Category Archives: Cell Phone

Extraction of Smartphone Data by U.S. Law Enforcement

Mass Extraction | Upturn

A new report from upturn.org reveals that thousands of smartphones are searched by police every day across the US. Unfortunately, most searches are done without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

THE PROBLEM

Law enforcement agencies across the country search thousands of cellphones, typically incident to arrest. To search phones, law enforcement agencies use mobile device forensic tools (MDFTs). This powerful technology allows police to extract a full copy of data from a cellphone. This data includes all emails, texts, photos, location, app data, and more. The report documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

“We found that state and local law enforcement agencies have performed hundreds of thousands of cellphone extractions since 2015, often without a warrant. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such records have been widely disclosed.” ~Upturn.org

According to the report, every American is at risk of having their phone forensically searched by law enforcement. Police use these tools to investigate assault, prostitution, vandalism, theft, drug-related offenses, etc. Given how routine these searches are today, it’s more than likely that these technologies disparately affect and are used against communities of color.

The emergence of these tools represents a dangerous expansion in law enforcement’s investigatory powers. In 2011, only 35% of Americans owned a smartphone. Today, it’s at least 81% of Americans. Moreover, many Americans — especially people of color and people with lower incomes — rely solely on their cellphones to connect to the internet. For law enforcement, mobile phones remain the most frequently used and most important digital source for investigation.

THE SOLUTIONS

Upurn.org believes that MDFTs are simply too powerful in the hands of law enforcement and should not be used. But recognizing that MDFTs are already in widespread use across the country, they offer a set of preliminary recommendations that, in the short-term, help reduce the use of MDFTs. These include:

  • banning the use of consent searches of mobile devices,
  • abolishing the plain view exception for digital searches,
  • requiring easy-to-understand audit logs,
  • enacting robust data deletion and sealing requirements, and
  • requiring clear public logging of law enforcement use.

Of course, these recommendations are only the first steps in a broader effort to minimize the scope of policing, and to confront and reckon with the role of police in the United States.

“This report seeks to not only better inform the public regarding law enforcement access to mobile phone data, but also to recenter the conversation on how law enforcement’s use of these tools entrenches police power and exacerbates racial inequities in policing. ” ~Upturn.org

Special thanks to authors Logan Koepke, Emma Weil, Urmila Janardan, Tinuola Dada and Harlan Yu for providing this highly informative and educational material.

Please review my Search & Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you are charged with a crime involving a smartphone search. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Give Them An Inch . . .

GIVE AN INCH THEY'LL TAKE A MILE - GOSPELDADS

In State v. Boman, the WA Supreme Court held that a cell phone owner who gave consent for police to search text messages also gave police the authority to use his phone to set up a “ruse” drug bust sting. The subsequent police ruse using lawfully obtained information does not constitute a privacy invasion or trespass in violation of either our state constitution or the United States Constitution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agent sent a series of text messages to Mr. Bowman. The DHS agent claimed to be someone named Mike Schabell, a person to whom Bowman had sold methamphetamine earlier that day, and indicated he wanted to buy more drugs. The ruse led to charges of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.

The trial court denied his motion to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia on his person and in his vehicle. At trial, Mr. Bowman was found guilty.

On Appeal, the WA Court of Appeals reversed Bowman’s conviction. The Court reasoned that the DHS Agent (1) disrupted Mr. Bowman’s private affairs and (2) was not acting under authority of law. With that, the Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Bowman’s conviction.

WA SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

However, the WA Supreme Court found that police did not violate Mr. Bowman’s constitutional rights. The Court reasoned that under State v. Hinton, Bowman did indeed have a privacy interest in the text messages he sent to a third party’s device. That said, Schabell’s consent to search his phone gave police the necessary authority of law to view the text message conversation. Furthermore, police did not commit an unconstitutional trespass by sending text messages to Bowman’s cell phone as part of a ruse.

“Consistent with long-standing precedent, we hold that a cell phone owner’s voluntary consent to search text messages on their phone provides law enforcement with the authority of law necessary to justify intruding on an otherwise private affair. We also hold that a subsequent police ruse using lawfully obtained information does not constitute a privacy invasion or trespass in violation of either our state constitution or the United States Constitution.” ~WA Supreme Court

“That he misunderstood the identity of the person he was texting does not transform the
unsolicited incoming message into an unconstitutional trespass,” said the WA Supreme Court. “The risk of being betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Bowman’s conviction.

