Silver Platter Doctrine

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In State v. Martinez, the WA Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s computer hard drive which Texas police seized in Texas pursuant to a search warrant was lawfully searched by the Washington State Patrol without a Washington search warrant under the silver platter doctrine.


Carlos Martinez began working at the Monroe Police Department in 1989. He worked in several capacities, including as a Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program instructor. While working as a D.A.R.E. instructor, Martinez met A.K., who was in fifth grade at the time.

Beginning in 2001 or 2002, when A.K. was 13 or 14 years old, she began baby-sitting Martinez’s two young children.  A.K. also came to the Martinezes’ house when she was not baby-sitting. She would sometimes show up unannounced. She would help Martinez with chores and do her schoolwork at the house. At the time, Martinez was married to his then-wife Julie West.

Apparently, Martinez began touching A.K. in a sexual manner when she was 14. He also set up a video camera in the bathroom and digitally recorded her when she used the facilities.

Ms. West went on vacation. During that time, A.K. stayed at the family home. When Ms. West returned from vacation, she discovered a love note from A.K. to Martinez. She also discovered a video recording that Martinez had made of A.K. getting out of the shower and stored on the family computer. West confronted Martinez about the recording. He said he wanted to see if A.K. had cut herself on the kitchen knife as she had claimed. West claimed that when she asked Martinez why he still had the recording on the computer, he responded that it was “nice to look at.”

Not long after this, A.K. and her family moved from Monroe to Eastern Washington. Martinez and A.K. kept in touch. Martinez claims that in February 2007 they began a consensual sexual relationship when A.K. was 18 years old. In fall 2009, the Army recalled Martinez to active duty and stationed him in San Antonio, Texas. A.K. moved to Texas to be with him. They lived together for a short time.

After their relationship deteriorated in October or November 2011, Martinez gave A.K. the video recordings that he made of her in his bathroom in 2004. A.K. testified that Martinez told her he wanted to watch the tapes one last time and masturbate to them. She claimed he asked her to touch him as well. A short time later, A.K. contacted the Texas police to turn over the tapes. She also told the Texas police that she began an intimate relationship with Martinez some time before she was 16. Later, she contacted WSP.

The Texas police obtained a warrant to search Martinez’s home and seize his laptop computer and digital media storage devices. Then, a grand jury was convened in Texas to consider a possession of child pornography charge. But the grand jury refused to indict, returning a “no bill.” The case was dismissed. Texas police made a mirror image of Martinez’s computer hard drive and, at WSP’s request, sent it to WSP. Without obtaining a separate warrant, WSP searched this mirror image hard drive. Texas police also sent WSP two actual laptop computers and hard drives seized from Martinez. After obtaining a warrant, WSP searched those items.

The State initially charged Martinez with two counts of voyeurism, two counts of child molestation, one count of rape of a child in the third degree, and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Later, the State dismissed the molestation and rape charges. It tried Martinez on only one count of voyeurism and one count of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The jury found Martinez guilty on both counts. Because the voyeurism charge occurred outside the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed that count and convicted him on only the possession count.


The Court of Appeals accepted review on the issues of (1) whether the warrantless search of Martinez’s computer hard drive was lawful when Texas police – and not WA law enforcement – searched the computer, and (2) whether spousal privilege applies to suppress the testimony of his ex-wife at trial.


The Court of Appeals held that (1) the silver platter doctrine allowed the Washington State Patrol to later examine the hard drive without a warrant, and (2) because Martinez acted
as a guardian to the victim, the spousal privilege does not apply here.


The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  If a government action intrudes upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of a person’s privacy rights than does the Fourth Amendment. Article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.

Silver Platter Doctrine

Under the Silver Platter Doctrine, however, evidence lawfully obtained under the laws of another jurisdiction is admissible in Washington courts even if the manner the evidence was obtained would violate Washington law. Evidence is admissible under this doctrine when (1) the foreign jurisdiction lawfully obtained evidence and (2) the forum state’s officers did not act as agents or cooperate or assist the foreign jurisdiction.

“Martinez does not dispute that Texas lawfully obtained the hard drive,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. “And he does not challenge the trial court’s findings that Washington State Patrol (WSP) had no involvement in obtaining or serving the Texas warrant and that Texas police did not act as agents of WSP when they obtained or served the warrant.” Thus, under the silver platter doctrine, the evidence was admissible.

Next, the Court of Appeals rejected Martinez’ arguments that the silver platter doctrine does not apply here because the Texas officers did not conduct any search that would be unlawful in Washington. “The doctrine requires that the State show only two things: (1) the search was lawful in Texas and (2) the Washington officers did not act as agents for Texas or cooperate or assist Texas in any way,” said the Court. “Because the State proved this, the doctrine applies.”

Search Warrant

Next, Martinez argued that the warrant issued in Washington allowing the WSP to search his laptop computers and hard drives was overbroad. In response, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Furthermore, the search warrant particularity requirement helps prevent general searches, the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.

“When a search warrant authorizes a search for materials protected by the First Amendment, a greater degree of particularity is required, and we employ a more stringent test,” said the Court. “While the First Amendment presumptively protects obscene books and films, it does not protect child pornography involving actual minors.” Also, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that the warrant was invalid for other reasons as well.

