Monthly Archives: July 2017

Reducing Recidivism

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In an article titled, “The Nearly Perfect Recidivism Machine”David J. Krajicek, a contributing editor with The Crime Report, discusses a book written by Texas criminologist William R. Kelley.

“One would have to look far and wide to find a greater public policy failure than the American criminal justice system,” says Kelly in the opening chapter of his new book, From Retribution to Public Safety: Disruptive Innovation of American Criminal Justice (Rowman & Littlefield).

William R. Kelly

Krajicek writes that Kelly, a University of Texas-Austin sociology professor, has long been one of the country’s toughest justice critics. In this book, he offers a plan for top-to-bottom transformation of the system, in collaboration with federal judge Robert Pitman and psychiatrist William Streusand.

Kelly suggest reforms to rein in the charging powers of prosecutors. He recommends the creation of independent panels of clinical experts that would screen offenders and recommend to prosecutors who ought to be diverted to treatment.

“There is nothing about punishment that changes the underlying conditions, disorders and deficits that the majority of criminal offenders bring into the justice system,” Kelly says. Arrestees with mental illness, substance-use disorders, homelessness and other problems churn through the system and into prison, where the underlying issues that led to a lawless life are ignored.

In a conversation with TCR Contributing Editor David J. Krajicek, Kelly explains why he believes the system should incorporate more carrot and less stick for offenders and how the Trump administration’s approach threatens to make things worse. He also suggests that the public already has a more sophisticated view of how to fix the system than our political leaders.

The Crime Report: What is the impact of the country’s justice policy failures?

William R. Kelly: The short financial and statistical answer is that over the past 45 years, we have spent $1 trillion on the war on crime, $1 trillion on the war on drugs and have accomplished a recidivism rate of 65 percent. Nearly all of this effort has focused on trying to punish crime out of people, based on naïve conceptions of criminality such as “hanging around with the wrong people” and “making bad decisions.” The evidence is quite clear that crime has much more complex origins and correlates.

What we have accomplished is a nearly perfect recidivism machine, placing all of us at the unnecessary and avoidable risk of criminal victimization, and wasting extraordinary amounts of money.

TCR: You refer to “the culture of American criminal justice.” What are its key characteristics and how do you change it?

Kelly: It is squarely based on the “tough on crime” mantra. This has dictated the decisions of legislators, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials. The focus over the past 45 years has been driven by retribution and misguided assumptions that punishment deters re-offending. The question that has been routinely asked is how much punishment does this offender deserve. A more productive question for many offenders is how do we reduce the likelihood a particular offender will reoffend…

We need to provide clear incentives to motivate changing how we think about crime and punishment. Cost-benefit analyses conclusively show that behavioral change through clinical intervention like mental health and substance use disorder treatment is much more effective and cost efficient. The financial advantages should motivate legislators and local government officials. Reducing recidivism should be an incentive for prosecutors, judges, public defenders, and probation and parole officers, who will benefit from reductions in caseloads. Then there is the greater good of enhanced public safety, something we incorrectly assume the justice system already does.

TCR: You say the facile American view of crime and punishment got us here. Have voters grown more sophisticated, or are reform-minded pols still at risk of being Willie Hortoned?

Kelly: Public opinion data demonstrate that much of the public has a more nuanced view of crime and punishment than many legislators, prosecutors and judges. The public believes that the purpose of corrections is to rehabilitate offenders and therefore reduce recidivism. Many have moved beyond “lock ‘em up and throw away the key.”

Unfortunately, many policymakers, elected officials and some segments of the public still seem to be holding on to the idea that criminals are just bad people deserving maximum punishment. I’m sorry to say that Willie Horton is alive and well…There appears to be a reluctance to really embrace meaningful, comprehensive criminal justice reform.

TCR: You write, “We have arrived at the nadir of politics and policy.” Did you write that before or after Donald Trump’s election?

Kelly: I wrote that before Trump was elected when I incorrectly believed that we had already reached bottom. Who would have thought that anyone with any sense of history and even a superficial exposure to the evidence would run as the law-and-order candidate and resurrect the war on drugs?

TCR: How do you demonstrate that “tough” and “dumb” are synonyms when it comes to criminal justice?

Kelly: You focus on the enormous financial waste that the justice policy has produced. While there will be endless debates about what’s right or just and who deserves what, it is pretty hard to ignore the bottom line. A recent study estimates that the criminal justice and collateral social costs of tough on crime is $1 trillion per year. And it’s hard to reconcile 65 percent recidivism.

TCR:  Who’s to blame for the state of “correctional malpractice” you say we are in?

Kelly: First and foremost, elected officials who have blindly championed “tough on crime” policies to their political benefit, but to the detriment of public safety and the prudent use of tax dollars. State legislators and Congress have provided the mechanisms for tough on crime—mandatory sentences, restrictive parole release laws, and an ever-expanding criminal code that seems to make criminal justice the go-to system for just about every social ill.

But the culpability of elected officials goes well beyond that. The vast majority of offenders in the criminal justice system have a substance-use disorder, 40 percent are mentally ill, and 60 percent have had a least one traumatic brain injury often leading to neurocognitive dysfunction…The decision to not properly fund public health, schools and social welfare agencies has created problems that by default are managed by the criminal justice system.

Criminal justice reform means much more than merely reforming the criminal justice system. It requires massive changes to and investment in a variety of collateral institutions.

TCR: Your book articulates and recommends a scientific approach to justice reform. Yet science is out of favor in Washington and many state houses. Is there a scientific path forward?