My opinion? This issue, and many other related issues, will likely require further consideration if such investigatory tactics continue to be used in Washington. Please review my Search and Seizure guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Cell Site Location Info

Find Your Nearest Cell Tower in Five Minutes or Less: 2021 Edition
In State v. Denham, the WA Supreme Court held there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s seized phone records and the suspected criminal activity to support the issuance of a search warrant.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A valuable diamond was stolen from a jewelry store. Within days, the Defendant Mr.  Denham sold that diamond. Police suspected Denham committed the burglary and got a warrant for his cell phone records. Cell site location information included in those phone records placed Denham’s phone near the jewelry store around the time of the burglary.
Mr. Denham was charged and ultimately convicted with second degree burglary and first degree trafficking in stolen property. At Denham’s bench trial, The trial judge cited the
fact that Denham had made phone calls that were routed through the cell tower in
the parking lot of the jewelry store around the time of the burglary. Ultimately, the trial judge found Denham guilty as charged.
Mr Denham appealed his case to the WA Court of Appeals. He challenged the admissibility of the search warrant and the evidence it produced. His argument was that the warrant based on generalizations and did not establish that evidence of wrongdoing would likely be found in his phone records. The WA Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Denham. The State, however, filed its own appeal. And Mr. Denham’s was heard in the WA Supreme Court.
COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
The WA Supreme Court began by discussing the admissibility of cell phone records.
“Our constitutions protect individual privacy against state intrusion,” said Justice Gonzalez, who authored the opinion.  He said that under the U.S. Constitution and WA State Constitution, police must have either the authority of a warrant or a well-established exception to the warrant requirement to lawfully intrude into an individual’s private affairs.
“This constitutional protection extends to cell phone location information held by cell phone companies,” said Justice Gonzalez.  He acknowledged that time-stamped data contained in cell phones provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.
Next, Justice Gonzalez described how a search warrant should be issued only if it shows probable cause that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity will be found in the place to be searched. “There must be a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be seized and between that item and the place to be searched,” he said. “The warrant must also describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.”
With that, Justice Gonzalez reasoned that the search warrant affidavits were proper:
“These affidavits present reasonable grounds to believe that the phones associated with the phone numbers belonged to Denham based on Denham’s own use of the numbers with his probation officers and with various businesses, that Denham had the phones around the time of the burglary because of specific facts suggesting he had the phones days before and after the date in question, that Denham burgled the store, and that Denham trafficked distinctive pieces stolen from the store. They also allege that Denham had both phones at the time of the burglary and used one to arrange the sale of the diamond that was the basis of the trafficking charge.
Taken together, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that evidence of burglary would be found in the cell site location information . . . The fact that there are some generalizations in the inferential chain does not defeat the reasonableness of the inference.” ~Justice Gonzalez, WA Supreme Court
Justice Gonzalez concluded by holding that the search warrant contained sufficient detail to conclude that evidence of a crime would more likely than not be found in the cell site location information in telephone company records of Denham’s cell phones.
Accordingly, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Denham’s convictions.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

A Cell Phone “Ping” Is a Search

Image result for cell phone ping

In State v. Muhammad, the WA Supreme Court held that a cell phone “Ping” is a search under the WA Constitution and the Fourth Amendment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Police investigated the rape and murder of Ms. Ina Claire Richardson. The night she was killed, Richardson had shopped at a local grocery store.  Security cameras recorded her walking through the parking lot toward a distinctive maroon sedan. Minutes later, the vehicle’s headlights switched on, and the vehicle exited the parking lot, drove onto an access road behind a nearby hotel, and parked. Two individuals appeared in the car, which remained parked for approximately one hour. Police officers later discovered a condom wrapper at this location.

On November 10, 2014, a law enforcement officer recognized the unique features of the maroon sedan from the security footage and conducted a traffic stop. The driver was Mr. Muhammad. During the stop, the officer asked Muhammad about his vehicle, asked him whether he had gone to the grocery store or had been in the area on the night of the murder, and obtained Muhammad’s cell phone number before letting him go.