Spousal Privilege

The Court of Appeals addressed Martinez’ arguments that the trial court mistakenly admitted the testimony of his ex-wife regarding a conversation she shared with Mr. Martinez’ video of A.K. as being “nice to look at.” The Court reasoned that generally, a current or former spouse cannot be examined about confidential communications made during the marriage without the consent of the other spouse. It also explained that the marital privilege rule tries to encourage the free interchange of confidences between husband and wife that are necessary for mutual understanding and trust. “But in some situations the policies that underlie the right to invoke a testimonial privilege are outweighed by the suppression of truth that may result,” said the Court. “Thus, this spousal privilege does not apply in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed against a child for whom the spouse is a parent or guardian.”

The Court reasoned that here, West merely repeated statements by Martinez and did not comment about her belief in Martinez’s guilt. “We agree that these facts are sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martinez kept the recording for the purpose of sexual stimulation and that West’s testimony that Martinez said the recording was ‘nice to look at’ could not have materially affected the outcome of the trial,” said the Court.

Finally, the Court of Appeals raised and dismissed Martinez’ arguments that there was prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. “The Prosecutor’s general references were unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict in light of the other incriminating evidence,” said the Court. Furthermore, Martinez does not show that his counsel’s failure to object to the Prosecutor’s case presentation was unreasonable and/or was not strategic.

With that, the Court of Appeals upheld Martinez’ conviction and sentence.

“Original Gangster” Comment Improper, But Not Prejudicial

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In In re Personal Restraint of Sandoval, the WA Supreme Court held that it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to the defendant as an “OG” (original gangster) in closing argument, where no one testified that simply being a longtime gang member was sufficient for “OG” status.


Sandoval is a member of the Eastside Lokotes Surefios (ELS) gang in Tacoma.
On February 7, 2010, ELS members, in a stolen van, pulled up to a car and fired no less
than 12 gunshots from at least two firearms into the passenger door of the car. The
driver, Camilla Love, was hit three times and died from her injuries.

Sandoval was arrested in September 2010. The State ultimately charged Sandoval
with three counts: first degree murder (by extreme indifference) of Camilla Love (count
I), first degree assault of Joshua Love (count 2), and conspiracy to commit first degree murder (count 3). The other ELS members involved in the shooting were similarly
charged. They were tried along with Sandoval in the same proceeding, but pleaded guilty
after the prosecution rested in exchange for reduced charges. Only Sandoval took his
case to the jury.

During trial, the Prosecutor presented evidence indicating that Sandoval was a longtime ELS member. Sandoval concedes this. Evidence was also presented that OGs have elevated status. The trial court found this evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
Sandoval was an OG.

Later, the jury ultimately convicted Sandoval as charged. The court sentenced Sandoval to a total sentence of 904 months of confinement. The ELS members who pleaded guilty received reduced charges.

Sandoval appealed. Among other issues on appeal, he argued that comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument constituted misconduct and that this misconduct violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.


  1. The Prosecutor’s “OG” References were Improper But Did Not Prejudice

The court explained that in order to make a successful claim of prosecutor misconduct, the defense must establish that the prosecuting attorney’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. To be prejudicial, a substantial likelihood must exist that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. The Court further reasoned that when a defendant objects to an allegedly improper comment, it evaluates the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Failure to object to an allegedly improper remark constitutes waiver unless the remark is so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an admonition to the jury.

“While some of the prosecutor’s comments were improper, Sandoval fails to demonstrate prejudice,” said the Court. The Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s repeated references to Sandoval being an “OG” during his rebuttal closing argument was an improper attempt to embellish Sandoval’s culpability to the jury because the inference was not reasonably supported by the record.

“But no one testified that simply being a longtime gang member was sufficient for OG status,” said the Court. The court reasoned that although a witness testified that an OG was one of the older original members of the gang, the witness did not identify Sandoval as such, instead naming older gang members who were incarcerated at the time of the Love shooting. “Thus, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the prosecutor to reasonably infer that Sandoval was an OG,” said the Court. “As a result, the OG comments were improper.”

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also reasoned that the prejudice generated from such comments is negligible. Sandoval freely admitted he needed to be involved in the attack, attended planning meetings for the attack, and voluntarily assisted a co-defendant in searching out a target and keeping an eye on police that evening. “Given these admissions, it is not substantially likely that the jury’s mistaken belief that Sandoval may have been an OG would have affected the outcome in this case. “This claim has no merit,” said the Court.

2. The Prosecutor’s Racial Comments Were Not Improper.

Here, Sandoval claimed that the prosecutor improperly distinguished between the
gang status of Asian/Pacific Islanders and Latinos during rebuttal closing argument.
The Supreme Court explained that it is improper and a Sixth Amendment violation for a
prosecutor to “flagrantly or apparently intentionally appeals to racial bias in a way that
undermines the defendant’s credibility or the presumption of innocence.”