Kelly: Yes there is, but I am afraid that we need to disguise it for some, by minimizing the science and emphasizing the public safety benefits and cost savings.

TCR: You note an overlooked data point: The country has 21 million people with substance-use disorders, the world’s third-highest rate. What explains this particular American exceptionalism?

Kelly: It is largely a result of the lack of public substance abuse resources, including inadequate treatment capacity and insurance coverage. Much of it can be attributed to the failure of the war on drugs and the belief that we can either punish or threaten substance abuse out of people. Criminalizing substance abuse rather than treating it as a public health problem has led to the failure to provide adequate funding for treatment.

Unfortunately, the picture is bleaker. The majority of substance abuse and mental health treatment in the U.S. is paid for by Medicaid. Current versions of repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act call for substantial cuts to Medicaid. That does not bode well for a problem that is crippling the country, the economy, communities, families, and the justice system.

TCR: You write that we have used an absurdly simplistic approach (lock ‘em up) for a boundlessly complex problem. Explain briefly the research on co-morbidity among inmates.

Kelly: The vast majority of offenders in the criminal justice system have clearly identifiable disorders, deficits and impairments. Many have more than one disorder, known as co-morbidity or co-occurring disorders. For example, the majority of offenders with a mental illness also have a substance-use disorder. Neuro-cognitive problems are often co-morbid with mental health and substance abuse. It does not require a clinician to appreciate that “lockin’ ‘em up” does nothing to alleviate these conditions and in fact typically exacerbates them.

When we do attempt to address these problems–diversion to a drug court or a mental health court–our focus is on just one crime-related condition. Our correctional treatment and rehabilitation efforts typically ignore co-morbidity.

TCR: What do the rest of us in a presumably civilized society owe these damaged people?

Kelly: I don’t think it’s so much what we owe them, but what do we owe ourselves: lower crime and recidivism, lower risk of being victims of crime, and lower cost of criminal justice. We have the tools to accomplish these things, but making it a political priority has been elusive.

TCR: You compare the U.S. system to those of Germany and Holland; it doesn’t stack up well.  You cite one lesson we can learn from those countries: “If you treat inmates like humans, they will act like humans.” How is it possible that we don’t know that already?

Kelly: In order to justify our draconian and dysfunctional reliance on punishment, we need to think of criminals as “not like us” in fundamental ways, as deserving retribution and harsh punishment. Punishment is what we have been told is the only thing “these people” will understand.

Psychological research confirmed a long time ago that, in most cases, incentives work much better than punishment for changing behavior. This is another example of the disjuncture between scientific evidence and criminal justice policy.

 TCR: Your key recommendation is an “unprecedented expansion” of diversion away from court toward intervention and treatment. Describe the panel review process you suggest.

Kelly: Traditional criminal prosecution, conviction and punishment are entirely appropriate for many offenders. For example, violent offenders and chronic, habitual offenders probably need to be separated from society through incarceration in the interest of public safety. For many others, such as non-violent offenders and many drug offenders, we have a much better chance of reducing recidivism by diverting them and mitigating the factors that are associated with their criminality. One of the key issues here is making good decisions about who to divert and who to prosecute.

We developed the concept of independent panels of clinical experts to facilitate better decision-making, both in terms of who should be diverted and what treatment or intervention will decrease the probability of recidivism. Offenders often have complex clinical needs that require the special expertise of psychiatrists, psychologists and clinical social workers who can assess and diagnose, determine the risk of re-offending, and make recommendations to prosecutors.

The goal is to divert appropriate individuals away from traditional prosecution to situations where their risk can be supervised and managed and where they can receive adequate treatment and intervention.

TCR: And this is the “disruptive innovation” of your book title?

Kelly: The panels are part of it. Implementing this concept will require a substantial shift in how prosecutors do their jobs, as well as how we think about crime and punishment. In effect, this requires changing the criminal justice culture.

We also argue that all levels of government need to address major deficiencies in public health, a fundamental consideration in assuring adequate capacity and expertise for intervention and treatment. The bigger picture is that criminal justice reform requires disruptive innovation of collateral institutions, such as public health.

TCR: And how might it be greeted by prosecutors, who hold all the power right now?

Kelly: This will not be easy. However, reasonable incentives for prosecutors should be recidivism reduction, in turn reducing caseloads.

The primary reasons that prosecutors’ caseloads are so large and unmanageable relate to the failure to reduce recidivism.

TCR: You say these changes will force us to redefine success in our justice system. How so?

Kelly: Success should be measured by recidivism rates, something directly related to performance of criminal justice. As it stands now, there really is no accountability. Everyone involved in criminal justice–legislators, police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and corrections officials–should all be held responsible for recidivism reduction. That would also be a disruptive change.

TCR: Tell me about the process of partnering with Robert Pitman and William Streusand in this book.

Kelly: I wrote the book, but both Pitman and Streusand played very important roles in devising solutions. For example, Pitman, a former U.S. Attorney who is now a federal judge, brought his knowledge and expertise to the task of developing statutory and procedural details for how the expert panels would fit into the roles and responsibilities of prosecutors, defense counsel and judges.

The input of Streusand, a psychiatrist, was crucial in the development of the clinical protocol for the expert panels and assessing offender dysfunction, as well as the discussions about fixing public health.

TCR: You were going through a serious health crisis while writing this book, as you point out in the introduction. I hope you are doing well. I wonder if that diversion somehow informed the book’s content.

Kelly: Thank you. I am in complete remission and feel very blessed. To be honest, it could not have worked out any better. I was diagnosed in early March of 2016, when I had a rough draft of one chapter written. I was so fortunate that I had this project to distract me from the reality of being pretty sick and going through some difficult chemo. It was also fortuitous that I had two collaborators who are very good friends and played important roles in my recovery.