After this encounter, law enforcement “pinged” Muhammad’s cell phone without a warrant. The ping placed Muhammad in an orchard in Lewiston, Idaho. Washington and Idaho police arrived, seized Muhammad’s cell phone, and impounded his car. Police also sought and obtained a search warrant for Muhammad’s car.

Muhammad was taken into custody. He denied any involvement in the rape and murder and eventually asked for legal counsel. Police later searched Muhammad’s car. They discovered blood on the passenger seat; in the trunk, they found latex gloves and other incriminating evidence. The police also discovered condoms in the trunk of the sedan. These condoms matched the condom wrapper found by the hotel service entrance. Finally, The blood was matched to that of Ms. Richardson. Autopsy swabs of Richardson’s vagina and fingernails revealed a limited amount of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) matching Muhammad’s profile.

The police obtained a search warrant for Muhammad’s cell phone records. These calls he made on the night of the incident connected to multiple cell towers, indicating that Muhammad was moving. One such cell tower placed Muhammad in the location where Richardson’s body was found.

Muhammad was arrested and charged with rape and felony murder.

At trial, Muhammad moved to suppress all physical evidence collected as a result of the warrantless ping of his cell phone. After a CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion based in part on exigent circumstances. A jury convicted Muhammad as charged. Muhammad appealed his convictions.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

  1. The Cell Phone “Ping” Tracking Was A Warrantless Search.

The WA Supreme Court held that the “ping” tracking of Muhammad’s cell phone was indeed a search.

“When law enforcement loses sight of a suspected individual, officers need merely ask a cellular service carrier to ping that individual’s phone and almost instantaneously police acquire data on the suspect’s past and present location,” said the Court. “This location tracking technique does substantially more than binoculars or flashlights; it enables officers to see farther than even the walls of a home—it pierces through space and time to pinpoint a cell phone’s location and, with it, the phone’s owner.”

The Court further reasoned that this type of search was exactly what happened to Mr. Muhammad. “The police could not locate Muhammad,” said the Court. “They knew only that he had likely left the area after officers returned to his apartment complex and found the maroon sedan had disappeared. As Muhammad pointed out, the officers’ senses alone could not locate him unless they converted his phone into a tracking device,” said the Court.

“Historical and real-time CSLI, like text messages, reveal an intensely intimate picture into our personal lives. Our cell phones accompany us on trips taken to places we would rather keep private, such as the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”

              2. Exigent Circumstances Exist to Justify the Warrantless Cell Phone Search.

The Court said that because the State failed to get a warrant prior to pinging Muhammad’s cell phone, the evidence obtained pursuant to the improper search should be suppressed unless the State proves that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. “Exigent Circumstances” is one of those exceptions.

To prove exigent circumstances, the State must point to specific, articulable facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom which justify the intrusion. “The mere suspicion of flight or destruction of evidence does not satisfy this particularity requirement,” said the Court.

The Court reasoned that under the facts of this case, the State has proved exigent circumstances—specifically that Muhammad was in flight, that he might have been in the process of destroying evidence, that the evidence sought was in a mobile vehicle, and that the suspected crimes (murder and rape) were grave and violent charges.

With that, the WA Supreme Court affirmed Muhammad’s conviction.

Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges and the evidence was obtained through a warrantless search of cell phone data and/or location. It is imperative to hire an experienced criminal defense attorney who is well-versed in the law regarding search and seizure of this evidence.

Bellingham Police Department Conducts Distracted Driving Emphasis

Image result for distracted driving police pullover

Put the cell phone away.

The Bellingham Police Department tweeted and facebooked notice that there will be a distracted driving emphasis on Friday, August 16th from 10:00am-2:00pm. Areas of emphasis are Lakeway/Ellis Streets and Holly Street to State Street.

Distracted driving — when drivers eat, put on makeup or text — causes more than 3,000 deaths a year. The National Highway Traffic Administration says it also costs $46 billion annually for everything from injuries to vehicle repairs, and of course, lost productivity due to death. With the exception of Montana and Arizona, texting while driving is illegal in every state, but unless police catch you in the act, it can be very hard to prove.