The court explained that when racial bias is implicated, the normal prejudicial standard for prosecutorial misconduct is elevated. To avoid a constitutional violation from prosecutorial misconduct based on comments appealing to racial bias, the State must demonstrate that the misconduct did not affect the verdict “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“However, this heightened standard does not apply every time a prosecutor mentions
race,” said the Court. “It applies only when a prosecutor mentions race in an effort to appeal to a juror’s potential racial bias, i.e., to support assertions based on stereotypes rather than evidence.”

The Supreme Court reasoned that here, the prosecutor referred to Asian/Pacific Islanders one time and did so to explain the hierarchy of the ELS membership; that is, only Latinos such as Sandoval could be full-fledged members.

The Supreme Court further reasoned that Sandoval, rather than the State, has the burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor’s comment regarding the role of Asian/Pacific Islanders was improper and prejudicial, and he fails to do so. The trial court did not err when it held that the prosecutor’s statement about gang hierarchy was a reasonable inference based on all the testimony that came out at trial.

“It is not substantially likely that any alleged improper comments by the prosecutor
prejudiced Sandoval,” said the Supreme Court. “This claim has no merit.”

With that, the Supreme Court upheld Sandoval’s conviction and sentence.

My opinion? Prosecutors are bound by a sets of rules which outline fair and dispassionate conduct, especially during trial. Generally, prosecutorial misconduct is an illegal act or failing to act, on the part of a prosecutor, especially an attempt to sway the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or to impose a harsher than appropriate punishment. If prosecutors break these rules, then misconduct might have happened.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member faces criminal charges, especially if it appears the prosecution is unfairly prosecuting your case. It’s important to hire defense counsel who know the scope and limits of which the government can go about proving its case.

DOL Shared Info With ICE

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According to reporters Shapiro and Davila, the Seattle Times first reported the agency’s practice Thursday, revealing that DOL was handing over personal information to federal authorities 20 to 30 times a month. The policy was surprising to many, given that Washington is among a minority of states to allow undocumented immigrants to get driver’s licenses.

 In another major shift announced in a news release Monday, DOL said it would use emergency rule-making to end its practice of collecting “information that isn’t mandated and could be misused,” specifically information on license applications about where a person was born.

The release did not say whether the application would continue to note the IDs a person used to obtain a license. Those IDs could include a foreign passport or other documents that might signal someone does not have legal status.

The agency also has accepted the resignation of Deputy Director Jeff DeVere. DeVere oversaw compliance with an executive order that Gov. Jay Inslee signed last year, designed to prevent state employees from helping federal officials enforce immigration laws — an attempt to thwart President Donald Trump’s approach to immigration enforcement.

Until questioned by The Seattle Times last week, Inslee’s office didn’t know the extent of DOL’s cooperation with the feds, according to his spokeswoman, Jaime Smith.

The response to the licensing department’s policy of cooperating with ICE was swift and furious. The governor ordered DOL to direct future requests from federal immigration officers to his general counsel. State lawmakers pledged to file a bill to ensure the practice was stopped.

Monday’s announcement from the department included an apology, and made clear that the offices of the governor and Attorney General Bob Ferguson had a hand in the changes.

“We support the Executive Order, but failed to meet the Governor’s intent regarding the protection of this type of information,” DOL Director Pat Kohler said in the news release. “We are sorry that our work did not align with our state’s values.”

She went on to say DOL “did not clearly communicate” the information federal law enforcement was requesting nor seek clarification with the governor’s office and the Legislature about how to handle those requests.

The agency also announced it would review its processes and computer systems with the governor’s and attorney general’s offices; hire a community liaison to ensure DOL practices “meet the needs of all Washington residents”; start a new hotline to answer questions about the issue; and educate agency staff on all policy and procedural changes and the governor’s executive order.

“The recent revelations about our state Department of Licensing’s failure to safeguard certain information from federal immigration officials has shaken and angered many communities” Inslee said in statement Monday. “It has angered me. I understand what’s at stake in getting this right, and the ramifications of what it means when we get it wrong,” the governor said. “I expect every employee in every one of my state agencies to understand this as well.”

ER 404(B) and “Lustful Disposition”

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In State v. Gonzales, the WA Court of Appeals held that a trial court did not commit error in admitting evidence that, after the charged conduct, the victim observed the defendant masturbating while holding the victim’s bra.


When J.G. was six years old, she and her younger brother moved in with their grandfather, defendant Eddy Gonzales and his wife. This sexual abuse ended when J.G. was ten or eleven years old. But after the molestation stopped, J.G. once encountered Gonzales masturbating in his room while holding her bra.

When J.G. was eleven years old, she moved out of the house. She informed family members of the molestation. They, in turn, contacted police; who later arrested Mr. Gonzales.

Gonzales was charged with first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. The State later added a second count of first degree child rape and charged him with tampering with a witness.

At trial, the Court admitted testimony that he masturbated while holding J.G.’s bra.

The jury acquitted Gonzales of one count of first degree child rape, but found him guilty of the remaining charges. Among other issues not discussed here, Gonzales appealed on the issue of whether the trial court wrongfully admitted that evidence. He argued this uncharged misconduct goes to propensity and should be excluded under ER 404(b). He argues the trial court wrongfully admitted this testimony to show his “lustful disposition” toward J.G., particularly because it occurred after the charged conduct.


