision ensure that treatment is taking place and serve to protect the public in the case that a probationer fails to comply with court-imposed conditions.

The court further reasoned that random UAs are narrowly tailored to monitor compliance with probation conditions, they are an effective monitoring tool and they are a permissible under these circumstances:

“Unannounced testing is, arguably, crucial if a court is to impose drug testing at all. Random testing seeks to deter the probationer from consuming drugs or alcohol by putting her on notice that drug use can be discovered at any time. It also promotes rehabilitation and accountability by providing the probation officer with a ‘practical mechanism to determine whether rehabilitation is indeed taking place.'”

Finally, the WA Supreme Court reasoned that random UAs, under certain circumstances, are a constitutionally permissible form of close scrutiny of DUI probationers. It found that
the testing here was a narrowly tailored monitoring tool imposed pursuant to a valid prohibition on drug and alcohol use. Random UAs are also directly related to a probationer’s rehabilitation and supervision.

With that, the Court concluded  that the random UAs here were conducted with “authority of law” under article I, section 7 of our state constitution and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision to invoke them.

Invalid Search Warrant

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In State v. Youngs, the WA Court of Appeals suppressed evidence of the defendant’s blood test collected after a search warrant because the search warrant application did not contain sufficient facts to establish that the suspect was driving the car.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In the early morning hours of May 15, 2013, a Washington State Patrol Trooper arrested Youngs after driving a car involved in a rollover collision. The judge issued the warrant based on the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant for Evidence of a Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUI).

This affidavit is a largely preprinted form to which the law enforcement officer may add information.

Following the blood draw, the State charged Youngs with DUI. Youngs moved to suppress evidence obtained under authority of the warrant. The district court denied the motion. Youngs then agreed to a stipulated bench trial based on the police report and blood alcohol report. The district court found Youngs guilty and sentenced him.

Youngs sought review in the superior court. The Court affirmed based on the content in the state trooper’s affidavit. Eventually, the WA Court of Appeals granted Youngs’s appeal.

ISSUE

The question was whether the trooper’s search warrant affidavit had sufficient facts for a judge to make an independent decision whether there was probable cause that the defendant was driving.

COURT’S DECISION & ANALYSIS

 

The Court decided that although the factual information concerning intoxication is sufficient and unchallenged in this case, the factual information to establish driving is insufficient.

The Court reasoned that a judge may only issue a search warrant upon probable cause. The warrant must be supported by an affidavit identifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The affidavit must contain sufficient facts to convince an ordinary person that the defendant is probably engaged in criminal activity.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that judges must evaluate the relevant affidavit “‘in a commonsense manner, rather than hypertechnically, and any doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant. Thus, a “negligent or innocent mistake” in drafting the affidavit will not void it. Also, judges may draw reasonable inferences from the stated facts.

However, the Court also reasoned that inferences alone, without an otherwise substantial basis of facts, are insufficient. The affidavit may provide summary statements so long as it also expresses the facts and circumstances underlying that summary.

Here, the Court found technical problems with the affidavit. For example, one problem is that the preprinted language in the form—”ceased driving/was found in physical control of a motor vehicle” — suggests that it is intended to apply to two different crimes. One crime is “Driving While Under the Influence under RCW 46.61.502, while the other is “Physical Control of Vehicle While Under the Influence under RCW 46.61.504, which is a totally separate and different crime with different elements for the State to prove:

The Court said that unlike the act of driving, which may be readily observed, “physical control” is a conclusion drawn from other facts. For example, a police officer may reach this conclusion based on the defendant’s proximity to the vehicle, possession of keys to it, or similar observable circumstances.  Because the magistrate must independently determine whether probable cause exists, he or she cannot simply accept such a conclusion without supporting allegations. Therefore, ruled the Court, the statements in the search warrant affidavit are conclusory, general, and insufficient to support probable cause that Youngs was driving the vehicle.

With that, the Court reversed Youngs’ conviction and remanded the case back to the district court with directions to suppress the evidence obtained by the warrant.