I’m not sure that being sick informed the content, but I suspect it influenced the tone. If I sound impatient at times in the book, it is probably a result of being confronted with the reality that life is short.

My opinion? Excellent article, and excellent book by Mr. Kelly.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Marijuana and Violent Crime

Marijuana Arrests on the Decline but Still Outnumber Violent Crime Arrests,  According to FBI Data

The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports violent crime rate in Washington has declined since voters here legalized recreational marijuana use in November 2012. The FBI numbers are based on crimes reported to law enforcement agencies.

2010: 313.5 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

2011: 294.6 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

2012: 295.6 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

2013: 289.1 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

2014: 285.8 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

2015: 284.4 offenses per 100,000 city inhabitants

The state’s rate of violent crime in 2015, the most recent year of data available, also was substantially lower than the national average, according to the FBI. Nationally, the estimated rate of violent crime was 372.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015.

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States reports, 2010-2015

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

“Furtive Movements”

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In State v. Weyand, the WA Supreme Court held that officers lacked sufficient facts to justify a Terry stop of the defendant. Walking quickly while looking up and down the street at 2:40 a.m. is an innocuous act, which cannot justify intruding into people’s private affairs.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On December 22, 2012, at 2:40 in the morning, Corporal Bryce Henry saw a car parked near 95 Cullum Avenue in Richland, Washington, that had not been there 20 minutes prior. The area is known for extensive drug history. Corporal Henry did not recognize the car and ran the license plate through an I/LEADS (Intergraph Law Enforcement Automated System) database. However, that license plate search revealed nothing of consequence about the vehicle or its registered owner.

After parking his car, Corporal Henry saw Weyand and another male leave 95 Cullum. As the men walked quickly toward the car, they looked up and down the street. The driver looked around once more before getting into the car. Weyand got into the passenger seat. Based on these observations and Corporal Henry’s knowledge of the extensive drug history at 95 Cullum, he conducted a Terry stop of the car.

After stopping Weyand, Corporal Henry observed that Weyand’s eyes were red and glassy and his pupils were constricted. Corporal Henry is a drug recognition expert and believed that Weyand was under the influence of a narcotic. When Corporal Henry ran Weyand’ s name, he discovered an outstanding warrant and arrested Weyand. Corporal Henry searched Weyand incident to that arrest and found a capped syringe. Corporal Henry advised Weyand of his Miranda3 rights, and Weyand admitted that the substance in the syringe was heroin that he had bought from a resident inside 95 Cullum.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Weyand with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Weyand moved to suppress all evidence and statements under Criminal Rules (CrR) 3.5 and 3.6 and to dismiss the case against him. Weyand argued that the officer did not have sufficient individualized suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop.

After the hearing, the court concluded that the seizure was a lawful investigative stop. According to the court, Corporal Henry had reasonable suspicion to believe that Weyand was involved in criminal activity. The court found Weyand’s case distinct from State v. Doughty, because in this case there was actual evidence of drug activity at, as well as known drug users frequenting, 95 Cullum.

The court additionally found that Weyand knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; thus, all post-Miranda statements were admissible at trial. Weyand waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case to a stipulated facts trial. Finding that Weyand possessed a loaded syringe that contained heroin, the court found Weyand guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

Weyand appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It reasoned that the totality of the circumstances, coupled with the officer’s training and experience, showed that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified the stop. Those circumstances included “the long history of drug activity at 95 Cullum, the time of night, the 20 minute stop at the house, the brisk walking, and the glances up and down the street.”

LEGAL ISSUE

Whether the specific facts that led to the Terry stop would lead an objective person to form a reasonable suspicion that Weyand was engaged in criminal activity.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court held that officers lacked sufficient facts to justify a Terry stop of the defendant. It reasoned that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an officer generally may not seize a person without a warrant. There are, however, a few carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. The State bears the burden to show that a warrantless search or seizure falls into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions.

One of these exceptions is the Terry investigative stop. The Terry exception allows an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning, without a warrant, if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. An officer may also briefly frisk the person if the officer has reasonable safety concerns to justify the protective frisk.

The Court found that the totality of the circumstances did not justify a warrantless seizure. It reasoned that in order to conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop. To evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion, Courts look at the totality of the circumstances known to the officer. The totality of circumstances includes the officer’s training and experience, the location of the stop, the conduct of the person detained, the purpose of the stop, and the amount of physical intrusion on the suspect’s liberty. The suspicion must be individualized to the person being stopped.

“Here, the trial court’s decision rested primarily on evidence that 95 Cullum was a
known drug location,” said the Court. “However, Corporal Henry did not observe current activity that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that criminal activity was taking place or about to take place in the residence.”

Furtive Movements

Also, the Court reasoned that reliance on ‘furtive movements’ as the basis for a Terry stop can be problematic. “Case law has not precisely defined such movements, and courts too often accept the label without questioning the breadth of the term.” It explained that ‘furtive movements’ are vague generalizations of what might be perceived as suspicious activity which does not provide a legal ( or factual) basis for a Terry stop.”

The Court quoted Judge Richard Posner in recognizing that “furtive movements,” standing alone, are a vague and unreliable indicator of criminality:

“Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court reasoned that simply labeling a suspect’s action a “furtive movement,” without explaining how it gives rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion, is not sufficient to justify a Terry stop. Furthermore, reasoned the Court, police cannot justify a suspicion of criminal conduct based only on a person’s location in a high crime area:

“It is beyond dispute that many members of our society live, work, and spend their waking hours in high crime areas, a description that can be applied to parts of many of our cities. That does not automatically make those individuals proper subjects for criminal investigation.”

