Category Archives: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

9th Circuit: Harassment is a Crime of Violence

Immigration Courts Further Limit Legal Help Available to People Facing Deportation

In Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Washington conviction for Harassment is a crime of violence. This is because the statute requires the “threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” As such, being convicted of Harassment risks deportatation for non-citizens.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2015, Rodriguez-Hernandez was an immigrant living in the United States. He served with a notice to appear alleging removability on the basis that he was not admitted or paroled into the United States (U.S.). Apparently, he faced persecution in Mexico due to threats made against his family. Rodriguez-Hernandez applied for cancellation of removal and sought asylum in the U.S.

Among other things, the 9th Circuit addressed whether Rodriguez-Hernandez’s Harassment conviction was for a crime of violence under federal law.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The 9th Circuit began by saying that a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is a deportable offense. It also discussed Washington’s Harassment statute in depth as follows:

RCW § 9A.46.020(1) provides that: (1) A person is guilty of harassment if: (a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens: (i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (iii) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or (iv) Maliciously to do any other act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety; and (b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out (emphasis supplied).

Next, the 9th Circuit addressed whether Harassment was a violent offense:

“A crime of violence requires physical force against the person or property of another . . . However, a crime of violence “does not require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality. The standard is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. . . .”  ~9th Circuit Court of Appeals

With that reasoning, the 9th Circuit held that Rodriguez-Hernandez’ threats against his family were, in fact, crimes of violence. Therefore, because Rodriguez-Hernandez was convicted of a crime of violence, he was ineligible for cancellation of removal or asylum.

My opinion?

The 9th Circuit’s Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Garland, certainly makes Washington’s Harassment statute far more egrigious for citizens and non-citizens alike. It could possibly have the following impacts and consequences on current charges:

  • Misdemeanor harassment with a DV tag is now a deportable “crime of domestic violence,” regardless of sentence.
  • Felony harassment, under any subsection, with a sentence imposed of one year or more will be an aggravated felony “crime of violence.” [Previously only the “threaten to kill” subsection had been held to be a “crime of violence.”]
  • Felony harassment-DV will be a deportable “crime of domestic violence” regardless of sentence imposed.

Even worse, the decision could have terribly negative impacts on non-citizens with prior convictions:

  • Misdemeanor harassment-DV convictions:
    • If conviction occurred prior to July 22, 2011 and the sentence imposed (regardless of time suspended) was 365 days it will be an aggravated felony “crime of violence.” Aggravated felonies carry the most severe immigration consequences and bar eligibility for any discretionary relief from removal.
    • Regardless of date of conviction, it may now be deemed a deportable crime of domestic violence.
  • Felony harassment convictions:
    • Any felony harassment conviction with a sentence imposed (regardless of time suspended) of one year or more may be deemed an aggravated felony crime of violence. Previously, only felony harassment “threat to kill” was considered an aggravated felony crime of violence.
    • Any felony harassment-DV conviction may now be deemed a deportable crime of domestic violence, regardless of sentence.

How this decision impacts individual non-citizen defendants will depend on their current immigration status, their immigration and criminal history, and other individual circumstances. For case-specific information please consult with other immigration counsel knowledgeable in the interplay between criminal and immigration law.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Display of a Firearm & Probable Cause

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In US v. Willy  (July 26, 2022), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s charges for Unlawful Display of a Weapon were not supported by Probable Cause.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Reporting Party #1

On May 12. 2019, the Yakima County’s Sheriff’s Office received a call from a witness (“Reporting Party 1”). The witness stated that a man had pulled up outside of his home in a vehicle and displayed a firearm. Dispatch relayed this information to Deputy Thaxton, who interviewed Reporting Party 1 at his residence. Reporting Party 1 told Deputy Thaxton that a white male in a green truck pulled up on the street in front of his house. The man began talking about being abducted and kept somewhere in the area. The man said he was trying to find the place where he was kept. During the conversation, the man pulled out a semiautomatic pistol, racked the slide, and then put it down.

Reporting Party 1 expressed concern about the man’s mental state. He provided Deputy Thaxton with the truck’s license plate number. The vehicle came back as registered to Mr.  Willy. Thaxton showed Reporting Party 1 Willy’s Department of Licensing photo, and he identified Willy as the man with whom he had spoken. Reporting Party 1 said that Willy made no threats to him, nor had Willy pointed the pistol at him at any time.