First, the Court of Appeals described the rules of evidence which allow or disallow the evidence from getting to the jury. In short, (ER) 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for “other purposes.”

Consequently, the Court reasoned that Washington courts have consistently held one such other purpose is evidence of collateral sexual misconduct when it shows the defendant’s lustful disposition toward the victim. This is because a lustful disposition makes it more likely that the defendant committed the crime charged. Evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct occurring before or after the charged acts is admissible. In an ER 404(b) analysis, the trial court must balance and weigh probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice.

Second, the Court of Appeals applied the law to its reasoning. It said that here, the trial court admitted J.G.’s testimony that she saw Gonzales masturbating while holding her bra. The trial court reasoned that Gonzales’s behavior was sexual conduct that showed lustful disposition toward J.G. The trial court also found that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice.

“The trial court did not abuse its discretion,” said the Court of Appeals. “Gonzales’s action shows a sexual desire for J.G. Thus, it goes toward an ‘other purpose’ as provided under ER 404(b).”

Third, the Court of Appeals rejected Gonzales’s arguments that any uncharged sexual misconduct is unfairly prejudicial in a sex abuse prosecution. It reasoned that the admitted evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because his act was not more inflammatory than the charged crime, and J.G. was only indirectly victimized by it.

Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Gonzales’s arguments that the admitted testimony had diminished probative value because the incident occurred after the alleged abuse. The Court of Appeals reasoned that an act occurring after the charged abuse is relevant to lustful disposition. It was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the probative value of this testimony was not outweighed by unfair prejudice.

With that, the Court of appeals affirm the admission of the “lustful disposition” testimony under ER 404(b) and upheld Mr. Gonzalez’s conviction.

My opinion?

It’s tricky to predict whether judges will admit or deny evidence when the evidence is offered for “other purposes” under ER 404(b). Judges have lots of discretion an how and where the rule applies. Still, judges must follow the doctrine of stare decisis and make rulings which are consistent existing case law when rendering decisions.

Fortunately, I’m quite familiar with the case law on this subject. Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member faces charges and the State wants to offer evidence of the offender’s behavior which falls outside the scope of the immediate facts that are alleged. Perhaps a well-argued pretrial motion to suppress evidence could change the complexion of the case and result in reducing or dismissing the charges.

Black & Undocumented

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Excellent article by Jeremy Raff of the Atlantic claims that although only 7 percent of non-citizens in the U.S. are black, they make up 20 percent of those facing deportation on criminal grounds.

The reason for higher deportation rates? Research suggests that because black people in the United States are more likely to be stopped, arrested, and incarcerated, black immigrants may be disproportionately vulnerable to deportation.

According to Raff, more than half a million black unauthorized immigrants in the United States—about 575,000 as of 2013. Last week, The New York Times reported that the presence of immigrants from Haiti and Nigeria, who together represent roughly 20 percent of the foreign-born black population, vexed President Trump. The Haitians “all have AIDS,” Trump said in a June meeting with his top advisers according to the Times, while the Nigerians would not “go back to their huts” after seeing America, he said. (The White House denied the comments).

“The criminal-justice system acts like a funnel into the immigration system,” said César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, a University of Denver law professor who studies the nexus of policing and immigration law. New York University law professor Alina Das said black immigrants are “targeted by criminalization.”

Raff reports that while the Obama administration prioritized immigrants with felony convictions for deportation, President Trump’s executive orders effectively made anyone in the country illegally a target for removal. Arrests of non-criminals more than doubled, and among those who have been charged with a crime, the top three categories are “traffic offenses—DUI,” “dangerous drugs,” and “immigration,” which means illegal entry, illegal reentry, false claim to U.S. citizenship, and trafficking, according to ICE. In fiscal year 2017, almost 74 percent of people arrested by ICE had a criminal conviction—arrests the agency uses to argue “that its officers know how to prioritize enforcement without overly prescriptive mandates.”

But Hernández sees something different in the large number of criminal convictions among ICE detainees.

“Racial bias present in the criminal-justice system plays itself out in the immigration context,” he said. “There are so many entry points” to deportation, said Das, and “when you are a person of color who is also an immigrant, you face a double punishment.”

Raff also reports that a 2016 report by the NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic, where Das is the co-director, and the Black Alliance for Just Immigration found that although black immigrants represent about 7 percent of the non-citizen population, they make up more than 10 percent of immigrants in removal proceedings. Criminal convictions amplify the disparity: Twenty percent of immigrants facing deportation on criminal grounds are black.

Today, almost 10 percent of the black population in the United States is foreign-born, up from about 3 percent in 1980. As the number of black immigrants has grown, so, too, have the linkages between cops, courts, and the immigration system.

According to Raff, aside from ICE’s splashier arrests within so-called “sanctuary cities,” most apprehensions nationwide happen inside jails once an immigrant has had contact with local police. This collaboration is a result of decades of legislation and executive action by both Democrats and Republicans. Two years after the passage of his controversial crime bill, former President Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996. Known as IIRIRA (pronounced “ira-ira”), the law expanded mandatory detention and the number of deportable crimes. As the federal inmate population doubled, prison-like immigrant-detention centers rose up in tandem.