Consequently, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and hold that walking quickly and looking around, even after leaving a house with extensive drug history at 2:40 in the morning, is not enough to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a Terry stop.

My opinion? Excellent decision. I’m very impressed the Court addressed the term “furtive movements” and put it in perspective. Law enforcement officers regularly use this catch-phrase to describe suspicious behavior allowing them stop/search/seize people. Although officer safety is a primary concern and a very good reason to search people who are already in police custody and making “furtive movements” in the presence of officers, it cannot be a basis for stopping and searching people who are simply going about their business walking down the street. Great decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Affidavits of Prejudice

Image result for striking a judge

In State v. Lile, the WA Supreme Court held that a judge’s granting a continuance is a discretionary ruling which effectively negates any affidavits of prejudice which the parties may file against  that judge afterward.

BACKGROUND FACTS

One evening in 2013, two intoxicated groups crossed paths on a Bellingham sidewalk. United States Navy sailor Lile (the Defendant) and his companions were walking in one direction on the sidewalk and another group moved toward them in the opposite direction. Lile’s group had recently left a party in which Lile had admittedly consumed alcohol over a period of about five hours.

Unfortunately, Mr. Lile’s group had negative interactions with the other group of individuals. This resulted in Liles being striking someone in the face, fracturing their jaw, knocking out some teeth, concussing the victim and rendering them briefly unconscious. Lile was pulled away by one of his companions. A nearby police officer witnessed the fracas and approached Lile, who ran away.

A chase ensued. Officer Woodward jumped onto Lile’s back. Lile struggled, striking Officer Woodward in the face. Officer Josh McKissick arrived shortly thereafter and assisted Officer Woodward in finally subduing and arresting Lile. Ultimately, Lile was charged with Assault in the Fourth Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, Assault in the Second Degree and Resisting Arrest under numerous counts.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS & AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE

The matter was set for a January 22, 2014 pretrial status hearing. During the hearing, the judge orally granted a 1-week continuance, issuing a written order to that effect February 3, 2014.

On February 4, 2014, Lile’s attorney submitted a motion to sever, asking the court to order separate trials for Lile’s alleged assaults on Millman and Rowles from his assault on Officer Woodward.

During the February 6, 2014 status hearing, before Judge Uhrig ruled on the motion to sever, Lile’s attorney informed Judge Uhrig that Lile had filed an affidavit of prejudice against him.

Affidavit of Prejudice

For those who don’t know, an affidavit of prejudice (AOP) is a statutory pleading/device which gives either the Prosecutor of the Defense Attorney opportunity to dismiss/excuse a particular judge from deciding any issues on a pending criminal case. The AOP must be filed as soon as possible; preferably before the particular judge decides any issues on the case. Typically, AOP’s are not honored if they are filed after the judge has already made discretionary rulings on the case.

The Prosecutor asserted the affidavit was not timely because the judge’s ruling on the January 22, 2014 continuance motion preceded the affidavit and was discretionary. The judge agreed with the Prosecutor, indicating that the continuance ruling was indeed discretionary; as he had denied such requests in the past. As a result, he ruled the AOP untimely. He then denied Lile’s motion to sever. Lile did not later renew the motion to sever, an option provided by CrR 4.4(a)(2).

Months later, Lile’s case proceeded to jury trial, where a different judge handled the proceedings. Lile was convicted on all charges. Lile appealed to the WA Court of Appeals on a number of issues, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Afterward, Lile appealed to the WA Supreme Court.

ISSUE

For purposes of this blog entry, we focus on the issue of whether the joint continuance motion  was discretionary, making Lile’ s affidavit of prejudice untimely and leaving the original judge qualified to hear the motion to sever.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The WA Supreme Court decided that a ruling to continue a case is, in fact, a discretionary ruling. For those who don’t know, a discretionary ruling is an official, substantive decision from the judge using reason and judgment to choose from among acceptable alternatives.

The court reasoned that under an AOP, a party has the right to disqualify a trial judge for prejudice, without substantiating the claim, if the requirements of the statute are met. The statute says, “no Judge of a superior court … shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding when it shall be established … that said judge is prejudiced against any party or attorney.”

To establish prejudice, a party can file a motion supported by an affidavit indicating
that the party cannot, or believes that it cannot, have a fair and impartial trial before
such judge. In order to be timely, however, an AOP must be made ‘before the judge presiding has made any order or ruling involving discretion. The statute also provides that the arrangement of the calendar, the setting of an action, motion or proceeding down for hearing or trial, the arraignment of the accused in a criminal action or the fixing of bail shall not be construed as a ruling or order involving discretion.

The Court reasoned that a trial court’s ruling on an opposed continuance is discretionary because the court must consider various factors; such as diligence, materiality, due process, a need for orderly procedure, and the possible impact of the result on the trial.

Furthermore, the WA Supreme Court held that the judge’s continuance ruling was discretionary. It reasoned that continuances, even when unopposed, have a significant impact on the efficient operation of our courts and the rights of the parties, particularly in criminal proceedings. Correspondingly, CrR 3 .3(h) gives trial courts discretion in granting them. Here, the continuance ruling here impacted the “duties and functions of the court, and therefore involved discretion.

In conclusion, the WA Supreme Court held that the judge’s continuance ruling was discretionary; which made him qualified to rule on Lile’ s severance motion.