Reporting Party #2

About ten minutes after leaving Reporting Party 1’s residence, Deputy Thaxton responded to another report from dispatch. The second call had come from Reporting Party 2, who lived about three miles from the previous caller. Deputy Thaxton spoke to the second witness over the phone because Reporting Party 2 had already left her residence. Reporting Party 2 stated that a man with a name like “Willis” pulled up to her gate in a green truck when she was leaving her house. “Willis” told her that he had been kidnapped and held in a camouflaged trailer or van in the area and that he was trying to find it. While they were talking, the man told her he was armed and then displayed a pistol and put it away. Reporting Party 2 told the man she did not know the place he was looking for, and he drove away. Reporting Party 2 said that she was not was not directly threatened, nor was Willy argumentative or hostile.

Deputy Thaxton located the green truck pulling into a gas station. Once he confirmed the license plate matched the one given to him by Reporting Party 1, Deputy Thaxton turned on his emergency lights and conducted a “high-risk stop.” With his firearm drawn, Deputy Thaxton ordered Willy out of the vehicle. Willy complied with all of Deputy Thaxton’s orders. While making Willy turn around, Deputy Thaxton saw a pistol holstered on his hip. Deputy Thaxton removed the gun, put Willy in handcuffs, and escorted him to the back seat of the police vehicle.

After his arrest, a search of Willy’s vehicle and person recovered illegal firearms and a modified CO2 cartridge. Willy was charged with making and possessing a destructive device in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861. He was also charged with Unlawful Display of a Weapon under Washington statute.

Willy moved to suppress the evidence. The lower federal district court granted the motion to suppress. It found that although Deputy Thaxton had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, he lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The evidence was “tainted by the illegality of the arrest.” The Government filed a timely notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the scope of Washington’s Unlawful Display of a Weapon statute. It began with a discussion of how the Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

“Washington is an open carry state. That means that it is presumptively legal to carry a firearm openly.” ~Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

“The bare fact that Willy displayed a weapon would not be sufficient to stop Willy, because there is no evidence that he was carrying a concealed weapon,” said the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, the reporting parties’ statements that Willy was carrying a gun “created at most a very weak inference that he was unlawfully carrying the gun concealed without a license, and certainly not enough to alone support a Terry stop.”

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Thaxton acquired no additional reasons for arresting Willy until after he stopped him. When Thaxton ordered Willy to leave his truck and turn around slowly, Willy was openly carrying his pistol, in a holster on his hip. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Washington courts have refused to enforce the statute when the threats are not sufficiently direct or imminent.

Deputy Thaxton’s suspicion that Willy had violated § 9.41.270 arose not from his own observations but from the accounts of two reporting parties.

“The strongest fact for the government is that Willy racked the slide of his gun in the presence of Reporting Party 1. In context, however, that fact does not demonstrate that Willy was acting in manner that warrants alarm.” ~Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.”

With that, the Ninth Circuit next addressed whether the C02 cartridge found in Willy’s car – and his statements to police – should be suppressed as evidence supporting the federal charges. The Ninth Circuit began by saying that under the “fruits of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence seized subsequent to a violation of the Fourth Amendment is tainted by the illegality and subject to exclusion, unless it has been sufficiently “purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit suppressed that evidence as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”

The Ninth Circuit concluded by affirming the lower federal court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.

My opinion? Good decision. The Ninth Circuit gave an accurate assessment of Washington Law surrounding this issue and made the right decision. Washington is indeed an “Open Carry” state. This fact alone challenges many people’s allegations that someone is unlawfully displaying a weapon. Also , the probabale cause alleged in this case was fart too attenuated to be reliable.

Please contact my office if you have Firearms Offense involving Search and Seizure issues. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement

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In United States v. Holiday, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the police officer’s opening of the defendant’s unlocked front door constituted a search that was not justified by Exigent Circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because officers had no reason to believe that an emergency existed.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Holiday was tried and convicted for seven counts of armed robbery and three instances of attempted armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. 1951. The federal district court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of eighty-five years’ imprisonment.