Additionally, depending on the circumstances, officers may develop probable cause to conduct a DUI investigation and/or search your vehicle for contraband or evidence of a crime.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges after being stopped for distracted driving. The charges could be dismissed if the search was pretextual and/or unlawful. Hiring a competent and credible defense attorney who is fluent in pretrial motions practice is the first and best step toward getting justice.

Increased DUI Patrols for Apple Cup & Thanksgiving

Image result for wa state patrol dui emphasis patrols

The emphasis patrols will run Thursday through Nov. 25, focusing on WSU students who are traveling for the Thanksgiving break and the Apple Cup in Pullman Nov. 23.

Troopers in Spokane, Whitman, Adams, Grant and Kittitas counties will be homing in on speeding-related infractions, including driving too fast for conditions, distracted/impaired driving, and violations that could cause a collision.

The patrol says motorists traveling to and from the WSU campus will see an increased presence on state routes 26 and 195, as well as on Interstate 90 over Snoqualmie Pass.

“Students traveling across the state should make sure to prepare their vehicles for winter travel conditions. A small emergency kit with water, food, blankets, winter clothing and emergency flares are a good idea,” states the Patrol. “Make sure all the fluids in vehicles are full and the vehicle’s battery is in good working order. Good all-season or snow tires, as well as tire chains are advised and may be required when traveling over the mountain passes.”

To check up on road and weather conditions on state highways, visit the Washington State Department of Transportation’s website at www.wsdot.wa.gov or download WSDOT’s mobile app.

My opinion? In addition to enforcing DUI emphasis patrols, troopers will also focus on distracted driving violations. Washington’s new distracted driving law, which went into effect in July, sets a fee schedule for drivers who are found to be driving while distracted. The law states drivers are not allowed to use a hand-held device while driving, stopped in traffic or at a stoplight. Violators of the law could face a $136 fine.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with crimes or infractions involving DUI, Reckless Driving, Distracted Driving, etc. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Backpage.com & Privacy

Online classified website Backpage.com takes down adult section amid  government pressure | Fox 59

In In re Personal Restraint of Hopper, the WA Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s calls and text messages to the phone number listed in a Backpage.com advertisement were not private communications protected by the Washington Privacy Act.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 2012, Mr. Hopper searched Backpage.com with the intent of purchasing sex. Backpage operated an online classified advertising service, Its users created and posted their own ads, including ads in the adult category. This category included ads for prostitution activity, often under the guise of an adult escort or entertainment service. The ads often featured pictures of women identified by false names and ages, along with hourly rates.

Hopper saw an advertisement for a woman named “Whisper,” who he later learned was K.H. The ad stated that she was 19 years old. She was actually 16 years old. It listed a phone number that Hopper both called and contacted by text. When he contacted the number by text, he initially believed that he was communicating with K.H. But K.H.’s pimp, identified as Mr. Park, had listed his own number on the ad and was reading and responding to Hopper’s text messages.

In December 2012, police arrested Park and, with a warrant, searched his cell phone. K.H. told police that Hopper had paid to have sex with her and identified him from a photograph montage. The police located Hopper’s home address from the text messages stored on Park’s phone. The State charged Hopper with commercial sexual abuse of a minor. In March 2014, a jury convicted Hopper as charged.

Hopper appealed his conviction on arguments that his trial counsel gave ineffective
assistance by failing to move to suppress his text messages to K.H., which police found stored on Park’s cellular phone.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Court of Appeals reasoned that a privacy act violation occurs when “(1) a private communication transmitted by a device. . . was (2) intercepted or recorded by use of (3) a device designed to record and/or transmit (4) without the consent of all parties to the private communication.” Hopper claims that his text messages to K.H. were “private communications” under the act because he intended them for her alone and they concerned illegal activity. Whether communications are private is a question of fact but may be decided as a question of law where, as here, the parties do not dispute the facts.

The Court of Appeals noted the Act does not define “private.” Instead, Washington courts have adopted the dictionary definition. Nevertheless, Washington courts will generally presume that each of the two parties participating in the conversation intends it to be private.