JUDGE MADSEN’S CONCURRING OPINION

Although Judge Madsen concurred with the opinion, her reasoning differed. She did, in fact, find that the judge did not make a discretionary ruling when granting the continuance.

She reasoned that whether an order is discretionary is not about the form of the motion, but about whether there was something substantive related to the case underlying the motion.

“In the present case, I would find that the continuance ruling was not discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050 because the court’s ruling indicated no predisposition on the issues in the case,” she said. She elaborated that, admittedly, granting or denying a motion necessarily involves some type of discretion, but the same is true of the other preliminary matters that the majority distinguishes. “Arranging the calendar, setting a matter for hearing or trial, arraigning an accused, and setting an amount for bail are all discretionary acts in the sense that the judge has the general freedom to make those decisions,” she said. However, the legislature has dictated that these acts will not be construed as rulings involving discretion within the meaning of RCW 4.12.050(1).

“The same is true of the agreed continuance in this case. The motion occurred pretrial and was unopposed. It was a calendaring matter, not a substantive ruling on an issue in the case.”

With that, Judge Madsen held that the judge erred in denying Lile’ s affidavit of prejudice.

My opinion? I must agree with Judge Madsen’s concurrence. Like her, I believe that arranging the calendar, setting a matter for hearing or trial, arraigning an accused, and setting an amount for bail can be seen as discretionary, however, the legislature has dictated that these acts will not be construed as rulings involving discretion within the meaning of the statute.

At any rate, the Court’s decision in this case highlights the fact that AOP’s must be filed by Defense Counsel as soon as possible.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Crime & Safety in America

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According to an article from the Crime Report, U.S. violent crime rates are lower than they have been for four decades, and prisons’ impact as a crime deterrent “is minimal at best.” Apparently, the Vera Institute of Justice gave two new briefing papers which countered the political rhetoric and unfounded assumptions which influence criminal justice policy.

The Prison Paradox

In The Prison Paradox, author Don Stemen summarizes the weak relationship between incarceration and crime reduction, and highlights proven strategies for improving public safety that are more effective and less expensive than incarceration. He writes that, despite its widespread use, research shows that the effect of incarceration as a deterrent to crime is minimal at best, and has been diminishing for several years.

“Indeed, increased rates of incarceration have no demonstrated effect on violent crime and in some instances may increase crime,” writes Stemen. “There are more effective ways to respond to crime—evidenced by the 19 states that recently reduced both their incarceration and crime rates.”

The report suggests that policymakers should adopt “crime reduction strategies that seek to engage the community, provide needed services to those who are criminally involved, and begin to address the underlying causes of crime.”

Measuring Public Safety

In Measuring Public Safety, author Bruce Frederick examines erroneous conclusions about current crime trends—using both existing and original research—and describes how to avoid common pitfalls when interpreting statistics on violent crime.

“With a few hyper-localized exceptions that require targeted attention, violent crime rates are lower today than they have been at any point over the past four decades,” says Frederick. “However, this era of public safety has been misrepresented by some media reports and public commentary concluding that violent crime increases in a few cities equal a sweeping national problem.”

Apparently, over-generalizing data on homicides from a small sample of major U.S. cities has led to premature conclusions being drawn about a nationwide reversal of the general decline in violent crime.

Such reports were “unfounded,” the Frederick says, adding that today’s relatively lower crime rates are “not a cause for complacency because some of our communities are experiencing significant increases in violent crime.”

My opinion? It’s important for criminal defense attorneys to be informed and aware of crime trend data. Oftentimes, our judiciary mistakenly cites unproven or misinterpreted data when they hand down lengthy prison sentences to citizens convicted of crimes. Therefore, it’s important to “fact check” and assist our judiciary in making clear, reasonable decisions whenever possible using studies like those mentioned above.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Public Records & Inmates

Meet one of the jailhouse lawyers at San Quentin Prison | KALW

In Department of Corrections v. McKee, the WA Court of Appeals held that state law prevents jail inmates from making prolific records requests for the purpose of suing the agency and profiting financially.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Jeffrey McKee is an inmate in the custody of the Washington State Department of Corrections (the Department). Since 2006, he submitted at least 336 requests to the Department under the Public Records Act (PRA). The Department filed a lawsuit against McKee and sought a preliminary injunction to stop Mr. McKee from filing further requests. It argued RCW 42.56.565(2)(c)(i) applies when an inmate makes prolific records requests for the purpose of suing the agency and profiting financially.

The trial court disagreed and interpreted the statute as being limited to situations in which inmates seek the private information of agency employees to harass those employees. The trial court therefore generally denied the Department’s request for an injunction.

After the trial court entered its order, the Department filed a motion in the Court of Appeals
for discretionary review.

ISSUE

On appeal the issue was whether Mr. McKee’s requests were made to harass or intimidate the agency or its employees.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Given the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that an inmate’s requests for public records may be prohibited if the request or requests are burdensome and made for financial gain.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the PRA is a “strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.” It requires all state and local agencies to make any public record available for public “inspection and copying” on request, unless the record falls within certain specific exemptions.  The policy behind this law is that “free and open examination of public records is in the public interest.” To promote this policy, the PRA is to
be “liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed.”

However, the Court also acknowledged that in 2009, the legislature enacted RCW 42.56.565 to address abusive requests for public records by inmates. This statute authorizes courts to prohibit the “inspection or copying of any nonexempt public record by persons serving criminal sentences in state, local, or privately operated correctional facilities” if the court finds that one of following four situations applies:  (1) The request was made to harass or intimidate the agency or its employees; (2) Fulfilling the request would likely threaten the security of correctional facilities; (3) Fulfilling the request would likely threaten the safety or security of staff, inmates, family members of staff, family members of other inmates, or any other person; or (4) Fulfilling the request may assist criminal activity.