At his trial, the Government sought to admit police body camera footage taken during an unrelated police encounter at the defendant’s home in connection with the report of child abuse in a vehicle registered to the defendant’s home. In the footage, the defendant was wearing shoes that matched the description of the shoes the suspect was wearing at an ARCO gas station in one of the robberies.

The body camera footage was taken on February 7, 2017. It was taken after police received a report that a man was hitting a child in the backseat of a blue Jaguar. In a “contemporaneous line” of actions from the report of the incident, police ran the license plate and found it was registered to a person with the initials M.B.

The bodycam video shows that when the officers arrived at the defendant’s  address, one of them knocked on the front door, tried the handle, and found it was unlocked. The officer pushed the door open but remained standing on the threshold. Holiday and his wife were on their way to the door when the officer opened it. They told the officers that their children were at school and that they did not own a blue Jaguar. There is no indication that the officers saw a blue Jaguar at or near Holiday’s residence. The officers took Holiday’s name and left.

Mr. Holiday moved to suppress the bodycam footage of this exchange on the ground that it was collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the federal district trial court denied Mr. Holiday’s motion to suppress the aforementioned bodycam evidence.  Later, Holiday was found guilty. The court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of eighty-five years’ imprisonment.

Holiday appealed on grounds that the trial court errored by denying his motion to suppress the body camera footage of him.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the 9th Circuit reasoned that The San Diego Police Department did not obtain a
warrant to search Holiday’s home in connection with the report of child abuse in a blue Jaguar registered to Holiday’s address.

“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment, unless subject to an established exception,” said the 9th Circuit, quoting  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).

Next, the 9th Circuit addressed the Government’s argument that the search was legal because it was pursuant to the Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement (Exigent Circumstances).

Ultimately, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Government. The court reasoned that the officers’ opening of the unlocked front door constituted a search that was not justified by the emergency exception as the officers had no reason to believe that the child victim was is the home at the address where the Jaguar was registered. There was no indication that the incident in the Jaguar had ended, and no blue Jaguar was at the address when the officers arrived.

“The officers’ conduct does not fall within the scope of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.” ~ 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The 9th Circuit concluded, however, that the error in admitting the body camera evidence was harmless because of the strength of the other evidence that the defendant committed the ARCO robbery.

Please review my Search and Seizure Legal Guide and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime and the police search/seizure might be unlawful. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Excessive Parking Fines

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In Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to excessive parking fines.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The City of Los Angeles imposes civil fines for parking meter violations. Under an ordinance, if a person parks her car past the allotted time limit, she must pay a $63 fine. And if she fails to pay the fine within 21 days, the City will impose a late-payment penalty $6300. In sum, a person who overstays a parking spot faces a fine of $63 – $181.

Appellant Mr. Pimentel and the other appellants sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the fines and late payment penalties violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and the California constitutional counterpart.

The case made its way through the lower federal district court. The lower court ordered that the initial parking fine was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and thus survives constitutional scrutiny. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, however, who issued its own opinion below.

COURT’S REASONING & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals held that although the initial parking fine was not disproportionate to the offense, the the City’s late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.

The Court said the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense. Also, the Court reasoned that the Excessive Fines Clause traces its lineage back to at least the Magna Carta which guaranteed that a free man shall not be fined for a small fault.

“For centuries, authorities abused their power to impose fines against their enemies or to illegitimately raise revenue,” said the Ninth Circuit. “That fear of abuse of power continued to the colonial times. During the founding era, fines were probably the most common form of punishment, and this made a constitutional prohibition on excessive fines all the more important.”

The Court extended the  four-factor analysis found in United States v. Bajakajian to decide whether a fine is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense: (1) the nature and extent of the crime, (2) whether the violations was related to other illegal activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and (4) the extent of the harm caused.

The Court reasoned that under the first Bajakajian factor—  the nature and extent of the crime — the plaintiffs were indeed culpable because there was no factual dispute that they violated the parking infraction code for failing to pay for over-time use of a metered space. However, the Ninth Circuit also found the the parking transgressions were small:

“But we also conclude that appellants’ culpability is low because the underlying parking violation is minor. We thus find that the nature and extent of appellants’ violations to be minimal but not de minimis.”

The Court further reasoned that the second Bajakajian factor — whether the violations was related to other illegal activities — was not as helpful to its analysis: “We only note that there is no information in the record showing whether overstaying a parking meter relates to other illegal activities, nor do the parties argue as much.”