Raff reports that in the early 1990s, there were around 5,000 immigrants detained each day; by 2001, the population quadrupled. And the Trump administration wants to keep that number growing: The president’s 2018 budget called for increasing the daily detainee population to 51,000, a 25 percent bump over last year.

“Additional detention space does make Americans safer,” argued Jessica Vaughan of the Center for Immigration Studies, a group that advocates for stricter enforcement. Detention also ensures that undocumented immigrants don’t “disappear into the woodwork,” Vaughan said. “The benefit of keeping illegal aliens in custody,” she said, is that “it prevents the release of criminal aliens back into the community to have the opportunity to reoffend.”

Raff reports that while the prison population has begun to dwindle in recent years—the incarceration rate fell 13 percent between 2007 and 2015—immigration detention remains “one of the fastest-growing sectors of the carceral state,” said Kelly Lytle Hernandez, a University of California, Los Angeles, historian who studies the origins of U.S. immigration control.

ICE’s Secure Communities program—which began under former President George W. Bush; was expanded, then killed, under his successor Barack Obama; then reinstated by Trump—provides local police with a national fingerprint database to check suspects for immigration violations. ICE can also deputize local law enforcement to make immigration arrests, a power authorized by IIRIRA. Some 60 law-enforcement agencies across 18 states participate in that program.

“Local police are some of the biggest feeders into the immigration-enforcement system,” said Will Gaona, the policy director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona. “And that’s more true in Arizona”—where Gustave was picked up—“because of S.B. 1070.” That 2010 state law, which has since been emulated in dozens of states, requires police to ask about immigration status if they suspect someone is in the country illegally.

My opinion? Immigration and race relations certainly are hot-button topics in today’s administration. Hopefully,equitable decisions in the criminal justice system can be made which don’t unduly and/or specifically affect immigrants; regardless of their race.

Please contact my office you have a non-American friend or family member who faces criminal charges. Immigration issues play a huge factor in how criminal cases are resolved.

Driverless Cars for Crime?

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Informative article by Tim Johnson of McClatchy DC Bureau reports that driverless cars could potentially be used by criminals, hackers and terrorists who want to employ them for mayhem and criminal purposes.

“Self-driving cars may enable new crimes that we can’t even imagine today,” said Patrick Lin, director of the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic University.

Johnson reports that the manufacture of self-driving cars is already underway among major automakers and Silicon Valley tech giants, and a handful of current models allow limited hands-free driving and even park themselves. Before long, experts say, totally autonomous vehicles will hit the roads, starting with taxis and fleet delivery vehicles.

The clearly visible potential danger, Lin and others say, focuses on vulnerability to hackers who could turn driverless autos into vehicles for mayhem if not into weapons themselves.


Lots of questions remain over whether the electronic systems of self-driving vehicles can be made tamperproof, and if humans aboard will be able to override if systems go haywire.

Some engineers say glitches are common and adoption is likely to be gradual.

“Most people don’t understand how easy it is to hack into a driverless car, and then basically steer it off course,” said Dr. Mary Cummings, a former Navy fighter pilot who heads the Humans and Autonomy Laboratory at Duke University’s Pratt School of Engineering.

Cummings said she views hackers as a greater threat than criminals or terrorists when it comes to autonomous vehicles.

“There’s no way I’d put my kid in a driverless car right now,” Cummings said.


Johnson reports that the FBI, in an unclassified report obtained by The Guardian in 2014, voiced concerned about how “game changing” autonomous cars may become for criminals, hackers and terrorists, turning the vehicles into more potentially lethal weapons than they are today. An FBI spokesperson did not immediately respond to a query about the impact of autonomous cars on law enforcement.

“The FBI is already worried about robo-getaway drivers, which frees up a suspect to shoot back,” Lin said. “Criminals might be able to make a better escape, if a road full of self-driving cars will always move out of the way when you threaten a collision.”

Criminals might commandeer self-driving vehicles and trap passengers inside until they pay a ransom, Lin said, or use camera-equipped models to case robbery locations over longer periods since the cars don’t need to eat or sleep. They can ditch accomplice drivers, who often have loose lips, as they conduct crimes.

Society still has to decide how much invasive technology it will permit in self-driving cars in the name of safety, experts said. Should they contain sensors to detect explosives or narcotics to halt terrorism and crime? Cameras to record what happens inside the vehicles?

“If law enforcement pulls over an empty self-driving car that’s carrying contraband, they can likely track down the user,” Lin said. “Cars aren’t as disposable as burner phones.”


Johnson reports that fears that hackers or terrorists could commandeer vehicles captivate the common imagination, fueled by Hollywood. Last year’s hit “The Fate of the Furious,” which tallied $1.1 billion in box office earnings, portrayed elite hackers guiding hundreds of cars speeding down New York’s Seventh Avenue, turning them into battering rams.

A less cinematic scenario, experts say, is that terrorists might use only one or two autonomous vehicles in an attack, perhaps blocking a tunnel leading into a metropolis to divert attention from a pending attack elsewhere in the city.