The statute then gives a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may consider in deciding whether to enjoin an inmate’s past or future records requests under RCW 42.56.565(3). These factors include: (1) other requests by the requestor, (2) the type of records sought, (3) statements offered by the requestor concerning the purpose for the request, (4) whether disclosure of the requested records would likely harm any person or vital government interest, (5) whether the request seeks a significant and burdensome number of documents, (6) the impact of disclosure on correctional facility security and order, the safety or security of correctional facility staff, inmates, or others, and (7) the deterrence of criminal activity.

The Court further reasoned that when an inmate files prolific records requests and sues an agency, the statute ensures the agency will not have to pay penalties in the event it makes a good faith error in responding. However, even if the agency is not required to pay penalties, it is still obligated to respond to future requests.

“This is still burdensome and expensive, even if the agency does not have to pay penalties,” said the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Court reasoned that in order to alleviate these burdens and expenses, the statute allows the agency to stop the inmate from making future requests, just like the Department did here.

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling on behalf of Mr. McKee.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Race-Based Jury Selection

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In City of Seattle v. Erickson, the WA Supreme Court held that the Prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a minority juror was a prima facie showing of racial discrimination requiring a full analysis under Batson v. Kentucky.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In 2013, Matthew Erickson, a black man, was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with Unlawful Use of a Weapon and Resisting Arrest. After voir dire, the City of Seattle (City) exercised a peremptory challenge against tjuror #5, who was the only black juror on the jury panel. After the jury was empaneled and excused from the courthouse with the rest of the venire, Erickson objected to the peremptory challenge, claiming the strike was racially motivated. The court found that there was no prima facie showing of racial discrimination and overruled Erickson’s objection.

Erickson was convicted on both counts.

Erickson appealed the municipal court’s decision to King County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the municipal court, finding that the circumstances surrounding the challenge did not raise any inference that the juror was stricken because of his race. The judge did not address whether Erickson’s motion was timely.

ISSUES

The WA Supreme Court granted review of Erickson’s appeal on the following issues:

1. Did Erickson waive his right to a Batson challenge when he objected after the jury was empaneled and both the jury and venire excused?

2. Did the trial court error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the City struck juror #5?

BATSON V. KENTUCKY: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND ON RACE-BASED PEREMPTORY STRIKES

For those who don’t know, in Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court created a 3-step process for enforcing the constitutional rule against excluding a potential juror based on race. First, the defense must show that the circumstances at trial raise an inference of discrimination. Second, the prosecutor must give a nonracial reason for the strike. Third, the court decides if the prosecutor intentionally discriminated against the juror because of race. The decision was made to stop the unfair practice of race-based peremptory strikes of qualified minority jurors because at that time, prosecutors could easily mask their efforts to exclude racial minorities from jury service.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

First, the Court ruled that Erickson did not waive His Right to a Batson challenge when he objected to the striking of a juror after the jury was empaneled but before testimony was heard. It reasoned that a number of federal courts also allow Batson challenges after the jury has been sworn. Read together, the case law has adopted rules requiring that a Batson challenge be brought at the earliest reasonable time while the trial court still has the ability to remedy the wrong.

“These cases recognize that judges and parties do not have instantaneous reaction time, and so have given both trial courts and litigants some lenience to bring Batson challenges after the jury was been sworn,” said the Court. “This is in line with our own jurisprudence.”

The Court further stated that objections should generally be brought when the trial court has the ability to remedy the error, and allowing some challenges after the swearing in of the jury does not offend that ability.

“Although the timing was not ideal, the Batson challenge was raised when the trial court still had an opportunity to correct it,” said the Court. “So even though Erickson brought his Batson challenge after the jury was empaneled, the trial court still had adequate ability to remedy any error. Therefore, Erickson made a timely Batson challenge.”

Second, the WA Supreme Court Court ruled that the trial court did, in fact, error in finding that Erickson did not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination when the Prosecutor struck juror #5.

Here, and in bold strokes, the Court changed how Batson is applied in Washington so that striking a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group automatically triggers a full Batson analysis by the trial court:

“The evil of racial discrimination is still the evil this rule seeks to eradicate,” the court explained, writing that “this alteration provides parties and courts with a new tool, allowing them an alternate route to defend the protections espoused by Batson. A prima facie case can always be made based on overt racism or a pattern of impermissible strikes. Now, it can also be made when the sole member of a racially cognizable group is removed using a peremptory strike.”

With that, the WA Supreme Court carved the following bright-line rule adopted from State v. Rhone:

“We hold that the trial court must recognize a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose when the sole member of a racially cognizable group has been struck from the jury. The trial court must then require an explanation from the striking party and analyze, based on the explanation and the totality of the circumstances, whether the strike was racially motivated.”

In other words, the peremptory strike of a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group on a jury panel does in fact, constitute a prima facie showing of racial motivation. Also, the trial court must ask for a race-neutral reason from the striking party and then determine, based on the facts and surrounding circumstances, whether the strike was driven by racial reasons.

The WA Supreme Court reverse Erickson’s conviction and remanded his case back to the trial court for a new trial.

My opinion? I’m very pleased. I wrote about unlawful race-based peremptory strikes in my blog on State v. Saintcalle; a WA Supreme Court case having similar dynamics, peremptory strikes and Batson challenges to the case at hand. In that post, I was very disappointed that the WA Supreme Court failed to fix a systemic problem of Prosecutors exercising race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection.