Similarly, the Court said that the third Bajakajian factor — whether other penalties may be imposed for the violation — also did not advance its analysis. “Neither party suggests that alternative penalties may be imposed instead of the fine, and the record is devoid of any such suggestion.”

Finally, the Court turned to the fourth Bajakajian factor — the extent of the harm caused by the violation. “The most obvious and simple way to assess this factor is to observe the monetary harm resulting from the violation,” said the Court. Ultimately, it reasoned that while a parking violation was not a serious offense, the fine is not so large, either, and likely deters violations.

With that, the Ninth Circuit held that the City’s initial parking fine of $63 was not grossly disproportional to the underlying offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. Nevertheless, the Court also held that the 100% late fee on the initial fine must be remanded back to the lower district court for the City to justify:

“The government cannot overstep its authority and impose fines on its citizens without paying heed to the limits posed by the Eighth Amendment. Yet in its brief to this court, the City of Los Angeles did not even bother addressing the constitutionality of its late fee. Based on the record, we do not know the City’s justification for setting the late fee at one hundred percent of the initial fine.”

With that, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the case back (remanded) to the lower court for a further analysis on this issue.

My opinion? Good decision. At the end of the day, paying a 100% late fee for a parking fine is truly excessive. The case is novel because we don’t see much litigation surrounding the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. We do know, however, that the Eighth Amendment also encompasses the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which is the most important and controversial part of the Amendment.

The issues relating to that constitutional amendment are, in some ways, shrouded in mystery. What does it mean for a punishment to be “cruel and unusual”? How do we measure a punishment’s cruelty? And if a punishment is cruel, why should we care whether it is “unusual”?

Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Reasonable Suspicion & 911 Calls

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In United States v. Vandergroen, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the police’s search of a suspicious person was reasonable under the circumstances when bar patrons called 911 minutes before to report the man had a pistol on him.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Late on a Saturday evening of February 17, 2018, a worker at a bar in California called 911 to report that three patrons had seen a man in the area with a pistol on him. In response to this call, the police stopped the man as he drove away, discovered a pistol in his car, and placed him under arrest. The man, Mr.  Vandergroen, argued a Rule 12 motion to suppress the evidence. The lower federal court denied the motion. Vandergroen was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which is a federal criminal conviction.

On appeal, Vandergroen now argues that the 911 call should never have led to his stop in the first place because it did not generate reasonable suspicion, and that the evidence of the pistol should therefore have been excluded.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Mr. Vandergroen. It affirmed the lower court’s denial of Vandergroen’s motion to suppress and upheld his conviction.

The Court began by saying that under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop only where s/he has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity, commonly referred to as “reasonable suspicion.”

The Court further elaborated that while a 911 call may generate reasonable suspicion, it can only do so when, under the totality-of-the circumstances, it possesses two features. First, the tip must exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability, and second, it must provide information on potential illegal activity serious enough to justify a stop.

Finally, the Court identified a number of factors that demonstrate the reliability of a tip. These facts include (1) whether the tipper is known, rather than anonymous; (2) whether the tipper reveals the basis of his knowledge; (3) whether the tipper provides detailed predictive information indicating insider knowledge, id.; whether the caller uses a 911 number rather than a non-emergency tip line; and (4) whether the tipster relays fresh, eyewitness knowledge, rather than stale, second-hand knowledge.

With the above in mind, the Court of Appeals delved into its analysis.

“The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion,” said the Court. It reasoned that first, the statements by an independent witness were undoubtedly reliable. “Witness #2 provided his name and employment position, making him a known, and therefore more reliable, witness,” said the Court.

Second, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the statements by the bar’s patrons were also reliable. “Although the patrons remained anonymous during the call, which generally cuts against reliability, their statements exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome this shortcoming,” said the Court. Finally, the Court reasoned that the reported activity — possessing a concealed weapon  was presumptively unlawful in California and was ongoing at the time of the stop.

In conclusion the Court of Appeals held that the 911 call generated reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and the lower court was correct to deny Vandergroen’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. His criminal conviction was upheld.

My opinion? Mind you, this is a federal opinion. Under Washington law, however,  a bare report that someone is in possession of a firearm does not provide reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. This is because Washington is both an open carry state and liberally grants concealed weapons permits. United States v. Brown.