“Hopper’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable,” said the Court of Appeals. The Court explained that Hopper responded to an ad on Backpage.com, a website notorious for advertising prostitution activity. The ad was titled “any way you want it 19” and featured an unidentifiable woman with a fictitious name. A reasonable person would not expect that contacting a stranger by text through the phone number listed in this advertisement would provide a legitimate opportunity for a private conversation with a known person. Even Hopper admitted that “the picture wasn’t a good enough picture to clearly identify a specific person.”

“And regardless of whether Hopper was initially aware of K.H.’s pimp, it is common knowledge that prostitutes often have pimps. Thus, even though Hopper subjectively intended for his text messages to K.H. to be private, his communications were not private
because this expectation was unreasonable. Park did not violate the act when he recorded and stored Hopper’s messages to K.H. on his cell phone.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that because Hopper does not establish that these text messages were “private communications” under the act, he does not show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard of care. His claim failed. The Court of Appeals upheld Hopper’s conviction and found his attorney was not ineffective.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving searches of cell phones. Depending on the circumstances, the evidence might be suppressible. And for more information on search warrants, please read my Legal Guide on Search & Seizure.

The Particularity Requirement for Search Warrants

Image result for cell phone search

In State v. McKee, the WA Court of Appeals held that a search warrant that authorized the police to search and seize a large amount of cell phone data, including images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, and tasks, and authorized a “physical dump” of “the memory of the phone for examination,” violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2012, A.Z. lived with her older brother and her mother in Anacortes. All parties were addicted to heroin, methamphetamine or both. A.Z. was using heroin and methamphetamine on a daily basis during 2012.

In January 2012, A.Z.’s mother introduced A.Z. to 40-year-old Marc Daniel McKee during a “drug deal” for methamphetamine. McKee started spending a lot of time with the family and supplied them with methamphetamine. They would often “get high” together. At the end of June, McKee left to go to Alaska for work.

When McKee returned two months later, he immediately contacted A.Z. McKee told A.Z. he had heroin and methamphetamine. McKee and A.Z. spent three days together at a Burlington motel using the drugs and engaging in consensual sex.

Eventually, A.Z’s mother confronted McKee about the sexual encounters between A.Z. and McKee. Bringing another male with her A.Z.’s mother confronted McKee at a hotel room, beat him up, took his cell phone, and pulled A.Z out of the room. Later, A.Z.’s mother scrolled through the phone. She found pictures and videos of her daughter A.Z tied naked to a bed as well as videos of McKee and A.Z. having sex.

After A.Z.’s mother looked at the video clips and photographs on the cell phone, she contacted the Mount Vernon Police Department. On October 30, A.Z.’s mother met with Detective Dave Shackleton. A.Z.’s mother described the video clips and photographs she saw on the cell phone. She left the cell phone with Detective Shackleton. Later, A.Z.’s mother contacted Detective Shackleton to report that J.P., another minor female, told her that McKee gave J.P. drugs in exchange for sex. Brickley obtained a restraining order prohibiting McKee from contacting A.Z.

Application for a Search Warrant

On October 31, Detective Jerrad Ely submitted an application and affidavit (Affidavit) in support of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search McKee’s cell phone to investigate the crimes of “Sexual Exploitation of a Minor RCW 9.68A.040” and “Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct RCW 9.68A.050.” The court issued a search warrant.

The warrant allowed the police to obtain evidence from the cell phone described as an LG cell phone with model VX9100 currently being held at the Mount Vernon Police Department for the following items wanted:

“Images, video, documents, text messages, contacts, audio recordings, call logs, calendars, notes, tasks, data/internet usage, any and all identifying data, and any other electronic data from the cell phone showing evidence of the above listed crimes.”

The search warrant authorizes the police to conduct a “physical dump” of the memory of
the cell phone for examination. On November 7, 2012, the court filed a “Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant.” The Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant states the police conducted a “Cellebrite Dump” of the cell phone on November 6. Cellebrite software obtains all information saved on the cell phone as well as deleted information and transfers the data from the cell phone to a computer.

Criminal Charges

The State charged McKee with three counts of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(1) based on the three cell phone video clips, one count of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the Second Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(2) based on the cell phone photographs, one count of Commercial Sex Abuse of J.P. as a minor in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, three counts of Distribution of Methamphetamine and/or Heroin to a person under age 18 in violation of RCW 69.50.406(1) and .401(2), and one count of Violation of a No-Contact Order in violation of RCW 26.50.110(1).