Finally, the WA Supreme Court has become more proactive in stopping this unfair, unconstitutional practice. It’s not enough for Prosecutors to give utterly superficial reasons for striking minority jurors when the real reason for striking them is blatantly staring us in the face. Now, and finally, Prosecutors must prove that their decision to strike is not race-based. This subtle, yet oh-so-important shift in perspective effectively addresses what’s really happening during jury selection and makes a solution toward preventing race-based peremptory strikes. Excellent.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Invalid Search Warrant

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In State v. Youngs, the WA Court of Appeals suppressed evidence of the defendant’s blood test collected after a search warrant because the search warrant application did not contain sufficient facts to establish that the suspect was driving the car.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In the early morning hours of May 15, 2013, a Washington State Patrol Trooper arrested Youngs after driving a car involved in a rollover collision. The judge issued the warrant based on the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant for Evidence of a Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUI).

This affidavit is a largely preprinted form to which the law enforcement officer may add information.

Following the blood draw, the State charged Youngs with DUI. Youngs moved to suppress evidence obtained under authority of the warrant. The district court denied the motion. Youngs then agreed to a stipulated bench trial based on the police report and blood alcohol report. The district court found Youngs guilty and sentenced him.

Youngs sought review in the superior court. The Court affirmed based on the content in the state trooper’s affidavit. Eventually, the WA Court of Appeals granted Youngs’s appeal.

ISSUE

The question was whether the trooper’s search warrant affidavit had sufficient facts for a judge to make an independent decision whether there was probable cause that the defendant was driving.

COURT’S DECISION & ANALYSIS

The Court decided that although the factual information concerning intoxication is sufficient and unchallenged in this case, the factual information to establish driving is insufficient.

The Court reasoned that a judge may only issue a search warrant upon probable cause. The warrant must be supported by an affidavit identifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The affidavit must contain sufficient facts to convince an ordinary person that the defendant is probably engaged in criminal activity.

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that judges must evaluate the relevant affidavit “‘in a commonsense manner, rather than hypertechnically, and any doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant. Thus, a “negligent or innocent mistake” in drafting the affidavit will not void it. Also, judges may draw reasonable inferences from the stated facts.

However, the Court also reasoned that inferences alone, without an otherwise substantial basis of facts, are insufficient. The affidavit may provide summary statements so long as it also expresses the facts and circumstances underlying that summary.

Here, the Court found technical problems with the affidavit. For example, one problem is that the preprinted language in the form—”ceased driving/was found in physical control of a motor vehicle” — suggests that it is intended to apply to two different crimes. One crime is “Driving While Under the Influence under RCW 46.61.502, while the other is “Physical Control of Vehicle While Under the Influence under RCW 46.61.504, which is a totally separate and different crime with different elements for the State to prove:

The Court said that unlike the act of driving, which may be readily observed, “physical control” is a conclusion drawn from other facts. For example, a police officer may reach this conclusion based on the defendant’s proximity to the vehicle, possession of keys to it, or similar observable circumstances.  Because the magistrate must independently determine whether probable cause exists, he or she cannot simply accept such a conclusion without supporting allegations. Therefore, ruled the Court, the statements in the search warrant affidavit are conclusory, general, and insufficient to support probable cause that Youngs was driving the vehicle.

With that, the Court reversed Youngs’ conviction and remanded the case back to the district court with directions to suppress the evidence obtained by the warrant.

My opinion? Excellent decision. Sure, it’s sometimes safe to assume that the sole driver of a car involved in a collision is, in fact, the driver. However, it muddies the waters even further when law enforcement officers issuing search warrants fail to clarify whether the crime of straight DUI or Physical Control DUI took place.

These crimes are very different. One crimes involves officers seeing the defendant drive (straight DUI) while the other crime does not (Physical Control DUI). Combined with the fact that there was missing information regarding the defendant’s driving at all, this combination of errors makes for an ineffective search warrant.

Again, good decision.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

Border Patrol Backs Trump

Brandon Judd, the president of the National Border Patrol Council, told "Fox and Friends" on July 17, 2017, that morale is the highest he's seen throughout his 20 years within the agency. (Fox News Channel screenshot)

According to a news article by reporter Douglass Ernst of the Washington Times, President Trump received a glowing performance review Monday from the head of the National Border Patrol Council.

Brandon Judd, who is the President of the National Border Patrol Council, appeared on “Fox and Friends” on Monday to discuss illegal immigration, Mr. Trump’s plan to build a border wall with Mexico, and morale within the agency. The union president said that agents have a new “energy” to them due to a concrete commitment to enforcing existing federal laws.

“There’s a vibe, there’s an energy in the Border Patrol that’s never been there before,” Mr. Judd told host Steve Doocy. “In the 20 years I’ve been in the patrol, we haven’t seen this type of energy, and we’re excited because we signed up to do a job and this president is allowing us to do that job.”

Mr. Judd said that having a giant contiguous wall along the southern border was not as important as having barricades at “strategic locations” such as El Paso and San Diego.

“The president has done a great job of actually enforcing the law — something we didn’t see in the last eight years,” Mr. Judd said, Fox News Channel reported. “And if we continue to do that, then a clear message will be sent throughout the world that if you cross our borders illegally, you will be detained and you will be sent back.

“If you look at the rhetoric that the president sent out, we’ve had a drop that we’ve never seen before with any president,” he continued. “If you’re in the left, right or middle, you have to say this president has done exactly what he promised to do and we do have border security like what we expect to see.”