In Washington, under RCW 9.41.300(1)(d), a stop may have been permissible in this case if the individual with the pistol had been in that portion of the lounge classified by the state liquor and cannabis board as off-limits to persons under twenty-one years of age. That’s because it is unlawful for any person to enter a bar with a firearm.

Please read my Legal Guide on Search and Seizure and contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal charges involving a questionable search or seizure of evidence. Hiring a competent and experienced defense attorney is the first and best step towards justice.

State-Created Danger Doctrine and Domestic Violence Victims

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In Martinez v. City of Clovis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that police officers investigating a DV crime breached the victim’s Due Process rights by intensifying her peril.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Ms. Martinez was a victim of domestic violence. After reporting an incident to police, the investigating officers took her statement in confidence as to physical and sexual abuse by her boyfriend Mr. Pennington in a hotel and then repeated the substance in the presence of the abuser. That night or the next day, Pennington again attacked Martinez, this time resulting in his arrest. Consequently, Ms. Martinez recanted her accusations out of fear that she would again be attacked. Later, Ms. Martinez sued the investigating officers and the Clovis Police Department.

LEGAL ISSUE

Whether Ms. Martinez can recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the law enforcement officers who allegedly placed her at greater risk of future abuse.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the State-Created Danger Doctrine applies because actions of the police put Martinez in greater jeopardy than if they had not arrived. It reasoned that officer Hershberger told Mr. Pennington about Martinez’s testimony relating to his prior abuse, and also stated that Martinez was not ‘the right girl’ for him.

“A reasonable jury could find that Hershberger’s disclosure provoked Pennington, and that her disparaging comments emboldened Pennington to believe that he could further abuse Martinez, including by retaliating against her for her testimony, with impunity,” said the Court. “The causal link between Hershberger’s affirmative conduct and the abuse Martinez suffered that night is supported by Martinez’s testimony that Pennington asked Martinez what she had told the officer while he was hitting her.”

“A reasonable jury could find that Pennington felt emboldened to continue his abuse with impunity.”

The Court further reasoned that the State-Created Danger Doctrine applies when an officer praises an abuser in the abuser’s presence after the abuser has been protected from arrest, in a manner that communicates to the abuser that the abuser may continue abusing the victim with impunity.

Nevertheless, the Court also decided the officers were entitled to Qualified Immunity because the law with respect to state-created danger doctrine was not clearly established. He added: “Going forward, the law in this circuit will be clearly established that such conduct is unconstitutional.”

Good opinion. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member face criminal Domestic Violence allegations. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Terry Stop Held Unlawful

Image result for police chase black man

In United States v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an anonymous tip that a person saw a black male with a gun does not provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop in Washington, where possession of a firearm is presumptively lawful.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Brown, who is a black man, had the misfortune of deciding to avoid contact with the police. Following an anonymous tip that a black man was carrying a gun—which is not a criminal offense in Washington State—police spotted Brown, who was on foot, activated their lights, and pursued him by car, going the wrong direction down a one-way street. Before flashing their lights, the officers did not order or otherwise signal Brown to stop. Brown reacted by running for about a block before the officers stopped him at gunpoint.

Police pursued Brown for one block before stopping him and ordering him to the ground at gunpoint. The officers placed Brown in handcuffs and found a firearm in his waistband. A further search revealed drugs, cash, and other items.

Police seized Mr. Brown even though there was no reliable tip, no reported criminal activity, no threat of harm, no suggestion that the area was known for high crime or narcotics, no command to stop, and no requirement to even speak with the police.

Brown moved to suppress the evidence from the searches, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him under Terry v. Ohio. The district court disagreed and denied the motion.

ISSUE

Whether police officers were justified in briefly stopping and detaining Mr. Brown.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that an an officer may only conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  Illinois v. Wardlow.

“Here, the lack of facts indicating criminal activity or a known high crime area drives our conclusion. The Metro officers who stopped Brown took an anonymous tip that a young, black man “had a gun”—which is presumptively lawful in Washington—and jumped to an unreasonable conclusion that Brown’s later flight indicated criminal activity. At best, the officers had nothing more than an unsupported hunch of wrongdoing.”