Motion to Suppress

McKee filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his cell phone. McKee asserted the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement to describe with particularity the “things to be seized.” McKee argued the warrant allowed the police to search an “overbroad list of items” unrelated to the identified crimes under investigation. McKee also argued probable cause did not support issuing a search warrant of the cell phone for the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court found the allegations in the Affidavit supported probable cause that McKee committed the crimes of sexual exploitation of a minor and dealing in depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court concluded the citation to the criminal statutes established particularity and the search warrant was not overbroad.

At trial, the jury found McKee not guilty of distribution of methamphetamine and/or heroin. The jury found McKee guilty as charged on all other counts.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants.’

“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” said the Court. “The Fourth Amendment
addresses the problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized . . .

The court further reasoned that by limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and would not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit.

“The degree of specificity required varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the types of items,” said the Court. “The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important.” The Court also quoted language from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Riley v. California and the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Samilia; both cases strongly supporting the notion that cell phones and the information contained therein are private affairs because they may contain intimate details about individuals’ lives.

“Here, the warrant cites and identifies the crimes under investigation but does not use the language in the statutes to describe the data sought from the cell phone,” said the Court. “The warrant lists the crimes under investigation on page one but separately lists the “Items Wanted” on page two.” Consequently, the Court reasoned that the description of the “Items Wanted” was overbroad and allowed the police to search and seize lawful data when the warrant could have been made more particular.

Furthermore, the Court held that the warrant in this case was not carefully tailored to the justification to search and was not limited to data for which there was probable cause. The warrant authorized the police to search all images, videos, documents, calendars, text messages, data, Internet usage, and “any other electronic data” and to conduct a “physical dump” of “all of the memory of the phone for examination.”

“The language of the search warrant clearly allows search and seizure of data without regard to whether the data is connected to the crime,” said the Court. “The warrant gives the police the right to search the contents of the cell phone and seize private information with no temporal or other limitation.” As a result, reasoned the Court, there was no limit on the topics of information for which the police could search. Nor did the warrant limit the search to information generated close in time to incidents for which the police had probable cause:

“The warrant allowed the police to search general categories of data on the cell phone with no objective standard or guidance to the police executing the warrant. The language of the search warrant left to the discretion of the police what to seize.”

With that, the Court of Appeals held the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reversed and dismissed the four convictions of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct.

My opinion? For the most part, courts look dis favorably on the searches of people’s homes, cars, phones, etc., unless the probable cause for the search is virtually overwhelming, and/or an emergency exists which would spoil the evidence if it was not gathered quickly; and/or a search warrant exists. Even when search warrants are drafted and executed, they must be particular to the search. In other words, law enforcement can’t expect that a general, non-specific search warrant is going to win the day for them and allow a fishing expedition to take place.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly followed the law. In this case, limiting the search to the crimes cited on the first page of the warrant was insufficient. The descriptions of what to be seized must be made more particular by using the precise statutory language to describe the materials sought.

Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member’s person, home, vehicle or cell phone was searched by police and evidence was seized. The search may have been unlawfully conducted in violation of your Constitutional rights.

Defense of Property

Should Married Couples Deny themselves Access To Each Other's Cell Phone? –  Rocworld

In State v. Yelovich, the WA Court of Appeals held that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Assault & Arrest

Defendant Yelovich and his ex-girlfriend De Armond dated for several years before breaking up. A domestic violence no-contact order was in place that prevented Yelovich from contacting De Armond. According to Yelovich, on the morning of June 7, 2015, he was at his son’s house packing boxes in the garage and moving them to his car. While he was working, Yelovich left several items unattended in his car, which had a broken passenger-side window. One of the items was a cell phone. As Yelovich was taking a box to his car, he caught a glimpse of someone walking down the street. At that time, he could not tell who the person was.

When he reached his car, he noticed that his cell phone and other items were missing.
Yelovich walked to the middle of the street and saw that the person in the street was De
Armond. De Armond was repeatedly turning around and looking back toward Yelovich.
Yelovich immediately believed that she had taken his cell phone.