Terrorists might seek to program autonomous vehicles to carry out attacks far in the future, with explosives or as a weapon to plow into crowds.

“Can I instruct a car to do something a year in advance? What if I’ve been dead for most of that year?” asked Martin C. Libicki, an information technology and national security expert.

Such fears tend to eclipse consideration of how self-driving vehicles are bound to lead to a steady, dramatic drop in traffic fatalities. In 2016, 37,461 people died in traffic accidents.

“All of these things are evaluated through a political filter. Nobody writes headlines about the person who didn’t die in an auto accident. Everybody will write headlines about the person who died because of a self-driving car,” Libicki said.

The vast majority of fatalities are caused by drivers who are distracted, drunk, not wearing seat belts, sleepy or otherwise not paying full attention.

“Ninety-four percent of all crashes have an element of human error. We’re talking about enormously significant numbers,” said David Strickland, counsel for the Self-Driving Coalition for Safer Streets, a group representing companies like Ford, Uber, Lyft and Volvo developing autonomous vehicles.

“This is going to sound cold hearted,” began Arthur Rizer, director of criminal justice at R Street Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, but the terrorist danger from autonomous vehicles “is minute compared to the lives that we will save just from reducing traffic accidents.”

Rizer said police departments across the country might face a drop in income as traffic fines and tickets decrease. Self-driving vehicles will be programmed to obey traffic laws. Traffic tickets cost drivers an average of $150.

“Revenue will plummet. Also, court revenues will plummet because courts make a lot of their money off of fees,” said Rizer, a former police officer and Justice Department prosecutor. Rizer said reducing the focus of police on traffic violations will certainly be part of a changing landscape for police forces brought about by autonomous vehicles. But he said police, too, will be freed somewhat from traffic patrols.

Yet to be seen is whether law enforcement will be empowered with remote “kill switches” for officers to use if they deem a self-driving vehicle to be operating suspiciously.

Lin concurred that as resources shift, police tactics will also need to shift.

“The police will no longer have a pretext for stopping a car if the vehicle never speeds, never drives recklessly, and so on,” Lin said. “Resources for highway patrols could be shifted to more targeted operations, if fewer traffic cops are needed.”

WA Death Penalty To End?

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Excellent article reporter Max Wasserman of the News Tribune reports that lawmakers are optimistic that 2018 may bring the end of Washington’s death penalty, following changes in senate leadership and years of stalled attempts in the state Legislature.

Wasserman reports that under current state law, individuals found guilty of aggravated first-degree murder can be put to death by hanging or lethal injection. The latest bill would replace that sentence with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Should it pass, Washington would a list of other states that have eliminated capital punishment in recent decades.

Wasserman also reports that the new chair on the committee overseeing the bill, state Sen. Jamie Pedersen, D-Seattle, expects the current push to abolish the death penalty to make it through the senate and possibly to the governor’s desk — the farthest any related bill would have made it in five years.

“The stars may be aligning now for support of doing away with the death penalty,” Pedersen said.

Washington’s death penalty has been seldom used in recent years. In 2014, Washington Gov. Jay Inslee placed a moratorium on capital punishment, suspending the practice for as long as he’s in office. The state’s last execution occurred in 2010 when Cal Coburn Brown, convicted for the 1991 rape and murder of 21 year-old Holly Washa, was put to death by lethal injection.

Despite its lack of use, the death penalty remains on the books in Washington. Attempts to match the governor’s position in the legislature have stalled in the past five decades, despite widespread support among lawmakers for abolishing it.

Wasserman reports that some place blame with prior leadership of the senate’s Law and Justice Committee. Sen. Mike Padden, R-Spokane Valley, who has been replaced by Pedersen as chairman of that committee, would not grant past death-penalty bills a hearing.

“I don’t anticipate I’ll be supporting the bill,” Padden said this week. “Some crimes are so heinous and so brutal that I think the death penalty is appropriate”

Padden pointed out that capital punishment also has been used as a negotiating tool against some of the state’s most egregious offenders, including serial killer Gary Ridgway. Ridgway — also known as the Green River killer — agreed to tell prosecutors the whereabouts of victims in exchange for the death penalty being taken off the table in his case.

Apparently, the state’s prosecutors are split on whether to abolish the death penalty.

“The death penalty is a question with profound moral implications, certainly worthy of wide discussion,” Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney Mark Lindquist said. “That discussion should not be limited to legislative debate in Olympia, but instead should be the subject of civic dialogue around the entire state.”

Tom McBride, the executive director of the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, defended the death penalty while leaving the door open for future reform.

“The constitutionality and evenhanded imposition of the death penalty in Washington State are issues that we will defend; but the costs, timely imposition and ultimate appropriateness of death for aggravated murder is certainly open to debate,” McBride told The News Tribune via email.


Wasserman reports that critics of the death penalty have long scrutinized the practice as a high-stakes arm of an imperfect justice system that can — and has — executed innocent people. More than 150 people nationwide have been exonerated from death row since 1973, according to data from the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP).