With that, the court reasoned that the circumstances of this case fails to satisfy the standard established by Terry and Wardlow. “The combination of almost no suspicion from the tip and Brown’s flight does not equal reasonable suspicion.”

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that in Washington State, it is lawful to carry a gun. Although carrying a concealed pistol without a license is a misdemeanor offense in Washington,  the failure to carry the license is simply a civil infraction.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals downplayed Brown running from police. “No one disputes that once the Metro officer activated his patrol car lights, Brown fled,” said the Court. “But the Supreme Court has never endorsed a per se rule that flight establishes reasonable suspicion. Instead, the Court has treated flight as just one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, if an admittedly significant one. “Notably, the officers did not communicate with Brown, use their speaker to talk with him, or tell him to stop before they flashed their lights and then detained him,” said the Court. “Under these circumstances, Brown had no obligation to stop and speak to an officer.”

My opinion? Good decision. Please read my Search and Seizure Legal Guide contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime under circumstances where the police may have conducted an unlawful search or seizure. Hiring competent defense is the first and best step toward gaining justice.

Unlawful Vehicle Stops

Image result for unlawful vehicle stop and search

In United States v. Landeros, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that law enforcement officers may not extend a lawfully initiated vehicle stop because a passenger refuses to identify himself, absent reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Early in the morning of February 9, 2016, police officer Baker pulled over a car driving 11 miles over the speed limit. The stop occurred on a road near the Pascua Yaqui Indian Reservation. Defendant Alfredo Landeros sat in the front passenger seat next to the driver. Two young women were in the back seat. The driver apologized to Officer Baker for speeding and provided identification.

Officer Baker wrote in his incident report and testified that he smelled alcohol in the car. The two women in the backseat appeared to him to be minors, and therefore subject to the underage drinking laws.  The two women—who were 21 and 19 years old—complied.

Officer Baker did not believe that Landeros was underage, and he was not. Nonetheless, Officer Baker commanded Landeros to provide identification.

Landeros refused to identify himself, and informed Officer Baker that he was not required to do so. Officer Baker then repeated his demand to see Landeros’s ID.” Landeros again refused. As a result, Officer Baker called for back-up, prolonging the stop. Officer Romero then arrived, and he too asked for Landeros’s identification. The two officers also repeatedly commanded Landeros to exit the car because he was not being compliant.

Landeros eventually did leave the car. At least several minutes passed between Officer Baker’s initial request for Landeros’s identification and his exit from the car. As Landeros exited the car, he saw for the first time pocketknives, a machete, and two open beer bottles on the floorboards by the front passenger seat. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-251, Arizona prohibits open containers of alcohol in cars on public highways. Officer Baker then placed Landeros under arrest.

Landeros was arrested both for possessing an open container and for “failure to provide his true full name and refusal to comply with directions of police officers under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2412(A). Under that statute, it is unlawful for a person, after being advised that the person’s refusal to answer is unlawful, to fail or refuse to state the person’s true full name on request of a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person based on reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.”

The officers handcuffed Landeros as soon as he exited the car. Officer Romero asked Landeros if he had any weapons. Landeros confirmed that he had a knife in a pocket. Officer Romero requested consent to search Landeros’s pockets, and Landeros agreed. During that search, Officer Romero found a smoking pipe and six bullets in Landeros’s pockets.

Landeros was federally indicted for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He moved to suppress the evidence based on the circumstances of the stop, however, the lower federal district court denied the motion. Landeros then entered into a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denials of the two motions. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Landeros to 405 days in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement officers may not extend a lawfully initiated vehicle stop because a passenger refuses to identify himself, absent reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense.

The Court reasoned held that because the lower court mistakenly approved the duration of the stop in this case based on United States v. Turvin and wrongfully disregarded Rodriguez v. United States.

“Applying Rodriguez, we shall assume that Officer Baker was permitted to prolong the initially lawful stop to ask the two women for identification, because he had reasonable suspicion they were underage. But the several minutes of additional questioning to ascertain Landeros’s identity was permissible only if it was (1) part of the stop’s “mission” or (2) supported by independent reasonable suspicion.”

The Ninth Circuit also held that any extension of the traffic stop to investigate those matters was an unlawful seizure because there was no evidence that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was out past his curfew or drinking underage. As a result, the record does not demonstrate that Officer Baker had a reasonable suspicion that Landeros was out past his curfew or drinking underage. Any extension of the traffic stop to investigate those matters was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s arguments that the defendant’s refusal to identify himself provided reasonable suspicion of the additional offenses of failure to provide identification and failure to comply with law enforcement orders.