Yelovich got into his car and chased after De Armond. He drove to the end of the road a
few blocks away and turned the corner before encountering De Armond. He parked his car, got out, and demanded that she return his phone. Yelovich knew at that point that he was violating the no-contact order. But he believed that the action was necessary before De Armond disappeared with his phone.

Yelovich grabbed De Armond’s purse strap and attempted to pull the purse from her, believing that the cell phone was in the purse. De Armond resisted, holding tightly to her purse. In the struggle, De Armond fell to the ground. After a bystander intervened, law enforcement officers arrived and arrested Yelovich.

The State charged Yelovich with violating the no-contact order. The information alleged
that Yelovich had assaulted De Armond, making the violation a felony under RCW 26.50.110(4).

Trial and Conviction

At trial, the witnesses testified to the facts recited above. Yelovich proposed a jury instruction that included both defense of property and self-defense components. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that a defense of property instruction did not apply because Yelovich was not using force to prevent the cell phone from being taken; he was trying to recover the cell phone that was no longer in his possession.

A jury convicted Yelovich of the felony contact order violation. Yelovich appeals his
conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the Court of Appeals disagreed with Yelovich’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing to give a defense of property jury instruction.

“Yelovich asserted as a defense that he was justified in using force against De Armond because she had taken his cell phone,” said the Court. It reasoned, however, that Yelovich’s own testimony established that he used force in an attempt to recover the cell phone after De Armond allegedly had taken it and had left the immediate area, not to prevent De Armond from taking the cell phone in the first instance. “The issue here is to what extent a defendant can rely on the defense of property as a defense when he or she uses force to recover property that already has been taken and is no longer in his or her possession,” said the Court.

The Court further reasoned that the plain language of the “Use of Force” Statute RCW 9A.16.020(3) establishes that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property after the interference with the property has been completed.

First, the property owner can use force only if he or she is about to be injured. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner no longer is about to be injured; he or she has been injured,” said the Court.

Second, the property owner can use force only in preventing or attempting to prevent
the interference. An action taken to prevent interference must occur before the interference has been completed. Defense of property by definition is defensive rather than offensive. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner’s use of force is to recover the property, not to prevent the interference,” said the Court.

Third, the property owner can use force only if the property is lawfully in his or her
possession. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, another person has obtained possession of the property and the owner necessarily no longer has possession,” said the Court.

“Based on the language of RCW 9A.16.020(3) and relevant case law, we hold that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.”

The Court reasoned that here, application of this three part test and the statutory language show that a defense of property instruction was not appropriate. First, Yelovich was not present at his car when De Armond allegedly removed the cell phone. He discovered that the cell phone was gone only after it already had been taken. Second, at that point De Armond had completed the alleged taking and had possession of the phone. Third, De Armond had left the area of Yelovich’s control – his car – and was a few blocks away. Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that De Armond’s theft of Yelovich’s cell phone, if it occurred, already had been completed when Yelovich chased after De Armond and accosted her. Yelovich was attempting to recover the cell phone, not to prevent its theft.

The Court furthe rreasoned that Yelovich was not about to be injured when he accosted De Armond; he already had been injured through the loss of his cell phone. He was not attempting to prevent a theft; the theft already had occurred. And Yelovich no longer had possession of the cell phone; the phone allegedly was in De Armond’s possession.

“Therefore, defense of property under RCW 9A.16.020(3) cannot apply and there was no evidence to support Yelovich’s other proposed instruction,” said the Court.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Juror Misconduct

All about juries: why do we actually need them and can they get it 'wrong'?

In Godoy v. Spearman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a murder conviction because a juror inappropriately communicated with a “judge friend” about the case during deliberations.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Enrique Godoy was convicted of second-degree murder by a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury. A week before his June 12, 2006 sentencing, he moved for a new trial alleging that Juror 10 had improperly communicated about the case with a “judge friend” during deliberations. To substantiate his allegations, Godoy brought brought alternate juror “E.M.” to his sentencing hearing. The trial court continued Godoy’s sentencing to a future court date. Later, Godoy sent the Prosecutor a declaration about Juror 10’s misconduct from alternate juror N.L., who wrote the following:

“During the course of the trial, juror number ten kept continuous communication with a gentleman up north, who she referred to as her “judge friend.” Juror number ten explained to us, the jury as a whole, that she had a friend that was a judge up north. From the time of jury selection until the time of verdict, juror number ten would communicate with her “judge friend” about the case via her TMobile Blackberry, a two way text paging system. When the jury was not sure what was going on or what procedurally would happen next, juror number ten would communicate with her friend and disclose to the jury what he said.”