My opinion? Excellent decision. Sure, it’s sometimes safe to assume that the sole driver of a car involved in a collision is, in fact, the driver. However, it muddies the waters even further when law enforcement officers issuing search warrants fail to clarify whether the crime of straight DUI or Physical Control DUI took place. These crimes are very different. One crimes involves officers seeing the defendant drive (straight DUI) while the other crime does not (Physical Control DUI). Combined with the fact that there was missing information regarding the defendant’s driving at all, this combination of errors makes for an ineffective search warrant.

Again, good decision.

Fourth of July is One of the Deadliest Days For Drunk Driving

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Excellent news article by reporter German Lopez of Vox discusses how the Fourth of July is among the deadliest days for drunk driving every year, thanks to people both drinking and driving more.

According to an analysis by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety using data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System, between 2010 and 2014, July 4 had the second highest percent of car crash deaths that were linked to alcohol, and July 3 was also in the top 10.

Lopez gives a scale on how the 10 deadliest days broke down, with the percentage noting how many of the car crash deaths involved a blood alcohol level of 0.08 g/dL or more:

  1. January 1: 62 percent (364 of 591 car crash deaths)
  2. July 4: 47 percent (278 of 592 car crash deaths)
  3. December 24: 41 percent (191 of 461 car crash deaths)
  4. February 6: 41 percent (151 of 366 car crash deaths)
  5. July 24: 41 percent (207 of 502 car crash deaths)
  6. July 3: 41 percent (219 of 533 car crash deaths)
  7. March 9: 41 percent (161 of 396 car crash deaths)
  8. December 25: 41 percent (137 of 338 car crash deaths)
  9. April 21: 40 percent (176 of 435 car crash deaths)
  10. April 17: 40 percent (176 of 438 car crash deaths)

Also, Lopez reported that although drunk driving deaths have plummeted over the past few decades. In 1981, drunk driving killed more than 21,000 people. By 2015, that figure was cut in half. An array of reforms played a big role in that reduction, including raising the legal alcohol age to 21, pushing police to take the enforcement of drunk driving laws much more seriously, and general improvements in car and traffic safety.

But much of that action happened in the 1980s and ’90s, when MADD and other advocacy groups came together in a strong, well-funded effort to take drunk driving more seriously. Since then, the issue has fallen off the national radar.

 Alcohol’s problems extend far beyond drunk driving as well. Alcohol is linked to at least 88,000 deaths in the US each year, only about an eighth of which are driving-related. That estimate comes from 2006 through 2010, but more recent data suggests that at least some alcohol deaths are trending up: Between 2010 and 2015, the number of alcohol-induced deaths (those that involve direct health complications from alcohol, like liver cirrhosis) rose from less than 26,000 to more than 33,000.

Based on the research, there is also a lot more that America could be doing to prevent alcohol-related deaths — yet there is little media or public attention to this issue, so there is little pressure for lawmakers to put this research into action. The result is that one of the big causes of death in America continues to kill thousands of people a year.

DEALING WITH INCREASED DEATH TOLLS RELATED TO ALCOHOL ABUSE.

Lopez points out that when Americans think about alcohol policy, the first thing that comes to mind is probably Prohibition, which effectively banned the manufacture and sale of alcohol from 1920 to 1933. That solution, of course, did not work. Still, Lopez suggests the following other policies could help address the negative safety impacts of drinking.

  • A higher alcohol tax: A 2010 review of the research in the American Journal of Public Health came out with strong findings: “Our results suggest that doubling the alcohol tax would reduce alcohol-related mortality by an average of 35%, traffic crash deaths by 11%, sexually transmitted disease by 6%, violence by 2%, and crime by 1.4%.”
  • Reducing the number of alcohol outlets: A 2009 review published in the American Journal of Preventive Medicine also found that limiting the number of alcohol outlets (such as liquor stores) in an area through stricter licensing, for example, can limit problematic drinking and its dangers. But it also found that going too far can have negative results — by, for example, causing more car crashes as people take longer drives to outlets and possibly drink before returning home.
  • Revoking alcohol offenders’ right to drink: South Dakota’s 24/7 Sobriety programeffectively revokes people’s right to drink if a court deems it necessary after an alcohol-related offense. The program, specifically, monitors offenders through twice-a-day breathalyzer tests or a bracelet that can track blood alcohol level, and jails them for one or two days for each failed test. Studies from the RAND Corporation have linked the program to drops in mortality, DUI arrests, and domestic violence arrests.
  • Put state governments in charge of selling alcohol: A 2014 report from RAND concluded that when state governments monopolize alcohol sales through state-run shops, they can keep prices higher, reduce access to youth, and reduce overall levels of use.