The Court reasoned that here, the officers insisted several times that Landeros identify himself after he initially refused, and detained him while making those demands. “At the time they did so, the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Landeros had committed an offense,” said the Ninth Circuit. “Accordingly, the police could not lawfully order him to identify himself. His repeated refusal to do so thus did not, as the government claims, constitute a failure to comply with an officer’s lawful order . . .” Consequently, reasoned the Ninth Circuit, there was therefore no justification for the extension of the detention to allow the officers to press Landeros further for his identity.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was therefore no justification for the extension of the detention to allow the officers to press the defendant further for his identity. It reasoned that the bullets the defendant was convicted of possessing cannot be introduced at trial because he was ordered from the car as part of the unlawfully extended seizure and subsequently consented to a search of his pockets. Furthermore, because the stop was no longer lawful by the time the officers ordered the defendant to leave the car, the validity (or not) of the police officer’s order to exit the vehicle did not matter.

Good opinion.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Right to Confront Victim Witnesses At Trial

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In  United States v. Carter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a victim’s testimony from her hospital bed in Minnesota via two-way video violated the defendant’s  Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Mr. Carter was convicted of forcing seven minor girls into prostitution and trafficking them across state lines. The crimes took place over a ten-year period from 2003 to 2013. For each of the seven victims, Carter was charged with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex trafficking of a minor or by force, fraud, or coercion), and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transportation of a minor in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution), for a total of fourteen counts.

One week before Carter’s April 2016 trial, the Prosecution anticipated bringing the testimony of J.C., the victim for Counts 13 and 14. J.C., who was by then an adult living in Minnesota, was seven months pregnant with a due date in June. The government explained that J.C. had been hospitalized for complications with her pregnancy and that her doctor had instructed her not to travel from Minnesota to California.

Accordingly, the government sought to have her testify during trial from Minnesota via live two-way video conference.

Carter opposed on Confrontation Clause grounds. Nevertheless, the federal district court granted the government’s application to use two-way video, and the case proceeded to trial. On the second day of trial, Carter again objected to the two-way video procedure. Again, the federal district court denied Carter’s motion.

J.C. testified by two-way video at trial. She stated that she met Carter in 2013, when she was 16 years old. She was living in Minnesota at the time, and Carter bought her a bus ticket to Los Angeles under an alias because she was underage. When she arrived in Los Angeles, Carter picked her up and took her to a motel room. There, he photographed her in lingerie and used the photographs in an advertisement on Backpage, a website used to advertise sexual services. She then worked as a prostitute for Carter for approximately two weeks. She testified that Carter kept all of her earnings, dictated how much she should charge and what she should wear, and threatened to beat her if she did not comply.

Carter was ultimately convicted on all fourteen counts. He appealed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to physically confront an adverse witness cannot be compromised by permitting the witness to testify by video unless use of the remote video procedure is necessary and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

The Court reasoned that the victim’s inability to travel to the trial location was due to a temporary pregnancy-related condition. Therefore, a continuance of the trial was a more appropriate solution. Furthermore, testimony from a remote location requires proof that the witness is not being coached or influenced during testimony, that the witness is not improperly referring to documents, that the witness has an adequate view of the courtroom, and that the jury has an adequate view of the witness.

Here, none of those proof conditions were met. Because alternatives were available for obtaining a victim-witness’s testimony that would have preserved the defendant’s right to physical confrontation, the use of a remote video was not necessary in this case, and violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

Consequently, the Court vacated the defendant’s convictions  on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (Sex Trafficking of a Minor) and remanded for re-sentencing on remaining counts as to which the panel affirmed the defendant’s convictions in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition.

My opinion? Despite Mr. Carter’s terrible charges, allegations and fact pattern, the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision on his behalf. The Sixth Amendment’s right to face-to-face confrontation ensures the integrity of the fact-finding process and forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.

Although exceptions to the Confrontation Clause rightfully exist – for example, if the testifying victim is a child who would suffer significant emotional trauma from being in the same room as their offender – these exceptions are narrow. Remote two-way video cameras can be used and substituted for face-to face contact upon a case-specific finding that (1) the denial of physical confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy, and (2) the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Ruse” Searches Held Unconstitutional.