My opinion? Let’s observe how these ongoing immigration issues develop. Last month,  the U.S. Supreme Court Supreme Court had a ruling which allowed parts of President Donald Trump’s travel ban to go into effect and will hear oral arguments on the case this fall. In its decision, the court is allowing the ban to go into effect for foreign nationals who lack any “bona fide relationship with any person or entity in the United States.”

The court, in an unsigned opinion, left the travel ban against citizens of six majority-Muslim on hold as applied to non-citizens with relationships with persons or entities in the United States, which includes most of the plaintiffs in both cases.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Many charges – including sex offenses, and felony assaults – are potentially deportable offenses for non-citizens. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.

DV Protection Orders

How Do I Get a Restraining Order Removed? - The Edmunds Law Firm

In Rodriquez v. Zavala, the WA Supreme Court held that a person does not have to be a victim of domestic violence (DV) in order to be included in a DV protection order.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Esmeralda Rodriguez and Luis Zavala shared a history of domestic violence. Over the course of their relationship, Zavala repeatedly physically and emotionally assaulted Rodriguez. He shoved Rodriguez to the ground while she was pregnant with their infant child L.Z., attempted to smother her with a pillow, blamed her for his failings in life, pulled a knife on her and promised to cut her into tiny pieces, threatened to kidnap L.Z., and said he would do something so horrible to Rodriguez’s daughters from a prior relationship that she would want to kill herself. He threatened to kill her, her children, and himself. Zavala tried to control Rodriguez. He restricted her communication with friends and family members, and he appeared uninvited wherever she was when she failed to return his phone calls.

Zavala’s history of violence against Rodriguez reached its peak one day in June 2015 after the couple had separated. At 2:00 a.m. that morning and in violation of a previous restraining order, Zavala pounded on Rodriguez’s door, threatening to break windows unless she let him in. Rodriguez went to the door and opened it enough to tell Zavala to leave. Zavala pushed past Rodriguez, cornered her, and began choking her. He told Rodriguez he was going to “end what he started.” The police arrived and arrested Zavala.

A few days later, Rodriguez went to the court and petitioned for a domestic violence protection order for herself and her children, including L.Z. In her petition, Rodriguez described the assault and Zavala’s history of violence. The court issued a temporary order pending a full hearing. The temporary order restrained Zavala from contacting Rodriguez and all four children.

At the later protection order hearing, Zavala appeared. Rodriguez discussed the choking incident and told the court that L.Z. had been asleep in another room during the most recent attack. She feared Zavala would take their son based on previous threats. Zavala admitted to coming to the house because he wanted to see L.Z., but denied Rodriguez’s allegations of abuse.

The trial court issued a protective order for Rodriguez and her daughters, but excluded L.Z., explaining that the boy was not “present” during the assault or threatened at all. According to the trial judge, “L.Z. wasn’t involved in any of this.” The order was effective for one year, expiring on June 26, 2016.

Rodriguez appealed. Among other things, she argued that her son should have been included in the final protection order based on her fear that Zavala would hurt L.Z. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that a petitioner may seek relief based only on her fear of imminent harm to herself. The WA Supreme Court granted review.

ISSUE

Whether the definition of “domestic violence” in chapter 26.50 RCW contemplates a parent’s fear of harm for a child at the hands of another parent.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The Court reasoned that in order to commence a domestic violence protection order action, a person must file a petition “alleging that the person has been the victim of domestic violence committed by the respondent. Under the statute, “Domestic violence” is defined as the following:

“(a) physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.”

The Court further explained that The Court of Appeals interpretation of the statute was unnecessarily narrow. “By relating the fear of harm back to the petitioner, it ignores the final prepositional phrase ‘between family or household members.'” Consequently, because domestic violence includes the infliction of fear of harm between family members generally, the definition includes a mother’s fear of harm to her child by that child’s father.

Also, the context of the statute, related provisions, and statutory scheme as a whole also indicate that “domestic violence” was intended to cover more than merely a petitioner and a perpetrator:

“This definition reflects the legislative recognition that violence in the home encompasses many different familial and household roles; violence does not distinguish on the basis of relationship.”

Moreover, the Court reasoned that a person does not have to be a victim of domestic violence to be included in a protection order. RCW 26.50.060 gives trial courts substantial discretion to protect victims and their loved ones. The provision explains that a trial court may bar a respondent from going to the “day care or school of a child” or having “any contact with the victim of domestic violence or the victim’s children or members of the victim’s household” and that, notably, the court may order “other relief as it deems necessary for the protection of the petitioner and other family or household members sought to be protected.”

Additionally, the Court said that the legislative intent of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) further supports that “domestic violence” includes a petitioner’s fear of harm between family members.

Finally, the Court explained that the plain language of RCW 26.50.010(3), related DV statutes, and the statutory scheme show that the definition of “domestic violence” allows a petitioner to seek relief based on a general fear of harm between family members. It said that deciding that “domestic violence” means the fear possessed only by the one seeking protection not only conflicts with the statute’s plain language, it would leave children unprotected:

“Even more acutely, such an interpretation would fail to protect infants and developmentally delayed children. These are the most vulnerable of our vulnerable populations. Excluding these children from protection orders because they fail to or cannot show fear of a harm they may not understand subjects them to violence the legislature expressly intended to prevent.”

Accordingly, the WA Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals because Zavala’s violent threats against L.Z. were “domestic violence” under the plain language of the statute, and Rodriguez properly petitioned for a protection order on L.Z.’s behalf based on her reasonable fear for him.

Please read my Legal Guide titled Defending Against Domestic Violence Charges and contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a DV crime. Hiring an effective and competent defense attorney is the first and best step toward justice.