These are just a few of the ideas that experts have put out there. There are many more ways to curtail alcohol consumption and misuse without outright banning it.

Maybe these policies still go too far for some people. Different individuals will likely disagree on whether these proposals go too far in restricting personal liberty, even if they do save some lives. But the research suggests such policies are at least worth considering.

Yet lawmakers have paid very little attention to alcohol policy. As Philip Cook, a public policy expert at Duke University who wrote Paying the Tab: The Costs and Benefits of Alcohol Control, told Mr. Lopez, the last time Congress raised the federal alcohol tax was 1991 — and that has let the actual impact of the tax erode due to increasing inflation:

“The great opportunity we have is to restore taxes to the real value that they had a few decades ago. That’s justified by the current social costs of drinking, and would have all kinds of beneficial effects, while being justified just from the point of view that drinkers should pay for the damage that they do.”

My opinion? I share Mr. Lopez’s argument that part of the problem is that policymakers just don’t feel much pressure to act on these kinds of public health problems — at least in the same way they feel compelled to act on an issue like, say, terrorism. So thousands of needless deaths continue happening in America every year, including hundreds this Fourth of July.

However, if you; a friend or family member is pulled over for alcohol-related driving, contact a qualified, competent criminal defense attorney as soon as possible. The consequences of DUI – ranging from jail, to high court fines to suspended/revoked drivers  licenses are too great to be trifled with.

Independent Blood Tests

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In State v. Sosa, the WA Court of Appeals Div. III decided there is no requirement that an officer performing a blood draw on a DUI suspect must advise the driver that the driver has the right to an independent blood alcohol test.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On March of 2014, defendant Jose Sosa’s vehicle crossed the center line of U.S. Route 12, causing a two-car collision. Mr. Sosa called 911 and law enforcement responded to the scene. On contact, the responding officer noticed Mr. Sosa smelled of alcohol and showed signs of impairment. In response to questioning, Mr. Sosa disclosed that he had some beer earlier but did not provide any specifics. An ambulance transported Mr. Sosa to the hospital.

At the emergency room, a state trooper contacted Mr. Sosa. Again, Mr. Sosa was noted to smell of alcohol and display signs of impairment. The trooper asked Mr. Sosa if he would be willing to do a voluntary field sobriety test. Mr. Sosa did not respond. The trooper then offered to administer a portable breath test (PBT), which would have provided a preliminary indication of Mr. Sosa’s BAC. Again, Mr. Sosa did not respond.

Based on the trooper’s observations, a warrant was obtained to procure a sample of Mr. Sosa’s blood. Three and a half hours after the accident, Mr. Sosa’s BAC was 0.12. Mr. Sosa was arrested and charged with vehicular assault.

Several days after the accident, the driver of the vehicle hit by Mr. Sosa returned to the hospital because of abdominal pain. Doctors performed a lifesaving partial splenectomy. Mr. Sosa’s case proceeded to trial. The jury found Mr. Sosa guilty of vehicular assault via all three of the charged alternatives: ( 1) operating a vehicle in a reckless manner, (2) operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and (3) operating a vehicle with disregard for the safety of others.

On appeal, Mr. Sosa argues evidence of his blood test results should have been suppressed because he was not advised, at the time of the blood draw, of the right to independent testing. Former RCW 46.61.506(6) (2010) stated: “The person tested may have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his or her own choosing administer one or more tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer. … ” On this argument, Mr. Sosa alleged his constitutional rights were violated.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Court reasoned that cases relied on by Mr. Sosa in support of his right-to-advice argument interpret prior versions of the Revised Code of Washington. The statutes in effect at the time of Mr. Sosa’s offense no longer required advice about independent testing in the context of a blood draw:

“Had Mr. Sosa’s offense taken place prior to the 2013 amendment, he undoubtedly would have been entitled to advice about independent blood testing. But this is no longer so. Our case law addressing the implied consent warning has always been based on statutory principles, not constitutional grounds.”