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In Whalen v. McMullen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an officer’s warrantless entry into a home via a ruse such as by asking the homeowner for assistance in a fictitious criminal investigation, violates the Fourth Amendment. A “ruse” entry is when a known government agent misrepresents his purpose in seeking entry.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

While investigating Kathleen Whalen for fraud related to her application for social security benefits, Washington State Patrol officer McMullen gained both her cooperation and entrance into her home by requesting her assistance in a fictitious criminal investigation. During his investigation, McMullen secretly videotaped Whalen both outside and inside her home. No criminal charges were ever lodged against Whalen, but the Washington Disability Determination Services division (“DDS”) of the Washington Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) used at her social security hearing the footage surreptitiously filmed inside her home.

Whalen brought suit against McMullen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that McMullen’s entry into her home without a warrant and under false pretenses violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

LEGAL ISSUES

(1) whether McMullen’s warrantless entry into Whalen’s home under false pretenses was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether it was clearly established that such an entry was a Fourth Amendment violation.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Ninth Circuit held that McMullen violated Whalen’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but agreed with the lower federal district court that McMullen had qualified immunity from suit because the right was not clearly established.

A. Whether the Officer’s Conduct Violated the Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit explained that the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, instructs that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

“Without question, the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections,” said the Court, citing Lewis v. United States. “Indeed, at the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when a government agent obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area. The Court distinguished between “undercover” entries, where a person invites a government agent who is concealing that he is a government agent into her home, and “ruse” entries, where a known government agent misrepresents his purpose in seeking entry. The former does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as long as the undercover agent does not exceed the scope of his invitation while inside the home.

However, it also reasoned that a ruse entry – one when the suspect is informed that the person seeking entry is a government agent but is misinformed as to the purpose for which the agent seeks entr – cannot be justified by consent. This is because access gained by a government agent, known to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing, violates the Fourth Amendment’s bar against unreasonable searches and seizures if such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of the government’s investigation.

In this case, McMullen identified himself as a law enforcement officer and requested Whalen’s assistance in a fictitious investigation, gaining entry into her home using this ruse.

“McMullen appealed to Whalen’s trust in law enforcement and her sense of civic duty to assist him in his “identity theft” investigation. McMullen’s description of an identity theft investigation was perfectly plausible, and Whalen readily agreed to cooperate. But there was no identify theft investigation underway. McMullen lied to Whalen about his real purpose—to investigate her for possible social security fraud. Whalen’s consent to McMullen’s entry into her home is vitiated by his deception.”

Consequently, reasoned the Court, it was entirely immaterial that McMullen could have lawfully searched Whalen’s home by securing her consent without using a ruse. “His argument is akin to justifying a warrantless search on the ground that a warrant would have been issued if one had been sought,” said the Court. Regardless of whether Whalen would have consented to McMullen’s entry into her home if he had not used a ruse, she did not validly consent here.

“Once we add to this the fact that McMullen videotaped his entire visit, any illusion that this was not a Fourth Amendment search evaporates. McMullen had two cameras running while he was talking with Whalen, and at least one of the cameras captured his entire visit inside her home. Of course it was a search: not only was McMullen there to observe Whalen, but he had also been asked specifically to seek evidence concerning Whalen’s use of an electric wheelchair, how wheelchair accessible the house was, were the wheelchairs used, were clothes on them, etc.”

With that, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McMullen’s entry into Whalen’s home without consent or a warrant in the course of a civil fraud investigation related to Whalen’s benefits claim was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

B. Whether the Violation Was “Clearly Established.”

Here, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in order to hold McMullen personally liable under § 1983, Whalen’s right to be free from a search in this context must have been clearly established. To be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

“The right Whalen asserts was not clearly established,” said the Court. “Therefore, officer McMullen was entitled to qualified immunity from this suit.”

My opinion? Good decision, mostly. I’m happy to see the Ninth found that the officer’s ruse violated Ms. Whalen’s constitutional rights. And although I would’ve liked to see the Ninth Circuit award Ms. Whalen damages for the violation of her rights, the reality is that it’s extremely difficult to succeed on suing police for misconduct.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.