One of those cases occurred in Washington. Benjamin Harris was sentenced to death in 1986 for the murder of Jimmie Lee Turner, a Tacoma auto mechanic, only to have the charges dropped on appeal 11 years later. Inadequate defense counsel may have led to Harris’ initial conviction, a point NCADP program director Toni Perry believes is emblematic of wealth disparities in capital sentencing.

“Minorities, persons with diminished capacities who can’t defend themselves, who can’t get a good attorney — it’s arbitrary. There are no rich people on death row,” Perry said.

The death penalty also comes with fiscal baggage. Largely due to legal fees in the appeal process, the death penalty costs an average $1 million more per case than life imprisonment in Washington, according to a 2015 Seattle University study of state convictions.

For these reasons, Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson called upon the Legislature to do away with the practice last year. Five states — New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut and Maryland — have since 2007 passed legislation to eliminate their death penalty.

“There is no role for capital punishment in a fair, equitable and humane justice system,” Ferguson, who requested this year’s bill, said in 2017 press release.

“Whether new leadership and a Democratic majority will be enough to achieve the goal one year later remains to be seen,” reports Wasserman.


Bla Bla Bla

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In State v. Boyd, the WA Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor improperly disrespects defense counsel by using “bla, bla, bla” to describe opposing counsel’s argument. This phrase is both disrespectful and dismissive.


In February 1998, when he was 23 years old, Jayson Boyd had sex with a 15 year old. In 1999, he pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the third degree. He was required to register as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130 and RCW 9A.44.140. Since his conviction in 1999, Boyd has been convicted of failure to register as a sex offender three times.

Boyd is homeless, has a ninth or tenth grade education, and is mentally ill. At the time of his crime in 1998, homeless sex offenders were not required to register as sex offenders because they did not have addresses. The legislature subsequently amended the statute to require homeless sex offenders who lacked a fixed address to update the county sheriff weekly, in person, of their whereabouts.

Boyd largely complied with the registration requirement but pleaded guilty to
crimes of failure to register in 2009, 2010, and 2013.

In March 2015, the State charged Boyd with failure to register as a sex offender between January 27, 2015 and February 10, 2015.  The court ordered a competency evaluation after Boyd rambled incoherently during a pretrial hearing. A month later, after Boyd was found competent to stand trial, the court held another hearing. At that hearing, the court issued a scheduling order, which Boyd signed, setting the next hearing date for November 6, 2015. While explaining the order to Boyd, however, the court misspoke—it told Boyd that he needed to appear on December 6, 2015. After Boyd failed to appear on November 6, 2015, the Prosecutor added a charge for bail jumping.

During closing arguments, the Prosecutor appeared to have given a mocking and deragatory tone. After the jury retired to deliberate, Boyd’s defense attorney  moved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct:

“During the prosecutor’s first closing argument, it was normal in tone, very even and level. And the rebuttal closing argument after I had given my closing, she started out and then repeatedly throughout that closing argument, either pretending she was me or Mr. Boyd, but was kind of in a sing-song tone, a complaining child-like type tone of voice when mentioning the barriers that my client faces as a homeless person and saying “bla, bla, bla,” and this was something that was repeated throughout the closing argument. And so I’d be making a motion for a mistrial based on—based on the prosecutor’s tone of
voice during the closing argument.”

The trial court denied the motion, explaining: “I did not hear what I consider to be a mocking or derogatory tone.” While the trial court agreed that the prosecutor used a different tone than her normal speech tone, it concluded that “having listened to many, many, many closing arguments, there was nothing in the tone that I heard that was derogatory or mocking or anything that grabbed my attention as being out of line, inappropriate or unprofessional.”

Boyd was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced to 45 months in prison.


On appeal, one of the issues was whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Boyd’s motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct.


The Court of Appeals said that the inquiry on prosecutorial misconduct consists of two prongs: (1) whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper and (2) if so, whether the improper comments caused prejudice. To show prejudice, the defendant must show a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor’s statements affected the jury’s verdict. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the comments were improper or prejudicial.

Here, the prosecutor’s references to Boyd’s “barriers” and chaotic life are not improper remarks about his homelessness, poverty, or mental illness because they rebut the very defense advanced by Boyd’s counsel—that complying with the law was “too much” for him because of his “barriers.” But we find that the prosecutor impugned defense counsel by stating “And again, Boyd’s Defense Counsel talks about chaos in his life, barriers, bla, bla, bla. No evidence of that.”

“Using ‘bla, bla, bla’ to refer to an opposing counsel’s argument is both disrespectful and dismissive. Although the statement does not imply deception or dishonesty like ‘crock,’ it implies that the arguments are unworthy of consideration and may be dismissed offhand. We find the statement was improper.”

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the Prosecutor’s statements during trial affected the jury’s verdict. “The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Boyd’s motion for a mistrial,” said the Court, and upheld Boyd’s conviction and sentence.


Justice Becker’s dissent focused on how poverty issues negatively impact justice as homelessness applies to offenders who have a duty to register:

“Our (failure to register) statute has grown steadily harsher, especially as applied to homeless offenders. I believe it is time to reconsider the ex post facto analysis of the statute in light of the changes since State v. Ward. I would join the jurisdictions holding that frequent in-person reporting requirements render a registration statute so punitive that applying it retroactively violates the constitution. I would reverse Boyd’s conviction and remand for dismissal with prejudice.”