In short, the Court stated there is no independent constitutional right to such advice. Accordingly, any failure of law enforcement to advise Mr. Sosa about the right to an independent test had no bearing on the State’s evidence or Mr. Sosa’s conviction. With that, the court rejected Mr. Sosa’s challenge to his conviction based on the blood test results.

My opinion? Had Mr. Sosa’s offense taken place prior to the 2013 amendment, he undoubtedly would have been entitled to advice about independent blood testing. But this is no longer so. Washington’s implied consent law changed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, which held the taking of a DUI suspect’s blood without a warrant violates the suspect’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the exigency exception to the warrant requirement generally does not apply.

 

 

DUI: Men vs. Women

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Great news article from the Bellingham Herald discusses the physiological differences in alcohol impairment levels experienced between men and women.

In Who Gets Arrested More for DUI: Men or Women?,  author Doug Dahl states that over the past couple decades, alcohol-impaired driving has steadily been decreasing, however, the reduction in impaired driving doesn’t apply to women. Dahl is the Target Zero Manager for the Whatcom County Traffic Safety Task Force.

Apparently, in a recent 10-year period, DUI arrests for men decreased by 7.5 percent while DUI arrests for women increased by 28.8 percent.

“According to the CDC, the average weight of an American man is 196 pounds, while the average American woman weighs 166 pounds,” said Dahl.  “Also, because of differences in enzymes, hormones and body fat percentages between men and women, women generally metabolize alcohol at a slower rate.” Simply put, says Dahl, women get drunk faster and stay drunk longer than men:

“To be clear, both of our imaginary people in this example shouldn’t drive. A BAC of .06 will cause impairment. It’s a big enough concern that legislators in some states, including Washington, have proposed reducing the legal limit to .05.”

Mr. Dahl further states that the level of impairment between a BAC of .06 and .09 is significant. According to a study of impaired driving crashes, a driver with a BAC of .06 is about 1.6 times more likely to cause a crash than a sober driver. For a driver with a BAC of .09, that jumps up to 3.5 times more likely. “Don’t judge your own impairment based on how someone else handles the same amount of alcohol, and always have a plan for a safe ride home before going out for drinks,” says Dahl.

Regardless of your gender, please contact my office if you, a friend or relative faces charges of DUI. These charges are serious, threaten careers and can significantly limit one’s driving privileges.

Lower .08 to .05?

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Interesting article from Heather Bosch of KING 5 news reports that Washington state lawmakers are considering lowering the legal limit for driving under intoxication (DUI) from .08 to .05.

“The research shows impairment begins with the first drink,” said Representative John Lovick, D-44th District. “And I believe this after being a state trooper for 31 years.” Lovick said he based his legislation, House Bill 1874, on recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board.

According to Bosche, however, the American Beverage Institute opposes the bill and similar legislation being proposed in Hawaii and Utah. The industry group claims only a small percentage of deadly car crashes are caused by drivers with a blood alcohol concentration between .05 and .08, and that a 120-pound woman could reach .05 with just little more than one drink. A 150-pound man could reach it after two.

“The move would target responsible and moderate social drinkers while ignoring the hardcore drunk drivers who pose the greatest threat to safety,” said American Beverage Institute Managing Director Sarah Longwell. In short, Longwell says what’s needed is better enforcement of current laws: “We have to focus on the real problem and not be distracted by feel-good legislation that criminalizes perfectly responsible behavior,” said Longwell.

Representative John Lovick agrees that current laws could be better enforced, but says lowering the alcohol limit to .05 would be “a great first step in letting the public know that we are serious about keeping people who drive drunk, off the streets.”

Bosche reports that a public hearing before the House Transportation Committee will be held Tuesday. The bill already cleared the House Public Safety committee, but not without controversy.

“There will be a few ‘no’ votes on this side of the aisle,” Representative Dave Hayes (R-10th District) said during a recent hearing. “My personal viewpoint on this is just the fact that I don’t believe it’s necessary to reduce the blood alcohol level, based on testimony and my own personal experience in processing DUIs.” Hayes is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office.  Lovick is the former Snohomish County Sheriff.

The National Transportation Safety Board has said that if every state lowered the legal blood alcohol limit to .05, it would save 1,000 lives every year.

Interestingly, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) does not support the measure, calling it a “waste of time” because most people who are under .08 can pass field sobriety tests.