Despite this “smoking gun” declaration, the trial court nevertheless sentenced Godoy to 16 years’ to life imprisonment. Godoy appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, arguing the trial court erred by (1) refusing to presume Juror 10’s communications prejudiced the verdict and (2) refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the alleged misconduct. However, the California Court of Appeal rejected both of these arguments on the merits and affirmed Godoy’s conviction. Gody again appealed, this time going to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This Ninth Circuit’s opinion began with the following:

“One of the most fundamental rights in our system of criminal justice is the right to trial before an impartial jury. Its common law origin can be traced back to the Middle Ages. It was enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, and it has been embraced by the Supreme Court in numerous cases . . .”

Against this backdrop, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Court of Appeal decision violated the clearly established Supreme Court law that governs this case. It reasoned that under Mattox v. United States, due process does not tolerate any ground of suspicion that the administration of justice has been interfered with by external influence.

“Thus, when faced with allegations of improper contact between a juror and an outside party, courts apply a settled two-step framework,” said the Ninth Circuit. At step one, the court asks whether the contact was “possibly prejudicial,” meaning it had a tendency to be injurious to the defendant. If so, the contact is deemed presumptively prejudicial and the court proceeds to step two, where the burden rests heavily upon the State to establish the contact was, in fact, harmless.

If the State does not show harmlessness – or in other words, if the defendant was, in fact, harmed by the juror’s contact with an outside party – then the court must grant the defendant a new trial.  However, when the prejudicial effect of the contact is unclear, then the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the circumstances of the contact, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial.

“Here, the California Court of Appeal failed to adhere to this framework in three key respects,” said the Ninth Circuit. First, although the State court correctly acknowledged at step one that N.L.’s declaration raised a presumption of prejudice, it never required the State to rebut that presumption at step two. It concluded instead that the presumption was rebutted because Godoy’s evidence failed to prove prejudice.”

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that under Mattox and Remmer, however, Mr. Godoy was not required to prove prejudice at step two. Once he triggered the presumption, the burden rested heavily upon the State to disprove prejudice. “Thus, in denying relief because Godoy’s evidence did not prove prejudice at step two, the State court acted contrary to well established law,” reasoned the Ninth Circuit.

Second, the California Court of Appeal decision to set aside the State court’s failure to hold the State to its burden was error. In other words, it was wrong for the California Court of Appeal to rely on the very same statement from N.L.’s declaration both to raise the presumption of prejudice and to rebut it.  “This defies not only logic, but also the clearly established definition of a ‘presumption,’” reasoned the Ninth Circuit.

Third, the California Court of Appeal denied Godoy a hearing on prejudice under the wrong legal rule. It held he had to show a “strong possibility” of prejudice, but Remmer requires a hearing whenever, as here, the presumption attaches but the prejudicial effect of the contact is unclear from the record. “Because the state court’s decision contravened these bedrock principles, it was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),” reasoned the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that because Godoy showed the presumption of prejudice, he was entitled to the evidentiary hearing that he never had to begin with. With that, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case back with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the circumstances of Juror 10’s misconduct, the impact thereof upon the jury, and whether or not it was prejudicial.

My opinion? There’s a lot to be learned from this case. First, in all of my trials I admit a jury instruction prohibiting the jurors from accessing the internet and/or their smartphone devices. Jurors must rely on the evidence and the law and not be guided by outside influences. Second, I try and discuss the case with jurors immediately after they render verdicts. These conversations are very helpful teaching moments because jurors reveal what swayed their decisions. Also – and important to the defense of my clients – jurors may reveal whether their fellow jurors committed misconducts  similar to the type described in this case.

Good decision. And kudos to the defense attorney who discovered the juror misconduct. Although my heart goes out to the friends and family of the murder victim, justice is not served when our courts fail to administer their obligation to give defendants a fair trial.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.