My opinion? “Bl bla bla” issues aside, I agree with the dissenting Justice Becker when she says that frequent in-person reporting requirements render a registration statute so punitive that applying it retroactively violates the constitution. Being homeless is difficult enough by itself. Requiring homeless people to register under Washington’s rigorous “Duty to Register” statute is incredibly difficult, if not nearly impossible, for homeless people to follow and obey. As a a result, the law unequally punishes sex offenders for being homeless. That’s simply not fair.

Glaring During Trial

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In State v. Sagethe WA Court of Appeals held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based upon the victim’s behavior – glaring at the defendant – when called to the stand.


Jonathan Sage faced four counts of second degree rape of a child. He was alleged to have engaged in sexual acts with minors J.M. and E.M., and came into contact with the two brothers because he owned a company at which J.M. and E.M.’s mother worked.

The case proceeded to trial. During proceedings, the victim E.M. glared at Sage as he entered the courtroom. Sage’s defense attorney objected and requested an immediate mistrial. He described the interaction as follows:

“E.M. walked past defense counsel and hissed at the Defendant, bent down, and made an aggressive stare. As best as I could tell, the jurors looked horrified. Their reaction is clear that the stance or that moment is going to live in their minds as opposed to what he
testifies to. My client has a right to a fair trial, to be presumed innocent, and I don’t know that he can get a fair trial with this jury after that behavior.”

Although the trial judge sustained defense counsel’s objection, the court denied the motion for mistrial and instructed the jury to disregard E.M.’s behavior.

The jury convicted Sage on all four counts and, by special verdict, found the alleged aggravating circumstances had been established. The court concluded the aggravating circumstances were substantial and compelling reasons to impose an exceptional sentence.

Sage appealed his conviction and his exceptional sentence under the argument that his motion for a mistrial should have been granted because E.M.’s courtroom behavior prejudiced the jury.


The Court of Appeals reasoned that a trial court should only grant a mistrial when the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can ensure that the defendant will be fairly tried. To determine the effect of the irregularity leading to the request for a mistrial, the court examines: (i) its seriousness; (ii) whether it involved cumulative evidence; and (iii) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard it.

“Here, E.M. entered the courtroom and glared at Sage,” said the Court of Appeals. “The trial court denied Sage’s motion for mistrial and entered a detailed ruling on the record. Unlike a verbal outburst or threatening gesture, E.M. glared at Sage. The court gave a curative instruction. E.M. did not repeat the behavior after the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the behavior,” said the Court of Appeals. “We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Also, the Court of Appeals upheld Sage’s exceptional sentence based on aggravating factors.

With that, the Court upheld Sage’s conviction and exceptional sentence.

Prosecutors Use Body Camera Evidence

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Interesting feature from  a correspondent for NPR who covers law enforcement and privacy issues. In this feature, he discusses how police body cameras are becoming key tools for prosecutors.

This year, police body cameras made the transition from experimental tech to standard equipment. Sales exploded after the 2014 Ferguson protests as police departments scrambled to refute claims of abuse. Now the cameras have become routine, but they’re not making a significant dent in the number of people shot and killed by police.

In this feauture from Weekend Edition Sunday, Kaste described how body cameras have become a standard piece of equipment for the criminal justice system.

“Prosecutors now use them far more often than – for police accountability, prosecutors are using it to make cases against defendants, against members of the public who are charged with crimes,” said Kaste. He also described how a survey last year conducted by George Mason University showed that prosecutors were far more likely to have used video to prosecute a member of the public than to use the video to prosecute a police officer.

“What we have really is technology that quickly became sort of required for prosecution in general,” said Mr. Kaste. “Juries now expect it, and the police in the field kind of feel the pressure to get video of themselves finding evidence.”

Kaste answered questions on whether citizens can use body camera video to support their own claims of police abuse.

“There’s no national standard on that, and that’s becoming more and more of a bone of contention,” he said. “In a lot of places, it’s considered a public record and you can request it. But a lot of cases, you don’t get to see the video because the case is under investigation, and that kind of puts it in limbo. Or, in places like California, Police departments have cited officer privacy. They kind of almost view it as a personnel record or something, and it takes a lot to get the video out,” said Mr. Kaste.

” . . . it’s gotten to the point where at least one academic I talked to this year said we should rethink the whole system and start giving the video to a third party to control, not to the police department.”

My opinion? Ultimately body-worn cameras (BWC’s) are a good thing. They provide non-objective evidence of what really happened instead of forcing us to rely on people’s stories. However, I agree with Mr. Kaste in his argument that obtaining the video is oftentimes difficult. It makes no sense that BWC evidence is released by the very same police departments that it’s made to scrutinize. This is the fox guarding the hen house. Consequently, attorneys must be incredibly careful, diligent and consistent on arguing public disclosure requests and motions to obtain pretrial discovery of this evidence.

Contact my office if you, a friend or family member faces criminal charges involving BWC evidence. Although it might work in a defendant’s favor, the evidence can be suppressed if it’s unfairly prejudicial against defendants under the rules of evidence.